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ABSTRACT 
 
A substantial amount of prior research has focused on the conflicting demands put on 
managers in multinational corporations (MNCs) as a result of simultaneous pressures 
for local responsiveness and global integration. However, despite this research we do 
not really understand how managers in subsidiaries balance pressures for integration and 
responsiveness. To address this issue, the research focused on how subsidiary managers 
interpret and respond to cross-border integration efforts originating from the corporate 
headquarters when also confronted with substantial pressures for local responsiveness. 
In relation to extant research, which tends to focus on integration from a macro 
perspective, this research makes a contribution to knowledge about integration from a 
micro-strategy and micro-politics perspective by going inside the multinational 
subsidiary. 
 
The empirical material consists of five case studies of mobile operators in China (1),  
Denmark (2), Romania (1) and Sweden (1). The research uses a constructivist grounded 
theory approach to understand the causes of local-global tensions at the subsidiary level 
and how managers respond to integration efforts. Identified causes of tension were 
perceptions of misfit, lack of procedural justice, weak execution, loss of personal 
control and cultural misunderstanding. Following from this, the research uncovered 
factors that led to subsidiary managers following either a rules-based logic of 
complying with headquarters, or shifting to a task-based logic of practical action to 
negotiate/challenge, manipulate or ignore headquarters‟ integration efforts.  
 
The core thesis in this research is that subsidiary managers‟ perceptions and responses 
are central to the outcome of corporate integration efforts. Given this, managers at 
headquarters have critical roles to play as sensegivers and change deployers in order to 
influence the sensemaking and actions of subsidiary managers. 
 
 
KEY WORDS 
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strategic behaviour; subsidiary initiative; micro strategy; micro politics; strategy as 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter begins by presenting the purpose of the research and continues with a 
personal statement about the motivation for conducting the research. Following from 
this, the research context is presented together with the characteristics of the mobile 
communications industry and some archival evidence of cross-border integration from 
annual reports of mobile operators. The chapter concludes with a structural overview of 
the dissertation. 
 
1.1 Purpose of the research 
 
This dissertation seeks to make a contribution to knowledge about cross-border 
integration in multinational corporations (MNCs) from the perspective of subsidiary 
managers. To achieve this objective, the dissertation explores how subsidiary managers 
in five subsidiaries in China (1), Denmark (2), Romania (1) and Sweden (1) interpret 
and respond to cross-border integration. The research builds on recent interest in 
exploring strategy phenomena from a „micro‟ or „strategy as practice‟ perspective (Chia, 
2004; Jarzabkowski, 2003; Jarzabkowski, 2004; Jarzabkowski, 2005; Johnson, Melin, & 
Whittington, 2003; Whittington, 1996; Whittington, 2004) and the micro-political 
perspective on multinational corporations (Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2006; 
Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2006; Geppert, 2003; Mense-Petermann, 2006; Sharpe, 
2006). Integration in MNCs has typically been researched using a macro perspective 
focused on organisational constructs such as „headquarters‟, „subsidiaries‟ and the 
„environment‟. This research instead takes a micro perspective and shifts the focus 
towards subsidiary managers and their sensemaking and responses. The findings of this 
research programme are relevant both to an academic audience, interested in MNC 
strategy and management, and to practitioners seeking to improve the success of 
integration efforts. 
 
Subsidiaries of multinational companies vary to the extent that they are subject to 
requirements for local responsiveness and global integration (Bartlett, 1986; Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1989; Doz, 1980; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). Local responsiveness is defined as 
decisions taken autonomously by a subsidiary to respond primarily to local customer 
needs or competitive demands, whereas global integration is achieved through either 
integration of activities across national borders or through strategic coordination. The 
objectives of integration include efficiency (economies of scale) and the transfer of 
knowledge or practices throughout the MNC (Prahalad & Doz, 1987). The requirements 
for local responsiveness and global integration are the result of a complex interplay of 
factors including customer preferences, competitors‟ strategies, regulatory and host 
government demands, industry characteristics and the decisions of managers at both 
headquarters and in subsidiaries. Subsidiary managers thus face what Kostova and Roth 
(2002) have referred to as „institutional duality‟ meaning that „there is a within-
organization domain that defines a set of pressures to which all units in the organization 
must conform. At the same time, the foreign subsidiary resides in a host country with its 
own institutional patterns specific to that domain. As a result, each foreign subsidiary is 
confronted with two distinct sets of isomorphic pressures (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
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DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and a need to maintain legitimacy within both the host 
country and the MNC‟ (2002:216). 
 
This research is focused on cross-border integration efforts in the multinational 
company in the context of substantial simultaneous pressures for local responsiveness 
and global integration. This circumstance has been characterised as multifocal (Prahalad 
& Doz, 1987) or transnational (Bartlett, 1986; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989) and requires 
organizational ambidexterity in order to respond to disparate and often conflicting 
demands at the same time (Birkinshaw & Gibson, 2004; Duncan, 1976; Gibson & 
Birkinshaw, 2004; O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996). The need to 
simultaneously manage competing demands for local responsiveness and global 
integration may generate tension at the subsidiary management level. Such tension may 
be at its highest during periods of strategic change as the roles and responsibilities of 
managers at headquarters and subsidiaries are likely to change significantly during that 
period (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989).  
 
Integration is ultimately concerned with how corporate management creates value over 
and beyond the sum of the parts of the separate businesses within a company 
(Burgelman & Doz, 1996). Based on this, integration is by definition a macro level 
phenomenon as the objective is to connect organisational units such as headquarters and 
subsidiaries. Consistent with this, prior research has tended to focus on integration in 
the MNC from a headquarters or network perspective and, as a result, we have only a 
limited understanding of what happens inside the „black box‟ of the multinational 
subsidiary. As noted by Birkinshaw, Hood and Jonsson (1998): „[t]aken as a whole, the 
body of literature on subsidiary management had done a far better job at understanding 
aspects of subsidiary context (how the subsidiary relates to its parent, its corporate 
network, its local environment) than of understanding what actually happens inside the 
subsidiary‟ (1998: 223). As a result of this, we know little about subsidiary business 
unit strategic management beyond a macro classification of different subsidiary roles 
(e.g. Birkinshaw, 1996; Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995; Jarillo & Martinez, 1990; 
Martinez & Jarillo, 1991; Taggart, 1998b; Taggart, 1998a; White & Poynter, 1984). We 
do not really understand how managers in subsidiaries manage competing demands for 
local responsiveness and global integration. In other words there is a need for research 
to understand integration from the perspective of subsidiary managers. While we know 
that subsidiary managers are not just passive agents of headquarters but capable of 
autonomous strategic behaviour (Burgelman, 1983b) and instigating subsidiary 
initiatives (Birkinshaw et al., 1998; Birkinshaw & Fry, 1998), we have an incomplete 
understanding of how subsidiary managers cope with simultaneous pressures for 
integration and responsiveness. In line with those who contend that execution is a 
neglected area in management studies (Bossidy, Charan, & Burck, 2002; Covey, 2004), 
the aim of this research was to develop a better understanding of how subsidiary 
managers interpret and respond to integration efforts, as these responses are likely to 
impact integration success. This research thus tries to shift the focus towards the 
subsidiary management perspective by taking a micro perspective.  
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1.2 Personal statement 
 
This research differs from much of mainstream management research in that I have 
approached the research topic both as a researcher and as a management practitioner. I 
believe it is important to present this fact up front so that the reader is in an informed 
position to interpret and judge my findings. I make the assumption that reality is 
socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) which implies that I regard context, 
perspective and personal experience as having significant impact on how people make 
sense of social reality. This is especially important to mention regarding the two Orange 
case studies as I was employed by the headquarters of Orange at the point in time of 
collecting the data. This means that I was an involved social actor rather than an 
„objective‟ detached scientist while conducting the first two case studies. I thus had a 
real stake in the subsidiaries I was researching and cross-border integration efforts had a 
direct impact on my daily work. My managerial career has involved working in 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations in Australia, Denmark, Japan, Oman, 
Romania and the United Kingdom. I have also held management positions at 
headquarters in Luxembourg and in the United Kingdom. From this, I have had first-
hand experience of integration from both the headquarters perspective and from the 
operational perspective of subsidiaries. In addition, I have worked in a range of different 
functions including finance, marketing, product development and strategy. I thus have 
experience of cross-border integration from a variety of different national contexts, 
industries, organisations and functional areas. My research interest was initially born 
out of personal experience of integration challenges in multinational corporations. The 
gap in knowledge was subsequently established following a review of the academic 
literature. This research was an opportunity to critically reflect on my own experience 
and the experience of fellow managers in the researched subsidiaries. This was a 
welcomed opportunity as the day-to-day realities of managerial positions leave little 
time for in-depth reflection. Given my high level of personal involvement with the 
research, I have not hesitated to use the „first person‟ and to write in a personal and 
reflexive style when appropriate. While my research journey has helped me to „make 
sense‟ of my past managerial experience, I hope that my efforts will allow me to be a 
sensegiver (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) to both academics and practitioners interested in 
cross-border integration. 
 
1.3 Introduction to the research context 
 
The fieldwork in this dissertation is focused on the mobile communications industry. As 
will be outlined below, the mobile industry provides a suitable context against which to 
research cross-border integration. The telecommunications industry has also previously 
been characterised as „transnational‟ given the simultaneous requirements for global 
integration and local responsiveness (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). However, Bartlett and 
Ghoshal‟s original classification of the telecommunications industry concerned the 
telecommunications switching equipment manufacturers, Ericsson, NEC and ITT, rather 
than mobile operators which are the focus of this research programme. 
 
In the next section, the characteristics of the European mobile communications industry 
are presented. This is followed by evidence of cross-border integration efforts based on 
an archival review of the 2004 annual reports of mobile operators. 
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1.3.1 Mobile industry characteristics 
 
There are a number of multinational companies in the mobile communications industry 
including Deutsche Telecom, France Telecom, Hutchison, Telefónica, TIM and 
Vodafone. Wireless Intelligence (2006) estimates that the total number of mobile users 
in the world passed 2.5 billion during the third quarter of 2006. With a global 
population of 6.5 billion people (CIA, 2006), almost 40% of the world‟s population use 
mobile phones, making it a global industry of substantial size. The industry is further 
characterised by significant pressures for both local market responsiveness and global 
integration. 
 
A number of drivers for local market responsiveness can be identified. First, the 
industry is a service industry which typically tends to lead to heightened needs for 
localisation of the customer experience (Sarathy, 1994). Second, mobile 
communications is a regulated industry where operators have to apply for licences from 
governments and need to comply with local license conditions, which vary from country 
to country. Third, competition has historically been between domestic or multidomestic 
players which has resulted in substantial local variations in value propositions including 
rate plans and terminal subsidies. 
 
There are also a number of drivers for global integration. First, the industry is 
characterised by high fixed costs, given the requirements to build network and systems 
infrastructure in each country. The capital intensity of the industry means that the 
minimum efficient scale for profitable operations is large. Second, global telecoms 
standards exist to ensure technology interoperability. Given this standardisation, there is 
substantial scope for synergies in terms of design of networks and systems, 
development of products and services, and in procurement, as global or regional 
standards exists. Third, mobile communications are now indispensable for both business 
and private usage and customers expect services to work seamlessly when travelling 
abroad. Ensuring that all voice and data services work well abroad is increasingly 
becoming a priority for the industry and becomes easier with the cross-border 
integration of operations. This also allows operators to capture premium charged 
roaming traffic.  
 
Several factors contribute towards making integration a pressing priority for European 
operators. To better understand these factors, I conducted an industry analysis according 
to Porter‟s (1980; 1985) five forces model based on my interpretation of industry 
evolution. I selected the years 1995 and 2005, given that cross-border integration is a 
recent phenomenon in mobile communications and many European mobile networks 
were initially launched in the 1990s as multidomestic operations. The analysis below, 
summarised in Table 1-1, highlights some of these differences. In addition, it cannot be 
excluded that there might be a certain herd effect as a new integrated industry recipe 
(Spender, 1989) is created for the mobile communications industry.  
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Table 1-1 
Industry analysis 
 
Industry forces 1995 2005 
Threat of new entrants Medium High 
Threat of substitutes Low Medium 
Bargaining power of buyers Low High 
Bargaining power of suppliers High Low 
Rivalry among existing firms Low High 
 
During the time period 1995-2005, there has been a significant increase in the threat of 
new entrants into the mobile industry. In the mid 1990‟s there was a threat of new 
network operators offering second generation GSM services. The threat of new entrants 
has since increased due to auctions for third generation (UMTS) licenses as well as 
deregulation opening up the market for mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) who 
purchase network capacity on a wholesale basis and re-sell services using their own 
brand names. 
 
The threat of substitutes has also increased during the time period. There is some 
evidence of voice substitution from primarily voice over IP (VoIP) services such as 
Skype; in particular for international calls. For data traffic, the dominant wireless 
technology is currently laptop WiFi rather than second- or third-generation mobile 
technologies. 
 
The bargaining power of buyers has also risen. In the mid 1990‟s there was only a 
limited number of mobile network operators to chose from and there were substantial 
switching costs as mobile phone numbers could not be transferred between operators. 
However, following the introduction of mobile number portability (MNP), it has 
become much easier for customers to switch between operators and still retain their 
phone numbers. A number of countries have also introduced stricter regulation limiting 
contractual binding periods. In addition, various prepaid services have been introduced 
that remove the need for contracts altogether. 
 
The bargaining power of suppliers has declined as a result of new vendors. The 
hegemony of early vendors such as Ericsson, Nokia and Motorola has been broken by a 
number of new entrants into the mobile telecoms market. Notably changes have 
occurred as a number of Asian players, including Huawei, LG and Samsung, have 
entered the market. 
 
The rivalry among existing firms has also increased. A key driver behind this is the 
saturation of European mobile markets and thus the reduction in growth rates. This 
means that the days of easy customer acquisition have come to an end as fewer and 
fewer new customers come onto the market. Together with a greater number of mobile 
competitors, the competition for existing customers has intensified. A result of this is 
significant price erosion on basic mobile services.  
 
The changes above have in many cases resulted in a misfit between the new strategic 
imperatives and the existing multidomestic operating models. These strategic 
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imperatives are increasingly pressing mobile network operators to integrate across 
borders. Integration efforts are used both to increase revenues and decrease costs. The 
risk of expensive developments can thus be pooled across several subsidiaries, margins 
can be improved and the minimum efficient scale can be reduced. 
 
Given that it is harder for operators to acquire new customers, there has been a 
corresponding shift towards customer retention and upselling to get additional value out 
of the existing customer base. This has led to a demand for more advanced 
segmentation models and CRM systems. Several operators have taken steps to introduce 
company-wide segmentation models and to use the insight to determine what elements 
of the customer experience to standardise versus adopt across its footprint. Central 
teams have also been created to facilitate transfer of practices between operators. 
Operators have further tried to generate new revenue streams from data services but the 
success to date has been limited with the exception of text services (SMS). To develop 
new revenue streams, operators require costly service platforms such as Vodafone Live. 
Operators can spread development costs, and gain time to market, by creating central 
platform solutions and negotiating framework agreements with global content players 
like CNN and Disney. On the pure cost side, procurement has become a centralised 
shared service in many operators to leverage buying power when sourcing especially 
network equipment, IT systems, handsets and advertising. 
 
The emergence of new integrated operating models marks a significant departure from 
previously domestic or multidomestic operations. In the mid 1990s, it was more 
common with a small headquarters that interfaced with largely autonomous subsidiaries. 
The level of contact between the subsidiaries was correspondingly low.  Ten years later, 
the simple structures have in many mobile operators evolved towards more complex 
arrangements with a variety of central functions as well as increased horizontal contacts 
between subsidiaries. Central functions might include marketing, technology and 
procurement, in addition to previously centralised staff functions such as finance and 
business development (as depicted in Figure 1-1 below). 
 
Figure 1-1 
Structural changes 
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The strategy execution challenges are significant, especially for subsidiaries that have to 
keep operating well in maturing and increasingly competitive markets while their 
operating models in many cases change significantly as a result of increased cross-
border integration.  
 
1.3.2 Review of mobile operator annual reports 
 
At the start of the research programme, the 2004 annual reports (published in 2005) of a 
number of mobile operators were reviewed to identify the extent to which the 
companies present details of ongoing cross-border integration efforts. European 
headquartered operators, and Hutchison, given the European focus of 3, were selected, 
as non-European operators still tend to operate within the boundaries of their home 
markets to a greater extent than European operators. Some basic 2004 data about the 
reviewed operators are presented in Table 1-2. 
 
Table 1-2 
Mobile Operators 
Operator Home market # of countries  2004 customers 
Vodafone
1
 UK 26 431.8 million 
(154.8 million
2
) 
Telefónica Spain 10 74.4 million? 
Deutsche Telekom Germany 6 69.2 million 
France Telecom UK & France 21 (15 Orange) 63.3 million 
TIM Italy 5 53.8 million 
TeliaSonera Sweden & Finland 13 35.9 million 
O2
3
 UK 3 24 million 
Telenor Norway 12 18.9 million 
KPN Netherlands 3 17.3 million 
Hutchison (3 only) UK & Hong Kong 8 8.1 million 
TDC Denmark 5 7.1 million 
1) & 3) fiscal years ending March 31, 2005 
2) proportionate equity customers including 3.27% ownership in China Mobile  
 
The degree to which the annual reports discussed strategic integration varied 
significantly. It is also clear that integration is used in three distinctly different ways. 
First, cross-border integration brings together different national subsidiaries. Second, 
alliance integration is used by independent operators to provide additional benefits to 
roaming customers. Such an alliance called Freemove was announced in March 2004, 
between T-Mobile (Deutsche Telecom), Orange (France Telecom), TIM and Telefónica. 
Third, business unit integration exploits synergies between fixed, mobile and internet 
units. It is thus clear that integration is a multifaceted concept with many different 
meanings. The focus of this research programme is limited to cross-border integration.  
 
Some illustrative quotes from the operators‟ 2004 annual reports are presented below. It 
is evident from these quotes that integration is a fairly recent phenomenon and that 
many operators are currently going through a transition period away from previously 
decentralised, fully autonomous operations towards more integrated operating models. 
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Vodafone 
 
Another key goal is to deliver fully the benefits of our scale and scope. As the Group has 
expanded over the past few years, we have been able to achieve some significant scale 
benefits. For example, as the volumes of network equipment and handsets we have 
purchased from the same suppliers have increased, we have secured better pricing. We 
have also harmonised the brand in many of our markets and started offering common 
products and services. The One Vodafone programme builds on this to further integrate our 
businesses and create sustainable competitive advantage…The programme is focused on 
six major areas of the business, defined as networks, service platforms, IT delivery, 
terminals, customer management and roaming. We aim to lever scale and scope through a 
combination of standardised designs and processes, reducing duplication, centralising 
certain functions and sharing best practice. The effect will be to improve our time to 
market with new offerings, create a consistent customer experience across our networks 
and enable us to achieve a strategic, lowest cost position (Vodafone, 2005:8). 
 
Telenor 
 
Today, the telecommunications industry is exposed to fierce competition. National and 
geographical borders no longer coincide with those of telecommunications. The same 
products and services are developed and offered in a number of different countries. 
Another example is how telecommunications solutions are managed and provided across 
borders. In our international commitments we have been able to draw on our experience 
and expertise, and this has given us a solid basis for extracting synergies relating to 
innovation and new development (Telenor, 2005:4). 
 
TeliaSonera 
 
As part of the Corporate Head Office, we have also established two group-wide units: (1) 
Marketing, Products and Services (MPS) and (2) Networks and Technology (NT). These 
are operational units with significant decision-making authorities and have the group 
responsibility for exploiting scale advantages and synergies. Corporate policies and road 
maps are used to set the framework for decisions in the profit center. Our MPS unit is 
responsible for common products and services, use of brand, pricing policies, common 
marketing and market segment initiatives, global account management, common research 
and development, and common lobbying initiatives. Our NT unit is responsible for network 
strategy and overall architecture, common network systems, IT strategy and overall 
architecture, common IT systems, corporate sourcing, and key vendor contracts 
(TeliaSonera, 2005:5). 
 
France Telecom (Orange) 
 
Within the framework of TopLine growth projects, Orange has developed a mobile data 
services platform in conjunction with other units, including Wanadoo and France Telecom 
R&D. This platform provides Orange customers in every country where the brand operates 
in Europe with identical, flexible and easy to use services. This includes portals and third 
party service kiosks, messaging, agenda, address book, chat, instant messaging, games, 
downloads and more. The project will be completed in March 2005 with the rollout of a 
unified Orange portal for all European countries (France Telecom, 2005:44). 
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Telefónica 
 
Another example of progress in process-related efficiency in 2004 was the Group 
purchasing processes, which totaled over 12.0 billion euros. Purchasing operations by 
subsidiaries in 19 countries are performed on a coordinated basis, under the same 
management model (Telefonica, 2005:28). 
 
 
1.4 Overview of the chapters 
 
This dissertation consists of twelve chapters plus references and appendix. The first 
chapter has provided an overall introduction to the research and an orientation to the 
research context.  
 
The second chapter is a literature overview which presents and integrates extant 
knowledge in relation to cross-border integration. Based on this, the gap in knowledge 
is identified together with the specific research questions for this dissertation. 
 
Chapter three presents the methodology of the dissertation. The chapter opens with a 
discussion regarding the philosophical positioning of the research and continues with 
the research strategy, selection of cases, data collection and data analysis methods. 
 
The first-order findings from the five cases studies of Orange Denmark, Orange 
Romania, 3 Denmark, 3 Sweden and Vodafone China are presented in chapters four to 
eight. These chapters provide the empirical findings from the perspective of the 
respondents in order to stay close to their lay accounts. However, the chapters are 
structured according to the same format in order to facilitate cross-case comparisons.  
 
Chapter nine outlines the second-order analysis based on the first-order findings. The 
result is a grounded model of causes and consequences of local-global tensions in a 
subsidiary context based on the five case studies. 
 
Chapter ten presents the managerial implications of the research for managers at both 
headquarters and in subsidiaries of MNCs. 
 
Chapter eleven contains the contribution of the dissertation, a discussion of its 
limitations and an overview of dissemination of research findings. 
 
Personal reflections of the research journey are included in chapter twelve. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This dissertation concerns how subsidiary managers interpret and respond to cross-
border integration efforts. The theoretical framework draws upon four primary 
literatures: 1) cross-border integration, 2) subsidiary management, 3) sensemaking, and 
4) strategy-as-practice and micro politics. This is illustrated below in Figure 2-1. 
 
Figure 2-1: 
Theoretical framework 
 
Cross-border
integration
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In Whetten‟s (2003) terminology, the dissertation seeks to make a contribution to the 
literatures on MNC cross-border integration and subsidiary management by introducing 
contributions from the sensemaking literature and the literature on strategy-as-practice 
and micro politics. The dissertation thus seeks to engage in a scholarly conversation 
(Huff 1999; 2002) with academics interested in cross-border integration and subsidiary 
management by widening the discourse towards considerations of the perspectives of 
sensemaking and strategy-as-practice and micro politics. In Chapter 11, which outlines 
the contribution of the research, there will be an attempt to reconnect with the literature 
in a discussion regarding how the findings from this dissertation can extend the 
literature on subsidiary management and cross-border integration. 
 
A mapping of the link between the theoretical framework and the research question is 
provided in Table 2-1 below. 
 
Table 2-1 
Theoretical framework and research question 
 
Literatures Link to research question 
Subsidiary management How do subsidiary managers… 
Sensemaking 
Strategic and political micro processes 
…interpret and respond to… 
Cross-border integration …cross-border integration efforts. 
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This chapter opens by an extensive overview of the literature on integration. The point 
of departure is a definition and an un-bundling of the term „integration‟. Following from 
this, integration rationales and drivers are reviewed from an „external‟ environmental 
contingency perspective and an „internal‟ strategic choice perspective. Based on this 
overview, integration challenges are identified across a number of different areas before 
reviewing relevant integration capabilities. The primary focus is on integration in the 
multinational corporation. However, the review also draws on literature regarding 
corporate parenting in multi-business firms, post-merger integration and international 
joint ventures and strategic alliances where such literatures are relevant to the study of 
cross-border integration in MNCs. To distinguish the contributions, the terms 
„headquarters‟ and „subsidiaries‟ are used when reviewing integration literature from the 
international business field and „parent‟ and „strategic business unit‟ (SBU) are used in 
relation to general multi-business literature. This distinction will hopefully provide an 
element of transparency.  
 
The chapter continues by discussing the extant literature on MNC subsidiary 
management. The focus is specifically on the way that subsidiary managers‟ actions and 
agency have been conceptualised in different strands of the literature. 
 
Based on this overview of literatures on integration and subsidiary management, the 
knowledge gap is identified through a conceptual framework that outlines the level of 
analysis at which the different theoretical contributions are positioned. To achieve this, 
contributions both from within and outside the international business literature are 
mapped against the different levels of analysis: to the industry, company, headquarters, 
subsidiary and managerial levels. From this meta-categorisation, I argue that we have a 
lack of knowledge regarding integration at the managerial level of analysis within the 
international business literature concerned with cross-border integration. This framing 
of the knowledge gap leads into a discussion of the specific research questions 
addressed by this dissertation. 
 
At the end of the chapter, the two perspectives of sensemaking, and strategy-as-practice 
and micropolitics are introduced as these literatures contain valuable points of departure 
from which to initiate research concerning integration from the subsidiary management 
perspective. 
 
2.1 Defining and un-bundling integration 
 
Given that this dissertation concerns cross-border integration, and that „integration‟ is 
used in a variety of different meanings in management literature, it would be hazardous 
to proceed before arriving at a definition of the construct.  
 
It is helpful to start by defining the opposite of integration. In an MNC context, this 
dissertation defines the opposite of integration as local autonomy. That is, when 
operations in different parts of the MNC are run on an independent basis and local 
decisions are made without coordination with other units within the MNC. An 
alternative candidate for the opposite of integration would be local responsiveness. 
However, given that several scholars have argued that it is possible to simultaneously 
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have high degrees of integration and responsiveness (Bartlett, 1986; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
1989; Prahalad & Doz, 1987), this dissertation argues that integration and autonomy are 
more appropriate labels for the different ends of the spectrum. 
 
Having defined the opposite of „integration‟, our attention now turns to the definition of 
the term itself. It is important to note that there is no clear and universally accepted 
definition of „integration‟ in the management literature. The two quotes below from the 
post-merger integration literature acknowledge this fact and the statements would be 
just as appropriate in relation to literature on cross-border integration within MNCs.  
 
Integration clearly means different things to different people. Most importantly, it 
means different things in different situations (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991:138). 
 
Surprisingly, very little literature directly defines integration. Although most authors 
acknowledge that integration involves some form of combining the assets and people of 
the buyer and the target, in general, the term is used quite loosely (Schweiger & Goulet, 
2000:63). 
 
It is also important to relate „integration‟ to „coordination‟. Mintzberg (1983b) has 
argued that coordination is one of the most fundamental requirements of management: 
 
Every organized human activity – from the making of pots to the placing of a man on 
the moon – gives rise to two fundamental and opposing requirements: the division of 
labor into various tasks to be performed, and the coordination of these tasks to 
accomplish the activity (1983b:2, italics in original).    
 
In this context, it is worth noting that while integration is sometimes considered as a 
synonym for coordination, other authors maintain a distinct separation between the two 
terms. The first position is taken by authors like Martinez and Jarillo (1989) who state 
that they use the terms „mechanisms of coordination‟ and „mechanisms of integration‟ 
as synonyms for the same underlying phenomenon. This is also evidenced in their 
definition of coordination mechanisms as: „any administrative tool for achieving 
integration among different units within an organization‟ (Martinez & Jarillo, 
1989:490). The second position is maintained by authors like Kobrin (1991) who 
propose a clear distinction between integration and coordination when it comes to 
global strategies: 
 
„Transnational integration, as opposed to the cross-border coordination of activities, 
involves rationalization that may entail standardization of product, centralization of 
technological development, or the vertical or horizontal integration of manufacturing‟ 
(1991:19). 
 
The above indicates that integration can be viewed as a process of change aimed at 
combining, concentrating, centralising or standardising activities. From this perspective, 
integration implies that activities will be done differently and that the integration 
process will have a start and a finish. In contrast, coordination refers to ongoing efforts 
to achieve alignment between different organisational units to ensure that required tasks 
are completed.  
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Given the above distinction between integration and coordination, it is useful to 
consider the difference between a process and an end-state. From a process perspective, 
integration would thus mean a change process that transforms the organisation from 
independence or autonomy towards integration in selected areas. However, coordination 
would simply be about ongoing alignment and would not require any change 
component, and coordination would not necessarily be distinguished by any specific 
start and finish. This can be illustrated using a specific example such as manufacturing. 
Using the above definition, there would be a distinct difference between integration of 
manufacturing and coordination of manufacturing. Integration of manufacturing would 
imply a process of change that results in a different end-state for the manufacturing 
function. It would be meaningful to compare manufacturing ex ante and ex post of 
integration efforts. Integration can thus be viewed as a change process that results in a 
different end-state for affected functions or business areas. This is in sharp contrast to 
coordination, which simply refers to ongoing alignment efforts without any specific 
objective to drive change and alter the end-state of the function being coordinated. From 
this perspective, manufacturing could be coordinated on an ongoing basis to ensure that 
input materials are delivered on time, that products are being produced according to 
required volumes and specifications, and that finished products are delivered to sales 
locations. While there may be significant efforts required to ensure effective 
coordination of manufacturing, the end-state of the manufacturing function would not 
be altered by ongoing coordination efforts. 
 
The desire to achieve integration may further require the creation of coordination 
mechanisms to ensure ongoing alignment. This becomes clear if we consider 
Mintzberg‟s (1983a) six coordination mechanisms: mutual adjustment, direct 
supervision, standardisation of work processes, standardisation of outputs, 
standardisation of skills and standardisation of norms. This illustrates that stronger 
coordination in the form of different types of standardisation may be required to align 
„integrated‟ organisational units given the higher degree of interdependence compared 
with independent, autonomous operations. 
 
Integration is clearly not limited to the domains of multinational or multi-business 
corporations. Thus, when it comes to integration within an organisation, such efforts can 
involve: 1) organisational units belonging to the same strategic business unit in a single 
country, 2) organisational units belonging to different strategic business units within the 
same country, 3) between organisational units at headquarters (parent) and in 
subsidiaries (SBUs) located in different countries, as well as 4) directly between 
subsidiaries (SBUs). The last two cases are labelled cross-border integration in order to 
provide clarity in this dissertation.  
 
Integration can also be used to refer to the value creating activities of the corporate 
headquarters. In this context, Burgelman and Doz (1996) have argued that „strategic 
integration‟ ultimately is concerned with how corporate management creates value over 
and beyond the sum of the parts of the separate businesses within a company. With this 
definition, strategic integration thus provides the rationale for the existence of 
headquarters and for grouping a set of businesses under one owner.  There are clear 
parallels here with Goold, Campbell and Alexander‟s (1994) discussion of corporate 
 25 
parenting and the conditions under which the corporate parent creates value in the 
multi-business firm. 
 
Integration takes on yet a wider meaning if we also consider integration of units within 
the organisation with other units outside of the organisation. This would be the case for 
a diverse range of cooperation efforts including joint ventures, strategic alliances, 
participation in industry organisations and standard-setting forums, providing 
specifications to vendors and aligning sales and marketing activities with distribution 
partners. A specific transition case would be post-merger integration that would 
combine units inside the organisation with unit(s) previously located on the outside. In 
addition to this, integration is sometimes also used in the context of systems integration, 
meaning the integration of different technical systems. 
 
Based on the above review, integration researched in this dissertation is limited to 
„cross-border integration‟ between organisational units within the same multinational 
corporation (e.g. headquarters and subsidiaries) located in different countries. Given 
this, we turn our attention to various forms of integration of particular relevance for 
MNCs. 
 
2.1.1 Value chain configuration and coordination 
 
In the MNC strategy literature, „integration‟ is sometimes referred to as a singular 
construct, often contrasted with „responsiveness‟ as in the integration-responsiveness 
(IR) grid (Bartlett, 1986; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1987a; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1987b; Bartlett 
& Ghoshal, 1988; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). However, 
Prahalad and Doz (1987) argue that „integration‟ is in fact composed of two building 
blocks. The first element, „global integration of activities‟, refers to centralised 
management of dispersed activities on an ongoing basis to reduce costs and optimise 
investments. The second element, „global strategic coordination‟, instead refers to 
coordination of resource commitments and strategic decisions across organisational 
units in different countries. In contrast to global integration of activities, strategic 
coordination can be selective and non-routine. But as they assume a high degree of 
interdependence between „global integration of activities‟ and „global strategic 
coordination‟, Prahalad and Doz decided to collapse the two dimensions in the IR 
matrix and only refer to integration as a single dimension. 
 
Porter‟s value chain (1985) can also be used to analyse the integration of activities 
between organisational units in a MNC. Porter (1986; 1998) has distinguished between 
configuration and coordination of value chain activities. Configuration refers to spatial 
decisions regarding the location of sites and the number of sites within the 
multinational. This is also referred to as the concentration-dispersion perspective (Lim, 
Acito, & Rusetski, 2006). In the post-merger integration literature, the term 
consolidation has instead been used regarding such decisions (Schweiger, 2002). 
Coordination refers to the nature and extent dispersed activities are coordinated versus 
remaining autonomous (Porter, 1998:7). This has also been called the integration-
independence perspective (Lim et al., 2006) or just „coordination‟, in the post-merger 
integration literature (Schweiger, 2002). 
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The elements of value chain integration are primarily internally oriented with a focus on 
how the company can configure and coordinate its business activities including 
sourcing, production, marketing, distribution, service and support activities across 
borders. 
 
2.1.2 Marketing standardisation 
 
The focus of the international marketing literature is instead clearly oriented towards the 
degree to which the customer experience is standardised or adapted across subsidiaries 
operating in different countries. While the strategy literature tends to be internally 
focused on the „business activity‟ as the unit of analysis, the international marketing 
literature is instead externally oriented and concerned with elements of the „marketing 
mix‟. The literature defines marketing standardisation as the degree to which a 
multinational company has standardised elements of the marketing mix (e.g. brand, 
products, price, promotions, advertising, distribution) across subsidiaries in different 
countries (Jain, 1989; Sorenson & Wiechmann, 1975; Yip, 1997). The degree of 
marketing mix standardisation will thus have a significant impact on the similarity of 
customer experience offered in different countries. 
 
In light of the discussion of the terminology introduced by Prahalad and Doz (1987) 
above, it is worth noting that while standardisation requires some form of strategic 
coordination across borders, there is no requirement for physical integration. 
 
In the post-merger integration literature, Schweiger (2002) has argued that all forms of 
functions and activities can be standardised, not just marketing activities. Thus, the 
primary focus in Schweiger‟s work is on consolidation, standardisation and 
coordination of functions and activities rather than a specific focus on the customer 
experience. 
 
The above thus relates to standardisation of work processes and outputs in the language 
of Mintzberg‟s (1983a) coordination mechanisms. 
 
2.1.3 Defining integration 
 
Following from the above discussion, this dissertation is limited to cross-border 
integration which is defined as: „efforts to standardise the marketing mix, and physical 
integration or strategic coordination of value chain activities across organisational 
units, located in different countries, within the same multinational corporation’. It is 
further acknowledged that integration can be viewed both as an outcome and as a 
process. 
 
This definition is based on the review of how „integration‟ is used in strategic 
management, international marketing and post-merger integration literature as outlined 
above. Multinational „value chain configuration and coordination‟, a concern addressed 
in the strategy literature, appears to be at least partially treated in isolation from 
„marketing standardisation‟ in the international marketing literature. This is unfortunate 
as these dimensions of international strategy clearly complement each other. The 
definition above seeks to bridge this gap and un-bundle integration into an external 
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dimension, focused on standardising elements of the customer experience across 
borders, and an internal dimension, focused on coordination of business activities. This 
distinction is also helpful in shedding light on the classic debate regarding whether 
„structure follows strategy‟ or „strategy follows structure‟ (Burgelman, 1983b; 
Chandler, 1962). Decisions to standardise marketing mix elements can result in 
structural adjustments as the value chain is integrated as a result of marketing mix 
standardisation. This would thus be a classic case of „structure follows strategy‟. At the 
same time, decisions regarding „back-end‟ or „upstream‟ integration may necessitate a 
standardisation of marketing mix elements that may or may not have been contemplated 
initially. This would then be a case of „strategy follows structure‟. There is thus a clear 
interrelationship between decisions to standardise marketing mix elements, and 
decisions to integrate value chain activities that appears not to have been explored 
sufficiently in literature. 
 
An organising framework of different forms of integration can be created by 
distinguishing between the integration type and the integration scope. Integration type 
refers to whether integration efforts consists of ‘one-off’ strategic change, as a result of 
a changed strategy-structure configuration, post-merger integration or other forms of 
restructuring, or ongoing strategic coordination of business activities within an existing 
strategy-structure configuration. Integration scope refers to whether integration efforts 
are directed towards standardising the external customer experience or towards aligning 
internal value chain activities.  
 
Figure 2-2 
Different forms of integration 
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In the top-right box, we have changes that affect the customer experience. This could 
include standardising customer experience elements such as products, advertising, 
customer service, retail shop design and pricing structures. 
 
The bottom-left box includes ongoing efforts to coordinate value chain activities. This 
might include the monthly consolidation of sales forecasts from multiple subsidiaries to 
purchase input materials under group framework agreements or to produce production 
targets for manufacturing units within the MNC. 
 
Finally, the bottom-right corner consists of ongoing efforts to coordinate the customer 
experience. This could include agreeing on joint advertising campaigns, coordinating 
prices across countries to avoid „gray‟ trade with the MNC‟s products and group-wide 
sponsorships of specific sport events (e.g. World Cup, Olympics) or movie releases (e.g. 
James Bond, Lord of the Rings). 
 
All forms of integration above are seen as distinctly different from local autonomy. A 
completely autonomous subsidiary or business unit would have freedom to decide both 
marketing mix as well as value chain activities. It follows from this that the different 
forms of integration act to restrict the local autonomy of subsidiary managers. 
Integration thus affects the level of managerial discretion of subsidiary managers, 
defined as „latitude of managerial action‟ (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987: 370). Un-
bundling integration into external marketing mix elements and internal value chain 
activities is useful in order to determine which business areas are affected by integration 
and to understand the domains over which subsidiary managers have managerial 
discretion.  Un-bundling integration into either strategic change or ongoing alignment 
provides insights into the nature and magnitude of possible changes to the business as a 
result of integration efforts. 
 
2.2 Integration rationale 
 
Having defined cross-border integration for the purposes of this research, we can now 
turn our attention to the rationale behind cross-border integration decisions. There 
appear to be two main perspectives regarding integration rationale, which are here 
labelled the „environmental contingency perspective‟ and the „strategic choice 
perspective‟. These distinctions, while theoretical, are useful as they highlight whether 
the literature views integration as driven by primarily „external‟ environmental/industry 
forces or „internal‟ strategic choices based on firm-specific capabilities. The integration 
literature is thus characterised by the same debate as in mainstream strategic 
management literature between environmental determinism versus strategic choice 
(Astley & Van de Ven, 1983; Child, 1972; Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Hrebiniak & 
Joyce, 1985). This is also reflective of the debate between, on the one hand, 
„positioning‟ oriented perspectives (e.g. Porter, 1980; Porter, 1985) and, on the other, 
the resource-based view (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984) and dynamic 
capabilities perspectives (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). 
While advocates of these two perspectives (outside in versus inside out) appear to put 
forward quite different arguments, it is worth noting that these views nevertheless 
reflect two sides of the same coin. Resources can only be valuable if they align in some 
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way to the imperatives of the market. In viewing integration through a particular 
theoretical lens, one will inevitably emphasise some aspects of the phenomenon under 
study at the expense of others. While offering powerful insights, a particular way of 
seeing can thus become a way of not seeing (Morgan, 1997). We thus need to be 
informed by both perspectives in order to gain a holistic understanding of integration. 
 
 
2.2.1 Environmental contingency perspective 
 
The fundamental argument advocated by scholars writing from the environmental 
contingency perspective (e.g. Hout, Porter, & Rudden, 1982; Bartlett, 1986; Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1989; Prahalad & Doz, 1987) is that industries differ in their globalisation 
potential. The role of the strategist is to understand the characteristics of the industry, 
and how it is evolving, and then to select an appropriate strategy that matches the 
industry requirements. From this perspective, there are largely generic industry types 
and corresponding generic strategy recipes that lead to superior performance. The core 
of the argument is thus a form of contingency theory (Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967) based on realising congruence, or co-alignment, 
between the environment the firm is operating in and the strategy and structure 
configuration of the firm. In what follows, the history and pedigree of a number of 
typologies of strategies for multinational corporations are reviewed, paying particular 
attention to the emergence of the complex configuration labelled transnational (Bartlett, 
1986; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1987b; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1987a; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1988; 
Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989), multifocal (Prahalad & Doz, 1987) or heterarchical 
(Hedlund, 1986). 
 
This section takes its starting point in the literatures on international marketing and 
multinational strategy to identify the evolution of typologies of multinational 
corporations. In this context, it is interesting to note that the marketing literature is using 
the term „international‟ marketing while the strategy literature is more often referring to 
„global‟ strategy as the overall label for the genre. This is problematic as these terms are 
used both in a general „cross-border‟ sense and also to distinguish specific 
environmental contexts or generic strategies in some typologies, as we will see below.  
 
MNC typologies 
 
An intense debate between scholars, largely within the international marketing area, has 
argued the extent to which markets are becoming increasingly homogeneous. From a 
contingency perspective, this is an important debate as congruence between the 
environment and the strategy/structure configuration of the MNC is considered essential 
to organisational performance. 
 
In a seminal contribution, Levitt (1983) argued for the globalisation of markets based on 
technological drivers. Levitt‟s prescribed strategy is based on standardised products that 
will both take advantage of, and further reinforce increasingly homogeneous customer 
preferences on a global scale. Douglas and Wind (1987) agree that changes in the global 
business environment necessitate a global perspective on strategy but conclude that 
Levitt‟s thesis of global standardisation is both naïve and over simplistic and may result 
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in major strategic blunders for multinationals who follow Levitt‟s prescriptions. In 
contrast to Levitt‟s (1983) prescription of „standardisation‟ as the one best way, Douglas 
& Wind (1987) advocate a contingency approach based on mixed strategies with some 
standardised and some differentiated components. Thus, rather than going exclusively 
for standardisation or adaptation, certain elements of the marketing mix are instead 
standardised across regions or clusters of markets, or customer segments.  Ohmae 
(1989) advocates a similar contingency solution when he concludes that the quest for 
universal products in general is a false allure but that Levitt‟s prescribed global 
standardisation makes sense for certain segments and certain product categories. 
 
The strategy typologies presented below, with the exception of Perlmutter (1969), reject 
the simplicity of Levitt‟s thesis in favour of contingency arguments. However, as we 
shall see, environmental and industry determinism are the primary drivers behind these 
typologies. 
 
Perlmutter‟s (1969) classification of ethnocentric, polycentric and geocentric 
organisations has had a significant influence on subsequent research. A characteristic of 
this work was that Perlmutter believed in an evolutionary path for multinationals from 
ethnocentric to polycentric and finally to geocentric. Another noteworthy feature was 
that Perlmutter was primarily focusing on managerial mindsets rather than on strategy 
and structure configurations. Limitations thus include the lack of influence of industry 
or type of business as well as the possibility that different functions within the business 
may be managed differently (Chng & Pangarkar, 2000). 
 
In an early MNC typology paper, Doz (1980) outlined three different strategies: 
worldwide integration strategy, national responsiveness strategy and administrative 
coordination strategy based on popularising the integration-responsiveness dimensions. 
While not citing Perlmutter, there are clear similarities between the two classifications. 
Doz‟s early work is also important as it introduces an antecedent to the transnational 
concept. He argues for an administrative coordination strategy seeking to leverage 
structural and administrative adjustments to reap the benefits of both worldwide 
integration and national responsiveness. 
 
The work of Hout, Porter and Rudden (1982) shifted the level of analysis from that of 
strategy alone to industry, by arguing that there are only two types of industries in 
which multinationals compete: multidomestic and global. Industry determinism is a 
clear feature in this work and the authors argue that the nature of the industry or 
industry segment should drive the selection of a global or multidomestic strategy.  
 
Bartlett (1986) was the first to explicitly introduce the transnational model of the 
multinational. Bartlett outlined global, multinational and transnational strategies with 
reference to the integration-responsiveness grid. A reference in the notes section in the 
book chapter, states that the I-R grid is derived from the integration-differentiation 
concepts developed by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and that the framework had 
originally been adapted by Prahalad in his Harvard DBA dissertation from 1975. 
Bartlett argues that the forces for both integration and responsiveness are becoming 
more important in many industries, putting pressure on companies to transition towards 
the transnational model.   
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Citing works by both Perlmutter and Bartlett, Hedlund (1986) proposed the term 
heterarchy for „hypermodern MNCs‟ that are organised as non-hierarchical networks 
and seek to simultaneously achieve both integration and responsiveness. This idea of 
characterising the MNC as a network was later extended by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1990) 
with their model of the MNC as an interdependent network and by Nohria and Ghoshal 
(1994; 1997) in their discussion of the differentiated network. 
 
An alternative framework for multinational strategy is proposed by Porter (1986) based 
on the two axes of coordination and configuration of activities. Using this framework, 
Porter arrives at four different strategies: 1) purest global strategy, 2) export-based 
strategy, 3) high foreign investment with extensive coordination among subsidiaries and 
4) country centred strategy. In relation to Bartlett‟s (1986) classification above, it is 
clear that Porter‟s country-centred strategy is most closely aligned with the 
multinational, the purest global strategy and the export-based strategy are variations of 
the global strategy and the high-foreign investment with extensive coordination among 
subsidiaries is closest to the transnational given the high level of coordination together 
with a geographic dispersion of activities. 
 
The work of Prahalad and Doz (1987) also built on the integration-responsiveness grid 
and produced similar strategies labelled global, locally responsive and multifocal. The 
authors further provided one of the most frequently quoted lists of factors pushing for 
integration and responsiveness. The pressures for global integration are: 1) importance 
of multinational customers, 2) presence of multinational competitors, 3) investment 
intensity, 4) technology intensity, 5) pressure for cost reduction, 6) universal needs and 
7) access to raw materials and energy. In contrast, the identified pressures for local 
responsiveness are: 1) differences in customer needs, 2) differences in distribution 
channels, 3) availability of substitutes and the need to adapt, 4) market structure and 5) 
host government demands.  
 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) built on Bartlett‟s (1986) earlier work but also introduced 
the international type based on exploiting parent company knowledge and capabilities. 
The transnational was also explicitly extended as an organisation seeking to 
simultaneously pursue global efficiency, local responsiveness and worldwide learning.  
 
Table 2-2 below presents an organising framework for the different classifications of 
strategies of multinational companies, with the exception of the international strategy 
which only appears in Bartlett and Ghoshal‟s work. The table is organised based on the 
importance placed on global standardisation/ integration versus local 
adaptation/responsiveness. The third category presents the „transnational‟ approach 
seeking to balance standardisation/integration with adaptation/responsiveness. There is 
thus a clear parallel between the marketing literature and the literature about strategic 
and international management. The organising dimensions below can be used to classify 
a substantial amount of prior research. 
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Table 2-2 
An Organising Framework of MNC Typologies 
 Year Global 
standardisation/ 
integration 
Local 
adaptation/ 
responsiveness 
Balancing integration 
and responsiveness 
Perlmutter 1969 Ethnocentric Polycentric Geocentric 
Doz 1980 Worldwide 
integration 
strategy 
National 
responsiveness 
strategy 
Administrative 
coordination strategy 
Hout, Porter, 
Rudden 
1982 Global Multidomestic n/a 
Bartlett 1986 Global Multinational Transnational 
Hedlund 1986 n/a n/a Heterarchy 
Porter 1986 1) Purest global 
strategy and 
2) Export based 
strategy 
Country-centred 
strategy 
High foreign 
investment with 
extensive coordination 
among subsidiaries 
Prahalad & Doz 1987 Global Locally 
responsive 
Multifocal 
Bartlett & Ghoshal 1989 Global Multinational Transnational 
 
The influence of Harvard Business School has been significant in this field as a number 
of scholars who have contributed seminal work received doctoral degrees from Harvard 
between 1973 and 1986 (i.e. Bartlett, Doz, Ghoshal, Porter and Prahalad).  
 
Bartlett and Ghoshal‟s work has had the most widespread impact on subsequent 
research and several quantitative studies have tested and empirically validated their 
typology (Roth & Morrison, 1990; Leong & Tan, 1993; Harzing, 2000). This research 
programme also adopts Bartlett and Ghoshal‟s terminology but following Harzing 
(1998), the terms multidomestic, global and transnational will be used while 
multinational will instead be reserved as the generic term for a company operating in 
different countries. 
 
Overview of configurations 
 
Following from the table above, this section provides a short summary of the key 
features of the three key configurations: multidomestic, global and transnational based 
on Bartlett (1986) and Bartlett and Ghoshal (1987a; 1987b; 1988; 1989). In this context, 
it is important to remember that the configurations are ideal type theoretical 
propositions rather than corresponding to actual organisations. The discussion does 
however help to focus attention on some of the differences between what cross-border 
integration means in different strategy and structure configurations of MNCs. 
 
The multidomestic (multinational) configuration is characterised by a high degree of 
autonomy for subsidiary units and decentralised decision-making. Subsidiaries are 
nationally self-sufficient which means that there are more or less complete stand-alone 
value chains in each country. Headquarters tends to manage multidomestic subsidiaries 
as a portfolio of independent businesses, and subsidiaries are typically measured using 
output control such as financial performance measures. In addition there is a layer of 
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informal personal relationships between managers at headquarters and trusted 
expatriates. Multidomestic subsidiaries are thus fairly independent and separate 
businesses operating with relatively little involvement from the parent company. 
Knowledge is primarily developed locally and resides in the subsidiary rather than 
being dispersed across the multinational. The primary flow between headquarters and 
subsidiary is in terms of financial resources. The consequence is a high degree of local 
responsiveness but only limited integration. 
 
The global configuration is in many ways diametrically opposed to the dispersed logic 
of the multidomestic configuration. Rather than replicating the value chain on a 
country-by-country basis, organisational units and activities are instead tightly 
integrated across the MNC. As a result, there is typically a high degree of centralisation 
for most strategic resources, including R&D and knowledge. Overseas subsidiaries are 
often performing specific functions such as extraction of raw materials or sales and 
customer service rather than being independent businesses capable of stand-alone 
operations. Global subsidiaries would thus typically not be able to function as stand-
alone operations without headquarters involvement. Given this, centralisation is a key 
control mechanism and there is correspondingly tight control from the centre and low 
levels of innovation and development in the periphery. The primary flow between 
organisational units is in terms of products. As a result, companies following a global 
strategy have a high degree of integration but lower levels of national responsiveness. 
 
The objective of the transnational configuration is to create an organisation that is 
simultaneously capable of local responsiveness, global integration and worldwide 
learning. This requires strategic and organisational capabilities of an ambidextrous 
nature, defined as the ability to pursue disparate and often conflicting demands at the 
same time (Birkinshaw & Gibson, 2004; Duncan, 1976; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; 
O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996). The image that best describes 
the transnational is that of an interdependent and differentiated network (Nohria & 
Ghoshal, 1997). This means a much higher degree of integration compared to the stand 
alone operations in the multidomestic model while more responsiveness compared with 
the global configuration. As a result, value chain activities are physically integrated or 
strategically coordinated as activities are performed where it makes most sense within 
the multinational‟s network. Subsidiaries are thus playing orchestrated roles in the 
multinational as a whole rather than simply maximising local opportunities. Knowledge 
creation is a much more dispersed activity and the objective is to share knowledge 
across the multinational. With the change towards interdependence and integration, 
control cannot be achieved through simple output measures any longer. Instead 
socialisation emerges as an important mechanism to achieve normative control 
throughout an increasingly complex organisation. This would thus be standardisation of 
norms in Mintzberg‟s (1983a) terminology.  The transnational is further characterised 
by a flow of resources, products and knowledge between different organisational units. 
Given the need to balance responsiveness, integration and learning, the transnational 
inevitably needs a matrix mindset which leads to complex organisational forms. While 
Bartlett and Ghoshal identified a number of organisations as fitting the other MNC 
configurations, the transnational was proffered as an ideal-type prescription for how to 
respond to the conflicting challenges of responsiveness, integration and learning. 
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The above discussion has highlighted some of the key differences between a number of 
the mostly commonly referenced strategy-structure configurations of multinational 
corporations. It is clear that both forms of integration, the ongoing coordination of 
activities, and the „one off‟ physical transformation of activities are involved in these 
configurations to different degrees. Integration as ongoing strategic coordination 
appears to be far more critical to the global and transnational configurations compared 
with multidomestic firms. In instances where the MNC has made the transition from 
global to transnational, or multidomestic to transnational or global, it would also appear 
that integration as strategic change has been important. 
 
2.2.2 Strategic choice perspective 
 
Ghoshal (1987) concluded at the time that industry determinism had become a dominant 
feature in multinational strategy but that while industry is important, it is only one of 
many influences on strategy. This serves as a good introduction to the strategic choice 
perspective of integration. In contrast to the external orientation of the environmental 
contingency perspective, scholars researching integration from the strategic choice 
perspective instead look within the firm to find the rationale for integration. This 
naturally leads to a focus on resources, processes and capabilities. 
 
This section will review the literature on strategic integration and corporate parenting 
which both turn our attention to the capabilities of the multinational firm. 
 
Strategic integration 
 
Burgelman and Doz (1996) have argued that strategic integration, from a broad 
perspective, is concerned with how corporate management creates value over and 
beyond the sum of the parts of the separate businesses within a company. They have 
also advocated that „strategic integration has to do with the assembly and cultivation of 
resources, including tangible assets and the integration capabilities themselves, over 
time and their coordinated deployment toward opportunities that not only confer 
competitive advantage but also drive the further sharpening and deepening of these 
tangible and intangible assets‟ (1996: 6). There are thus similarities between strategic 
integration and corporate parenting, which we will focus on in the next section. There is 
also a clear link to the resource based view (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 
1984) and the dynamic capabilities perspective (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece et 
al., 1997) which both seek to understand how competitive advantage is achieved from 
within the firm and how it is sustained over time. Strategic integration can thus be 
viewed as a dynamic capability, based on specific strategic and organisational routines 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997).  
 
The strategic integration capability is especially important when managers wish to 
transition between one configuration to another, given the differences in resources, 
strategy and structure between configurations. The capability is also critical if managers 
want to move from weak to strong execution of a given configuration. Tying this 
together with the previous definition of integration, would suggest that different 
combinations of marketing standardisation and value chain integration correspond to 
specific configurations (Miller, 1986; Mintzberg, 1983b) of strategy and structure in 
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multinational corporations. As previously noted, it is likely that integration as a strategic 
change process could result in the creation of coordination mechanisms such as 
standardisation of work processes or outputs. 
 
Parenting theory 
 
Researchers at the Ashridge Strategic Management Centre (Goold, 1996a; Goold, 
1996b; Goold & Campbell, 1991; Goold & Campbell, 2002; Goold et al., 1994; Goold, 
Campbell, & Alexander, 1998) have explored the conditions under which corporate 
parents add value (rather than destroy value) in multi-business contexts. The language 
of these publications does not refer directly to multinational corporations, to integration 
or to dynamic capabilities. However, it is clear from the content of the writings that the 
focus is on interventions by the corporate parent that affect SBUs, and that there is 
relevance to the discussion about integration in MNCs. Given that the autonomy of 
subsidiary units becomes restricted as a result of integration, the role of the corporate 
parent or headquarters becomes critical in MNCs. 
 
Goold, Campbell and Alexander (1994) have identified four ways in which parent 
companies can create value. First, through stand-alone influence whereby the parent 
influences the strategy and performance of otherwise stand-alone businesses. This might 
be achieved in part through the standardisation of outputs (Mintzberg, 1983a); in this 
case the parent company might use quality parameters or financial ratios as targets for 
SBUs. Second, through linkage influences including synergies and transfer of best 
practices. This could be achieved by standardising work processes or alternatively 
through training to standardise worker skills or through the standardisation of norms 
(Mintzberg, 1983a).  Third, through the cost-efficient provisioning of central functions 
and services to business units. This would correspond to integration as strategic change 
rather than as ongoing coordination. Fourth, through corporate development activities 
that alter the composition of the corporate portfolio by acquiring or divesting 
operations. This would be a form of corporate restructuring, which would be closer to 
integration as strategic change than ongoing coordination. The last form of parent 
influence provides a link to the literature on mergers and acquisitions that discuss post-
merger integration (Schweiger, 2002).  
 
Bowman and Ambrosini (2003) have also explored the conditions under which the 
corporate centre is valuable to the organisation. In their discussion of how resource-
based and dynamic capability views of the firm can inform corporate level strategy, they 
reach the conclusion that the corporate centre has to either be a resource or alternatively 
have processes that create resources in SBUs in order to be valuable.  
 
Goold, Campbell and Alexander (1994) have also outlined three different parent styles 
which characterise how the parent relates to its business units. The financial control 
style is characterised by a high degree of decentralisation of decision-making to 
business units and a correspondingly small organisation in the parent company. 
Business units are given a high degree of autonomy and are primarily measured in terms 
of output control through the setting of budgets and performance targets. We can clearly 
see how the financial control style would fit locally oriented MNC strategies described 
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as multidomestic (Hout et al., 1982), multinational (Bartlett, 1986) or locally responsive 
(Prahalad & Doz, 1987). 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, we find the strategic planning style. Parent companies 
following this style typically have large and influential staffs that are closely involved 
with a large number of functional areas across all areas of the business. As a result, the 
level of autonomy for business units is fairly limited. There are thus clear parallels 
between the strategic planning style and the centrally coordinated MNC strategies 
labelled global (Bartlett, 1986; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Hout et al., 1982; Prahalad & 
Doz, 1987) and purest global (Porter, 1986).  
 
In between these two extremes above, we find the strategic control style. This style is 
characterised by a balanced view between top-down planning driven by the parent and 
bottom-up actions taken by the business units. Parent companies do this by balancing 
the importance placed on financial objectives in the financial control style with the 
focus on strategic milestones and objectives in the strategic planning style. The strategic 
planning style is seen as gaining in popularity despite the fact that there are considerable 
challenges to make the style work well. There are thus at least some similarities 
between the strategic control style and the complex configurations labelled heterarchical 
(Hedlund, 1986), multifocal (Prahalad & Doz, 1987) and transnational (Bartlett, 1986; 
Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989).  
 
Goold and Campbell (2002) have further argued that „corporate parents inevitably 
destroy some value by incurring overhead costs, slowing down decisions, and making 
some ill-judged interventions, and that many corporate parents do not add enough value 
to compensate‟ (2002:219). Given this, Goold, Campell and Alexander (1998) have 
concluded that corporate parents „should avoid intervening in businesses unless they 
have specific reasons for believing that their influence will be positive‟ (1998:309-310). 
Goold, Campbell and Alexander (1998) have further proposed that three conditions 
must be satisfied in order for the parent to add value: 
 
Value creation only occurs under three conditions: 
 The parent sees an opportunity for a business to improve performance and a role for 
the parent in helping to grasp the opportunity 
 The parent has the skills, resources and other characteristics needed to fulfil the 
required role 
 The parent has sufficient understanding of the business and sufficient discipline to 
avoid other value destroying interventions (1998:310) 
 
The parenting theory discussion is informative in that it highlights the conditions that 
must be present in order for the parent to create value in the organisation. This literature 
thus acknowledges the fact that not all activities of the headquarters necessarily add 
value in multi-business corporations.  
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2.3 Integration challenges 
 
This section reviews challenges to achieving successful integration. The challenges are 
categorised as primarily relating to either headquarters or subsidiaries. 
 
This section draws on literature relating to corporate parenting, MNC strategy and 
mergers and acquisitions. Schweiger, Csiszar and Napier (1993) have argued that 
mergers and acquisitions typically involve eliminating or shutting down units, 
combining units and creating new interrelationships between units. To the extent that 
cross-border integration efforts result in such strategic changes within the MNC, it 
would be reasonable to assume that the implementation challenges would also be 
similar. This provides the rationale for including literature on post-merger integration. 
 
2.3.1 Headquarters related challenges 
 
A number of integration challenges that primarily relate to the headquarters are outlined 
below. 
 
Ensuring value creation from integration 
 
It is widely argued that the overriding rationale for integration within a company, as 
well as for acquiring another company, should be that it creates more value than it 
destroys. As stated by Goold (1996b) „[t]he purpose of any corporate parent should be 
to add value to its businesses. In other words, the businesses should perform better as a 
result of the parent than they would as independent entities…[however]…We have 
found that unless the corporate parent is able to identify and focus on specific parenting 
opportunities in its businesses, it is liable to damage, rather than enhance, the 
performance of its businesses‟ (1996b:359). The same value creation logic is also 
advocated from within the mergers and acquisition literature (Schweiger, 2002).   
 
Ghoshal and Nohria (1993) have argued that integration is costly, and if a high degree 
of integration is not fundamental to competitive advantage, a strategy based on strong 
integration may destroy rather than create value. There must thus be a sound 
justification for an organisation to adopt a more complex strategy configuration such as 
the transnational. 
 
Avoiding misguided headquarters intervention 
 
The corporate parenting literature has identified that misguided intervention from the 
parent can have negative effects. Goold and Campbell (2002) have argued that „[h]ands 
on parenting can add high value, but it can also destroy it. If hands-on parents have 
insufficient skills or poor staff support, they may blunder about rather than help the 
business. If they are too prone to interfere, they may inhibit the initiatives of unit 
managers and take on tasks for which they are ill-suited…Misguided hands-on 
parenting is even more damaging than misguided hands-off parenting‟ (2002:226-227). 
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Goold, Campbell and Alexander (1998) have also proposed that successful parent 
companies limit their attention to a few key opportunity areas rather than seeking to 
intervene broadly right across the business. This allows the parent company to develop 
distinctive skills rather than spread their efforts across areas where their intervention 
would have low or negative value. 
 
The potential for misguided interventions from the parent has also been identified in the 
mergers and acquisitions literature. Jemison and Sitkin (1986b) have argued that 
arrogant and defensive behaviour from parent company managers can lead to a rather 
heavy-handed imposition of parent company practices in the subsidiary and sometimes 
even the elemination of subsidiary-level capabilities that initially motivated the 
acquisition. Several authors have further argued that post-merger integration efforts 
should be limited only to areas where integration can capture most value (Carr, Elton, 
Rovit, & Vestring, 2004; Schweiger et al., 1993; Vestring, Rouse, & Rovit, 2004). 
Schweiger, Csiszar and Napier (1993) have labelled this the „principle of minimum 
intervention‟ (1993:58). Vestring, Rouse and Rovit (2004) argue that many acquirers 
surprisingly „often destroy value not as a result of inattention to detail but through 
excessive zeal in their integration efforts…The reality is that too much integration can 
block companies from realizing the benefits of a merger just as easily as too little can. 
And, in some cases, over-integrating can do far more damage‟ (2004:15). This is similar 
to the conclusion in the parenting literature that corporate parents should limit their 
attention to a few areas with significant opportunities (Goold et al., 1994). 
 
In general, there appears to be a realisation from within both the corporate parenting 
literature (Goold & Campbell, 1998; Goold et al., 1994; Goold et al., 1998) and the 
mergers and acquisition literature (Schweiger, 2002; Schweiger et al., 1993) that parent 
company managers tend to overestimate the potential synergies from integration, while 
implementation challenges are usually underestimated. 
 
Ensuring quality of headquarter staff and execution 
 
The role of parent level managers is significantly more complex in integrated 
configurations compared with the situation where the parent operates closer to a 
financial holding company, like in the financial control style (Goold et al., 1994) 
expected in configurations described as locally responsive (Prahalad & Doz, 1987), 
multidomestic (Hout et al., 1982) or multinational (Bartlett, 1986; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
1989). 
 
This places requirements on the quality of staff within the parent and highlights whether 
or not they have relevant strategic and operational experience. Goold and Campbell 
(2002) have argued that „since upper level management have more demanding 
responsibilities in complex structures, the issue of whether they have the necessary 
skills is especially important. If they do not, value destruction by the parent is a very 
real risk…A realistic assessment of value destruction by upper levels, and how it can be 
minimised, continues to be a highly worthwhile discipline, with powerful practical 
implications for management‟ (2002:241).  
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Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989)  have commented that increased complexity in strategy 
places requirements on headquarters employees to implement a multidimensional 
organisation with differentiated roles for subsidiaries and leveraging flexible forms of 
coordination. Prahalad and Doz (1987) have similarly argued that headquarter managers 
need increased analytical sophistication and that successful managers will need to be 
„half yogis, and half commissars‟ (1987:272). 
 
Goold, Campbell and Alexander (1998) have also stated that „the skills of the 
individuals involved and the organisational heritage in which they operate can make 
essentially the „same‟ process effective or ineffective‟ (1998:311). This point to the 
essential role of high quality execution; the „practices‟ themselves may matter less than 
how they are actually „practiced‟. 
 
Avoiding multiple parenting levels 
 
In large companies, there may be more than one level of management within the parent. 
Goold and Campbell (2002) have argued that „[e]very extra level of parent management 
brings with it the danger of duplication, redundancy, extra overheads and contradictory 
parenting influences. A series of levels, each of which repeats the work of lower levels, 
but with progressively less detailed knowledge, is a sure recipe for parenting value 
destruction and should be avoided‟ (2002:233).  
 
Managing divided and dotted-line reporting 
 
Both Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) and Prahalad and Doz (1987) have argued that simple 
organisational structures are unlikely to be appropriate for complex integrated 
strategies.  A consequence of complex structures is that subsidiary/SBU managers often 
need to report in some form of divided or dotted-line reporting relationships, like in a 
matrix organisation. Goold and Campbell (2002) have argued that „[d]ivided reporting 
is not easy. To work well, it requires clear agreement about who is responsible for what, 
and a process for reaching a collective view on parenting responsibilities that are shared 
between the bosses. Such agreements may be possible in principle, but are always liable 
to break down in the face of specific issues and crises…Divided reporting also causes 
potential conflict for operating unit managers. It is harder to respond to two bosses, each 
with separate agendas and sometimes pulling in different directions‟ (2002:236-237).  
 
Prahalad and Doz (1987) argue that most of the difficulties that managers experience in 
matrix organisations are due to managers still relying on concepts and mental 
frameworks used to manage simpler organisational forms.  
 
Avoiding empire building at headquarters 
 
Goold and Campbell (2002) have proposed that „[u]pper levels of management have 
essentially two roles to play. The first concerns the minimum obligatory tasks needed to 
manage and maintain the existence of the corporate entity. The second concerns adding 
value to the operating units‟ (2002:220). However, it is far from clear that these two 
„legitimate‟ rationales are the actual drivers behind the dimensioning of the parent‟s 
organisational structure and reasons for interventions undertaken by parent level 
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managers. This may especially be the case with regards to intermediate parent levels. As 
argued by Goold and Campbell (2002) „groups and divisions are often created for 
reasons that have little to do with the parenting needs of the units within them. Power, 
politics, personal ambitions, management succession, location, or accidents of history 
can all influence the formation of groups‟ (2002:233). 
 
Taken together, the above acknowledges that not all interventions by a corporate parent 
or headquarters actually add value. 
 
2.3.2 Subsidiary related challenges 
 
A number of challenges related to the subsidiary level were also identified which are 
presented below. 
 
Strategic and organisational fit 
 
The issue of fit is typically not directly discussed in the MNC strategy literature in 
relation to cross-border integration. However, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) have argued 
that a firm‟s administrative heritage is formidably difficult to change. This indicates that 
integration between organisational units that have different administrative heritages 
would not be easy, such as the integration of a previously autonomous subsidiary that 
has evolved characteristics that are distinctly different from the parent. 
 
The mergers and acquisition literature further informs us that acquisitions are likely to 
be more successful if there is a high degree of both strategic and organisational fit 
between the target and parent firms (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986a; Jemison & Sitkin, 
1986b). Jemison and Sitkin (1986b) have defined strategic fit as „the degree to which 
the target firm augments or complements the parent‟s strategy and thus makes 
identifiable contributions to the financial and non-financial goals of the parent‟, while 
organisational fit is defined as „the match between administrative practices, cultural 
practices, and personnel characteristics of the target and parent firms and may directly 
affect how the firms can be integrated with respect to day-to-day operations once an 
acquisition has been made‟ (1986b: 146-147). Olie (1994) has further argued that a 
stronger degree of operational integration requires reasonably compatible styles across 
all aspects of the acquirer and target including personnel policies, decision-making 
styles and the focus of authority and responsibility. One manifestation of lack of 
organisational fit would be a „culture clash‟ (Carleton, 1997) or „culture collision‟ 
(Buono, Bowditch, & Lewis, 1985) based on differing opinions or practices across a 
wide range of areas. We can infer from this that cross-border integration is also likely to 
be more difficult in situations where there are low levels of strategic and organisational 
fit between headquarters and subsidiaries. 
 
Opportunistic subsidiary managers 
 
The relationship between managers at headquarters and subsidiaries could be viewed as 
an agency theory problem based on Jensen and Meckling‟s (1976) definition: 
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We define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. If both parties 
to the relationship are utility maximizers there is good reason to believe that the agent 
will not always act in the best interests of the principal. The principal can limit 
divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by 
incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities, of the agent 
(1976:308). 
 
From this perspective, managers at headquarters need to protect themselves against two 
problems that Eisenhardt (1989a) has labelled the agency problem and the risk sharing 
problem. The agency problem relates to the possibility of divergent objectives between 
the principal and the agent and also to the fact that it may be difficult for the principal to 
verify what the agent is really doing. The risk sharing problem occurs if the principal 
and agent have different attitudes towards risk taking. 
 
The agency theory perspective thus focuses our attention on the fact that subsidiary 
managers may not always act in the best interests of headquarter managers due to either 
opportunistic behaviour or different attitudes towards risk. Agency theory has however 
come under heavy criticism as a theory based on a negative view of human behaviour 
and as a theory that can actually stimulate the opportunistic behaviour it seeks to control 
(Ghoshal, 2005; Ghoshal & Moran, 1996).  
 
Securing subsidiary managers’ commitment 
 
Ensuring compliance, and beyond that, commitment from subsidiary managers is likely 
to have a substantial impact on the successful outcome of integration initiatives. Kim 
and Mauborgne‟s (1991; 1993b; 1993a; 1993c; 1995) research on procedural justice has 
informed us that subsidiary managers are less likely to be committed to corporate 
integration initiatives and mandates if they perceive the decision-making process as 
unfair. This stream of research thus informs us that the degree of commitment from 
subsidiary managers is important to the success of integration initiatives. However, in 
contrast to agency theory research, the procedural justice literature suggests that 
subsidiary managers‟ commitment can be reduced by perceptions that the integration 
process is unfair. 
 
In a general discussion regarding justice, Greenberg (1993) has argued that justice 
comes in several different classes based on whether the category of justice is procedural 
or distributive, and whether the focal determinants are structural and social.  The first 
category relates to a focus on justice in either the process itself or the outcome of the 
process (distributive). The second category refers to justice in the structure of the 
system versus perceived justice in interpersonal social relations. Managerial 
commitment may thus be negatively affected as a result of perceived injustice at both 
interpersonal and structural levels as well as from both the process itself and the 
outcome of the process. 
 
While the discussion of subsidiary managers‟ perceptions of cross-border integration is 
rather limited in the MNC strategy literature, the mergers and acquisitions literature 
offers a rich source of information including full volumes dedicated to the „human‟ 
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dimension of M&A (e.g. Buono & Bowditch, 1989; Cartwright & Cooper, 1996). 
Jemison and Sitkin‟s (1986b) review identified a number of people-related problems 
including career uncertainty, concerns about geographic relocation and financial 
security, feeling alienated and lack of trust in co-workers. Another review identified 
additional human behaviour problems in the integration process: communications 
breakdown, „we-they‟ communication dynamics and decreased commitment (Yu, 
Engleman, & Van de Ven, 2005). Napier (1989) has also identified reactions such as 
fear, „being sold out‟, loss of autonomy, anxiety and low morale. Marks (1997) has 
further argued that „[s]igns of human stress are present in all combinations, even the 
friendliest and best-managed ones‟ (1997:268). There are also those who have argued 
that mergers and acquisitions often fail because the target company managers often feel 
like stepchildren experiencing the same emotional challenges as in ordinary stepfamilies 
including discrimination, feeling deficient, lacking clear guidelines of role definition, 
experiencing anxiety and uncertainty and feeling helpless and rejected (Allred, Boal, & 
Holstein, 2005; Fulmer & Gilkey, 1988). In instances where cross-border integration 
involves large-scale strategic change, it would not be too much of a leap in faith to 
assume that similar mechanisms may be triggered at a subsidiary management level. 
 
2.4 Integration capabilities 
 
Given the many challenges that must be overcome to realise successful integration, the 
attention now turns towards some key organisational capabilities that appear relevant 
for multinationals seeking integration.  
 
2.4.1 Managing decision-making and implementation 
 
The complexity of integration raises the question of how such strategies should be 
developed and implemented. The area of procedural justice championed by Kim and 
Mauborgne offers suitable suggestions for the complex and interdependent 
multinational (Kim & Mauborgne, 1991; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993a; Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1993c; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993b; Kim & Mauborgne, 1995; Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1996; Taggart, 1997; Kim & Mauborgne, 1998; Ellis, 2000).  
 
Procedural justice is defined as „the extent to which the dynamic of the multinational‟s 
strategy-making process for its subsidiary units are judged to be fair by subsidiary top 
management‟ (Kim & Mauborgne, 1993a:422). A high level of perceived procedural 
justice has been shown to lead to significantly greater compliance by subsidiary units 
also in the situation when subsidiary managers disapprove of the decisions taken by the 
corporate centre. The concept is thus essential as it will inevitably be difficult to please 
all subsidiary units in an interdependent multinational yet some degree of compliance is 
required to realise gains from strategic integration (Kim & Mauborgne, 1993a). 
 
According to Kim and Mauborgne (1993c), there are five central pillars to procedural 
justice in the context of multinational management. First, the existence of two-way 
communication between the corporate centre and the subsidiary in strategic decision 
making. Second, the ability for subsidiary managers to legitimately challenge the 
strategic views of the corporate centre. Third, that the corporate centre is knowledgeable 
about the local situation of subsidiaries. Fourth, that subsidiary managers are given an 
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account of the final strategic decisions by the corporate centre together with an 
explanation of the rationale behind the final decision. Fifth, that the corporate centre is 
consistent in decision making across subsidiaries. 
 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1988) have also looked at the need for the parent company to gain 
subsidiary input into decision making, given that parent company managers need to 
ensure both an understanding of market needs and secure the commitments of those 
subsidiary managers who will be asked to implement decisions. 
 
In the mergers and acquisition literature, it has also been argued that fairness during the 
integration process, together with open and honest communication, are prerequisites for 
success (Schweiger et al., 1993; Schweiger, 2002). The need for fairness and 
communication are thus stressed across both the MNC strategy and post-merger 
integration literatures. It would further appear that trust is a central component to make 
both cross-border integration and post-merger integration work. In relation to this, it is 
worth noting that trust is also viewed as a central component of successful international 
joint ventures and strategic alliances (Currall & Inkpen, 2002; Inkpen, 2001; Inkpen & 
Currall, 1998; Inkpen & Currall, 2004; Madhok, 1995; Svejenova, 2006; Yan & Gray, 
1994). This thus indicates that trust and fairness may be of universal importance for 
cross-border integration, post-merger integration and international joint ventures and 
strategic alliances. 
  
2.4.2 Managing structure 
 
The complexity of integration often prevents the adoption of simple organisational 
arrangements, given the need to manage multidirectional flows of capital, products and 
knowledge. This points in the direction of some form of matrix arrangement which 
recognises the need for geographic/country management for local responsiveness, 
business/product management for global integration and efficiency and functional 
management for worldwide learning (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1992). Given the inherent 
challenges of a formal matrix organisation, it has been argued that such a „transnational‟ 
matrix is not simply a structure but a „decision-making culture‟ (Prahalad & Doz, 1987) 
or a „frame of mind‟ (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1990). Bartlett and Ghoshal recognised that 
advances in strategy have moved out of pace with organisational and managerial 
developments and that as a result: „corporations now commonly design strategies that 
seem impossible to implement, for the simple reason that no one can effectively 
implement third-generation strategies through second-generation organisations run by 
first-generation managers‟ (1990:144-145). This raises the question of whether 
challenges to make complex strategies such as the transnational work, primarily relate 
to failures of formulation or failures of implementation? That is, if appropriate 
implementation capabilities do not exist, and cannot be developed or acquired within a 
realistic timeframe, sophisticated „third-generation‟ strategies might actually be flawed. 
 
Numerous studies have reported on the many challenges of making matrix organisations 
work (Prahalad, 1976). These include problems such as unclear roles and 
responsibilities, ambiguous authority, difficulties in measuring performance, misaligned 
goals, increased information and coordination costs, slower response time and excessive 
overheads (Davis & Lawrence, 1978; Kolodny, 1981; Naylor, 1985; Larson & Gobeli, 
 44 
1987; Ford & Randolph, 1992; Sy & D'Annunzio, 2005). However, despite the many 
drawbacks of matrices no real alternative appears to have emerged to replace the matrix. 
As argued by Naylor (1985) „the matrices are not the cause of the organisational 
complexities. Rather matrices merely reflect the degree of complexity that already 
pervades large multinational companies‟ (1985:18). Goold and Campbell (2003b; 
2003a) have also studied the many problems with matrix structures and have also 
advocated that the best way forward is to improve the way matrices work rather than 
abandon them all together.  
 
To avoid the negative reputation of matrix organisations, Goold and Campbell (2003b) 
proposed the term „structured networks‟ to describe well designed matrices: 
 
Structured networks avoid the problems of matrices by keeping the amount of structure, 
process and central influence to a minimum. Units are defined so that they can be as 
self-managing as possible. Collaboration is achieved primarily through self-managed 
networking between units. Rules, influence and control from the centre are kept as lean 
and unobtrusive as possible. In a structured network, the default position is 
decentralisation, yet there is just enough structure to promote the right kind of self-
managed behaviour and there is just enough processes, rules and controls to ensure 
success…Network structures are intended to achieve both the benefits of focus and 
autonomy associated with SBU-based structures and the benefits of interdependence, 
which are designed into matrix structures. The danger, of course, is that the network 
ends up instead with the lack of co-operation of SBUs together with the excessive 
complexity and ambiguity of the matrix. To fulfil its potential, a network must be 
designed with enough structure to make the whole add up to more than the sum of its 
parts, but not so much that it inhibits initiative and accountability (2003b:428-429). 
 
It is evident from the above, that matrix-type organisational solutions should be viewed 
as a way to manage complexity rather than a miracle cure. 
 
In many cases, it would appear that the implementation of an integrated configuration 
would require a fairly complex organisational arrangement. The management of 
integration would thus need to include an ongoing review and adjustment of the 
organisational structure.   
 
2.4.3 Control and coordination mechanisms 
 
In line with Martinez and Jarillo (1989) a coordination mechanism is defined as „any 
administrative tool for achieving integration among different units within an 
organisation‟ (1989:490). Martinez and Jarillo (1989) further argue that: 
 
Mechanisms of coordination are not exclusive tools of multinational corporations 
(MNCs). Indeed, by definition, all organizations have a certain degree of specialization 
or differentiation among their parts, which calls for some sort of coordination effort 
across them. Large and complex firms competing in multiple markets need coordination 
among different dimensions. Thus, mechanisms of coordination are neither original to 
nor exclusive of MNCs: they are common to all large firms. It is the especial 
complexity of MNCs that makes their study of interest (1989:490). 
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The literature on coordination and control mechanisms offers some guidance regarding 
how to achieve integration. The strategy pursued by the multinational as well as the role 
of the subsidiary appears to determine the type of reporting relationship between the 
management of the subsidiary and the corporate centre (Picard, 1980). A complex and 
interdependent configuration is likely to require a greater degree of communication 
between subsidiaries and the corporate centre compared with simpler strategy 
configurations. Complex strategies thus require a substantial amount of coordination 
using both structural and formal mechanisms as well as more informal and subtler 
mechanisms. The more subsidiaries are integrated, the higher the need seems to be for 
all of the above forms of coordination mechanisms (Martinez & Jarillo, 1991). There 
also appears to have been a general shift towards increased use of subtler coordination 
mechanisms (Martinez & Jarillo, 1989) and it has been argued that the role of top 
management is changing from managing strategy, structure and systems towards the 
management of purpose, process and people (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1995). 
 
Mintzberg (1983a) has argued that there are six coordination mechanisms that provide 
the glue which hold organisations together: mutual adjustment, direct supervision, 
standardisation of work processes, standardisation of outputs, standardisation of skills 
and standardisation of norms. Mintzberg (1983b) further argues that „[a]s organizational 
work becomes more complicated, the favored means of coordination seems to shift from 
mutual adjustment to direct supervision to standardization, preferably of work 
processes, otherwise of outputs, or else of skills, finally reverting back to mutual 
adjustment‟ (1983b:7). The form of mutual adjustment that manifests in complex matrix 
structures would include extensive meetings, cross-country boards, liaison roles and 
global project teams. This leads to a contingency argument which matches the 
appropriate coordination mechanisms with the type of work performed in different parts 
of the organisation. 
 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) has distinguished between the use of centralisation, 
formalisation and socialisation as means to achieve coordination in MNCs. It would 
appear that formalisation corresponds to standardisation of work processes, outputs and 
skills, while socialisation corresponds to standardisation of norms. As previously 
mentioned, complex strategies appear to require a lot of coordination as well as the use 
of a variety of different mechanisms.  
 
It would appear that control mechanisms for complex and interdependent networks need 
to evolve from simple output based financial performance measures for the subsidiaries 
towards more balanced measures that take account of the role of the subsidiaries within 
the overall network. This is likely to lead to increased use of behavioural and input 
control mechanisms and a reduction in the exclusive use of output control mechanisms 
(Muralidharan & Hamilton, 1999).  Given the difficulties with using simple control 
mechanisms, Gupta and Govindarajan (2001) have argued for the need to cultivate a 
„global mindset‟ that simultaneously balances the needs for high integration and high 
differentiation. This is similar to what Bartlett and Ghoshal have labelled the „mind 
matrix‟ (1987a). The above would explain why Goold, Campbell and Alexander‟s 
(1994) financial control style would appear to be best suited for locally oriented MNC 
strategies labelled multidomestic (Hout et al., 1982), multinational (Bartlett, 1986) or 
locally responsive (Prahalad & Doz, 1987). 
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The use of expatriates (Edström & Galbraith, 1977), global teams and task forces 
(Harvey & Novicevic, 2002) can also play central coordination roles. In addition, Gupta 
and Govindarajan have suggested that feedback-seeking behaviour by subsidiary 
managers is particularly effective in an MNC context (Gupta, Govindarajan, & 
Malhotra, 1996; Gupta, Govindarajan, & Malhotra, 1999). This mirrors Stewart‟s 
(1995) discussion of self-management and lends further support for the use of subtler 
coordination mechanisms. 
 
The above has informed us that complex strategies require a good deal of coordination 
and that there has been a shift away from relying exclusively on structural and formal 
control mechanisms towards subtler coordination mechanisms. 
 
2.4.4 Managing strategic change 
 
In many cases, it would appear that integration is closely intertwined with processes of 
strategic change. Bartlett and Ghoshal‟s (1987b; 1987a; 1988; 1989) research tracked 
how a number of multinationals tried to transition from their previous multidomestic, 
international or global forms towards the transnational, and they noted that: 
 
In finding their way through the complex process of strategic change, all the companies 
have learned one fundamental lesson: a company‟s ability to build and manage new 
strategic capabilities depends on its existing organizational attributes – its configuration 
of assets and capabilities, built up over the decades; its distribution of managerial 
responsibilities which cannot be shifted quickly; and an ongoing set of relationships that 
endure long after any structural change. Collectively, these attributes shape what we 
refer to as a company‟s administrative heritage. While strategic plans can be redrawn or 
scrapped overnight, it is more difficult to refocus a company‟s organizational capability. 
The administrative heritage can be one of the company‟s greatest assets – the 
underlying sources of its key competences – and also one of its most significant 
liabilities, since it resists change and thereby prevents realignment and broadening of 
strategic capabilities (1998:38). 
 
Such substantial change can be characterised as a shift in strategy configuration (Miller, 
1986; Mintzberg, 1983b), organisational archetype (Greenwood & Hinings, 1993), 
institutional template (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996) or paradigm (Johnson, 1992). It 
has been argued that such combinations of structures and systems are characterised by a 
single interpretive scheme based on an underlying set of beliefs and values (Greenwood 
& Hinings, 1993) and exhibit patterned regularity (Ranson, Hinings, & Greenwood, 
1980). Large scale change thus departs from the established individual and collective 
organisational schemas of managers (Labianca et al., 2000). 
  
Proponents of the punctuated equilibrium view of strategic change (e.g. Miller & 
Friesen, 1980; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Tushman, 
Newman, & Romanelli, 1986) argue that organisations are in stable equilibrium most of 
the time and that major change occurs during short periods of intensive, discontinuous 
bursts of activity. Tushman, Newman and Romanelli (1986) have distinguished 
between, on the one hand, convergent or incremental change, and on the other, 
discontinuous or frame-braking change. While convergent change is compatible with 
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the existing structure of the organisation, „[d]iscontinuous or “frame-breaking” change 
involves simultaneous and sharp shifts in strategy, power, structure, and controls‟ 
(1986:3). Romanelli and Tushman (1994) have argued that organisational resistance to 
change is fundamental to punctuated equilibrium theory as it describes why small-scale 
changes fail to take hold. In this regards, it is however worth noting that „resistance to 
change‟ is a loaded term that probably reflects power and hierarchical relationships. The 
term is thus likely to reflect a headquarters bias given that there may be situations when 
subsidiary managers‟ resistance to change is appropriate given the inappropriateness of 
the imposed change originating at headquarters. 
 
In a related discussion, Greenwood and Hinings (1996) have proposed that convergent 
change occurs within an existing archetype or template while radical change occurs as 
organisations move from one archetype or template to another. Following from their 
argument, a shift from one strategy configuration to another can be considered an 
example of radical change while gradual integration initiatives within an existing 
configuration can be considered convergent change. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) 
have argued that radical change is problematic given the institutional embeddedness of 
an existing archetype. In a similar vein, Johnson (1992) has argued that paradigm shifts 
are often required in relation to major strategic changes and that those are the most 
difficult to achieve. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) have further proposed that 
„[r]evolutionary and evolutionary change are defined by the scale and pace of upheaval 
and adjustment. Whereas evolutionary change occurs slowly and gradually, 
revolutionary change happens swiftly and affects virtually all parts of the organization 
simultaneously‟ (1996:1024). Greenwood and Hinings (1993) have argued that change 
is affected by the degree of commitment that organisational members have towards an 
existing interpretive scheme versus new alternatives. During this change period, we thus 
have the coexistence of two different interpretive schemes or templates which compete 
for legitimacy as the existing form becomes de-institutionalised while the new form 
becomes institutionalised (Johnson, Smith, & Codling, 2000). Bartunek (1984) has 
referred to this process as second-order change described as „a radical, discontinuous 
shift in interpretive schemes: organizational paradigms are reframed, and norms and 
worldviews are changed‟ (1984:356). Balogun and Jenkins (2003) have argued that 
„[f]or change to occur in organisations, the routines and their associated meanings have 
to evolve. This is consistent with evolving new shared tacit knowledge about the way 
we do things around here, and how organisational activities are co-ordinated and 
integrated. It is necessary to somehow surface and change the knowledge of embedded 
social practices and behaviours‟ (2003:249). In relation to change in MNC subsidiaries 
it would thus appear that subsidiary managers might resist imposed change if they hold 
a different local schema compared with managers at headquarters. 
 
In the mergers and acquisition literature, Schweiger (2002) has identified that the 
acquirer has four choices in relation to the target company: continue autonomous 
operations, forced assimilation, voluntary assimilation and innovation. In forced 
assimilation, the target company is required to adopt the practices of the new parent 
company. There is substantial potential for resistance given the forced nature of 
integration. Voluntary assimilation is much softer in that the target company voluntarily 
buys into change and adopts parent company practices. In innovation, also called 
novation (Schweiger et al., 1993), an integration group decides to innovate and go for 
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new practices independent of those of either the target company or the parent.  Such 
practices might originate as a result of benchmarking efforts or from the use of 
management consultants. This offers the potential of a new start without a feeling of 
superiority or „win-lose situation‟ of either party but may incur additional costs and 
slow down the integration process. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) have similarly 
proposed that the acquirer has the options of preservation, absorption and symbiosis 
with the target firm based on relative needs for strategic interdependence and 
organisational autonomy. Another typology is provided by Marks and Mirvis (2001) 
who propose the five options of preservation, reverse takeover, absorption, 
transformation and „best of both‟ based on the degree of change in the acquirer and 
target. In discussing organisational cultures in mergers and acquisitions, Nahavandi and 
Malekzadeh (1988) have argued that the acquirer has a choice of integration, separation, 
assimilation and deculturation. All of these different typologies indicate that the parent 
has a choice regarding: 1) keeping the target more or less intact, 2) imposing parent 
company standards, 3) taking target company standards, 4) combining elements from 
the two, and 5) innovating to create a fresh start for both companies. 
 
The above has illustrated that management of strategic change may be a significant 
component in integration, especially if integration introduces a different way of 
working. As previously argued, it is thus relevant to distinguish between integration as 
an ongoing alignment process and integration as a process of strategic change. The 
latter form of cross-border integration would likely share many of the features of post-
merger integration. In fact, it may even be impossible to disentangle cross-border 
integration and post-merger integration in instances when a heavily integrated MNC 
purchases a previously autonomous company located in another country and proceeds 
with integration efforts. 
 
As identified above, the management of integration as strategic change appears be a 
critical capability for multinationals who seek to realise integration benefits during 
times of transition from one strategy configuration to another. Radical and revolutionary 
change together with very high ambiguity can create cognitive disorder and a fault line 
in sensemaking (Balogun & Johnson, 2004). This provides an explanation for why it 
can be so challenging to make the transition between configurations. 
 
Bolman and Deal (1991) have recommended that the management of change needs to 
be considered from four different frames: human resource, structural, political and 
symbolic (see Table 2-3). Each of these perspectives highlights different dimensions 
and needs arising from the change process and prevents managers from applying a one-
dimensional approach to a multidimensional challenge. 
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Table 2-3 
Four perspectives on change 
Human resource: 
Change causes people to feel incompetent, 
needy, and powerless. Developing new skills, 
creating opportunities for involvement, and 
providing psychological support are essential. 
Structural: 
Change alters the clarity and stability of roles 
and responsibilities creating confusion and 
chaos. This requires attention to realigning and 
renegotiating formal patterns and policies. 
Political: 
Change generates conflict and creates winners 
and losers. Avoiding or smoothing over those 
issues drives conflict underground. Managing 
change effectively requires the creation of 
arenas where issues can be negotiated. 
Symbolic: 
Change creates loss of meaning and purpose. 
People form attachments to symbols and 
symbolic activity. When attachments are 
severed, they experience difficulty in letting go. 
Existential wounds require symbolic healing. 
Source: Bolman and Deal (1991:377) 
 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) also recognise the need to manage change across different 
dimensions and they have outlined two distinctly different sequences of change, based 
on a biology analogy, reproduced in Table 2-4 below. While recognising exceptions, 
they propose that the change process has a greater chance of success if companies 
follow the emergent change process, based on first changing individual attitudes and 
mentalities, before attempting large scale change to interpersonal relationships, 
processes, structures and responsibilities. Connecting with Bolman and Deal‟s (1991) 
four frames of change above, it would appear that Bartlett and Ghoshal‟s proposed 
approach begins with symbolic change, continues with human resource and political 
change and finally concludes with structural change. 
 
Table 2-4 
Two perspectives on managing strategic change 
Traditional change process Emerging change process 
1. Change in formal structure and 
responsibilities (Anatomy) 
2. Change in interpersonal relationships and 
process (Physiology) 
3. Change in individual attitudes and 
mentalities (Psychology) 
1. Change in individual attitudes and 
mentalities (Psychology) 
2. Change in interpersonal relationships and 
process (Physiology) 
3. Change in formal structure and 
responsibilities (Anatomy) 
Source: Adapted from Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998:291-292) 
 
In a study of post-merger integration, Birkinshaw, Bresman and Håkanson (2000) made 
a separation between task-integration and human-integration. The authors found that 
task-integration could only be achieved after human integration had first been realised. 
This findings mirrors Bartlett and Ghoshal‟s (1998) argumentation above and provides 
further support for the need to focus on, and prioritise, the human side of integration. 
 
Moving beyond the literature on major strategic change described above, it is also 
interesting to note that Lervik (2005) found that change management has a significant 
impact on the transfer of managerial practices within a multinational setting. Lervik‟s 
(2005) research was focused on the transfer of a performance management practice 
within Norsk Hydro, a major Norwegian multinational. This suggests that the 
management of strategic change is a critical capability both in order to implement major 
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shifts between strategy configurations as well as for ongoing efforts to transfer practices 
between headquarters and subsidiaries. 
 
2.5 Subsidiary management 
 
Following from this overview of the integration literature, our attention now turns to the 
way that subsidiary managers are conceptualised. Nohria and Ghoshal (1997) have 
argued that there has historically been a headquarters bias in the literature about 
headquarters-subsidiary relations. Birkinshaw, Hood and Jonsson (1998) have gone 
further and stated that: „[t]aken as a whole, the body of literature on subsidiary 
management had done a far better job at understanding aspects of subsidiary context 
(how the subsidiary relates to its parent, its corporate network, its local environment) 
than of understanding what actually happens inside the subsidiary‟ (1998:223). 
Regarding how the actions and agency of subsidiary managers have been 
conceptualised in literature, we find that there are four primary positions taken as 
illustrated in Table 2-5 below. 
 
Table 2-5 
Conceptualisations of subsidiary managers 
 
Conceptualisation of subsidiary managers Illustrative examples 
Not directly addressed Porter (1980; 1985) 
Instruments of headquarters Johansson & Vahlne (1977) 
Vernon (1966) 
Socialised members of the multinational Bartlett & Ghoshal (1989) 
Nohria and Ghoshal (1994; 1997) 
Active entrepreneurs Burgelman (1983a; 1983b) 
Birkinshaw & Hood (1998) 
Birkinshaw et al. (1998) 
 
First, we note that we have a fairly limited understanding, in general, of strategy 
formation at the subsidiary or business unit level. In contrast, we know a great deal 
about strategy from a corporate portfolio perspective or in terms of business strategy for 
stand-alone companies. Many common text-book frameworks used to analyse and 
develop strategy, including Porter‟s five forces (1980) and value chain (1985), take their 
starting point in independent operations where managers are implicitly assumed to have 
significant managerial discretion and degrees of freedom when it comes to setting the 
strategy. In this literature, the specifics of subsidiary management are thus typically not 
directly addressed. 
 
In the early international business literature, we find a hierarchical perspective in which 
subsidiary managers are often treated as instruments of headquarters that are assumed 
to merely implement a strategy which has originated at headquarters. This position is 
evident in some early internationalisation theories, including the product life cycle 
(Vernon, 1966) and the Uppsala internationalisation process (Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977). Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) concluded that these two theories „work on the 
assumption that the subsidiary is an instrument of the MNC and, consequently, that it 
acts solely with regard to head-office-determined imperatives‟ (1998:775). As a 
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consequence, the agency of subsidiary managers is substantially restricted in this strand 
of literature. 
 
With the relaxation of assumptions of hierarchy, and the introduction of MNC 
conceptualisations based on heterarchy (Hedlund, 1986) and the differentiated network 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994; 1997), the attention shifted 
towards viewing subsidiary managers as contributing members to the wider 
multinational. Given the complexities of managing transnationals or multifocal firms, 
these scholars argued that subsidiary managers needed to be socialised members of the 
multinational capable of taking a wider view than the short-term requirements of the 
particular subsidiary in which they are working at any specific point in time. This thus 
shifts the focus away from the the top-down view in which subsidiary managers are 
mere instruments of headquarters. 
 
A similar stance is taken in the literature on autonomus strategic behaviour (Burgelman, 
1983a; 1983b) and subsidiary initiatives (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Birkinshaw et al., 
1998) which goes further by showing that subsidiary managers have the capability to act 
as active entrepreneurs. This position is thus similar to the literature on middle 
management which also points to the key strategic role played by managers at a lower 
level in the organisation than corporate top management. This feature of the middle 
management literature is well summarised by Bower and Gilbert (2007) who noted that 
„[w]e have found in one research study after another that how business really gets done 
has little connection to strategy developed at corporate headquarters‟ (2007:74, italics in 
original). Floyd and Wooldridge (1990; 1994; 1997) have also focused our attention on 
the critical role of middle managers both in terms of developing and implementing 
strategies. Their findings indicate that involvement of middle managers in the strategy 
formation process is associated with improved organisational performance (Woolridge 
& Floyd, 1990). Boundary spanning middle managers were found to have especially 
significant levels of strategic influence within their organisations, given that those 
managers typically mediate between the organisation and its environment (Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 1997). The above suggests that subsidiary managers of multinationals 
share many of the characteristics commonly attributed to middle managers. It can thus 
be argued that subsidiary managers play key roles as recipients and deployers of cross-
border integration initiatives. As such they share many of the key characteristics 
described in the middle management literature even though they may be perceived as 
top managers in a local subsidiary context. 
 
The active agency of subsidiary managers is also important in relation to the literature 
on execution. There has been recent interest in execution as evidenced by some best-
sellers in the popular management press. Bossidy, et al. (2002) argue that „[e]xecution is 
the unaddressed issue in the business world today. Its absence is the single biggest 
obstacle to success and the cause of most of the disappointments that are mistakenly 
attributed to other causes‟ (2002:5, italics in original). In a similar vein, Covey (2004) 
states that „[e]xecution is the great unaddressed issue in most organizations today. It is 
one thing to have a clear strategy; it is quite another to actually implement and realize 
the strategy, to execute. In fact, most leaders would agree that they‟d be better off 
having an average strategy with superb execution than a superb strategy with poor 
execution‟ (2004:271-275, italics in original). These practitioner oriented sources thus 
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shift the focus away from the potential elegance of strategy formulation towards 
actually getting things done. In this context, it would appear that how subsidiary 
managers respond to corporate integration efforts has a significant impact on the quality 
of execution. And the quality of execution, at the subsidiary level, has in turn a great 
deal to do with how successful such integration initiatives will become. 
 
2.6 Outlining the knowledge gap 
 
This section seeks to outline the gap in extant knowledge based on the preceding review 
of literature in relation to integration and subsidiary management. As the review 
includes a wide range of literature, both from within and outside, the international 
business domains, we need a general conceptual framework that allows us to synthesise 
the various contributions in a format suitable to pinpoint the knowledge gap. Based on 
numerous attempts at structuring the literature, I argue that a simple framework 
mapping contributions against the level of analysis allows us to draw key insights. In 
Figure 2-3 below, all major contributions reviewed in this chapter are mapped against 
the following five levels of analysis: industry, company, headquarters/parent, 
subsidiary/business unit and managerial levels. The purpose is to try to pinpoint the 
level at which these literatures operate in order to inform our understanding of what we 
know versus what we do not know about cross-border integration. To provide clarity, 
contributions are classified into belonging to either the MNC strategy and management 
domain or other literature. 
 
Figure 2-3 
Levels of analysis of literature 
 
Industry
Company
Headquarters/
Parent
Subsidiary/
Business Unit
Managers
MNC Strategy and Management LiteratureOther Literature
Marketing mix standardisation
Value chain analysis (I-O)
Corporate parenting
Strategic integration
Autonomous strategic
behaviour
Post-merger integration (M&A)
MNC strategy & structure
(environmental determinism)
MNC control & coordination
Subsidiary initiative
Procedural justice
Strategic change
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Starting at the top of Figure 2-3, we note that several strands of literature appear to 
operate at the intersection of industry and company levels. Within the IB literature, this 
is the case for much of the strategy and structure literature that derives a variety of 
different configurations (e.g. multidomestic, global, transnational) based on 
environmental determinism. Outside the IB field, we note that the literatures on 
marketing mix standardisation and value chain analysis also appear to be located at this 
level of analysis. 
 
Moving down, we find a number of literatures that are concerned with issues relating to 
the relationship between headquarters/parents and subsidiaries/strategic business units. 
In the IB literature, this is especially the case regarding work relating to MNC control 
and coordination mechanisms. In addition, we find the subsidiary initiative stream here 
as it explores how the charters and mandates of subsidiary units can evolve over time. 
Outside the IB field, we find relevant work relating to strategic integration and 
corporate parenting at this level of analysis. Both of these strands explore value creation 
or value destruction between the parent and business units. In addition, we find the 
work on autonomous strategic behaviour here which has a close similarlity to the 
subsidiary initiative stream in the MNC strategy and management literature. 
 
In the lower half of the figure, as we move from macro towards micro, we find those 
literatures that relate to the managerial dimension of relevance to cross-border 
integration. Within the IB literature, the theory of procedural justice occupies a unique 
position as the only identified stream of IB research that takes a distinct focus on 
subsidiary managers and their perceptions regarding the fairness of the integration 
process. Outside the IB literature, we find interesting work relating to post-merger 
integration, including the dynamics between acquiring and acquired managers that does 
not appear to be mirrored in the international business literature. We also find literature 
relating to the managerial dimension of strategic change. 
 
We are now in a position to draw several conclusions regarding the literature of 
relevance to cross-border integration. 
 
First, we can conclude that the literature on MNC cross-border integration in general is 
biased towards the macro (industry) and meso (company) levels of analysis with very 
limited micro level research, with the noteworthy exception of the procedural justice 
literature.  
 
Second, there is a clear lack of studies concerned with management practice and 
strategy execution at the subsidiary level. While there is substantial discussion about 
competing pressures for integration and responsiveness in the MNC strategy and 
structure stream, there is a lack of understanding regarding how subsidiary managers 
balance integration and responsiveness to cope with the institutional duality of 
simultaneously being exposed to requirements from the home and host environments. 
 
Third, given the lack of micro level studies, there is a shortage of managerial 
prescriptions grounded in micro level research. Existing prescriptions are thus primarily 
based on research conducted at the macro and meso levels without adequate attention 
paid to research concerning the managerial dimension.  
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Fourth, looking beyond the level of analysis framework presented above, we also note 
that the IB field is dominated by a positivist orientation with a bias towards quantitative 
studies (Welch & Welch, 2004; Yang, Wang, & Su, 2006). As an example, Welch and 
Welch (2004) found, in a review of articles published in the Journal of International 
Business Studies between 1990-1999, that only 3% of published articles reported 
qualitative research. 
 
Based on the above, the overall research questions for this dissertation are „how do 
MNC subsidiary managers interpret and respond to cross-border integration efforts 
and what are the managerial implications for headquarters and subsidiary 
managers?‟ 
 
This focus of the dissertation seeks to contribute towards closing the knowledge gap 
identified above by taking a micro rather than macro/meso orientation; by going inside 
the „black box‟ of the multinational subsidiary; by deriving managerial prescriptions 
grounded in micro level research; and by shifting the international business research 
agenda towards qualitative research. 
 
Following from the identification of the knowledge gap and the research questions, our 
attention now turns to two additional literatures that can inform the study. The first 
relates to managerial cognition and especially the sensemaking of managers. This 
literature is important given the intention to research how subsidiary managers interpret 
and respond to cross-border integration. The second area of literature concerns 
emerging micro perspectives on strategy (i.e. strategy-as-practice) and micro-politics. 
These latter areas are considered worth exploring given the objective to contribute 
towards moving the IB literature from a macro/meso bias towards micro level research. 
 
These two perspectives have not had a great deal of application within the international 
business field given the focus on macro and meso levels of analysis, and the 
documented bias towards positivist research. They thus offer the potential to enhance 
our understanding of cross-border integration further. 
 
2.7 Sensemaking perspective 
 
The literature on organisational behaviour informs us that early attempts at 
understanding human nature was often characterised by a simple stimulus-response (S-
R) model in which human behaviour was portrayed as fairly mechanistic and passive. 
Critique of the S-R models led to the modified S-O-R models: „Insistence upon a more 
active role of the perceiver led to a modification of the S-R model to one of S-O-R 
where the O represented the organism in the link between environmental conditions and 
responses. Much [organizational behavior] OB research today operates under this S-O-
R model, which affords cognitive processes a major role in the behavioral sequence‟ 
(Ilgen, & Klein, 1988:328-329). Managerial agency thus takes centre stage in the S-O-R 
models as opposed to mechanistic responses to environmental stimuli in the simple S-R 
models. This perspective thus attempts to forge a link between managerial cognition and 
organisational action (Dutton & Jackson, 1987) which is useful for this study given the 
concern with how subsidiary managers interpret and respond to cross-border integration 
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efforts. 
 
The field of international business (IB) is dominated by research based on a positivist 
paradigm. As a result, most IB research appears to be based on the assumption that the 
environment exists as an objective entity in isolation from the multinational corporation. 
From the perspective of sensemaking, reality is socially constructed through the 
interaction of actors rather than an objective entity that can be isolated from the actors.  
Sensemaking is defined as the „processes of interpretation and meaning production 
whereby individuals and groups reflect on and interpret phenomena and produce 
intersubjective accounts‟(Brown, 2000:45). Sensemaking is thus based on the 
constructivist premise that people create their social reality and then respond to that 
reality. This leads to a portrait of „human activity as an ongoing input-output cycle in 
which subjective interpretations of externally situated information become themselves 
objectified via behaviour‟ (Porac, Thomas & Baden-Fuller, 1989). The environment is 
thus not an objective entity that can be isolated from the actors. In fact Daft and Weick 
(1984) have argued that „[o]rganizations must make interpretations. Managers literally 
must wade into the ocean of events that surround the organization and try to make 
active sense of them‟ (1984: 286). This is in contrast to the objectivist ontology with the 
assumption of an independent external reality. As argued by Weick (1979) „the firm 
partitioning of the world into the environment and the organization excludes the 
possibility that people invent rather than discover part of what they think they see‟ 
(1979:166). From a sensemaking perspective, people thus enact reality. Scott (2003) has 
defined enactment as „the active process by which individuals, in interaction, construct a 
picture of their world, their environment, their situation‟ (2003:98). Rather than being 
static, environments break down and get recreated in a social process (Weick, 1979). 
„To talk about sensemaking is to talk about reality as an ongoing accomplishment that 
takes form when people make retrospective sense of the situations in which they find 
themselves and their creations... People make sense of things by seeing a world on 
which they already imposed what they believe‟ (Weick, 1995:15). Weick (1979) is 
using the term „enacted environment‟ to signify that meaningful environments are 
outputs of the organising process rather than inputs to the process. This ongoing process 
of collective reality construction is capable of producing institutions. In the language of 
Weick (1995) „[i]t is this institutionalizing of social constructions into the way things 
are done, and the transmission of these products, that links ideas about sensemaking 
with those of institutional theory. Sensemaking is the feedstock of institutionalization‟ 
(1995:36). Linking this with the previous change discussion, enactment is thus a critical 
process to help people construct new interpretive schemas, and make sense of their new 
reality, as the organisation changes from one strategy configuration to another. 
Labianca, Gray and Brass (2000) have defined schemas as „generalized cognitive 
frameworks that give form and meaning to experience, and contain general knowledge 
about a domain. They are a collection of related ideas and specific examples about a 
domain‟ (2000:237). Schemas help individuals to process information by reducing 
ambiguity and creating meaning (Lord & Foti, 1986; Thomas & McDaniel, 1990). 
 
Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) have argued for the central role of leaders as sensegivers. 
Based on their definitions, this dissertation will use „sensemaking‟ to refer to meaning 
construction and reconstruction by change recipients while „sensegiving‟ is concerned 
with the process of attempting to influence the sensemaking and meaning construction 
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of others towards their preferred redefinition of organisational reality (1991:442). The 
separation between sensegivers and sensemakers is insightful in a multinational context 
given the interplay between managers at headquarters and in subsidiaries. 
 
A key feature of organisational life is ambiguity and ambiguity supports several 
different interpretations at the same time (Weick, 1995). Smircich and Stubbart (1985)  
propose that „[i]n an enacted environment model, the world is essentially an ambiguous 
field of experience‟ (1985:726). Weick (1979) has similarly stated that „[t]he basic raw 
materials on which organizations operate are informational inputs that are ambiguous, 
uncertain, equivocal‟ (1979:6). Given the inherent messiness of organisational life, a 
key task of organising is to reach an agreement regarding what is real versus what is 
illusory. Weick (1979) has labelled this process consensual validation, to note that 
organisational members spend a significant amount of time negotiating an acceptable 
version of reality to reduce equivocality. As argued by Weick (1995): „[i]n real-world 
practice, problems do not present themselves to the practitioners as givens. They must 
be constructed from the materials of problematic situations which are puzzling, 
troubling, and uncertain. In order to convert a problematic situation to a problem, a 
practitioner must do a certain kind of work. He must make sense of an uncertain 
situation that initially makes no sense‟ (1995:9). The objective of this process is to 
reduce uncertainty to a workable level so that the organisation can function properly.  
 
There are similarities between consensual validation and McKinley and Scherer‟s 
(2000) concept of creating „cognitive order‟ meaning „a reduction of uncertainty that 
results from foreclosing alternative possibilities of meaning or action and embracing a 
single one‟ (2000:738). There are also clear parallels to what Brunsson (1985; 1989) 
calls action rationality referring to focusing on a single path of action in contrast to the 
evaluation of multiple possibilities in a rational decision-making process. However, 
given that people enact multiple subjective realities there is possibility for substantial 
tension as some social actors enact a less ambiguous reality from their perspective. 
McKinley and Scherer (2000) have argued that „the sense of cognitive order felt by top 
executives as a result of restructuring is not shared by their subordinates, who are prone 
to perceive organizational restructuring as a source of cognitive disorder, because it 
disrupts established business processes and opens up alternatives to established ways of 
getting work done. Therefore, the possibility arises of a bifurcation, or gap, between the 
cognitions of top managers and their subordinates as organizational restructuring 
progresses‟ (2000:747). This points to the important distinction between top 
management as change initiators and middle managers as change recipients and change 
deployers (Balogun & Johnson, 2005). Sensemaking is also made more difficult in 
ambiguous change situations such as during transition from one strategy configuration 
to another. In such situations, it thus becomes harder for social actors to enact a new 
collective interpretive schema of reality. Managers then need to construct new meanings 
of the changes in order to take action (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982). 
 
As we have seen, the cognitive sensemaking perspective thus makes a departure from 
the assumption of an objective environment or reality that is separate from social actors. 
This perspective thus contributes valuable insights into the subjective nature of human 
interpretation and acknowledges the link between interpretation and action. With the 
exception of the procedural justice literature, as discussed, this stance is not commonly 
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adopted in mainstream international business research. As a result, we have the 
opportunity to enrich our understanding of cross-border integration by applying a 
research perspective which acknowledges respondents‟ perceptions and interpretations. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2 below attempts to identidy contributions that a sensemaking perspective 
could make in this dissertation. The figure illustrates that tension or dissonance can 
occur if there is a mismatch between subsidiary managers‟ schema and the actions taken 
by managers at headquarters. In the context of subsidiary-headquarters relations, this 
dissertation defines „tension‟ as when subsidiary managers experience a degree of 
incompatibility between local and global requirements. 
 
Figure 2-4 
The research focus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following the sensemaking discussion, we next turn our attention towards recent 
interest in micro perspectives on strategy and politics. In this context, it is worth noting 
that these perspectives typically adopt an interpretive position consistent with the 
cognitive sensemaking perspective discussed above. 
 
 
2.8 Micro perspectives on strategy and politics 
  
There has recently been an increased interest in exploring strategy phenomena from a 
„micro‟ or „strategy-as-practice‟ perspective, which supports the focus in this 
dissertation on going inside the black box of the multinational subsidiary (Chia, 2004; 
Jarzabkowski, 2004; Jarzabkowski, 2005; Johnson & Bowman, 1999; Johnson et al., 
2003; Whittington, 1996; Whittington, 2004). For the purposes of clarity, micro strategy 
is defined as the study of strategy at the level of individuals and their group interactions, 
in contrast to macro strategy which studies strategy at the level of the organisation, 
across organisations and the interactions between the organisation and the environment. 
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Reverting back to Figure 2-3, we thus note that there has been a dominance of macro 
strategy in relation to cross-border integration. 
 
Within the strategy-as-practice community, there is a growing concern that academic 
strategy research has lost managerial relevance and become overly obsessed with the 
rigour and mathematical pyrotechnics of modernist quantitative strategy research. As 
already discussed, we noted a similar bias in favour of quantitative research in the 
internatonal business field. The strategy-as-practice perspective is concerned with a gap 
between academic research about what people do and what they actually do 
(Jarzabkowski, 2004). The focus is often on „the close understanding of the myriad, 
micro activities that make up strategy and strategizing in practice‟ (Johnson et al., 
2003:3). Such a view of stratey is consistent with Mintzberg‟s (1978) definition of 
strategy as a pattern in a stream of decisions over time which may arise through 
planned/deliberate actions as well as through emergent actions 
 
From the above, we can thus note the emergence of a group of scholars that advocate 
the need to re-orient strategy research in general towards micro-level. However, it is 
worth noting that with the exception of Regner‟s (2003) comparative study of strategy 
making at headquarters and in MNC subsidiaries, strategy-as-practice scholars have not 
paid much attention to international business topics to date. 
 
Next we turn our attention towards the recent debate regarding MNC micro-politics 
(Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2006; Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2006; Geppert, 2003; 
Mense-Petermann, 2006; Sharpe, 2006). Similar to the strategy-as-practice perspective, 
we note that scholars interested in MNC micro-politics take a similar micro view and 
often favour an interpretive stance. Authors writing from this perspective have argued 
that „[t]he focus on micro-politics in MNCs is first and foremost about bringing back 
the actors and examining the conflicts that emerge when powerful actors with different 
goals, interests and identities interact with each other locally and across national and 
functional borders. Despite some general claims to have incorporated actors‟ strategies 
and interests (Doz & Prahalad, 1993) and a general rethinking of the mainly context-
based understanding of organizations in terms of action theories since the 1980s, most 
empirical studies are still strongly influenced by contingency theories‟ (Dörrenbächer & 
Geppert, 2006:255-256, italics in original). The micro-political perspective views 
politics and conflicts within MNCs as normal social reality rather than as signs of 
dysfunctional management, or the results of a misfit between a given strategy 
configuration and the environment (Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2006). Dörrenbächer and 
Geppert (2006) have further argued that micro-politics are a normal consequence as 
MNCs struggle with balancing global integration and local responsiveness but that 
„there are very few scholars developing an awareness of the increasing importance of 
power, politics and conflicts in the newly emerging transnational organization forms‟ 
(2006:253). 
 
While the micro-politics debate is very recent within an MNC context, there has been a 
related discussion for some time outside of the IB literature regarding how social actors 
manage different institutional pressures. Especially noteworthy in this respect is the 
conceptual work by Oliver (1991) regarding her categorisation of five types of strategic 
responses to institutional pressures: acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance and 
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manipulation. Similar arguments have typically not been made in relation to the study 
of multinational corporations.  
 
Taken together, the two complementary perspectives of strategy-as-practice and micro 
politics have to date only seen limited application in the field of international business. 
However, they offer promising avenues to pursue in order to enrich our understanding 
of cross-border integration.  
 
Against the background of the preceding literature review, identification of knowledge 
gap and research questions, we now turn our attention to the research methodology 
applied in this dissertation. 
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3 METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the research design in terms of philosophical 
perspective, selection of case studies, data collection and data analysis. 
 
3.1 Philosophical perspective 
 
Ontology deals with the nature of reality while epistemology deals with questions about 
how and what it is possible to know (Chia, 2002).  Ontological assumptions are thus 
concerned with what we believe constitute social reality and epistemology refers to 
valid ways of gaining insights into the social reality within a particular ontological 
perspective (Blaikie, 2000). Based on Blaikie (2000), methods are defined as specific 
techniques or procedures to collect and analyse data while methodology refers to a 
wider discussion of how research should be conducted.  
 
Blaikie (2000) recommends the selection of a research strategy in order to ensure a 
consistent and valid approach to answer research questions. Blaikie has identified four 
possible research strategies: inductive, deductive, retroductive and abductive. Central 
characteristics of research strategies and how they relate to philosophical perspectives 
are outlined below in Table 3-1. 
Table 3-1 
Summary of different philosophical perspectives 
Philosophical 
perspectives 
Positivist Critical 
Rationalism 
Structural 
(Transcendental) 
Realism 
Constructivist 
Realism 
Interpretivist 
Central 
Philosophers 
Bacon, 
Mill 
Popper Bhaskar Harré Peirce, Willer, 
Blaikie 
Ontology Objectivist 
 (Absolutist / Realist) 
Constructivist  
(Relativist) 
Scope Natural & Social Sciences Social Sciences 
Associated 
Research 
Strategy 
Induction Deduction Retroduction Abduction 
Exploration Major - - - Major 
Description Major - - - Major 
Explanation Minor Major Major Major - 
Prediction Minor Major - - - 
Understanding - - - Major Major 
Change - Minor Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Output Laws Tested 
hypotheses 
Models of underlying structures 
or generative mechanisms 
Respondents‟ 
accounts 
Researchers 
stance 
Detached / 
Inquiry from the outside 
Involved / 
Inquiry from the inside 
Starting point Data Theory Data Data Data 
Initial account 
of reality 
Based on ‟objective‟ data Based on respondents‟ subjective 
accounts 
Final account 
(Theory) 
Researcher‟s  
viewpoint 
Respondents‟ 
viewpoint 
Source: based on Blaikie (1993; 2000), Evered and Louis (1981).  
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Selection of research strategy and philosophical perspective 
 
This research is concerned with MNC integration from the perspective of subsidiary 
managers. Given my intention to understand integration from the perspectives of 
subsidiary managers my inquiry is based on the assumption that reality is socially 
constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) and that people respond to their constructed 
reality. I thus reject the objectivist stance of positivism, critical rationalism and 
structural/ transcendental realism. Having adopted a constructivist ontology left me with 
a choice between a retroductive research strategy based on constructivist realism or an 
abductive research strategy based on classic interpretivism. As I sought to explain how 
subsidiary managers interpret and respond to corporate integration initiatives, an 
orthodox interpretive approach was considered unsuitable given my intention to derive 
explanations. Given this focus in my research questions, I selected a retroductive 
research strategy from a constructivist realist perspective. Despite the potential for 
substantial criticism from proponents of several different perspectives, I believe the 
selected research strategy offers two unique advantages over other possible approaches. 
First, in contrast to the abstract and detached nature of the inductive and deductive 
research strategies, the constructivist stance allows me to confront the messy and 
ambiguous managerial reality of everyday life in multinational corporations. Second, in 
contrast to the abductive approach, the retroductive strategy allows me to provide 
explanations rather than simply rich descriptions and accounts of social life from the 
perspective of social actors.  
 
Retroductive research strategy 
 
The retroductive research strategy is based on realism which is distinct in dividing 
reality into three domains: the empirical, the actual and the real. Events that can be 
observed are located in the empirical domain while the actual domain consists of all 
events whether or not they can be observed. The real domain, in contrast, consists of the 
underlying structures or generative mechanisms that produce the events in the empirical 
and actual domains (Bhaskar, 1975). According to Bhaskar‟s (1979) structural version 
of realism the „essence lies in the movement at any one level from knowledge of 
manifest phenomena to knowledge of the structures that generate them‟(1979:13, italics 
in original). Retroductive research thus starts with an observed regularity or 
phenomenon and then seeks to uncover either the underlying structure or generative 
mechanism responsible for the regularity or phenomenon of study. Harré and Secord 
(1972) have referred to this process of discovery and identification of mechanisms as 
„ethogeny‟ (1972:9).  Such theorising around mechanisms can aspire to explain but not 
to predict (Davis & Marquis, 2005). The approach is essentially data driven (Langley, 
1999) and then uses imagination and creativity to construct an hypothetical model 
explaining the regularity. Following from this, the researcher seeks to prove the 
existence of the mechanism and make possible modifications to the model. This creative 
process is required as structures and mechanisms in the ‟real‟ domain are typically not 
directly observable but have to be imagined before evidence can be sought (Blaikie, 
2000).  In this regard, there are some similarities to Weick‟s (1989) notion of theory 
construction as disciplined imagination. This approach to theory construction is shared 
by both structural realism and constructivist realism. The two approaches are instead 
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separated based on different ontological assumptions regarding whether the nature of 
reality is objective or socially constructed.  
 
As the retroductive research strategy is based on explaining an observed regularity or 
phenomenon, rather than identifying it in the first place, the retroductive research 
strategy relies on either induction or abduction to explore and describe a phenomenon. 
Following from this, the retroductive logic is used to seek explanation. Based on the 
underlying difference in ontological assumptions, the structural version depends on the 
inductive research strategy for exploration and description while the constructivist 
version is informed by prior abductive research and thus takes the starting point in 
accounts of how respondents construct reality and act in response to their own 
constructions (Blaikie, 2000). 
 
Realists further argue that absolute causality cannot be established and the best that can 
be achieved is an understanding of tendencies and how underlying structures and 
generative mechanisms are contingent upon contextual factors. This means that even if 
a structure or mechanism exists in the real domain, it does not have to generate a 
specific event in the empirical or actual domains. Depending on the context, the 
mechanism can remain dormant, be cancelled or modified by competing mechanisms 
(Blaikie, 2000; Tsoukas, 1989). A key task of realist researchers is thus not only to 
uncover structures or mechanisms but also to understand how these are activated 
depending on different contextual factors. 
 
Implications of selected strategy 
 
Given that the selected research strategy fits within the paradigm (Kuhn, 1962) of 
constructivist social science, there are a number of implications following from the 
choice of research strategy.  
 
This includes the importance of context in contrast to the de-contextual nature 
prominent in positivist research building on the research tradition initiated by the 17
th
 
century rationalists. As argued by Toulmin (1990) „[a]fter 1630, philosophers ignored 
the concrete, timely, particular issues of practical philosophy, and pursued abstract, 
timeless, and universal (i.e. theoretical) issues. Today, this theoretical agenda is wearing 
out its welcome, and the philosophical problems of practice are coming back in focus‟ 
(1990:186). In the terminology of the Greek philosophers, this research is thus 
concerned with „phronesis‟ rather than „episteme‟ (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
As used in Aristotelian philosophy, „episteme‟ refers to scientific knowledge in the 
sense of the pursuit of universal truths while „Phronesis, an Aristotelian term, refers to a 
discipline that is pragmatic, variable, context dependent, based on practical rationality, 
leading not to a concern with generating formal covering lawlike explanations but to 
building contextual, case-based knowledge‟ (Clegg & Ross-Smith, 2003:86, italics in 
original). Similar calls for a reorientation of research towards practice have been made 
by advocates of both Mode 2 management research (Das, 2003; Huff, 2000; Balogun, 
Huff, & Johnson, 2003; Romme, 2003; Starkey & Madan, 2001; Tranfield & Starkey, 
1998; van Aken, 2005) and strategy-as-practice (Chia, 2004; Jarzabkowski, 2004; 
Jarzabkowski, 2005; Johnson et al., 2003; Whittington, 1996; Whittington, 2004). 
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Given the objective to understand social reality from the perspective of social actors, it 
would be desirable to try to inhabit their social world as a „native‟ rather than being a 
detached outsider (Blaikie, 2000). This ideally requires an element of „inquiry from the 
inside‟ rather than „inquiry from the outside‟ (Evered & Louis, 1981). 
 
Constructivist realism takes its starting point in exploration or description generated 
from the abductive research strategy. These initial accounts provide the opportunity to 
conduct a first-order descriptive analysis of findings that is closely grounded in the data 
from the researched case. While perhaps acceptable as the final research product by 
some abductive researchers, this first-order analysis is the starting point for the realist. 
The next step consists of a second-order theoretical analysis with the objective of 
uncovering the generative mechanisms and contextual factors that lead to the events in 
the empirical or actual domains. The purpose of second-order analysis is to theorise and 
to generate insights that might be relevant beyond the specific case researched (Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991).  
 
I argue that grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) offers a 
suitable methodology that is consistent with my philosophical stance. Grounded theory 
seeks to develop theories closely grounded in empirical data and the research 
methodology is located at the border between abductive and retroductive research 
strategies. My reasoning is based on Partington (2000) who has advocated the use of 
grounded theory from a realist perspective to build management theory, and Charmaz 
(2000; 2006) who has proposed a constructivist version of grounded theory in contrast 
to the original, somewhat positivist orientation of the approach. Given the need to move 
between first-order and second-order analysis, grounded theory appears to fit the 
retroductive research strategy especially well. Blaikie (2000) has argued that qualitative 
researchers differ to the extent that they take a low stance to preserve respondents‟ 
accounts of concepts and phenomenon versus taking a high stance by imposing their 
own concepts and categories on lay accounts. The reductionist nature of grounded 
theory is based on moving to a higher order of abstraction which typically means that 
the researcher is subsequently imposing categories to abstract from the initial categories 
which emerge directly from the data. This is especially important in constructivist 
realism as the second-order analysis requires the researcher to theorise from a high 
stance to determine generative mechanisms. In this context it is interesting to note the 
similarities with some forms of abductive research; examples include Gioia and 
Chittipeddi (1991) who have used first- and second-order analysis and Van Maanen 
(1979) who refers to first- and second-order constructs.  
 
3.2 Possible critique from philosophical standpoints 
 
The selected research strategy is open to criticism from advocates of alternative 
philosophical perspectives and research strategies. While I believe that all research 
ultimately has to be evaluated against the specific ontological and epistemological 
criteria inherent within a given research strategy, I have tried to outline possible 
critiques below from advocates of alternative approaches. 
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Inductive 
 
I believe that researchers focused on classic inductivism would be sympathetic to the 
„data driven‟ (Langley, 1999) nature of my research process, with the objective of 
building theory from bottom-up. However, beyond that they would have substantial 
ontological and epistemological concerns. From an ontological perspective, they would 
reject my constructivist view of social reality in favour of the pursuit of discovering the 
„objective‟ truth. The implication is that they would reject my research design on two 
epistemological grounds. First, they would not accept my focus on abduction and the 
fact that I take my starting point in accounts of how my respondents construct reality. 
While I am open to multiple realities being constructed by my respondents, and the fact 
that I seek to understand reality from their perspective, the classic inductivists would 
instead seek to come closer to an absolute and objective reality. Second, they would 
have concerns with my involvement in two of the case studies and thus the fact that I 
could not be regarded as a detached, objective researcher. This would lead them to 
argue that my involvement would have contaminated the „objective truth‟. In addition, 
inductive researchers would argue that the validity of my model of generative 
mechanisms cannot be established and that it will be up to judgemental arguments 
rather than scientific evidence to assess the model. 
 
Deductive 
 
Deductive researchers would also have a number of concerns with my research design. 
From an ontological perspective, they would concur with the viewpoint of the 
inductivists that multiple realities are not possible in favour of one objective reality. On 
epistemological grounds, they would thus reject the abductive focus on interacting with 
respondents to understand how they construct their realities. They would also agree with 
the inductivists that the validity of the model cannot be scientifically established and 
that the model would thus have to be assessed on a judgmental basis. Their proposed 
remedy would be to develop hypotheses from the research for subsequent „scientific‟ 
testing. In addition, they would not appreciate the bottom-up, grounded, approach to 
building data in favour of a priori determined hypotheses for subsequent testing. Having 
said the above, the deductivists would recognise two features of my approach as 
resembling their own viewpoints. First, the retroductive approach of using prior 
knowledge to inform the construction of a model to account for the phenomenon of 
study would be somewhat similar to setting up hypotheses of how the world works in 
the deductive approach. Second, my focus on constant comparisons, and alterations 
between theory and data, would have features in common with the temporary nature of 
deductivist knowledge and have some similarities with how they seek to refute or falsify 
(Popper, 1959) an existing theory, based on contradicting empirical evidence, in order 
to advance our understanding further.  
 
Retroductive 
 
As my research is based on constructivist realism, the research might be challenged by 
advocates of the structural version of realism. Such researchers would generally 
recognise and be sympathetic to my focus on generative mechanisms and model 
building efforts. However, they would have an ontological concern with my 
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constructivist perspective of social reality. While my starting point is exploration from 
an abductive stance, using respondents‟ own accounts of reality, they would instead 
insist on starting from the objectivist ontology of classic induction. Thus, while the 
approach would be largely the same, there are epistemological differences as to what 
would count as valid knowledge for determining generative mechanisms and 
constructing models. 
 
Abductive 
 
The critique from within the abductive camp would also be mixed. While abductive 
researchers would accept my ontological assumption of reality as socially constructed, 
there would be differing epistemological opinions as to what can be done to analyse the 
data once it has been collected. From the viewpoint of „purist‟ interpretivists, all that is 
possible would be to generate a rich description of how the respondents construct their 
worlds. They would thus reject my second-order retroductive analysis to analyse and 
construct a model of generative mechanisms on the grounds that such an approach is not 
consistent with seeking to understand reality from the perspective of the respondents. 
By seeking to „construct‟ a model of generative mechanisms, they would argue that I 
have contaminated the abductive approach by introducing my own perspective into the 
model building and taken an inappropriate high stance in contrast to the low stance they 
would advocate. From an orthodox abductivist perspective, it would thus not be 
possible to construct a reductionist model of generative mechanisms based on a 
researcher‟s creative imagination and analysis. Having said the above, there are many 
„liberal‟ scholars within the abductive camp that would allow the researcher to analyse 
and interpret the findings with a view to developing propositions or models at a more 
aggregate level than the individual rich account of social actors. 
 
3.3 Selection of cases 
 
My original intention had been to „catch reality in flight‟ (Pettigrew, 1990) and conduct 
a longitudinal, embedded case study of integration initiatives in Orange Denmark. This 
would have provided the opportunity to conduct action research along the lines of 
collaborative inquiry (Eden & Huxham, 2002; Reason, 2001; Reason, 2006; Reason & 
McArdle, 2004; Reason & Torbert, 2001). However following the sale of the business 
to TeliaSonera, this avenue was no longer feasible given that my secondment from 
Orange headquarters finished three months after the sale of the business. Given this, I 
changed focus to a multiple case study design. 
 
The empirical material consists of five case studies of subsidiaries in China (1), 
Denmark (2), Romania (1) and Sweden (1).  Following Birkinshaw and Hood (1998), a 
subsidiary is defined as „a value-adding entity in a host country‟ (1998:774). As 
presented in the introduction chapter, I argue that the mobile communications industry 
provides a suitable context to research how subsidiary managers interpret and respond 
to cross-border integration. Given the identified gap in knowledge, the decision was 
taken to focus specifically on subsidiary managers rather than to also interview 
managers at headquarters. 
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Cross-border integration was an important element in all of the researched organisations 
but the shape and form of integration efforts differed significantly across the case 
studies. While the research progressed according to the principle of theoretical 
sampling, whereby cases were selected sequentially, a short overview of the cases is 
provided below for the reader‟s convenience. Further details about the theoretical 
sampling logic is then provided within each of the first-order findings chapters. In 
comparison to much positivist research, it is important to stress this point as it might 
otherwise appear as if the five case studies were selected prior to the start of the 
fieldwork. The sampling strategy can best be labelled as „planned opportunism‟ 
(Pettigrew, 1990) given the combination of theoretical aspects and a consideration for 
the possibility of securing research access. As will be discussed later, the inclusion of 
Vodafone China was especially opportunistic.   
 
Orange Denmark and Orange Romania 
 
My research interest in cross-border integration was sparked during my secondment 
from headquarters to the Danish subsidiary of Orange from October 2002 until 
December 2004. Following a sabbatical leave, I accepted another secondment to Orange 
Romania to assist the CEO with strategy development. This assignment was much 
shorter compared with Denmark and only lasted from December 2005 until February 
2006. This provided the opportunity to add one more Orange subsidiary to the research 
programme. 
 
The two Orange cases are examples of far reaching corporate integration efforts that 
affected a substantial number of business functions. There were thus significant efforts 
both to align the customer experience as well as to coordinate the delivery of business 
functions. Orange was running integration efforts by setting business requirements for 
integration, typically involving some form of consultation with subsidiaries, and then 
creating central roadmaps for the delivery and rollout across countries. Once decided, 
integration initiatives were to a high degree „forced‟ upon subsidiaries, though the scale 
and speed of deployment varied. The Orange cases are thus examples of integration as 
configurational changes given the magnitude of change. The cases differ in that the 
Danish subsidiary was a sub-scale operation with limited bargaining power versus the 
corporate centre while the Romanian subsidiary was one of the most profitable 
operations in the Orange group. The hypercompetitive situation in the Danish market, 
led to the Danish subsidiary being sold to TeliaSonera in October 2004. 
 
Given that I was seconded to both the Danish and the Romanian subsidiaries while 
conducting the research, these two case studies represent „inquiry from the inside‟, 
while the other three case studies are examples of „inquiry from the outside‟ (Evered & 
Louis, 1981). 
 
3 Sweden and 3 Denmark 
 
The 3 case studies represent a very different approach to cross-border integration. 3 
launched with a common brand name across its subsidiaries in Australia, Austria, 
Denmark, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Sweden and the UK from the beginning. This is in 
sharp contrast to the gradual internationalisation of Orange. Given this, 3 could procure 
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networks, IT systems and handsets on a group basis and achieve some economies of 
scale. However, beyond these major areas, integration was rarely mandated from 
headquarters but instead took place on a voluntary basis between countries. The result, 
was a lower level of cross-border integration compared with Orange. However, it was 
interesting to note that the level of integration between 3 in Sweden and Denmark was 
very significant and in many ways goes beyond the level of operational integration 
within Orange. In the Nordic region, there was a shared services organisation 
responsible for network, IT and finance. The two 3 cases are thus characterised by a 
limited global layer of integration focused on some major areas including brand name 
and purchasing together with tight operational integration between Sweden and 
Denmark.  
 
Vodafone China 
 
Vodafone China is a fully owned subsidary of Vodafone in China. The subsidiary is 
responsible for managing the relationship with China Mobile which is the world‟s 
largest mobile operator with over 270 million customers when the case study was 
conducted. China Mobile is organised into 31 subsidiaries covering all provinces in 
China. The company is majority owned (76%) by the Chinese government and 
Vodafone only owns 3.27% of the operator. However, given the competence and global 
scale of the Vodafone Group and the massive local scale of China Mobile, there were 9 
cooperation work streams between Vodafone and China Mobile. These work streams 
covered technical, commercial, cost savings and standard settings areas.  
 
As a majority state-owned company, China Mobile is managed in a top-down way. 
Given this, there is a Chairman‟s forum where the CEO of Vodafone and China Mobile 
meets twice per year to discuss cooperation opportunities and agree on high priority 
areas. There is then a more operational steering committee which meets four times per 
year to establish the roadmap, monitor progress, make operational decisions and resolve 
issues. 
 
The case of Vodafone in China was yet another case of cross-border integration in the 
mobile communications industry. Given the low ownership control, and the fact that 
China Mobile is not branded Vodafone, integration efforts were limited to specific 
initiatives and were thus closer to a strategic alliance than a subsidiary. However, this 
case study concerns the fully owned subsidiary Vodafone China rather than China 
Mobile. To date, most integration initiatives related to value chain/activity integration 
and there have almost not been any examples of marketing/customer experience 
standardisation, with the exception of roaming services. 
 
Comparison of cases 
 
Looking for similarities and differences between the cases, it appears that there are three 
different approaches taken to integration. The two Orange cases represent a relatively 
tight model of integration with large central support and development functions, central 
roadmaps and programme management and the relatively frequent use of expatriates. 
Orange is thus largely achieving integration by structural means. However, the level of 
operational integration of core business functions is rather limited. In contrast, 3 in 
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Scandinavia represents a very different model with rather limited global integration and 
an almost non-existent headquarters structure. Coordination efforts are largely the result 
of the personal commitment of Hutchison‟s CEO and ad hoc decisions to cooperate 
between managers in different countries. However, while this represents the general 
model for 3, there is a very high level of operational integration in Scandinavia as the 
business is run through a shared services organisation covering network, IT and finance. 
The case of Vodafone in China is different again in that it would be more similar to a 
strategic alliance, limited to specific cooperation programmes. This is in contrast to 
Vodafone‟s overall model which is similar to, and probably more developed than the 
Orange model of structural integration across a large number of areas.  Appendix 14.1 
outlines the three different models identified in this research. 
 
There are also significant similarities and differences between the individual case 
studies. Appendix 14.2 compares the cases across a number of contextual dimensions. 
Taken together with the previous discussion of three different integration models, the 
selected cases include a large degree of variation across several different areas that may 
affect managerial perceptions. 
 
3.4 Data collection 
 
A special feature of grounded theory construction is the alternation between data 
collection and analysis. This implies a cyclical process with constant comparisons 
between data and the emerging theory, and further data collection based on theoretical 
sampling, rather than a linear process in which all data is collected up front and only 
subsequently analysed. For this research programme it means that data collection and 
analysis have taken place continuously. For the purposes of presentation, this 
dissertation does however adopt the convention, set by the positivist research paradigm, 
of presenting literature up front, followed by methods and then findings (Suddaby, 
2006).  It is however, important to stress that this format has been adopted to provide 
clarity to the reader, rather than to reflect the chronological unfolding of the research. 
 
Data was collected using semi-structured interviews for all cases. Semi-structured 
interviews were considered appropriate in order to gain a rich and deep understanding 
of integration from the perspectives of the respondents. The first case, Orange Denmark, 
may be considered a pilot study in that it helped to focus the research and take the 
research topic into the empirical domain. The questions used in the Danish case were 
later replicated in the other four case studies. However, additional questions were added 
to the subsequent case studies as I had gained a clearer idea of what I was looking for 
and the extended literature review had indicated the potential usefulness of unbundling 
integration into marketing mix/customer experience standardisation and value 
chain/activity coordination. The interview guide for Romania thus built directly on the 
Danish guide by adding additional discussion topics. The interview guide used for 3 in 
Denmark and Sweden as well as Vodafone in China was an updated version of the one 
used for Orange Romania. The significant changes related to adding some additional 
questions regarding corporate parenting and questions to understand managerial 
responses to tensions. 
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Consistent with the middle management perspective (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1994; Floyd 
& Wooldridge, 1997; Huy, 2001; Huy, 2002; Woolridge & Floyd, 1990), I included 
boundary spanning middle managers in all cases to complement my interviews with top 
management respondents. All respondents were invited to meet with me via e-mail. The 
invitation e-mail stated that participation in the research was voluntary and that their 
names would not be identified in the final report. I also provided a brief description of 
the objectives of the research to ensure that respondents had some time to reflect on the 
topic, but the interview guide was not distributed in advance. All respondents granted 
permission for me to digitally record the interviews and they were later transcribed prior 
to analysis yielding over 150,000 words. Interviews were conducted in English with the 
exception of five interviews at 3 Sweden and one at 3 Denmark. All transcripts were 
coded directly in the original language and selected text passages were translated to 
English for inclusion in this dissertation. 
 
In terms of timing, this meant that I collected and analysed the Orange Denmark data 
prior to arriving in Romania. I thus conducted both first-order and second-order analysis 
of the Orange Denmark data before continuing the research with additional empirical 
material. The same process was repeated for the material collected in Romania. I 
analysed the Romanian findings in comparison to the Danish data before the decision 
was taken to extend the research to additional cases. However, following this step, data 
for the additional three case studies were collected without each additional case being 
analysed before proceeding to the next. The approach was thus largely developed for the 
first two cases and subsequently replicated across the other three case studies as 
illustrated in Figure 3-1 below. 
 
Figure 3-1 
Case studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A list of respondents has been provided in each of the subsequent chapters together with 
further details regarding the interview guides used. 
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3.5 Data analysis 
 
This section presents the data analysis process. As the cases were analysed sequentially, 
I will detail how the analysis evolved in a linear way. 
 
Orange Denmark case 
 
The transcribed interviews were coded in a manner consistent with grounded theory as 
described in Corbin and Strauss (1998) based on the three phases of open coding, axial 
coding and selective coding. I started by printing copies of the interview transcripts and 
conducted line-by-line analysis of the content. During this initial review, I made 
frequent marks in the margins for possible codes. This process helped to sensitise me to 
the content in the interviews and to determine possible codes to structure the content. 
After this first review, I imported all transcripts into the software programme NVivo 
v2.0 to facilitate further analysis. I repeated the open coding process with line-by-line 
analysis again in NVivo. However, this time I coded sections of text as free nodes with 
reference to my original margin notes and additional thinking that had emerged during 
the review of all transcripts. Already during the open coding process, some higher-order 
categories started to emerge. When that happened, I created tree nodes to structure both 
previous free nodes and new emerging nodes. However, the process of free coding 
continued throughout. This meant that I started the process of clustering nodes in 
parallel to the open coding. This clustering process is referred to as axial coding in that 
nodes are re-arranged around central categories. This process of coding continued until 
no further concepts were identified. When all transcripts had been coded, I again 
reviewed the nodes and completed the axial coding phase by focusing specifically on 
the remaining free nodes. During this stage, I renamed, moved or merged nodes to 
create consistency. In the end I had two primary tree nodes labelled „tension‟ and 
„management‟. The „tension‟ category structured all findings relating to the frequency 
of tension, impact of tension, which functions had been affected by tension, reasons for 
tensions and how managers had reacted to tension. The „management‟ strategy instead 
focused on what subsidiary managers had done to manage or cope with tension and 
what they thought that managers at headquarters should have done differently. During 
this step in the process, I decided to focus on tension as the primary category and the 
next step consisted of relating all other categories to tension. This step in the process is 
known as „selective‟ coding.  
 
The original node structure from the Danish case is available in Appendix 14.7  and 
contains a total of 130 nodes. 
 
Orange Romania case 
 
It was my intention to analyse the Romanian case in exactly the same way as the Danish 
case. However, it proved impossible to approach this case with naïve eyes as I had 
already analysed the Danish case. I started with a paper-based review of the transcripts 
and wrote possible codes in the margins. Following this step, I imported the transcripts 
into NVivo v2.0 and repeated the line-by-line coding to generate free nodes from this 
open coding exercise. However, after about three interviews, it became clear that the 
causes of tension did fit well with the primary categories from the Danish case. I then 
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recreated those as nodes under „causes of tensions‟ and continued the coding. I also 
identified an additional cause of tension based on the Romanian data. Given this, open 
coding and axial coding proceeded much more in parallel than in sequence when coding 
the Romanian case. The Romanian case was different in that I had added a number of 
questions related to marketing mix standardisation and value chain integration. To 
separate those out, I decided to create a tree structure with „tensions‟ and „integration‟ 
as the top nodes. The category used in the Orange Denmark case relating to the 
management of tensions instead became a sub-category within the „tension‟ node.  This 
process meant saving time on first-order analysis, compared with the Danish case, as the 
broad categories around causes of tensions had a good fit. However, at the end of the 
process I was confronted with two very different node structures for the two cases 
where the only real similarity was in terms of having similar sub-categories for causes 
of tensions while the rest was different. With my own retroductive stance, it was 
essential to seek to isolate generative mechanisms in the „real‟ domain and then explain 
how they are activated or not activated depending on contextual factors. To achieve this, 
I needed to be able to compare the two cases so that the same category, sub-category or 
construct was called the same thing in both cases. To move forward, I decided to re-
code the Danish case. 
 
The node structure from the Romanian case is available in Appendix 14.8 and contains 
a total of 208 nodes. 
 
Re-coding the Orange Denmark case. 
 
I decided to re-code the Danish case from the original transcripts using the Romanian 
node structure. To achieve this, I saved a new version of the Romanian case and then 
deleted all Romanian transcript data. Following this, I imported the Danish transcripts 
again and proceeded with line-by-line coding. However, this time, I did not follow the 
standard steps of open, axial and selective coding. I was instead „testing‟ the Romanian 
node structure on the Danish data. This meant that I needed to create new sub-categories 
when required to account for Danish differences. In the end I had some Romanian 
categories that did not contain any data in the Danish case. Such categories were deleted 
to ensure that all nodes reflected empirical data. This process also identified several 
passages of text in the Danish case that were consistent with the additional category 
identified in the Romanian case. I concluded that I had originally overlooked these 
findings during the first coding of the Danish case. The main benefit from this process 
was that primary categories and many sub-categories were now the same between the 
two cases. This created a similar overall structure that ensured a more consistent use of 
terminology and allowed me to pinpoint similarities as well as differences between the 
two cases. It is also important to note that I gained additional insight from re-coding the 
Danish case that made me modify the node structure at the sub-category level. 
Modifications of that nature were re-created back in the Romanian NVivo node 
structure to ensure that the structure was mirrored when relevant. 
 
The revised node structure from the Danish case is available in Appendix 14.9 and 
contains a total of 146 nodes. 
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Remaining cases: 3 Denmark, 3 Sweden and Vodafone China 
 
At the end of the re-coding of the Orange Denmark case, there were thus two separate, 
but comparable, node structures in NVivo v2.0. This made it difficult to utilise search 
functions in the software programme to facilitate the process of constant comparisons. 
This was discussed with my supervisory panel and it was proposed that I should merge 
the two models and add subsequent cases to the same model. Based on this advice, I 
created a merged model in the latest version of NVivo (version 7.0). The transcripts for 
the remaining three cases were then imported into NVivo and coding proceeded 
according to the replication logic. I frequently used my memory, NVivo‟s search 
functionality and re-readings of the transcripts to check for the existence of emerging 
codes in already coded transcripts. This process of constant comparison, led to the 
coding of passages of text based on newly discovered codes. While a number of node 
categories were replicated across the last three case studies, the opposite is also true in 
that the latter cases also sensitised me to constructs that I had initially overlooked in the 
preceding cases. 
 
The combined node structure from all five cases is available in Appendix 14.10 and 
contains a total of 254 nodes. 
 
Comparison across cases 
 
Bryman (1988) has argued that some qualitative research relies on presenting anecdotal 
or illustrative evidence rather than providing an overview of the typicality or generality 
of the presented findings. The impact is that the reader might feel uneasy regarding the 
degree to which the findings are actually representative of the empirical evidence. To 
remedy such cases of selective anecdotalism, Silverman (1985) has advocated the use of 
simple counting techniques based on the natural categories that emerge from the data. 
This provides both the researcher and the reader with an overview of the data. This 
research programme adopted the „simple counting‟ procedures proposed by Silverman 
(1985) and all key parts of the node tree were cross-tabulated across the five cases as 
illustrated in Appendix 14.3. These tables provide a measure of node groundedness that 
allows the reader to get an overview of the extent to which passages in the transcripts 
were coded to nodes across the cases.  
 
Given that Silverman‟s (1985) approach is based on counting data in categories that are 
not alien to the respondents, Bryman (1988) concluded that Silverman‟s counting 
approach provides a valid method to integrate qualitative and quantitative methods 
within a constructivist research paradigm. 
 
In the first-order findings chapters, the number and percentage of respondents are 
shown as [5;42%] meaning that 5 respondents, representing 42% of all case 
respondents, discussed a particular topic. To preserve anonymity, the respondents are 
coded with a company code and a number. [ODK 3] thus means respondent number 3 
from Orange Denmark. 
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3.6 Interplay of literature and data 
 
As mentioned, grounded theory requires interplay between theory and data. Theorising 
is thus an integral part of the approach rather than something that is confined to only a 
particular stage in the research. The implication of this is that literature has been used 
for different purposes throughout this research programme. First, literature was used to 
establish the research gap that this programme seeks to contribute towards filling. 
Second, literature was used again as part of second-order analysis of the Orange 
Denmark findings. At this stage, literature was used to interpret and make sense of the 
empirical findings. In parallel, I consulted literature again in a wider sense as I wished 
not only to explore managerial tensions in an abductive sense but also construct 
knowledge that would be useful for change and intervention by management 
practitioners. This led me to conduct a systematic review of literature on MNC 
integration, and especially to un-bundle integration into marketing mix standardisation 
and value chain integration. Based on this conceptual argument derived from the 
literature, I then revised the interview guide for Orange Romania to explore integration 
deeper within these two categories. Third, literature played yet another role after I had 
completed first-order analysis of the Orange Romania findings. At this point in time, I 
was confronted with a wealth of empirical material and I felt the need to approach the 
material from a specific theoretical framework. Given my philosophical stance of reality 
as socially constructed, sensemaking emerged as the „sensible‟ choice. Fourth, the 
addition of parenting literature led to the inclusion of further questions for the last three 
cases. 
  
3.7 Summary 
 
Table 3-2 below summarises the central features of this research. 
 
Table 3-2 
Positioning of the dissertation 
Area Position of dissertation 
Ontology Social constructivist 
Research strategy Retroductive based on abductive accounts 
Philosophical 
perspective 
Constructivist realist 
Theoretical perspective Sensemaking 
Context Subsidiaries of multinational companies following corporate 
strategies that require cross-border integration 
Phenomenon How subsidiary managers interpret and respond to corporate 
integration efforts when they perceive a high degree of 
tension between requirements for local responsiveness and 
global integration 
Unit of analysis Subsidiary managers 
Research methodology Grounded theory 
Data collection method Semi-structured interviews 
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4 ORANGE DENMARK CASE 
  
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the first-order findings from the first case study conducted at 
Orange Denmark. 
 
4.2 Case context 
 
Company context 
 
The company was launched by France Telecom in March 1998 under the brand name 
Mobilix. Following the acquisition of Orange by France Telecom in August 2000, 
France Telecom‟s mobile assets were transferred to the acquired entity. Orange was de-
listed from the stock exchange as a result of the acquisition but was reintroduced in 
February 2001 following an IPO. The new management team announced the intention 
to rebrand former France Telecom operators to Orange which lead to the replacement of 
Mobilix by Orange in May 2001. The subsidiary was sold to TeliaSonera in October 
2004 following bids from a number of telecoms companies to take over the operator. 
 
Market context 
 
When conducting the research, the Danish mobile market had one of the highest levels 
of competitive intensity in Europe (measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index) 
following deregulation which had led to the introduction of a number of network 
operators as well as virtual operators. The introduction of virtual operators, starting in 
2000, represented a significant discontinuity in the Danish competitive landscape and 
more than tripled the number of mobile brands in the market during the following three-
year period. Together with strict regulatory restrictions on contract binding periods, this 
led to drastic price reductions and among the highest customer churn levels in Europe. 
 
Given the high competitive intensity, and the sub-scale size of the business, the Danish 
Orange subsidiary had been suffering from operational losses and negative cash flow 
since launch of operations. When a new management team took over the subsidiary in 
October 2002, the business was suffering from poor financial performance and 
headquarters questioned the viability of the operator. The new management team 
confronted the simultaneous challenges of turning around the performance of the 
business, meeting intensified local competition and responding to corporate integration 
efforts from the Orange Group. Following implementation of a turnaround strategy, the 
subsidiary achieved improved financial results by end of 2003 with positive 
performance at both EBITDA and free cash flow levels. This made the subsidiary an 
attractive takeover candidate to corporations looking to consolidate the Danish mobile 
market. 
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Integration context 
 
The strategies of both France Telecom and Orange, prior to 2002, could be 
characterised as locally responsive (Prahalad & Doz, 1987), multinational (Bartlett, 
1986; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989) or multidomestic (Hout et al., 1982) given the high 
degree of local autonomy and competition on a country-by-country basis. France 
Telecom had operated its mobile companies on a portfolio basis without any common 
brand name or substantial synergies between the operations. Orange had also followed a 
strategy of local autonomy. As a result, there were few linkages between the Orange 
operations apart from the brand name. However, from 2002 onwards, Orange made 
significant efforts towards implementing greater integration across its different 
European operations. The Danish case is thus an example of far reaching corporate 
integration efforts that affected a substantial number of business functions. There were 
thus significant efforts from the Orange Group both to align the customer experience as 
well as to coordinate the delivery of business functions. Orange was running integration 
efforts by setting central business requirements for integration efforts, typically 
involving some form of consultation with subsidiaries, and then creating delivery 
roadmaps for rollout across countries. Once decided, integration initiatives were to a 
high degree „forced‟ upon subsidiaries though scale and speed of deployment varied.  
 
The Orange Denmark case is thus about integration as early stage configurational 
change involving a challenger operator with sub-scale size and relatively weak financial 
performance. Integration took place through centrally structured initiatives rolled out on 
a global/regional basis. 
 
4.3 Data collection 
 
Respondents 
 
All respondents were members of the management team who managed the business for 
the two-year period between October 2002 and October 2004. The twelve interviews 
lasted between 21 and 53 minutes and generated 42,131 words when transcribed. It is 
important to note that the interviews were conducted in December 2004 after the sale of 
the business to TeliaSonera. 
 
Table 4-1 
Orange Denmark respondents 
Respondent Data collection Interview length 
CEO Phone 
Dec 22, 2004 
31 minutes 
(3,853 words) 
Chief Operating Officer (Commercial) Face to face 
Dec 22, 2004 
38 minutes 
(3,935 words) 
Chief Technical Officer Face to face 
Dec 23, 2004 
48 minutes 
(5,502 words) 
Chief Financial Officer Face to face 
Dec 21, 2004 
48 minutes 
(6,081 words) 
VP Strategy & Planning Face to face 
Dec 16, 2004 
37 minutes 
(3,767 words) 
VP Human Resources Face to face 21 minutes 
 76 
Dec 19, 2004 (1,935 words) 
Segment Director (Commercial) Face to face 
Dec 20, 2004 
53 minutes 
(4,065 words) 
Head of Product Management 
(Commercial) 
Face to face 
Dec 15, 2004 
38 minutes 
(3,460 words) 
Head of Brand and Marketing 
(Commercial) 
Face to face 
Dec 20, 2004 
33 minutes 
(3,089 words) 
Head of Procurement (Finance) Face to face 
Dec 28, 2004 
23 minutes 
(2,177 words) 
Head of Training & Development 
(HR) 
Face to face 
Dec 21, 2004 
40 minutes 
(2,008 words) 
Head of Technology Delivery 
(Technology) 
Face to face 
Dec 23, 2004 
36 minutes 
(2,259 words) 
 
Interview guide 
 
The interviews for the first case study focused specifically on situations when the 
respondents had felt competing demands for local responsiveness and global integration 
by exploring how common it had been for respondents to experience competing 
demands, in what areas of the business competing demands had been the highest, what 
the underlying reasons for tension had been, how managers had experienced the tension, 
what they had done to manage in such situations and what had worked well versus not 
so well.  
 
The full interview guide is available in Appendix 14.4.  
 
4.4 Tension findings 
 
This section presents the findings relating to local – global tensions as experienced by 
the Danish subsidiary managers. 
 
4.4.1 Frequency of tensions 
 
All respondents [12; 100%] noted that they had frequently experienced tension between 
group demands and local requirements. Some of the representative statements include: 
„We more or less discussed this constantly‟ [ODK 8]; „In my business it was pretty 
common actually, that was our bread and butter I would say‟ [ODK 4]; „In my situation 
it was extremely common‟ [ODK 1]; „Those kind of conflicts were fairly frequent‟ 
[ODK 2]; and „It‟s a common thing that happens all the time‟ [ODK 5]. 
 
4.4.2 Areas affected by tensions 
 
The key areas of tension were commercial, especially product development and 
propositions marketing, and technical functions that were increasingly being integrated. 
Support functions were also affected but to a lesser degree. 
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4.4.3 Causes of tensions 
 
The five areas below will be used to structure findings across the five case studies to 
enable comparisons across the cases. It is however important to state that these five 
categories of tensions emerged from the study rather than being imposed on the data 
based on a priori determined categories from the literature review.  
 
1. Content of integration initiatives 
2. Decision-making process and interaction with headquarters representatives 
3. Implementation of integration initiatives 
4. Loss of autonomy of subsidiary managers 
5. Cultural differences 
 
Perceptions of the content of integration initiatives 
 
One of the key drivers of tensions was that managers perceived that the „content‟ of 
integration initiatives did not fit well with the requirements of the Danish business. 
There were four primary drivers of this perception. First, that there were underlying 
market differences across the Orange footprint that simply made it very difficult to 
develop initiatives that would be relevant across the European footprint. Second, that 
initiatives had negative or marginal benefits in a local context. Third, that the Danish 
business had a different strategy or market positioning that necessitated a different 
focus. Fourth, that there were legacy set-ups that it would be complex and expensive to 
replace. Most respondents [10;83%] discussed various aspects of misfit. 
 
Underlying market differences [5;42%]. Fundamental market differences were 
perceived as generating tension. This included regulatory and competitive differences 
that lowered the perceived value of initiatives emanating from the corporate centre. 
 
There were a lot of initiatives from the Orange Group that were highly prioritised that 
didn‟t really jibe with what would have been a good strategy for a company in our 
situation with the competitiveness of the Danish market [ODK 8]. 
 
Negative or marginal local benefits [4;33%]. Several managers commented that they 
saw marginal or even negative value of a number of the proposed or mandated 
integration initiatives. 
 
The underlying reasons would be that ultimately, the people in the local business felt 
they knew what was best for the business in terms of its financial and commercial 
performance and felt that many of the initiatives which were being put forward by 
Group were not going to add significant incremental value and might even detract from 
value in terms of using scarce resources that would otherwise be used to develop 
products and services which would develop more money for the local business [ODK 
2]. 
 
Different strategy and positioning [3;25%]. Group initiatives were also felt to have 
primarily been created to address the competitive situation in the two major countries 
where Orange was present: UK and France. The respondents noted that you need to 
adapt your strategy to whether you are a market leader or a challenger. 
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From a Group level you had guidelines and structures and governance that didn‟t fit 
with the Danish market. The basic problem, to boil it down, was that we had a market 
leader strategy applied to Orange whereas a lot of Orange countries and certainly 
Denmark, was very much a challenger [ODK 6]. 
 
Legacy set-up [4;33%]. In addition, mandated requirements sometimes required 
complex and expensive modifications or replacements of legacy systems. 
 
From a Technical perspective there would have been legacy systems which would have 
needed to be removed to allow a Group solution to be put in place. But there was no 
methodology of the compensation of the cost of doing it. The local subsidiaries had to bear 
the cost themselves [ODK 12].  
 
Perceptions of the decision-making process 
 
Another key category of tensions related to various aspects of the decision-making 
process and how headquarters representatives had interacted with subsidiary managers. 
All interviewed managers [12;100%] discussed tensions arising from the integration 
process. 
 
Lack of fair treatment [10;83%]. There were a large number of comments that 
indicated that the integration process had not been perceived as fair. This included 
perceptions that the Group had had unrealistically high expectations on how fast 
integration could be achieved and of the benefits of such initiatives in a local context. 
 
In terms of what did not go well, you could say virtually any part of the process, I 
would think. In terms of initial consultation, or lack of it, the realism concerning what 
could be achieved by many of the products which were on the roadmap and in terms of 
realism of how much value they could bring to a local business against stuff which 
could be developed specifically for the business locally which would have brought a lot 
more value, quite obviously. Only a moron in a hurry would fail to see those things I 
think [ODK 2]. 
 
There were also comments that managers felt that integration was driven more by 
politics and power games than by sound business reasons. 
 
What we could see was a huge fight between UK and France between persons, 
positions, directions. So maybe they couldn‟t tell us the direction because they didn‟t 
know it themselves? We could see the big picture but weren‟t told. I never saw a 2 or 5 
year plan telling that this is the future set up of the organisation and why we we‟re 
working so hard on this delivery [ODK 9]. 
 
Lack of understanding from managers at headquarters [7;58%]. Managers in the 
Danish subsidiary reported that they had felt that managers at headquarters showed a 
lack of understanding of local circumstances. Some respondents felt that head office 
managers were not listening to what subsidiary managers had to say. 
 
I think the operating model was not working. The formal structure did not work. The 
process for decisions was unrealistic. I could see looking at it with our CTO that it 
would never work. Nobody seemed to flag the issues. We definitely tried, I tried 
constantly but no one was listening really [ODK 1]. 
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Subsidiary managers also reported that there was lack of understanding from head office 
managers stemming from lack of operational knowledge of what it would take to 
implement integration initiatives locally. 
 
I think the other thing is, with hindsight, that the centre underestimated the complexity 
of what they were trying to do. So the time frames were all wrong and that‟s about 
having non-operational people doing most of the business, because the deliveries 
depend on the cooperation of the people in the countries [ODK 10]. 
 
One manager reflected that there was unwillingness from Group managers to 
acknowledge that the central strategy may not be equally effective in all markets. 
 
It‟s the inability to fully accept that the Group strategy wouldn‟t work to its full extent 
in all markets [ODK 8]. 
 
Integration not sold to subsidiary managers [5;42%]. There was thus a lack of strong 
belief and commitment to the integration process. Some managers noted that it would 
have helped if managers at HQ would have communicated more and tried to sell 
integration better. 
 
I think the overall idea of having some kind of global framework was very good and my 
intention was to follow that framework but it was really hard because the resources 
from the central HR were not very good and they almost never came out to talk to us 
about it [ODK 3]. 
 
Lack of trust [2;17%]. Due to early failures during the integration process, some 
subsidiary managers did not trust that the Group would deliver what it said. 
 
So [Group] delivery is almost completely nonexistent. If it hadn‟t been I think there 
would have been a much better perception of what the Group was asking us to deliver 
because we were always being put under extreme pressure to deliver while they 
delivered nothing [ODK 2]. 
 
Perceptions of implementation 
 
The next key category of tensions related to statements about the implementation of 
integration initiatives. Perceived tensions arose for a variety of reasons including goal 
and resource conflicts, increased bureaucracy, lack of clear direction, inexperienced 
people at headquarters, unclear roles and responsibilities, and weak delivery. All 
managers [12;100%] discussed tensions created as a result of weak implementation. 
 
Goal and Resource conflicts [11;92%]. A key driver, was conflicting goals based on 
different units at headquarters setting different targets to the local entity that were not 
aligned. One of the drivers was a perceived disconnect between short-term financial 
demands versus long-term benefits of integration initiatives. Integration initiatives often 
had an adverse short-term impact but no target relief was granted for implementation. 
 
In my mind there was disconnect between the expectations in the local company to 
deliver a result and what Group wanted long term. So you had the short term targets and 
Group long term targets. And that was a mismatch. There was no prioritisation, there 
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was no handling of the consequences, you can easily go the Group way if you are aware 
of the consequences and you deal with them locally. Meaning that you could be 
accepting worse and risk your results for a time until you delivered the Group solutions, 
but no one did that… I think it was a disconnect between local short term and global 
long term [ODK 9]. 
 
There was also no clear method for prioritising global and local demands. This was 
problematic as all initiatives eventually competed for resources from the same overall 
budget in the Danish subsidiary. 
 
It was clear that the Orange Group wanted to go for consolidation and a unified 
approach. What was unclear was how they could prioritise certain initiatives against 
others when certain initiatives were clearly valueless and others probably had 
significant value but were apparently being ignored. So that‟s kind of a paradox [ODK 
2]. 
 
Increased bureaucracy [1;8%]. Participation in Group projects also led to increased 
paper work at the subsidiary level. 
 
I think the data content team spent over 50-70% of their time reviewing Group papers 
and commenting on them and basically we didn‟t deliver or even prioritise data content 
anyway, at that time, but spent a lot of time and the output was zero, so it decreased the 
efficiency in the team…From a local perspective it decreased efficiency. My team had 
to spend a lot of time interfacing with Group and not interfacing with the local sales 
team. So they were withdrawn from the market and we were criticized a lot for that 
from local sales that we were not supporting them, when we were supposed to be 
spending our time interfacing with Group [ODK 1].  
 
Lack of clear direction [10;83%]. Another sub-theme relates to unclear objectives and 
operating rules. One of the key drivers of this was multiple voices issuing different 
instructions and mandates. 
 
There was no interface between finance and commercial and finance and technical at 
corporate level. Corporate finance would say you need to reach a hundred and then 
suddenly Technology comes in and says we have to implement this and it‟s not going to 
increase your 100, it‟s going to cost 50. But Finance at Group still said, so what, we 
want 100. How do you do that? They didn‟t talk together [ODK 11]. 
 
As a result of this, it meant that the overall direction was unclear. 
 
Because when they launched the work and tried to set up the new processes they were 
not ready with their analyses. That was still work in progress, it has been work in 
progress for 2 years on those roadmaps. I mean the roadmap at the GBMP steering 
committee was changing every time, back and forth, reopening old items, re-discussing 
old fights that they‟d already had. It was just very, very unstructured from their side, I 
would say [ODK 4]. 
 
One respondent noted that that integration seemed to swing like a pendulum between 
global and local. This perception was later confirmed by other respondents outside of 
the formal interviews. 
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Inexperienced people at headquarters [3;25%]. It was also argued that people at Group 
level did not have the competence to deliver what was required. 
 
I‟m not sure it‟s because of the fact that they didn‟t want to coordinate because I think 
that they tried to coordinate, but I think that the people that were there maybe were not 
the right people to run those processes. They didn‟t have the experience of running 
[operations]. I mean, it‟s very different coming from one world where you manage 
different local entities locally to one managing the different local entities centrally with 
central propositions. It‟s a completely different expertise I would say that you expect 
from the group of people that sit in the headquarters [ODK 4]. 
 
Unclear roles and responsibilities [3;25%]. Managers also talked about unclear roles 
and responsibilities when it came to implementation of integration initiatives. This 
included both between headquarters and the subsidiaries and between different entities 
at headquarters. 
 
In Orange we wanted to get to the result of having centralised solutions but we didn‟t 
want to centralise the organisation. They also did it organisation-wise in that there were 
not created Group organisations to deliver this. They created an organisation grouping 
responsible for delivery but you still had all the equivalent satellite organisations in 
each local MCO. So you still had a central technology and commercial competing with 
local Commercial and Technology. They were definitely unclear about their 
responsibilities and there wasn‟t a centralised organisation behind this…We tried to go 
for a central solution with decentralised organisations. I think we failed doing that 
[ODK 9]. 
 
Weak delivery of integration initiatives [4;33%]. It was further felt that processes were 
either lacking or not functioning well. 
 
The other one, the major one that I see is that the infrastructure was not in place. I mean 
all the resulting bullshit.  I mean nothing really happened in the correct way. It was 
really pushed back from the Group from people that have never had experience in 
implementing this kind of recharging principles between the different entities. There 
was not even a clear process in terms of how you manage your budget, your planning 
phase with regard to that. It was always at the last minute that we got input from GBMP 
or from wherever to implement into our forecast. And then you don‟t have an 
integration process where you have a chance to discuss how you‟re going to make it 
[ODK 4]. 
 
Perceptions of the loss of autonomy 
 
Another category of tension related to subsidiary managers losing power and influence 
over the way their business was run. Half of the managers [6;50%] discussed tensions 
resulting from a loss of local autonomy and reluctance to change. 
 
Loss of local autonomy [6;50%]. Local power and influence of subsidiary managers 
were reduced as a result of the integration process. However, there was no explicit 
change management process in place to manage this.  
 
Well I think that on a personal level it was frustrating because first, although I had a 
CEO position in Thailand, there was a lot more autonomy, perhaps because it was 
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further away, and there was less focus on that particular business. In Denmark, 
obviously, there was a major change in that context and it was rather frustrating [ODK 
2]. 
 
Reluctance to change [4;33%]. Some of the expatriates also noted that a number of 
their Danish colleagues were reluctant to change and that they had strong national pride 
in doing things the local way. 
 
From the local side, it‟s the Danishness or unwillingness to accept that somebody else 
sets the rules and says this is the map, this is where we‟re going to go. That doesn‟t 
really work with Danish culture and the way people work [ODK 8]. 
 
Perceptions of cultural differences 
 
Cultural interaction style [3;25%]. There were also comments about the specific 
Danish style that are closely related to the reluctance to change described above. 
 
If you work in Thailand for instance you can give people a global mindset because they 
are immature from a corporate perspective and they want to learn from the global 
involvement. They‟re interested in being more global. In Denmark it‟s the other way 
around. They‟re more interested in protecting the language and the local market and the 
way you do things. „We have one of the most penetrated markets in the world, the 
toughest market in the world, blah, blah, blah. Why would we do it differently? We 
know how to do it, we‟re dealing in the toughest market‟. And it‟s constricted in that 
sense. [ODK 7].   
 
In the Orange Denmark case it was difficult to disentangle the influence of culture given 
that the subsidiary was undergoing strategic change. Culture may thus both have played 
a role in terms of leading to a reluctance to change (the previous theme), and to 
differences in cultural interaction style. The effect of cultural differences was much 
easier to identify in the Vodafone China case as we will see later. 
 
4.4.4 Consequences of tensions 
 
The perceived tensions had a number of positive and negative consequences. 
 
Positive consequences 
 
Respondents noted getting a new perspective on things and knowledge sharing as 
primary benefits from integration. However, the discussion of positive benefits was 
fairly limited in the Danish case [2;17%]. 
 
Getting new perspectives [1;8%]. One respondent noted that a bit of friction between 
local and Group can generate new perspectives. 
 
I think a little bit of tension is a good thing and it‟s permissible if you try to drive from 
the top specific Commercial or Technical projects because you are aiming to find 
synergies in the Group and standardise. You will always have some kind of push back 
from the local team because you‟re taking responsibility from them but globally it 
makes sense. So a little bit of friction and tension is all right but I think in this situation 
 83 
we were reaching a too high level of tension because I didn‟t feel that it was done in a 
smart way [ODK 11]. 
 
Knowledge sharing [1;8%]. Another key benefit was increased knowledge sharing 
across the Group. 
 
The advantage was that there was a lot of knowledge sharing and personally I think it 
was interesting to see how the in-life process was, for example, when each country had 
to come up with 10 top initiatives that really worked. That was interesting to see. I think 
if you got it up and running there was probably some value in it [ODK 1]. 
 
Negative consequences 
 
There was however substantial discussion around negative consequences [5;42%]. This 
included both adverse business impact and negative personal impact. 
 
Business impact 
 
Following a sub-optimal strategy [1;8%]. A senior manager felt that the constant 
conflicts between delivering short-term financial targets and long-term integration 
initiatives led to a sub-optimisation of the strategy. 
 
The ideal is standardisation. If you do it effectively like Vodafone you can be very 
successful and reduce costs. But if you don‟t do that you drive local businesses to seek 
new solutions to subscribers because they have to provide solutions to their subscribers 
because the competition is doing it. We acted tactically when we should have been 
acting strategically. So what we were doing was effective in terms of turning the 
performance of the business around, but it wasn‟t what we should have been doing 
[ODK 2]. 
 
Wasting resources [3;25%]. Several managers felt that integration efforts consumed a 
lot of resources that could have been put to more productive use elsewhere. 
 
It required a lot of time. I spent a lot of time negotiating and discussing with Group; our 
roadmap and what we were doing in comparison to what their expectations were. So as 
an individual, it took a lot of my time [ODK 7]. 
 
Loss of time to market [1;8%]. Another business impact was the loss of time to market. 
 
It had an impact on the result of the business, because obvious things that we wanted to 
do to respond to the Danish market needs and conditions were delayed or not 
necessarily met because of competing demands [ODK 5]. 
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People impact 
 
Some managers [4;33%] also noted examples of negative personal impact.  
 
Demotivation [1;8%]. The tension could result in demotivation. 
 
In terms of motivation in the whole organisation, it increased people‟s workload, and 
they felt it was great to be part of a Group, but they never saw complete tangible 
benefits. They just saw that they had to provide more and more and got less and less 
back. That took the motivation down in Finance [ODK 11]. 
 
Frustration [4;33%]. Several managers reported feeling substantial frustration. 
 
You feel that you are facing an enormous, horrible machinery that‟s driving all over 
you. You can shout and try to defend yourself, but it‟s roaring all over you and if you 
don‟t take the decision it‟s escalated and your boss gets beaten over the head and you 
have to do it anyway [ODK 11].  
 
Generating scepticism [1;8%]. It was also noted that the chaos and confusion could 
generate a sceptical attitude towards integration initiatives. 
 
I should have been tougher on saying we shouldn‟t do it if we don‟t have the time or 
resources. We wasted a lot of time like that. I should have gone more for the 
prioritisations and when I had the opportunity to push a project forward, I should have 
pushed harder. I was always in doubt whether that target would change in the next few 
weeks. So I hesitated [ODK 9]. 
 
4.4.5 Managing tensions 
 
Managers used a variety of different ways to manage or cope with the perceived 
tensions. 
 
Gamesmanship 
 
Most managers [10;83%] noted that political „gamesmanship‟ behaviours constituted 
vital survival tactics when confronted with competing demands.  
 
Asking for forgiveness [2;17%]. This included asking forgiveness rather than 
permission before deviating from initiatives. 
 
You have to work with them and make sure that you deliver what you can into the local 
market. I didn‟t have a problem with it. It never really stopped us, though sometimes we 
would have to ask forgiveness rather than permission, but we had a clear objective; to 
succeed in the local market. Obviously, we couldn‟t violate brand guidelines but we 
could bend them a bit [ODK 6]. 
 
Break guidelines [1;8%]. It also meant accepting that you sometimes had to break 
guidelines in specific areas in order to achieve overall financial targets.  
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It made it very difficult because from a local perspective we had targets to meet and to 
achieve those targets it was necessary to go outside the Group guidelines [ODK 12]. 
 
Build subsidiary alliances [2;17%]. Subsidiary alliances were used to gain bargaining 
power versus Group. 
 
One of the other big things is you have informal groups or committees forming. So for 
example, I know for a fact that CEOs would get together prior to meetings with Group 
and decide on what positions the [subsidiaries] would take on certain issues. And in 
certain cases I actually know that they went above the formal reporting structure, in 
terms of products and services, in order to stop things happening. So you actually had 
whole bits of the organisation pulling in different directions [ODK 10] 
 
Comply on paper [2;17%]. Another tactic was to comply on paper and make it appear 
as if the subsidiary was doing much more than was actually the case. 
 
We had major discussions, particularly when it came to allocating spend. And on 
occasions the impression would be given that more was being done on certain Group 
activities than actually was, so you‟d try to show commitment but actually not do 
anything. [ODK 10]. 
 
Create confusion [1;8%]. Or creating confusion at the Group level. 
 
You can do a lot of nasty stuff. You create confusion and that I have done on a couple 
of occasions because the best way to try to avoid being under the light is to put the other 
guys under the light, and you know you have a big political agenda between GBMP and 
corporate finance and international finance so you just play them against each other. But 
it isn‟t very productive and I‟m not proud of it, but it did help us, I mean, it gave us 
time, to create confusion [ODK 4]. 
 
Delay implementation [4;33%]. And to use a variety of methods to delay 
implementation 
 
The biggest tactic is buying time, we don‟t say no but we don‟t say yes either. It takes 
time, you need to investigate, you have to prioritise, you need to have the resources, etc. 
That‟s the only way to cope with it in my view. I understand that our CEO couldn‟t say 
no to everything. You needed, of course, to pick your fights, some of the things that you 
don‟t really believe in [ODK 4]. 
 
Make delivery contingent on Group [1;8%]. As the Danish subsidiary was short of 
resources, it was considered vital to conserve resources to the most critical projects. 
Management was thus careful to not spend significant local resources on projects that 
were contingent upon delivery of platforms or enablers from group. 
 
In terms of content management platforms which was a 30m krona investment. Five or 
six other projects were depending on that so we said „yes we‟ll deliver these projects‟ 
but we put in asterisks provided that we get a platform delivered by April. If we don‟t 
we can‟t deliver the other ones [ODK 5]. 
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Over embrace selected initiatives [2;17%]. Other methods included claiming that the 
subsidiary already had implemented the initiative as well as over embracing some 
initiatives. 
 
By driving all these Corporate projects they could gain a trump card to play in Group, to 
be able to say „hey, we‟re really good at that‟. It helped to build up the credibility. 
That‟s how I felt in my role [ODK 11]. 
 
The author had also personally been involved in making a show-case of the 
implementation of a new pan-European segmentation model. The Danish subsidiary got 
substantial recognition from the top management of Orange by becoming a frontrunner 
of the implementation of the new segmentation. 
 
Passive compliance [1;8%]. There were also instances of passive compliance with 
Group initiatives. 
 
The biggest thing that was used was to say well, we don‟t have the money, financial 
results or the physical resource to deliver within the time frame that they were asking. 
That was then thrown back at the Group to come up with those resources, and 90% of 
the time their agenda and their plan was far too large to deliver within the timeframes 
they were saying. They didn‟t have the resources themselves. So there was a lot of 
double bluffing. We‟d say, we‟d love to do it but we don‟t have the resource and then 
they would come back and say great, we‟ll get you the resources. Three months later, 
we‟d find that they didn‟t actually have the resources. And it comes back to what I‟ve 
said before, it comes down to budgeting. They didn‟t have the budget and we didn‟t 
have the budget, yet they had these big plans [ODK 10]. 
 
Prioritising local demands [5;42%]. It also sometimes meant prioritising local 
demands over Group. 
 
We had to say, yes, we‟ll do it and show them that we did implement certain things and 
we communicated everything from new bonus targets and policies to our roadmap for 
delivery of products and services but in the end we had to do our own thing and that 
satisfied them because they‟re so big and we‟re so small [ODK 8]. 
 
Interacting with Group 
 
The way you interact with counterparts at Group level was also seen as important and 
was discussed by all respondents [12;100%].  
 
Argue the local case [2;17%]. This included being good at arguing the local case to 
headquarters representatives. 
 
We tried to get exemptions, where possible. For instance if we had a legacy system that 
was particularly expensive to change at that point in time we applied to be exempt from 
the supply of that equipment and go to another supplier [ODK 12]. 
 
Be honest with Group [2;17%]. Two managers talked about the necessity to be honest 
and straight with Group. 
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I think in a sense that I managed to stay on good terms with my second boss though I 
was in an impossible situation and could not deliver. I was open about the issues and I 
think he agreed with me. We did a lot of other things with the in-life process, like who 
did the best reporting, on time and we got a lot of credit for that. I said I can‟t deliver 
this stuff but I can deliver this stuff. I made it very clear that it wasn‟t that I was 
ignoring Group because Group was very sensitive to the fact that they were, in the 
beginning the countries had all the power and Group was weak. Group was challenged 
in that „you don‟t know how the locals work‟ you can always hide behind that so they 
were sceptical. So I was being very open with Group, shared information with them, 
reporting, delivering other stuff and I did that because I used to be Group and knew 
what it was like when countries didn‟t want to share information with us [ODK 1]. 
 
Build personal networks [7:58%]. It was also considered key to invest the time and 
efforts to build personal networks at Group level. This was seen as making it easier to 
get your voice heard and built trust that was needed for inevitable exemptions later on. 
 
It is very political and not necessarily in the negative sense. Political from the point of 
view of understanding who the players are, and making sure that you‟re tapping into 
that resource, and you‟ve got a position that makes sense so they know what you‟re at 
and you know what they‟re at and you can come up with a common direction [ODK 7]. 
 
Compromise [1;8%]. The ability to strike the right compromises was also seen as 
important 
 
Eventually we got to an easy position where we weren‟t entirely satisfied with the 
outcome but nevertheless, there was a consolidated local/global roadmap which 
everyone, broadly speaking, was willing to accept and follow [ODK 2]. 
 
Escalation [1;8%]. Escalation was also used but it provided a mix bag of results. 
 
And obviously, initially, I spoke to [the Group Executive VP for Marketing] who was 
running the whole show and pushed back but that only led to threats so then we pushed 
back at different levels so that I had the opportunity to take different decisions if we got 
severe objectives from Group level and some of that worked in terms of compromises 
and some of it didn‟t [ODK 2].  
 
Fight back for prioritisation [1;8%]. A senior manager mentioned that he had tried to 
argue for prioritisation of initiatives against the local budget. However, the outcome of 
such moves was often not successful. 
 
The other way is basically, just to, how do you call it, not blackmail, but to take the 
fight on the financials and the implications it would have but you don‟t win this fight 
usually [ODK 4]. 
 
Get the right targets [1;8%]. The same manager also noted that the Danish business 
was struggling as the overall financial targets had been set too high at an earlier date. 
This meant it was hard to deliver financials when the competitive intensity increased 
and the Group requested that a larger proportion of local resources would be used on 
integration initiatives in the short-run. 
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I think the first key learning is to negotiate the right target up front. Don‟t fuck around, 
just get it over with at once and get the right level. Not to be too aggressive, because if 
you get it too aggressive you‟ll suffer all the way. You need to create some kind of 
buffer and that‟s just the way it is. Take the fight up front instead of taking it after. It‟s 
just a waste of energy [ODK 4]. 
 
Influence rules of the game [1;8%]. It was also seen as important to participate 
actively in various Group forums with the specific objective of seeking to influence the 
rules of the game. This meant both that subsidiary managers could be seen as „playing 
ball‟ and were in line with corporate integration efforts and it also made it possible for 
managers of the Danish subsidiary to exercise a greater amount of influence than the 
relative size of the Danish subsidiary would normally warrant. 
 
Personally, I was involved in a lot of Group forums, CTO forums and other forums 
about governance, and about general management from a Group perspective. There was 
a lot of discussion with all of the entities and with Group structure as to how best we 
should set it up. So I had a fair bit of influence in that at some stage from a governance 
perspective [ODK 7]. 
 
Request additional resources [5;42%]. Managers also requested additional resources 
from Group to be able to deliver integration requirements. 
 
We hired in consultants. That was a mechanical way of doing it. We would put in the 
request to Group and get consultants and they would pay them. We ended up with two 
separate organisations. One delivering local targets one to deliver Group requirements 
[ODK 9]. 
 
Signal compliance [4;33%]. This included signalling compliance and showing that you 
were on board. 
 
I tried complete honesty for a short while. It wasn‟t saying no, it was saying we don‟t 
think we can do this, it‟s very difficult for us. This showed up in a very red colour on 
the spread sheets. So we changed the tactics to saying Yes, provided….Essentially you 
say yes and hope it goes away. It all sounds very counterproductive and it‟s not meant 
to be that but it‟s a fact that if we had to do all the projects that everybody wanted us to 
do the CAPEX project would have to be twice the size of the going one. So it‟s about 
managing [ODK 5]. 
 
Understand the political landscape [3;25%]. It was also seen as key to have the ability 
to read and understand the political landscape at Group level. 
 
That‟s where the political dimension comes into play. You need to understand the 
people that are leading the Group at the Group level and how they interact with each 
other. And then, basically, it‟s a game of cards. You need to play your cards right. And 
if you mess up then you end up doing everything and not doing anything local. It‟s a 
chess game. You need to put your pieces on the chessboard at the right time, in the right 
order towards the right opponent [ODK 4]. 
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Structure local subsidiary 
 
At a structural level, managers considered it key to get control over the local 
organisation.  
 
Create a consolidated roadmap [5;42%]. A key initiative consisted of constructing a 
consolidated local roadmap that contained a total overview of all initiatives that required 
local resources.  
 
What worked well. Eventually a local/global roadmap was devised which became the 
roadmap which everyone understood and was following [ODK 2]. 
 
Ensure a united management team [2;17%]. It was also seen as important to ensure a 
united local management team. 
 
On those occasions when there was Group pressure we were pretty good at 
communicating informing and standing behind each other, all of us, including [the 
COO], which has not always been as easy as it sounds. But that actually helped us 
create a team spirit and stand united [ODK 4]. 
 
Reprioritise [2;17%]. And often some form of reprioritisation. 
 
On the spot you try to reprioritise in terms of your projects list. Then you inform people 
of the impacts of this decision versus that decision. It doesn‟t mean anybody‟s going to 
answer you but it‟s the process. Then on any local as well as international wish list of 
projects there are projects with high and low impact. So you try to sanity check and 
reprioritise those so you feel confident that you can deliver the major ones and not 
necessarily the ones you are doubtful of [ODK 5]. 
 
Streamline interfaces [2;17%]. And to streamline interfaces with Group so it was clear 
what the subsidiary committed to during the course of Group interaction. 
 
What I did was to make sure I had the interfaces into the Group. So we streamlined the 
interfaces and that was done, not just in Technology, but in a number of areas. So at 
least, we sort of got some control over the reporting and the understanding of what the 
requirements were. And that helped, definitely.  We just agreed generally at the VP 
level on the things we would do and wouldn‟t do, and we all communicated a similar 
view to Group in that respect [ODK 7].   
 
Get your priorities straight 
 
Decide on what matters most [3;25%]. In a complex operating environment, with 
competing objectives and limited resources, it was considered important to keep the eye 
on the ball and be clear on what really mattered as it was impossible to simply do 
everything. 
 
Probably the real challenge is to work out which ones are mandatory and can‟t be 
avoided and which ones are the wish list of people who are not particularly senior in the 
Group corporate organisation [ODK 10].  
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Decide who you work for [1;8%]. This also included knowing who you really worked 
for in a matrix structure with multiple reporting lines. 
 
Basically when I was hit by those objectives that my boss in Group wanted me to sign 
off, I said I‟d only sign one set of objectives…You need to decide for yourself which 
team you‟re on and also who is going to take you out if you get into trouble [ODK 1]. 
 
 
4.5 Integration findings 
 
This section presents the findings relating to how subsidiary managers suggested that 
integration decisions should be made and how integration initiatives should be 
implemented. 
 
4.5.1 How to make integration decisions 
 
Recommendations in this section relate to how the strategy should be set, how managers 
at head office should interact with subsidiary managers and how staff should be 
appointed for head office positions. 
 
Setting the strategy 
 
Agree funding up front [2;17%]. Given the many resource conflicts experienced, 
agreeing funding of initiatives up front was seen an absolutely essential. The fact that 
many integration initiatives had been mandated by Group after the local budgets had 
been set, and Group did not grant any target relief, was seen as a root cause of tensions. 
 
The whole issue of the finance and the budgeting and those things. That‟s a much 
bigger issue, it‟s an issue planning budgeting for the Group. I don‟t think anybody, even 
the CEO group have really made anybody understand how key it is to organise the 
budget process so it works. I know there have been attempts at it but it‟s just a shambles 
[ODK 10]. 
 
Cluster similar countries [1;8%]. One manager noted that it had been too much of a 
„one size fits all approach‟ in Europe and that it would have made sense to cluster 
similar countries. 
 
I think it would have been nice feeling that in the whole implementation and roadmap 
of a project, you feel that there are some kind of modules relating to each type of 
country. You have an implementation model for the big countries, one for the 
developing countries and another one for the smaller countries. For example, the 
African countries were not touched by most of the Group projects so they had a module 
but there was no intermediate model between the big countries and the small countries 
[ODK 11]. 
 
Modular approach [2;17%]. Rather than having a one size fits all, two managers 
considered it important to have a modular approach where the level of integration could 
be varied depending of the circumstances.  
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When building the platforms you should be able to do modular development. It 
shouldn‟t just be all platforms [ODK 9]. 
 
Adapt customer facing functions [1;8%]. One respondent noted that functions needed 
to be more local, the closer they were to customers. 
 
For instance, when buying a laptop, centralise the purchase and price. But don‟t 
centralise the local IT helpdesk. In other words when you‟re closer to a customer either 
internal or external you should use the local [ODK 9]. 
 
Find the right balance [2;17%]. It was argued that a strategic challenge was to strike 
the right balance between local and global so that both flexibility and consistency were 
achieved at the same time. 
 
One thing is that it‟s certainly a requirement to have a global strategy. You have to have 
it if you‟re going to be a big telco. But when you‟re setting that strategy you also have 
to allow a certain amount of flexibility; not flexibility for delivery of services because if 
you‟re going to be a global player, you have to have a consistency of delivery. But what 
those services are, the pricing in different markets and also the ability to buy at different 
prices where those prices are lower than what can be gained from the global needs to be 
addressed [ODK 12] 
 
Focus on what matters most [1;8%]. A senior manager noted that Orange Group had 
not focused on integration projects with the largest potential for benefits across the 
European subsidiaries. This had led to a number of more insignificant, peripheral 
initiatives being driven at Group level. The manager thus advocated an integration 
approach that would focus on what mattered most. 
 
Work towards a clear vision [1;8%]. A blueprint was also proposed that clearly 
outlined what the role of the subsidiaries was versus functions at headquarters. 
 
It‟s alignment of people‟s objectives so it‟s very clear what the objective of the country 
is. The objective of the country is to gain revenue, do sales and marketing, to manage 
the customer experience, and maybe to advise on what products and services that should 
be offered. Then the centre‟s role would be to find the bullets for those guys to fire. But 
you can‟t have a half-way house where you‟ve got the countries saying, „well, we‟ll 
only fire certain bullets, and the bullet has to be pink instead of blue‟ [ODK 10]. 
 
Appointing the right people 
 
Ensure operational people are involved [1;8%]. A senior manager noted that it was 
essential to involve operational people throughout the integration process. 
 
I think the other thing, with hindsight, is that the centre underestimated the complexity 
of what they were trying to do. So the time frames were all wrong and that‟s about 
having non-operational people doing most of the business, because the deliveries 
depend on the cooperation of the people in the countries. So for the delivery of the 
mobile services platform, some of it can be done in isolation in the centre but the actual 
deployment can only be done with the cooperation of the countries [ODK 10]. 
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Get the right people [1;8%]. One respondent stressed the need to appoint the right 
people at Group level. 
 
You get people who know what they‟re doing, who have the right project management 
and strategic skills perspective. You then prioritise the products and services which are 
really going to add value across all subsidiaries no matter how large or small they are, 
and then you ruthlessly implement them. Sounds pretty simple and it is. Orange has 
simply made it very difficult and not really added significant value or indeed any value 
[ODK 2]. 
 
Interacting with subsidiaries 
 
The respondents also had opinions regarding how the head office should interact with 
the local subsidiaries. 
 
Be clear that integration will happen [3;25%]. This included the importance of being 
very clear on the fact that integration will happen and then being consistent in decision-
making.  
 
If you‟re going to try and deliver things from the centre you need to be very dictatorial. 
You‟re going to do this, you can‟t have a fluffy centre because the countries tend to be 
very practical operational people [ODK 10]. 
 
Consult and ‘sell’ integration to subsidiaries [1;8%]. On the other hand, another senior 
manager argued that head office managers needed to adopt a selling approach and 
convince him of the integration rationale rather than just mandate initiatives. 
 
But you have to have someone with enough vision and clarity to paint the global 
roadmap, the global target architecture to convince me that these steps make sense to 
get there, if you know what I mean. Then it‟s all about timing [ODK 7]. 
 
4.5.2 How to implement integration 
 
Manage structure 
 
Align subsidiary structures [2;17%]. Due to the complexity of integration, some 
managers considered it important to align subsidiary structures, or at least interfaces 
across the Group to facilitate interaction. 
 
I think you can probably align the structure better. Because what tends to happen is that 
all the entities have a different structure… I think it makes it easier, maybe not across 
the entities but from a corporate perspective you have a certain structure and you should 
try to have that structure duplicated or at least agree the interfaces into a local structure 
because then it‟s much easier to communicate and do things commonly and share 
resources and share the way you do things in particular entities [ODK 7]. 
 
Control subsidiaries [1;8%]. Given the significant shift in strategy, minority 
shareholders might have the right to block integration. In the Danish case, the minority 
shareholders had originally held Orange hostage until they were bought out. One 
 93 
manager thus argued that it was important to secure control over subsidiaries prior to 
integration. 
  
So for example, again using Vodafone, I think a prerequisite to being responsive and 
centralised is to be a 100% shareholder. Because otherwise the local shareholders say, 
„why are we spending all of this money and becoming more dependent on these guys 
when they‟re using our money to fill their coffers and use elsewhere?‟ [ODK 10]. 
 
Manage people 
 
Build a global mindset [1;8%]. The shift from independent country-by-country 
operations towards an integrated Group meant that a mindset shift was required 
throughout the organisation. 
 
Mindset is the key. Mindset needs to be a more globalised view rather than the localised 
view [ODK 7]. 
 
Review required people profiles [2;17%]. Two respondents talked about changing 
business requirements in terms of the people needed to run the businesses. 
 
It depends on the people you put as heads of the subsidiaries locally. I think you have 
some people who are motivated by having a lot of autonomy even though they may 
have limited resources and others who want to make a real difference in the market and 
make changes. If you have the right people leading the subsidiaries and provide them 
with tools that competition doesn‟t have; provide them with a competitive edge and 
help them make a difference in the market, I think you can sell your project [ODK 11]. 
 
Appoint strong people [1;8%]. Given the increasingly operational involvement of head 
office, it was seen as important to get the right people into the new delivery roles.  
 
I think the issue is the transition period and the competence of the people that will set 
up this new form of business model because it‟s completely different, as I see it, you 
don‟t run the local entities in at all the same way and you don‟t need the same people to 
do it either. You need a completely different set of people. Maybe also potentially 
locally, I mean the rules of the game have to be clear up front, that the centre is the one 
dictating products, services, whatever that have to be pushed and the local unit is just 
basically a sales unit more or less [ODK 4]. 
 
Manage objectives and resources 
 
Avoid too many swings [1;8%]. A middle manager noted that there was a tendency for 
pendulum swings between centralisation and decentralisation. 
 
I think basically there‟s a pendulum swinging. The old Orange was way too 
decentralised, so they moved to over centralise everything. And I think that that whole 
integration process was not properly developed. They took it too far and they didn‟t 
align all the development things with financial planning and I think that now Orange is 
swinging back again [ODK 1]. 
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Ensure local resources [1;8%]. A senior manager discussed the fact that there needed 
to be more realism between the size of the local budgets and the strategic aspirations of 
headquarters, to avoid a mismatch. 
 
I think I‟d be more pragmatic about funding requirement, in a way, it‟s perspective. 
Then you get the outcome, you get the synergies, you get the uniform infrastructure and 
there are significant benefits moving forward from that. Because then you take the 
objection away Day 1 and the biggest objection is P&L and local market conditions. 
What do you know about the local market in Denmark? OK, I don‟t know much but I 
know that this product looks good, and this one, and this one and we‟re going to deliver 
it from a corporate perspective and we‟re going to help you get it in place and then get 
individual agreement from the MCOs [ODK 7].  
 
Implement using a phased approach [1;8%]. Given the complexity of integration, a 
senior manager discussed the importance of planning and delivering according to 
phases. 
 
You have to crawl before you can walk and I think that what Orange did was to try and 
skip the crawling stage, which I think Vodafone must have been through at least at 
some length more than Orange had. Orange saw themselves being passed over by 
Vodafone and decided to act really quickly; too quickly from my point of view [ODK 
5]. 
 
Manage interaction 
 
Establish strong communication [1;8%]. Strong communication makes integration 
much easier as it provides clarity around the direction. 
 
In a few areas where there was clarity of what we were doing, in small limited areas 
where there was good communication between group and local it worked great [ODK 
9]. 
 
Manage delivery 
 
Ensure strong delivery management [1;8%]. A senior manager argued that having a 
well-oiled delivery machinery was essential to ensure implementation of integration 
initiatives. This included setting the right targets, agreeing funding, doing proper 
planning and following initiatives through. 
 
4.5.3 Context factors affecting integration 
 
A number of context factors were highlighted by the Danish subsidiary managers as 
having had an impact on the local situation.  
 
Service industry [1;8%]. The localised nature of a service industry was seen as adding 
complications. There was a need to build a network in-country, that required a large 
customer base to reach minimum-efficiency scale, compared to product industries 
where products can be shipped on a global basis. 
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The difficult part with telecommunication is that you have a huge network behind that 
cannot be global, it has to be local and that‟s the tricky bit and I don‟t know how to 
handle that really [ODK 4]. 
 
Legacy versus new [1;8%]. One respondent commented that geographical complexity 
and different legacies both make integration more challenging. 
 
You‟ve got the historic complexity of how the different companies evolved within those 
geographical complexities and it‟s pretty difficult to align that across a common 
roadmap when you have to deal individually with each of those entities to make it really 
work [ODK 7]. 
 
Subsidiary strength and size [2;17%]. Two managers noted that the Danish subsidiary 
was weak, both from the perspective of struggling to meet its financial targets and from 
the fact that it was so much smaller in size compared to other operations like the UK 
and France. 
 
The impact of what they were doing was obviously much different on small subsidiaries 
than it was on large subsidiaries because large subsidiaries have large staff handling this 
type of area and if someone throws in a few extra peripheral developments, it‟s not 
necessarily going to derail their own commercial progress. Whereas in a business like 
Denmark, where the amount of capital expenditure and personnel resource that we had 
in order to deal with this was extremely limited. It had a much more significant effect 
because it was trying to take away a much greater proportion of what we had at our 
disposal. And therefore, the impact was huge. So the UK and France could afford to 
brush it off and they were also in a much more powerful position to brush it off as well, 
whereas small countries like Denmark that were in weak positions were not [ODK 2]. 
 
Expatriate as CEO [3;25%]. A number of the non-expat managers commented that it 
made a difference having an expat CEO that was dependent on Group good-will for his 
future career. 
 
I think the Englishmen who have been here have been much more into development 
within the Group than the Danish managers who look to another big company in 
Denmark rather within Group [for their future career]. It made a difference in the long 
and short term perspective and to networking with the local function and considering 
the local expertise [ODK 3]. 
 
Transition period [3;25%]. As integration was relatively new in Orange, there were a 
lot of chaos and initial teething problems from the restructuring.  
 
But I think it was also due to the fact that the Group was going through a restructuring 
and a lot of new people were in place that didn‟t have the overview and they maybe had 
the responsibility and how do you link the business together [ODK 1]. 
 
Different cultures [1;8%]. Different cultures also had an impact on the complexity of 
integration. 
 
If you talk about global integration the cultural difference is significant, between local 
and global. When we tried to centralise globally you had a lot of new people moving in. 
The old decentralised Orange was very UK mentality, very entrepreneurial etc. Then 
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you had the more centralised [approach] with all the Swiss people moving in. I think 
maybe that was why the model didn‟t work because you were trying to change and had 
different thoughts about the right way to do business and it made the transition period in 
Orange more difficult but also more interesting. I love cultural differences. They‟re very 
interesting but they can make things difficult [ODK 1]. 
 
Long term future of business [1;8%]. One respondent noted that he himself questioned 
the long-term future of the business and that this made him question the logic of 
spending money on long-term integration initiatives with a long pay-back time. 
However, we need to remember that the interview took place two months after the 
business had been sold to Telia Sonera, which could have led to post-fact 
rationalisation. 
 
I was always certain that there wouldn‟t be a long term view in the business taken. That 
it was more of a compliance to things that were required in the Group rather than trying 
to do anything. And I really only paid a lot of attention to the ones that would have a 
short term effect on the business. Short term being defined as 18-24 months ahead.  So 
things that would help to provide a sound structure for the business rather than things 
that would cost a lot of money [ODK 10]. 
 
Subsidiary market position [2;17%]. The market position of the subsidiary was also 
considered very important. The largest subsidiaries in the Group, were in leadership 
positions, while the Danish subsidiary was a challenger. This meant that the Danish 
managers felt they needed to take a different approach compared to that mandated by 
integration efforts. 
 
What‟s important is that when you are the number one player in a market and that‟s 
where your headquarters is, you need to have some respect for your other markets and 
you can‟t really have the same strategy everywhere. Even if you can have synergies and 
some expertise that you can use in other countries. But from the customer perspective, 
how you are viewed in the market you need to respect if you are a number three player 
or a number one [ODK 3]. 
 
4.5.4 Learning and implications for next stage 
 
The Orange Denmark case illustrated how challenging cross-border integration can be. 
This case study identified the first three causes of local-global tensions: 1) misfit, 2) 
unfair process, and 3) weak implementation. Loss of autonomy was included after 
comparison with the Orange Romania case. Tensions generated by cultural differences 
were included after comparison with the 3 Sweden and Vodafone China cases. Model 
development thus progressed according to the principles of constant comparison. 
 
There are a number of characteristics that could have contributed towards making the 
case unique. First, the Danish mobile market had one of the highest levels of 
competitive intensity in Europe. This pushed Orange Denmark towards a high degree of 
local market responsiveness. Second, Orange Denmark was a sub-scale challenger 
operator with weak financial performance. Third, Orange Denmark had low bargaining 
power versus headquarters given its position. Fourth, the overall size of the budget was 
comparatively limited, given the small customer base. 
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The above factors might have had substantial influence on the findings from the case 
study. For my next case study, I was thus determined to select a case that had very 
different characteristics but where there were also cross-border integration efforts.  
Following the end of my assignment to Orange in Denmark, I went to work for the 
mobile operator Nawras in Oman. I had initially hoped to find an interesting integration 
angle there but quickly realised that the case was unsuitable. Nawras pursued a 
multidomestic strategy with almost no integration with the other mobile assets in the 
owners‟ portfolios. I instead decided to concentrate on further literature review rather 
than to quickly identify the next case study. I thus did not conduct any additional 
empirical work for over a year. 
 
However, towards the end of my assignment to Oman, I was offered the opportunity to 
undertake a ten week strategy assignment for Orange in Romania. The former CEO of 
Orange in Denmark had taken up the position as CEO of the Romanian business and 
invited me to come. After consultation with my supervisor, it became clear that Orange 
in Romania was a close to ideal opportunity to conduct additional research. The 
Romanian market had a much lower competitive intensity compared with Denmark and 
Orange Romania was a strong incumbent player. With a large customer base, and strong 
financial performance, Orange Romania had high bargaining power versus 
headquarters. In addition, Romania was an emerging market with high growth while 
Denmark was a mature market. This was an additional difference. 
 
Table 4-2 
Comparison of Orange Denmark and Orange Romania 
 Orange Denmark Orange Romania 
Competitive intensity High Low 
Scale of business Small Large 
Market position Challenger Incumbent 
Bargaining power versus 
headquarters 
Low High 
Market stage Mature Growth 
 
Prior to undertaking the next case, the interview guide was revised. The guide used for 
Orange Denmark had been focused on tension as a result of competing demands. This 
was motivated by the fact that I had worked in the business for over two years when 
conducting the interviews and that I knew that local-global tensions were frequently 
discussed. However, it was felt that a revised interview guide would be less likely to 
introduce bias in a research setting that I was less familiar with.  
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5 ORANGE ROMANIA CASE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the first-order findings from the second case study conducted in 
Orange Romania. 
 
5.2 Case context 
 
Company context 
 
The Romanian subsidiary of Orange shared a similar history to the Orange Denmark 
case. The business had been launched by France Telecom in April 1997 using the brand 
names Mobil Rom and Dialog. The Romanian subsidiary was also transferred to the 
merged Orange entity following completion of the purchase of Orange by France 
Telecom in August 2000. Re-branding to Orange took place in April 2002, almost a 
year later than the Danish subsidiary. 
 
Market context 
 
The Romanian mobile market had a low competitive intensity compared to the Danish 
market. The population is four times larger and the mobile market was a de facto 
duopoly as there were four mobile operators but the two smallest players had less than 
one percent market share each. 
 
Orange Romania was the dominant operator with a market share of over 50% and 
almost seven million customers. As a consequence, financial results were very strong 
and the Romanian subsidiary made a significant cash contribution each year to the 
overall financial results of Orange‟s operations outside of the two core markets of 
France and the United Kingdom. Orange Romania was the largest company in the 
private sector in Romania and the largest tax paying entity. The company was also a 
symbol for the transformation of the country since the days of communism. As a result, 
the company was well respected and the CEO is a public figure in Romanian society. 
 
At the point in time of conducting the case study, there were however some ominous 
clouds on the horizon. Vodafone had previously passively held a 20% minority stake in 
Connex which is the second largest mobile operator in the country with a market share 
slightly lower than Orange. This did however change in March 2005 when Vodafone 
announced the acquisition of 79% of the equity from the Canadian company 
Telesystems International Wireless (TIW).  Following completion of the acquisition by 
Vodafone, the business was rebranded Connex-Vodafone in October 2005 and 
subsequently to just Vodafone in April 2006. Vodafone invested substantially in 
branding, in upgrading the distribution network and by bringing Vodafone‟s global 
portfolio of products and services to Romania. 
 
In addition, the Greek mobile operator Cosmote, acquired a controlling 70% of the 
shares in the struggling operator Cosmorom in August 2005 from Romtelecom, and 
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rebranded it to Cosmote in December 2005. Though a very weak operator in Romania 
with less than one percent market share, Cosmote in Greece had reached fame for 
entering the Greek market as the third operator in 1998 and become the largest operator 
after only three years of operation in 2001. In addition, there were also market rumours 
that the fourth struggling player, Zapp, might be up for sale.  
 
At the point in time of conducting the case study in January-February 2006, the market 
was thus changing away from the previously comfortable duopoly situation. 
 
Integration context 
 
The Orange Romania case is also characterised by substantial integration efforts, given 
the changes in strategy at Orange Group level. Corporate integration efforts affected a 
wide variety of marketing mix elements and value chain activities. The Orange 
Romania case study was conducted more than a year later than the Orange Denmark 
case. Orange Group integration efforts were thus more advanced at the time of the 
Romanian case study, but the overall nature and scope of integration was of a similar 
magnitude. In addition, France Telecom had announced, but not yet implemented, wide 
ranging plans to integrate the Orange Group into France Telecom. 
 
The Orange Romania case is about integration as late stage configurational change 
involving an incumbent operator with a substantial customer base and strong financial 
performance. Integration took place through centrally structured initiatives rolled out on 
a global/regional basis. 
 
5.3 Data collection 
 
Respondents 
 
All respondents were senior managers in the Romanian business. The nine interviews 
lasted between 36 and 75 minutes and generated 48,990 words when transcribed. 
 
Table 5-1 
Orange Romania respondents 
Respondent Data collection Interview length 
CEO Face to face 
Feb 1, 2006 
61 minutes 
(6,928 words) 
Sales Director Face to face 
Feb 1, 2006 
56 minutes 
(5,132 words) 
Marketing Director Face to face 
Jan 31, 2006 
50 minutes 
(5,735 words) 
Customer Service Director Face to face 
Feb 1, 2006 
75 minutes 
(6,056 words) 
HR Director Face to face 
Feb 2, 2006 
51 minutes 
(3,489 words) 
Procurement Director Face to face 
Feb 1, 2006 
65 minutes 
(7,732 words) 
Brand and Communications Manager Face to face 
Jan 28, 2006 
61 minutes 
(5,149 words) 
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Commercial Business Analysis and 
Planning Manager 
Face to face 
Feb 27, 2006 
65 minutes 
(5,780 words) 
Budget and Business Planning Manager Face to face 
Jan 31, 2006 
36 minutes 
(2,989 words) 
 
 
Interview guide 
 
The interview guide was changed after the Orange Denmark case to include additional 
questions about integration. Bias was avoided by not opening the interviews with 
questions regarding managerial tensions. The tension related questions were however 
kept but moved to the final part of the interview following the integration questions. To 
provide consistency, the case narratives start by reporting the tension related findings 
even though those questions were asked towards the end of the interview. A number of 
questions were added in relation to integration that focused on what elements were 
integrated or standardised today, what the ideal situation would be, why such decisions 
were made, who make the decisions today, how decisions should ideally be made, how 
decisions should be implemented and what problems could occur. This provided rich 
additional data as respondents often provided real life examples to questions. The 
Danish case had also led me to want to unbundle integration into an external dimension, 
focused on standardising customer experience between subsidiaries, and an internal 
dimension focused on activity integration.  
 
The interview guide is available in Appendix 14.5. 
 
5.4 Tension findings 
 
5.4.1 Frequency of tensions 
 
Most Romanian respondents [8; 89%] noted that they frequently experienced tension 
between Group and local. This included comments like: „Such tension is as common as 
daily‟ [ORO 5], „It happens all the time‟ [ORO 9] and simply „Very often‟ [ORO 6]. In 
addition, three respondents noted that the frequency of tensions had increased as 
integration had progressed: „I think it is quite common. And it has come to be more and 
more acute‟ [ORO 8], and „I think you feel that tension all the time. There are more and 
more demands‟ [ORO 3]. 
 
5.4.2 Areas affected by tensions 
 
Tensions were widely perceived throughout the organisation as noted by a senior 
manager: „I feel tension almost everywhere. I feel tension in commercial. I feel tension 
in network. I feel tension in IT. I feel tension in finance‟ [ORO 4]. Marketing, products 
and services and technical functions appear to have been particularly affected but there 
was also significant impact on support functions including finance, procurement and 
HR. However, sales and customer service were fairly unaffected.  
 
 101 
5.4.3 Causes of tensions 
 
Similar to the Orange Denmark case, managerial tensions have been clustered into the 
four areas below:  
 
1. Content of integration initiatives 
2. Decision-making process and interaction with headquarter representatives 
3. Implementation of integration initiatives 
4. Loss of autonomy of subsidiary managers 
 
There was no evidence of tensions arising from cultural differences. 
 
Perceptions of the content of integration initiatives 
 
The first category of tensions concerns lack of local fit of integration initiatives 
discussed by most managers [8;89%]. There were four drivers of this perception. First, 
many initiatives were considered to have negative or marginal benefits in a local 
context. Second, the Romanian business had a different strategy or market positioning 
that necessitated a different focus. Third, there were underlying market differences 
between Romania and the key Orange markets in Western Europe. The fourth reason 
related to perceived misfit of recent integration into the France Telecom Group. The 
first three areas were thus shared with the Orange Denmark case. 
 
Underlying market differences [8;89%]. Most managers felt that the there were 
underlying market reasons generating the misfit of Group initiatives. This included a 
difference between developed markets in Western Europe and developing markets in 
Eastern Europe. 
 
When you are in a growing market, an acquisition market like we are now, and voice is 
the main revenue stream, obviously your offers will be tailored within that area. So 
again, in a more developed market, where penetration is almost 100%, people would 
tend to have more retention offers and the focus would turn more towards the existing 
customers than towards acquiring new customers. So again, it depends very much on 
where the respective markets are [ORO 1]. 
 
A senior manager noted that offers are primarily driven by the local competitive 
situation and thus responding to local competitors. 
 
Our offers tend to be driven by what the competition is doing here rather than what the 
rest of the Orange Group is doing elsewhere. Therefore if we suddenly introduced an 
offer which has been used in the UK, it might look very odd here because people 
wouldn‟t understand how it worked and it might be too much of a step jump from what 
we have been doing here [ORO 3]. 
 
Changing market conditions was also seen as a key driver of misfit. What may seem 
like a good idea at an earlier date may all the sudden be down prioritised if the local 
situation changes.  
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Another set of tensions can appear when you have big movements inside a market 
which are changing the initial landscape. Then you can have tension because it comes 
back to prioritisation and what is more important to do [ORO 5]. 
 
Negative or marginal local benefits [4;44%]. Several managers frequently referred to 
limited or even negative impact of integration initiatives. 
 
From the point of view of marketing again because it is about standardisation of things 
that for us are not really that important at this moment... Again, they are not really that 
relevant at this moment for the business and they don‟t really feel that the time and 
effort invested is that relevant [ORO 1]. 
 
Different strategy and positioning [1;11%]. One manager argued that Group initiatives 
were often developed with the UK and France in mind and the Romanian business had a 
different strategy and market positioning. 
 
Brand again. It could be good if we could get greater standardisation and these global 
campaigns, if they are right, could be very useful to us. Although as we discussed 
yesterday, if you have significantly different composition in terms of target customers, 
than they are having in the core business units in Orange, you could end up with 
advertising that doesn‟t really mean anything or that is pushing in the wrong direction 
[ORO 3]. 
 
Legacy set-up [1;11%]. Legacy set-up could also make it difficult to implement Group 
initiatives. 
 
When you have a legacy you need to be very careful in terms of how you go from the 
legacy to a standardised element [ORO 5]. 
 
Misfit with integration into the parent [2;22%]. Two respondents voiced negative 
feelings towards the parent company, France Telecom. This was also stated by several 
of the other respondents in other situations when the tape recorder was not running. The 
Romanian business was originally set up as a fairly independent operation within the 
France Telecom Group. Employees had then been very positive towards the rebranding 
to Orange. The latest trend with integration into France Telecom was seen by many as a 
negative development given that FT was a giant state-owned company. With the 
previous „multidomestic‟ strategy, this had not been a problem as FT‟s involvement had 
been limited to primarily financial control. 
 
It is a negative change. For me at least. I cannot see the future at France Telecom level. 
I am pretty sure everyone sees it as a step back [ORO 6]. 
 
Perceptions of the decision-making process 
 
The second category of tensions related to the decision-making process and how Group 
had interacted with subsidiary managers. This category was also discussed by most of 
the Romanian managers [8;89%]. 
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Lack of fair treatment [5;56%]. There were numerous accounts of managers feeling 
that the treatment by head office managers had been unfair. This included a feeling that 
France Telecom was taking its revenge over Orange. 
 
Well, Orange started off as a very young, entrepreneurial organisation and became very 
successful under charismatic leadership. It was then taken over by a failing incumbent 
who was a little afraid of it for a while, and didn‟t do anything with it, and then 
achieved its revenge. Although, I think we have actually moved through the revenge 
period now, and into a more normal approach. Although I think that, in that process, 
there has been a lot of talent lost because the French are a very proud, arrogant and 
nationalistic people and they assume that they have a lock on intellectual capital, 
especially if you have been to the Ecole Polytechnique. So there aren‟t many people 
like me around. And I think there will be fewer and fewer going into the future. So 
actually, in terms of integration, I think that France Telecom should have acted earlier 
to integrate Orange into France Telecom. I think that it should have adopted a more 
open minded approach as to the benefits of using the Orange brand and the Orange 
brand values. Which is now accepted but it couldn‟t stomach it, weirdly, immediately 
after it had spent all that money to take Orange over. And I think it should have taken a 
much more objective approach towards talent management. Because what it actually did 
was to say: „the Group as a whole is overstaffed, we cannot downsize in France because 
of the unions and the government ownership, and therefore we will downsize 
everywhere else irrespective of talent‟. Which is rather like the Russians shooting the 
Polish officers and it has about the same logic attached to it. So, I would say, implement 
faster but make sure that you don‟t kill the officer class in the organisations that you are 
integrating on the way through. Because you are basically going to end up like after 
Stalin‟s purging. Because you will have a lot of people who will do exactly what you 
want, but one day Communism will fall as a result. You have to maintain talent 
throughout this process [ORO 3]. 
 
The tough ethno-centric stance taken by the French was also described with reference to 
the civil war in Bosnia as involving war lords and ethnic cleansing. 
 
The way that the TOP programme ended up was rather like Bosnia about 1990. There 
were a lot of war lords with militias cruising around making land grabs and demanding 
information. And there was something else that was similar to Bosnia. The French 
implemented a policy of ethnic cleansing as well [ORO 3]. 
 
Another manager described it as France Telecom (FT) sucking the life energy out of 
Orange. 
 
So honestly, I do not think that FT is feeling comfortable about the brand. It was 
something that was trendy for the market…but they never felt comfortable about the 
brand. The theory, on the dark side of the force, is saying that you must never put a 
small child sleeping with his grandmother. Because, the older body will suck the vital 
energy from the younger body. So basically, the baby will not develop. So the baby 
should sleep alone or with his parents, never with his grandparents. It is like that here 
when merging a younger body like Orange with an old body like France Telecom. You 
end up sucking all the vital energy from Orange and it will collapse. They never felt 
comfortable. They talked about the brand, it is nice not wearing ties, but then in the end 
everyone just leaves. And then you just have 1 or 2 people left from the old days. The 
last of the Mohicans. So I am not quite optimistic about the future [ORO 8].  
 
 104 
The same manager also noted that there was a tendency for a snow-ball effect with 
integration in that the initiatives keep expanding and expanding well beyond their 
original business rationale. 
 
When you start to build a central team, a headquarters, you can have quick wins. But 
then when you will go beyond this point, you will start to suffocate the local business in 
order to justify the central position. You will create a demand because you want to keep 
your place, and keep your team, so then you generate demand for what you do and you 
go further and further and you start to strangle the business. And this is a very delicate 
balance; to know when to stop [ORO 8]. 
 
In an example about central FT sourcing contracts, the same manager argued that less 
than 1% of the total number of contracts generated 90% of savings but that integration 
efforts just kept increasing all the time anyway. There was thus no end point. 
 
Taking the example of sourcing, I saw a presentation and I was overwhelmed. We have 
something like 3,400 and something corporate sourcing contracts. Out of these 3,400 
something, 27 contracts generate 90% of the savings for the Group. Well come on, why 
do I need to have over 3,000 contracts and you keep chasing me for the others. Come 
on, once you have generated 90% in savings with less than 30 contracts, the rest is just 
wasting time. Why do we need the others? Basically you create a structure, just to 
follow something which has only a 10% impact [ORO 8]. 
 
It was argued that you needed to appoint people with operational experience to avoid 
this from happening. 
 
If you put only ex-operational guys in charge, they would know it because they will all 
the time look in the mirror and think, „would this be OK or not if it happened to me?‟. 
You cannot have a magical formula to say that when you have reached this point you 
stop. It is common business sense. But if you put only guys at headquarters, who have 
never run a business, then you are dead. Because they will take the quick wins to justify 
their own expansion. They will create a mega structure at headquarters, with lots of 
people. But you have to remember all the time that the money is coming from the 
subsidiaries and not from headquarters. The headquarter support is necessary but it is 
important that you do not cross the point [ORO 8]. 
 
There was also a feeling that the Group imposed unrealistically high expectations on the 
local subsidiary. 
 
There is a products & services roadmap which includes global as well as local products. 
And it is a bit more realistic now in terms of what can be achieved from the central 
perspective as against the local perspective. Although, I think that the expectations of 
product performance are probably still unrealistically high at Group level [ORO 3]. 
 
Substantial frustration was also generated when the Group prevented the local 
subsidiary from taking initiatives in a local context by claiming that this was an area 
where the Group would be responsible. This generated tension when the Group then 
failed to deliver what had been promised and local subsidiary managers still had their 
hands tied. 
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A good example of that would be advertising. We have now been waiting for two and a 
half years for the appointment of a Group agency. During that time we have been told 
we cannot run a pitch for an alternative agency. All of the creative staff previously with 
our two advertising agencies in Romania have either left Romania or have gone to the 
agency now working for our competitor. So our agencies have no creative people to 
speak of. So our advertising has been crap. And this has fed through to brand metrics. 
But we haven‟t been able to appoint a new agency, until recently, because we were told 
not to as this was a Group decision but the Group didn‟t do anything. They said they 
were going to do, but then they didn‟t. So they compelled inaction and then became 
inactive themselves which is unforgivable [ORO 3]. 
 
There was also some resentment towards people in various departments at Group hiding 
behind the Group label, rather than business rationale, as an excuse for demanding 
things.  
 
The Group is sort of like a mastermind. You cannot touch it and everybody is hiding 
behind the „Group‟. But what exactly is the Group? It is just people in different 
departments who have said something. It is not a super bullet proof formula… the 
Group with the big „G‟ [ORO 8]. 
 
Lack of understanding from managers at headquarters [4;44%]. There was a fair 
amount of discussion about lack of understanding and experience of managers at 
headquarters. This included a shortage of operational field experience of headquarters 
managers. 
 
I think mainly because they do not know how the local businesses operate. I also 
witnessed in sourcing that they don‟t realise how a local procurement department 
works. What are the day-to-day challenges and you sometime start to wonder if they 
really believe that my job is to provide reports each and every day. Because they are not 
aware of what exactly it means to do something. To be in a business. I don‟t think it is 
an evil mind behind this. It is just people who have no experience of running an 
operational business. Normally they should find out themselves that it does not make 
sense what they are asking because things like this cannot be handled… They do not 
know even where Romania is [ORO 8]. 
 
This included parochial attitudes of head office managers not realising that there are 
variations on a country-by-country basis. 
 
It happens that you have to communicate with people who do not have an understanding 
of other countries and differences. That cannot imagine that the law is different between 
countries [ORO 4]. 
 
Integration not ‘sold’ to subsidiary [5;56%]. A majority of respondents stated that their 
level of belief in the integration process was fairly low. A key driver was because there 
had been only limited communication from head office and integration had not been 
„sold‟ to subsidiary managers. 
 
I am not a fan of head office is deciding because I am more oriented to selling ideas and 
having people buying in the ideas. Because if the headquarters is going to the local 
managers and are imposing something and he doesn‟t get his team committed, the result 
will be harder to obtain. It is a matter of leadership style because there are situations 
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when you buy things, and you appreciate that you were given the possibility to buy-in 
even if you know that it is a top decision. It is a matter of involvement and if you have 
people locally involved I think the result is better than let‟s say receiving a big objective 
for every country saying you are going to receive this, good luck and see you when you 
have achieved your target [ORO 7]. 
 
A result of the lack of communicating and selling was limited local buy-in: 
 
I do not have too much experience in terms of global implementations but what is quite 
clear is that it works very well once you get the buy-in. It works very tough once you do 
not get the buy-in. So if you do not deliver enough explanations and you do not stress 
enough, and the people locally do not see the advantage of such a global initiative, in 
the immediate future or in the medium or long-term future, then it is a risk. So whatever 
you try to do, you should convince the top management to not necessarily just force the 
local management [ORO 5]. 
 
This ultimately led to a lack of faith in the ultimate results of integration: 
 
I guess the worst thing is the lack of belief in the end result. I think people will 
ultimately agree to, and comply with anything, that they see, even grudgingly, as being 
valuable in the end. But if the outcome appears to be ridiculous or counterproductive 
then you will never achieve their buy-in [ORO 3]. 
 
Lack of trust [4;44%]. There was also lack of trust in relation to both the ability of the 
head office to deliver and the ultimate motives for integration. 
 
I think it is the lack of trust in decisions and projects that are imposed on me [ORO 7]. 
 
Trust was further eroded when tensions were not being resolved 
 
Negative is of course if tensions are staying and having quite the same type of tension 
all the time and nobody is trying to resolve them [ORO 5]. 
 
HQ micro management [2;22%]. Subsidiary managers also felt that they were being 
micro managed by head office managers. 
 
I will give you a specific example from the business review last week. One of the 
group‟s requirements is that you must not spend more than 2.45% of your revenues on 
advertising and promotions expenditure. Now, it also says to me that it wants me to 
achieve specific EBITDA and revenue targets. So, it not only gives me macro targets 
but it also tries to force me into a box in virtually every area of the P&L and balance 
sheet to tell me how to do it. And that is ridiculous because you need flexibility because 
life changes, the market changes. You can‟t control down to that level of detail every 
single aspect of the P&L because then you are going to fail… The thinking, the mind 
set from the central bureaucrats, is that „if I control advertising and promotions 
expenditures to 2.45% of revenues in Romania, and in every other operating business, 
then I have restricted advertising and promotions to 2.45%, which is in line with 
industry benchmarks so haven‟t I done a fantastic job‟. Yeah, but does anyone look 
down below and note that we have lost 5% in market share in these five markets. 
Because we didn‟t necessarily have to do this and we could have made more EBITDA 
if we hadn‟t [ORO 3]. 
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Perceptions of implementation 
 
The third category of tensions related to the implementation of integration initiatives 
which was raised by a majority of respondents [8;89%]. 
 
Goal and Resource conflicts [8;89%]. The most widely discussed topic related to 
conflicting goals and resource conflicts in relation to prioritising local and global 
demands. 
 
I think the objectives are not aligned…If I have a local objective, which is more or less 
P&L related, and someone at Group has another objective, he would try and get his 
objective put in place. But I would start to argue because it is against my local 
objective. Because when we look at the Group functions, they have some objectives. 
And then you have objectives by business unit and by subsidiary and they are not 
harmonised. So he wants to deliver his objective and he doesn‟t care…And I start to 
argue that I cannot do that because I have other things to do. We have objectives 
coming like this, and like this and like this [ORO 8]. 
 
Specifically there was a feeling that local budgets were not dimensioned to factor in the 
short-term effects of Group initiatives. 
 
Again it is the fact that, when doing these plans, the local resources are not really 
assessed or dimensioned accordingly. So the local has resources dimensioned for what 
is in their local objectives and then something comes on top of that and needs to be 
done with the same kind of resources. And with the result being uncertain and not being 
sure what will happen, and with objectives not really being that clear and perhaps not 
really profitably at the moment, it is very difficult to allocate more resources to it [ORO 
1]. 
 
This included different Group entities cutting the local budgets at the same time as other 
Group entities were mandating integration initiatives with adverse short-term budget 
impact. 
 
What is contradictory, when we say one thing and then we cannot do it, is when the 
budgets are cut for different reasons. Budgetary constraints can sometimes be in 
opposite direction to some decisions [ORO 2]. 
 
A key driver behind resource conflicts was seen as the lack of a way to prioritise local 
versus global projects. 
 
It is exactly because when having this plan for integration, this global standardisation, 
doesn‟t take into consideration what the activities and priorities are, and basically what 
the objectives are that have also been set for the local business. So you are setting 
several separate objectives for the local business and many times you are not making a 
prioritisation between them. When people have to deliver on several levels that are not 
consistent between them [ORO 1]. 
 
Increased bureaucracy [3;33%]. Increased bureaucracy was also seen as consuming 
local resources that could have been put to more productive use. 
 
Enormous amounts of local resources are being taken in trying to produce reports and 
trying to comply with central dictates. And in travelling back and forth between Paris 
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and London to hear these kind of politburo statements about how things will be handled 
in the future [ORO 3]. 
 
Lack of clear direction [4;44%]. The implementation was made difficult by the 
presence of many different units at headquarters that issued conflicting instructions 
towards the Romanian subsidiary. 
 
One of the key things about the way in which they are attempting to enforce this is that 
it is extremely confused. So there are groups within France Telecom and groups within 
Orange who are often attempting to achieve the same goals. So you get two different 
work streams, covering the same area, coming from two different directions. And the 
plethora of initiatives which exist right across the business is huge and therefore people 
on the ground here get very confused about what the prioritisation is and who is really 
calling the shots… I think that the way in which power was allowed to reside in various 
different units, various different functions, various different levels, within the Group, 
without any clear coordination was a critical negative factor in terms of how this has all 
evolved [ORO 3]. 
 
Some respondents observed that Orange tended to swing back and forth between 
emphasising local and global dimensions of management. A middle of the road was 
advocated but it was noted that this seemed difficult to achieve. 
 
It is true that you might face a risk of going into an over integration trying to integrate 
everything and to make all the processes equal everywhere. You know it is like a 
pendulum, you go for full centralisation and then decentralisation. The difficult part is 
to find the middle. Normally it is moving in between. It started with full centralisation, 
then too much decentralisation and then back towards full centralisation again. And 
now I think it is somewhere in the middle [ORO 5]. 
 
Inexperienced people at headquarters [3;33%]. Not having the right people with 
strong backgrounds was another cause of tension. 
 
Obviously, like with everything, the quality of the people, the calibre of the people, and 
the approach of the people is going to be critical [ORO 3]. 
 
Weak delivery of integration initiatives [5;55%]. There was further a feeling among the 
majority of interviewed managers that actual delivery of integration initiatives was 
weak. 
 
What is happening with a lot of these things is that the projects start and people are not 
aware of them and along the line the objectives move and it takes years and years for 
them to happen. I think the proper way is, when you lead this centrally, if you don‟t 
really have a very clear rollout plan and you are not able to stick with that plan, then the 
problem appears because people don‟t take it seriously anymore…We have seen that 
happen with different projects. It didn‟t work because of this [ORO 1]. 
 
It was specifically noted that strong change management was needed throughout the 
process. 
 
Implementation can be broken first of all by the problem of change management. Any 
such implementation will introduce changes and it can introduce changes in terms of 
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organisation, in terms of metrics calculation, in terms of follow-up, in terms of the way 
you do business. So I think one of the biggest risks, as a deal-breaker in this case, would 
be not managing the change in fact [ORO 5]. 
 
Lack of sufficient „home work‟ prior to the start of implementation was also generating 
tension between Group and local. 
 
I think in a lot of cases, the majority of times in fact, global implementations are not 
necessarily well prepared from the beginning. Initial phases of preparations are 
generally very much burnt out. This generally puts you in a situation where you lack the 
buy-in, because the initial phase of analysis is either not done or not properly done and 
then it begins to be a game of somebody locally who does not really understand why 
they should do such a thing, who does not really understand what the benefits are, and 
then fights back instead of constructively bringing things to be better. So what I think 
could be done better, is the initial phase of analysis and definition of the two elements,  
the global and local,  and explanations of purpose and scope in fact. The other element 
that can come in, and could be done better, is planning.  Because as I have said, one of 
the big killers of global implementation in local countries is resources. You will never 
succeed to pilot the business only by global implementation. Therefore, you will 
always, all the time, also have local implementation. Therefore it will all the time be a 
balance between resources used for global and local implementation. So in this case, if 
you do not plan correctly from the beginning, you risk entering very quickly into such 
resource clashes [ORO 5]. 
 
Perceptions of the loss of autonomy 
 
The fourth category of tension related to subsidiary managers losing power and 
influence over the way their business was run. This was discussed by two thirds of the 
respondents [6;67%] 
 
Loss of local autonomy [1;11%]. An integrated operating model meant a reduction in 
the level of management autonomy in the Romanian subsidiary. 
 
If I answer it by saying that, rather facetiously, I often say that if this drive for 
standardisation and integration continues, the only thing that I will eventually do is to 
cut ribbons to open Orange shops because I will not have any executive authority apart 
from that. Because the brand will be developed centrally. The products and services, 
promotions and tariffs will be developed centrally. All budgets will be controlled 
centrally. The network decisions will be controlled centrally. Customer service 
everything, everything. There will be no decisions to take here. We will simply adopt 
procedures, practices, prices, products and promotions which come out of the middle. 
And we don‟t make any creative decisions at all. We just drive the truck. But I also say 
that, there is a belief, a naive belief I think, that if this nirvana could be achieved, this 
would then create the perfect business environment and that the France Telecom Group 
would be the best performing business in the world. I actually see it the other way. I 
think that if one adopts this painting by numbers approach, one ends up with a painting 
which has clearly been painted by numbers. You do not end up with Mona Lisa [ORO 
3]. 
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Reluctance to change [5;56%]. A majority of respondents also noted that it was 
common human behaviour to resist changes, including those related to integration. 
 
Every time, the approach was more like „you have to‟, well then we come back to the 
buy-in phase. I think it is human, from the time when you were a child, whenever 
someone tells you „you have to‟, the first reaction is why? And if that is a change from 
what you do normally, your first reaction is why? [ORO 5]. 
 
Perceptions of the cultural interaction style 
 
Not identified in this case study. 
 
5.4.4 Consequences of tensions 
 
The perceived tensions had a number of positive consequences. 
 
Positive consequences 
 
Respondents noted getting new perspectives and improvements as the primary benefits 
from integration. Compared with the Danish case, half [5;56%] of the interviewed 
managers discussed positive benefits of integration. 
 
Getting new perspectives [4;44%]. If integration is done in a constructive way, 
subsidiary managers felt they could benefit from gaining a new perspective. 
 
I think that what has happened in the last year like Value Based Marketing, which main 
activity, but not the only one, was to share best practice. I think it was very useful 
because if you learn directly from people using some things you become interested. It is 
not at all imposed. You are the one who is asking for it and it is what happened for us 
[ORO 9]. 
 
Improvements [3;33%]. As a result of getting a new perspective, integration can lead to 
improvements in the local business. 
 
There can be some positive impact. Sometime you may see or you may find some input 
during these tensions. You may find some things that you may not see otherwise 
because you are blind. But during this tension when you explain and you are 
questioned, you may discover things which can be improved [ORO 4]. 
 
Negative consequences 
 
However, like with the Danish case, there was substantial discussion around negative 
consequences for both the business and the people concerned [8;89%]. 
 
Business impact 
 
Crashed implementation [1;11%]. One negative influence is that implementation can 
crash. A senior manager considered the risk of this especially high if people had not 
bought into the integration efforts. It was noted that a single person could through 
spanners in the wheel of implementation. 
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In my opinion, if somebody is not convinced and doesn‟t believe it is a good decision, 
then one person can crash everything. If HR or sales is not convinced that the decision 
is correct and leading to benefits, then it doesn‟t matter if the others are convinced 
because one person can crash the project [ORO 4]. 
 
Losing control of local business [1;11%]. One manager also noted that integration 
could have the effect that you lose control over the way your business is run locally. 
Rather than having full control over your network, systems, products and services, 
integrated solutions can become „black boxes‟ that you do not know how to handle. 
 
The first impact is on network and I have seen it many times. Each time they have 
started to integrate somehow the technical and the network, we finish by not 
understanding our network [ORO 6]. 
 
Wasting resources [3;33%]. Integration was seen as taking a lot of resources. And as 
was previously illustrated, managers often felt that the return was low. 
 
The problems it causes in the local business are related to the time and effort and 
resources invested in trying to do those things that basically never happen…So I think it 
is not good for the moral of the people…when time is invested in something that is 
never finalised [ORO 1]. 
 
A senior manager also noted that the constant involvement from Group meant he had to 
spend additional time to ensure that he always documented every step he took and every 
decision he made in case he would be challenged later on. 
 
And then you have the emotional part that I am at least part of my time attentive to 
cover my tracks, to cover my ass so that nobody can blame me about something. And 
this is time consuming and is not producing any value. Because I know that somebody 
at Group can challenge me on this so I have an additional workload to ensure that 
everything is bullet proof from Group involvement [ORO 8]. 
 
Losing time to market [3;33%]. Managers also discussed losing time to market as a 
result of becoming inward-oriented. The subsidiary did not respond fast enough to 
changes in the Romanian market place as a consequence. 
 
During these efforts there is time which is lost. We lose time to explain why we need 
these, these and these and why it would be to the detriment of the business. Why we 
need to do this, why we need to do that. And the whole process of providing 
explanations and being understood and raise questions, it is time when everything is 
blocked [ORO 4]. 
 
Loss of sales [3;33%]. The ultimate impact was manifested in losing sales and 
revenues. 
 
The latest example we had was a client, I will not name it, whose contract was OK and 
running. The contract was signed for two years and everything was OK. The Group 
invitation to bid arrived, because their headquarters wanted to choose. Following all the 
negotiations we had to, first of all, change the conditions before the expiry of the term. 
Going lower. And even if here we could have managed to negotiate better we had to 
offer lower….In this case we don‟t like it because it induced a loss for us [ORO 2]. 
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Neglecting customers [4;44%]. There was substantial frustration that integration made 
the company inward-oriented with the result that customers were neglected. 
 
And as we were saying yesterday, the one thing which gets neglected, and there is no 
way you can exaggerate this, it is neglected, is the customer out there on the street. 
Because there is no one out there talking to the customer or checking that he is getting 
the right experience when he walks into one of our shops. We are off to London and 
Paris talking about Group integration and we have been doing that for three years [ORO 
3]. 
 
People impact 
 
Integration related tension also had a personal impact on the Romanian subsidiary 
managers [4;44%].  
 
Demotivation [3;33%]. The primary impact discussed related to feeling demotivated. 
 
Even if you have an initial buy-in, you can lose the buy-in after a period of time. Worst 
case, you can begin to lose local resources and lose experiences and knowhow and 
knowledge, because people get too much stressed with the tension and then in the end 
they say „nice, do your game alone, but not with me‟, which is not necessarily a good 
thing [ORO 5]. 
 
Frustration [1;11%]. And feeling frustrated. 
 
Because the Group says something and our local needs are different. We need to react 
fast and we are not able to react fast due to the regulations imposed.  And that is the 
tension. People become frustrated [ORO 4]. 
 
And feeling like a fool from being pushed around by conflicting demands from Group 
over a period of many years without any end. 
 
It depends how long you have already worked for Orange Romania. If you are in the 
beginning you see challenges. However, after a period of time you feel like a fool. It 
depends on how long you have worked and on your previous experience [ORO 6]. 
 
A senior manager mentioned balancing local and local demands as the primary reason 
for stress. 
 
With me as an example, my most difficult challenge is to find a balance between the 
Group policies which are obliging me to do this or that and the business requirements 
which sometimes are contradictory…This is the most stressful and tense part of my job, 
the most hard work to find this balance [ORO 4]. 
 
Generating scepticism [2;22%]. A period of unresolved tension and failed integration 
efforts can also lead to a cynical attitude among managers that undermines the potential 
for future success. 
 
I think the impact is first of all that people become quite sceptical towards the 
standardisation process itself. And even if it is something that might be good, they will 
not feel it anymore like that and they will tend to see it as something negative. This 
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tension obviously would be the first thing that they would feel. So I think this basically 
undermines the chances of this process being successful if people are not really seeing it 
as something good after all [ORO 1]. 
 
5.4.5 Managing tensions 
 
Managers used a variety of different ways to manage or cope with the perceived 
tensions. 
 
Gamesmanship 
 
Similar to the Danish case, managers relied on political gamesmanship behaviours from 
time to time when confronted with competing demands. A majority of respondents 
[7;78%] discussed the need to resort to various forms of gamesmanship. 
 
Build subsidiary alliances [1;11%]. To gain bargaining power versus Group, it 
happened that subsidiary managers formed alliances with peers in other subsidiaries and 
then challenged Group together. 
 
We have a collaborative association between us [in function X], when we found 
common things that affected us…We exchange information between us. What do you 
see? What do you think? What is your opinion? How does it affect you? We make an 
agreement and then we attack the issues together [ORO 4]. 
 
Delay implementation [2;22%]. Delay was also used to push implementation on 
occasions when it was not possible to challenge the Group or Group denied local 
exemptions. 
 
I think what normally has happened is that you either ignore it for the moment or you 
ask for a delay [ORO 1]. 
 
Economise the truth [1;11%]. Certain facts were also hidden from headquarters, 
especially to create buffers that could be used for „rainy days‟. 
 
Because always the subsidiaries are hiding behind their figures, saving the truth to 
corporate in order to save some money, some room to manoeuvre [ORO 6]. 
 
Passive compliance [2;22%]. This included passive compliance without really working 
very hard to deliver integration initiatives. 
 
I actually think that to some extent we are successful in spite of, rather than because of, 
these initiatives. I think we have found a way of adapting, and a method of passive 
compliance which is enough to satisfy the Group, but not so much that it destroys our 
business prospects [ORO 3]. 
 
Prioritise local demands [4;44%]. When competing demands got too high, and 
managers felt they could not openly challenge the Group, several respondents concluded 
that they had prioritised local demands over Group initiatives. 
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For me, the priority is the local business. I need to take care of employees, payments, 
salaries and training. And the Group is telling me, this is the policy, you should do this, 
you should do that [ORO 4]. 
 
Interacting with Group 
 
Managers also discussed the importance of how you interact with Group.  
 
Argue the local case [5;56%]. Several respondents talked about the need to build up 
strong cases when asking for exemptions from initiatives mandated by Group. 
 
I shouted that „we cannot comply‟ and I will keep shouting that we cannot comply with 
the rules. Because we have this, this and this and I will give explanations. I will try to 
establish communication channels [ORO 4]. 
 
Build personal networks [1;11%]. Personal relationships and networks were seen as 
important to build trust with managers at headquarters. 
 
I think it is very important with a personal network, relationships with the people, and the 
fact that people trust you. So that the more you tell them something, they know that it is 
something that has been thought of previously [ORO 9]. 
 
Compromise [2;22%]. The importance of striking compromises between Group and 
local was stressed by several managers. 
 
In the end, it is like living together so there are compromises all the time. You have to 
compromise somehow in solving these tensions [ORO 5]. 
 
Escalation [2;22%]. The possibility to escalate conflicts to senior managers was also 
discussed. However that did not ultimately solve the issue but pushed the conflict to 
another level. It also sometimes helped to delay implementation. 
 
In that situation, you obviously have to go through an upper level and basically present 
the problem and then the decision will be taken. So the company will negotiate again 
the importance of what is being set as a local objective and priority and this process and 
whatever it means as a whole for the company. Depending on the decision it will be 
done or not [ORO 1]. 
 
Fight back for prioritisation [1;11%]. One manager also discussed the need to push 
back as demands were always increasing. 
 
It is simple. I say „Do you want one or nothing‟... Do you want nothing or you have to 
choose what you want [ORO 6]. 
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Structure local subsidiary 
 
Reprioritise [1;11%]. A senior manager mentioned the need to look over current 
prioritisations when faced with integration requirements. 
 
If it is a too tight deadline…you first of all try to push back deadlines. If you cannot, and 
there are bigger objectives that will not allow you, then you try to re-allocate and 
reprioritise. In the end this could have a positive effect because you may find out that you 
could have optimised your organisation or your way of management [ORO 5]. 
 
Get your priorities straight 
 
Decide on what matters most [2;22%]. Two respondents discussed the need to be clear 
on what was really important as integration could cause loss of focus in the local 
subsidiary. 
 
You go back to the resources. If you are not allowed to increase the resources to be able 
to be the best student and at the same time you have to deliver results. I think the critical 
one is to deliver results and then to be a good student. You have to make a choice and in 
the end if you are not a good student but you have a good result you are maybe not 
congratulated but you are forgiven. In the other case there is no escape [ORO 9]. 
 
5.5 Integration findings 
 
This section presents the findings relating to how the Romanian subsidiary managers 
suggested that integration decisions should be made and how integration initiatives 
should be implemented. 
 
5.5.1 How to make integration decisions 
 
Recommendations in this section relates to how the strategy should be set, how 
managers at head office should interact with subsidiary managers and how staff should 
be appointed for head office positions. 
 
Analysis 
 
Most managers [8;89%] discussed different forms of analysis as input to standardisation 
and integration decisions. 
 
Analyse and benchmark local operations [7;78%]. Several Romanian managers 
argued for the importance that head office had a good understanding of local operations. 
A starting point was a sound understanding of local KPIs. 
 
I would start first of all with a common set of KPIs, clear KPIs, with financial reporting. 
This has to be. Because first of all we have to speak the same language. To speak the 
same language, we need to refer to the same KPIs and definitions. To report in the same 
way.  If we do not have this, we not know how to compare and to analyse on the same 
basis [ORO 2]. 
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One manager argued that IT and reporting systems needed standardising in order to be 
able to extract the same KPIs from the different subsidiaries. This had not yet been 
achieved. 
 
First of all, in tools, you should have standardised information systems that allows us to 
see the same things. Because, the results we are analysing are usually different. So if we 
do not have the same information tools standardised, then we will never be able to see 
the same results. I am giving just an example. It is a project which has been going on for 
five years, saying that all the Orange subsidiaries should have the same financial 
systems. After five years they realise it is not possible due to the local constrains, local 
financial constraints in fact. As long as you do not have the same tools, you cannot have 
the same results [ORO 6]. 
 
Many managers discussed the need to use benchmarking, both within the company and 
with external companies, to justify integration efforts. 
 
You would look at benchmarks against the rest of the industry, like the A.T. Kearney 
European cost benchmarking report, and see that you are underperforming against your 
competition, which tends to suggest that you need to adopt a different approach in order 
to improve…Or simply how you are performing against your competition in each 
market. [ORO 3]. 
 
It was also argued that benchmarking should be used to ensure that integration did not 
by accident result in worse local performance. 
 
If you have very high performance, it would be useful to make benchmarks and to see if 
you can improve or not. You may damage if you impose standards in some areas which 
are very high performing the way they are [ORO 9]. 
 
Analyse customer needs [4;44%]. It was also seen as important to analyse similarities 
and differences in terms of customer needs to assess how similar or different the 
markets were before deciding on the level of standardisation. 
 
I would like to know first information related to the nations and to the customers in the 
countries we are looking at. Then I would like to have similarities because people have 
common features so do the countries. So similarities between them and also among 
other subsidiaries that were centralised [ORO 7]. 
 
As already noted, integration can become too inwardly oriented to the neglect of 
customers. It was thus argued the importance of viewing standardisation and integration 
from a customer perspective.  
 
I would look at if, out of these standards, we obtain something relevant for customers 
[ORO 2]. 
 
Analyse market development stage [4;44%]. Assessing the level of maturity of the 
different markets was also seen as important before making decisions. 
 
And then there is another point which I think is important. That is in which phase of the 
business each of the territories are. Because, it is not all the time that you have all the 
territories at the same level of development of the business itself and of the market. In 
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some cases, a global deployment would have an effect of pushing up the business. In 
some cases, it would have the effect of innovativeness. In some cases it would have the 
effect of pure demonstration of force, not necessarily increasing business [ORO 5]. 
 
Make proper initial assessment [2;22%]. In depth analysis was also seen as essential 
up front to ensure that the next steps in the process would run smoothly. Proper analysis 
served to build up confidence in the integration process and to pre-empt tension further 
down the line and preserve the credibility of head office. 
 
If the documentation before choosing that this will be the product to be implemented 
was not well conducted, because you may find out that a certain country does not have 
technical capabilities, or will not have the ability to deliver in time for some very good 
reasons. Before taking the decision, it has to be checked and feasibility investigated at 
country level [ORO 2]. 
 
It was argued that resource requirements should be analysed early in the process to 
ensure that there would not be a disconnect between the ambition of corporate 
integration efforts and the financial reality. There should thus be alignment at 
headquarters level to avoid subsidiaries being caught in the middle between different 
Group functions. 
 
Strategically I think that the central entity should ensure that there is a match, there is an 
overall match between the business objectives of the local entity and what comes as 
objectives from the standardisation. If there is agreement on all the parameters of the 
objectives I think it should work fine [ORO 1]. 
 
Setting the strategy 
 
Align objectives [1;11%]. Given the many experiences with competing objectives, it 
was argued that clarity of objectives was necessary for success. This would ensure that 
different Group functions did not pose conflicting demands. 
 
They should agree about the objectives they give to the business units. And the business 
units should break down the objectives to the subsidiaries. There are global objectives 
to be agreed across the Group functions [ORO 8]. 
 
Be clear on integration benefits [4;44%]. It was further argued that head office should 
be clear on what the purpose is of integration. This will also make it easier to sell 
integration to subsidiary managers. 
 
First of all I think the proposition of integration is based on relevance of the product 
itself. And the possibility to obtain some benefits out of integration. It should also be 
analysed locally what is to be gained and what is to be lost if we do something like 
this…I don‟t think there are answers valid for all areas. It is area by area and has to be 
very well assessed the relevance. To do something one must obtain anything at the end, 
either better perceptions by customers or savings [ORO 2]. 
 
Cluster similar countries [2;22%]. Following from a minimum core, it was argued that 
subsidiaries should be clustered, based on how similar they were. The minimum core 
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would be deployed across all subsidiaries but further integration could then take place 
within more similar clusters. 
 
For example between Slovakia, Romania and Poland. That might be easier…When you 
think about it with companies at the same level of development I think it is easier. 
However, if you look at 15 companies and some of them are in Africa and some of them 
in Europe, at different stages of development, it becomes really very complicated [ORO 
1]. 
 
Adapt customer facing functions [2;22%]. Two managers advocated the logic that 
customer facing functions needed a higher degree of local flexibility to cater to different 
markets. The level of standardisation and integration should thus be varied area by area. 
 
The areas that I wouldn‟t recommend centralising would be marketing, sales and 
customer service. That is, any direct customer touch point, which needs to have a local 
design and local flavour to be successful…I would hesitate in getting into the really 
front line customer touch points because then you are assuming that you know more 
than the people on the ground. And as Colin Powell says, in his opinion, the local 
commander is in the best position to know what actions should be taken. And that is the 
principle you should always operate on. Rather than assume that you can second guess 
[ORO 3]. 
 
Define overall brand position [1;11%]. Part of the vision should include a statement of 
the desired brand position. One manager argued that a common brand position was 
required in order to base integration efforts around pulling in the same direction. 
 
Starting with brand positioning, I would go to details on common marketing plans, 
some, those common elements only. The first thing would be the same parameters and 
definitions and then a clear brand positioning [ORO 2]. 
 
Define minimum core [1;11%]. Defining the minimum core across all countries was 
regarded as helpful. A very clear minimum core was seen as strengthening the overall 
brand positioning without suffocating the subsidiaries. 
 
I think it should be at least a minimum of elements because otherwise you dilute the 
idea. You cannot standardise something on a worldwide basis which consists of only 
one element. Basically, I think we do not need to reinvent the wheel here. We can look 
at other worldwide providers [ORO 8]. 
 
Find the right balance [1;11%]. A senior manager touched upon the difficulty in 
striking the right balance between standardisation and adaptation. 
 
When you standardise things you are losing autonomy. We are talking about different 
countries so you need to leave flexibility to the countries. And sometimes it is not in a 
favourable position to get everything standardised. So there are two extremes: 
standardising and independence. And we need to find a place in the middle and it is 
very difficult [ORO 4]. 
 
Focus on common segments [1;11%]. Following from a common brand position, 
integration would be easier if there were commonly defined market segments to develop 
initiatives towards. 
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If we speak about how to attack competitor‟s clients, this may be very different from 
country to country. Competition has not the same weaknesses or strengths in all the 
countries. The customers do not react to the same stimulus. This is very dependent on 
the market and on the local situation. So we cannot say we standardise a method to sell. 
But what we can try to do is to follow some segments. To follow some segments that 
can be valuable for all [ORO 2]. 
 
Focus on what matters most [1;11%]. As part of defining the minimum core, one 
manager argued for the importance of focusing on those initiatives that mattered most 
across the footprint. This also ensured concentration of efforts on fewer initiatives rather 
than dilution across too many. 
 
But we should restrict. Because if they propose to us to do a lot of things, we dissipate 
our efforts in all directions and finally the processes are slowed down… To focus 
exactly on the common products agreed by everyone which again, should not be a very 
long list... More focus is needed. More focus and shorter selections of products [ORO 
2]. 
 
Work towards a clear vision [3;33%]. Respondents discussed the need to have clarity 
around the end goal of integration rather than simply seeing a list of operational 
initiatives. It was also regarded as important to stick working towards the overall vision 
rather than keep changing regularly. 
 
For me, these decisions are something that has to be taken by looking at very broad 
objectives. These multinational companies want to get to this point and they want to 
provide these kind of services to business clients or to consumers. So we have to start 
with the very broad objectives of the company and then we may see that some of these 
objectives cannot be achieved without standardising different things. I think you have to 
see where you want to get and then you decide that you have to do it and then you do it 
[ORO 1]. 
 
People 
 
Ensure operationally experienced people at HQ [1;11%]. The vital importance of 
appointing operationally experienced people to head office positions was also 
emphasised. 
 
First of all, I would not put anybody in the headquarters until he has run a business. You 
must have the local operational experience. You will be the manager of a group of 
companies or countries, so if you do not know what it is like to run a business, what 
operational issues you are facing, you cannot set the vision because you do not have the 
basics to do this. This is an issue right now because you have people, who have not run 
a business, maybe they have never driven a car in their life, now they think about what 
you should do. They put some ideas about what you should do without understanding 
that somehow, all of the things are linked with each other. If they want to change 
something, they don‟t see that other areas are linked. Because they do not have any 
experience. Just guys who gathers reports, analyses reports and then make reports from 
other reports. If you really want this to work, you need to put an operational guy in this 
position [ORO 8]. 
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Interaction 
 
Be clear that integration will happen [2;22%]. Subsidiary managers argued that head 
office should make it clear that integration will happen rather than send weak messages. 
Integration should then be backed up by strong top management support. 
 
And obviously there has to be a flow of information from subsidiaries to the central 
office. I think decisions have to be taken and people have no other choice than to do it. 
Because otherwise, because people don‟t want to change. They have their own way of 
doing things and their own ideas are always better than the ideas that someone else has. 
It is really a difficult balance how to do this without losing the knowledge from the 
local market. Because they may have some really good ideas that you don‟t want to 
lose. So you should ensure a workflow of information from the subsidiary to the centre. 
But they should know that they have to do it. The information will help them to do it the 
best way. Otherwise, you know if it is a sort of consultancy, should we do this or should 
we not, you will never reach an agreement because people have their own objectives 
and their own little worlds [ORO 1]. 
 
Consult and sell integration to subsidiary managers [6;67%]. Most respondents 
argued that head office managers should adopt a consultative approach to integration 
rather than just mandate integration. 
 
We have to involve the CEOs of the subsidiaries and their key staff. I think the first 
time round, the reason why the process failed, was because there wasn‟t sufficient 
consultation. And then they took that consultation on a limited basis and then created 
this new Group operating model. I would take a lot more consultation. OK, eventually I 
would have to take central decisions but I am saying that you should achieve the 
maximum possible level of consultation so that you get the best ideas that you can 
before you start [ORO 3]. 
 
5.5.2 How to implement integration 
 
Manage people 
 
Engage people [1;11%]. Beyond formal commitment, it was seen as important to 
engage people in the subsidiary to also put their hearts and souls into the 
implementation. 
 
You can work to a project with your mind and you can work on a project with your 
mind, soul and everything. And this is the difference. And Romanians as you have seen 
are very subordinated to the boss. So if the boss is telling them something they will do 
it. But if you touch their hearts, they will do better than you would ever think they can 
do. Because they are able to bring a lot of fine tunings that give value. That make the 
final results better than expected. These are the key elements to success [ORO 7]. 
 
Move people around [1;11%]. Rather than reinventing the wheel in each operation, 
based on a standard blueprint, the benefits of circulating experts around the Group was 
put forward. 
 
I would probably ask someone who has implemented it in another country to come to 
the country that is implementing this and coordinate the whole project. Because I think 
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the person who implements it once or twice will make less mistakes than a brand new 
person and also will be able to train a new potential implementer [ORO 7]. 
 
Share ways of working [2;22%]. Rather than just having a push from Group, managers 
argued for creating a subsidiary „pull‟ effect where people would seek out information 
and share ways of working. This was seen as leading to a positive climate. 
 
Another thing which normally works, I think it could be changed very much, is the role 
of the Group into best practice sharing. This is very important. Sometimes, it is more 
important than to have a Group organisation focused on pure delivery and 
implementation. Not forgetting to have elements inside that organisation that are 
focused on communication between entities of the Group and best practice sharing. 
Because sometimes it is easier to be convinced of a good thing, that the Group wants to 
implement here, by talking to other people who have done it and it worked well for 
them, than only the Group coming here and saying „you have to do it, because I know it 
is good and it has worked there‟. Wherever you go in terms of integration, there should 
be an element inside the organisation that facilitate all the time this best practice 
sharing, and not only facilitates it, it also encourages it, it generates it [ORO 5]. 
 
Secure top management commitment [3;33%]. Strong commitment from top 
management at both Group and local level was regarded as essential in order to send the 
signal that integration was a top priority. Without this, other projects would be given 
priority. 
 
The senior people in the organisation should buy into the decisions and be convinced 
that it is of benefit. It is a mentality. They should be taken on board and feel that it is the 
right decision. The top people should be convinced of the benefits. If they are convinced 
of the benefits they will drive the implementation correctly and they will put their 
efforts to ensure successful implementation [ORO 4]. 
 
Manage objectives and resources 
 
Avoid too many swings [1;11]. Consistency was also seen as essential. Frequent 
changes in direction would cause efforts to be diluted and staff to lose interest. 
 
Then it cannot be moved or changed so that we say today „we are doing this‟, then 
tomorrow we change a little bit, this project is no longer the first priority but another 
project is and so on. If we found, with good documentation, that this is a good element, 
we should rapidly put it into the market [ORO 2]. 
 
Establish dedicated working groups [1;11%]. Like with many things, dedicated 
resources with responsibility for delivery was considered important to ensure success. 
 
If the process affects lots of processes inside the company, it has to be a dedicated 
working group. Set up locally. A connection to the central Group for support or 
reporting. But I think once the target is very well established and the parameters and the 
KPIs we want to reach, I think local groups can perform very well in implementation. 
Maybe better than a team coming from the outside [ORO 2]. 
 
Establish local prioritisation forum [1;11%]. The need for an overall forum for 
prioritisation of all local projects regardless of whether the origin is local or Group was 
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also discussed. Conflicting priorities was seen as leading to sub-optimisation as people 
worked towards different agendas. 
 
First, we need to prioritise internally with everybody to know what direction we will 
take and what the key priorities are this month, this quarter and this year. From my 
point of view, there are a lot of organisations in which everybody is working hard but 
people are working to different projects or people perceive the importance differently or 
don‟t understand the prioritisation correctly [ORO 7]. 
 
Ensure local resources [1;11%]. It was considered essential that resources exist in the 
local business to deliver Group initiatives. It does not work if the gap between strategic 
aspirations and financial aspirations is too wide as argued by one manager: „It comes back to 
ensuring that the resources exist‟ [ORO 1]. 
 
Implement in stages [1;11%]. Rather than a „one size fits all‟ approach, a staged 
implementation was advocated. This would make it possible to roll-out in different 
speeds across various markets and show how efforts had worked in other places. 
 
Obviously it cannot be done everywhere at the same time so it needs to start 
somewhere. I think it helps a lot if you see that it is being done in stages and that it did 
work in some other market places [ORO 1]. 
 
Manage interaction 
 
The respondents also had opinions regarding how the head office should interact with 
the local subsidiaries. 
 
Accept mistakes in order to learn [2;22%]. It was argued that the corporate culture has 
to tolerate mistakes in order to create an open environment where errors generate 
learning and then improvement. Without that, the culture would instead encourage 
managers to hide their errors to the greater loss of the company. 
 
Whenever you implement something, something can go wrong. You can make the 
wrong decisions in the beginning, try to cover it, try to adjust on the way, so the final 
can be a disaster. And it is very hard to come and say OK, I made a wrong decision, I 
was stupid. I don‟t know what I did but it was the wrong decision so please stop 
everything and let‟s start again [ORO 7]. 
 
Establish strong communication [5;56%]. Strong communication was seen as key 
throughout the implementation process to ensure alignment and an open dialogue. 
 
It is good to communicate. It is good to understand also the reasons people from the 
Group are doing some things. In fact I think, if we get to a common understanding of 
the ultimate goal, to build the profitability of the company, because after all we are 
working to make profits. That is clear. If we take the share and look at the evolution and 
we know that everything we do has to increase share value, we understand a little bit 
some of the Group decisions also. So first of all you have to understand the motivation 
of everyone in order to be open minded [ORO 2]. 
 
Establish and use subsidiary feedback loop [2;22%]. Ensuring a feedback loop from 
subsidiary managers back to head office was advocated. This ensured that bottom-up 
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feedback from subsidiary managers was taken into consideration to improve the 
process. 
 
I think that standardising should have a limit and the coordination of standardisation 
should have the possibility to absorb ideas coming from others. Because what is usually 
happing is that there is a central point which is deciding that we are going to follow this 
but things can be improved during their lifetime. If you receive a suggestion from a 
country it is difficult to change a little the way you are doing standardisation [ORO 7]. 
 
Use subtle control mechanisms [1;11%]. One Romanian manager also argued that it 
was better for head office to use subtle means of control over subsidiaries rather than an 
aggressive controlling stance. 
 
You can control without telling that you are controlling and without letting people feel 
that they are controlled [ORO 9]. 
 
Manage delivery 
 
Don’t skip phases [1;11%]. A senior manager commented that phases in the 
implementation were too often skipped with adverse impact. He viewed it as important 
to go through the required phases.  
 
What I would probably try to do all the time, is to not burn steps in terms of 
implementation. However good the communication would be, still it is not a day to day 
communication, and it is not a full day to day operation that is only between local and 
global. In this case, I think that you need not necessarily to burn the steps. You need the 
initial assessment, you need the analysis, you need common understanding, you need 
the buy-in, you need the implications, you need the planning, you need the follow-up, 
you need the feedback loop and you also need to show that things are changing because 
of the loop [ORO 5]. 
 
Stick to the minimum core [1;11%]. As presented earlier, there was a feeling that a 
company should have a minimum core that is standardised or integrated rather than 
spreading efforts across everything. Once that minimum core is decided, it was argued 
that it should be safe-guarded strictly while most other elements were flexible. 
 
I think that once you have reached a decision about the core elements of the standard, 
you definitely will not allow shifts to happen. Because, when you start to implement 
something which is standardised, if you start to make compromises, just a little bit this 
or a little bit that. Because, each and every country will have their own specificity... I 
would put a standard which does not include everything. It would be just three or four 
elements but I would stick with it. And I would force you locally to change everything 
to deliver this. I would then give you the flexibility to adjust all the other factors but not 
these [ORO 8]. 
 
Ensure strong delivery management [5;56%]. A majority of interviewed managers 
discussed the need for competent and strong delivery management to pilot integration 
efforts.  
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The resource allocation goes again back to having a plan and really sticking to it. And 
being able to deliver what you say that you have to deliver from the global perspective 
in the local market [ORO 1]. 
 
Given the people impact of integration, strong change management from a people 
perspective was regarded as important. 
 
For those things affecting people, people‟s jobs, it has to be put in place good change 
processes and programmes. Think of alternatives. It is a most delicate thing to do, if you 
are affecting people‟s jobs... If a new decision affects people‟s job, it has to be very well 
conducted and managed with alternatives and programmes [ORO 2]. 
 
Other 
 
Freedom within guidelines [1;11%]. A senior manager discussed the need to provide 
freedom within guidelines to ensure sufficient flexibility while staying true to the 
overall integration course. 
 
You don‟t want minimum compliance to minimum standards. You want hearts and 
minds, you want buy-in, and you want cooperation. Therefore you need a flexible 
approach, but not so flexible that you are not achieving the goals you are seeking. So it 
is kind of about management rather than about the programme. It is about how it is 
handled. If it is too draconian, then it will start to become counterproductive because 
people are having their power and influence taken away. And that is difficult to accept. 
So going through that process sensibly is going to be one of the key challenges [ORO 
3]. 
 
5.5.3 Context factors affecting integration 
 
The Romanian managers indicted some context factors that were seen as having an 
impact on integration. 
 
Service industry [1;11%]. The added complexity of service industries was discussed in 
relation to product industries where the products can be produced in one location and 
sold in other places. 
 
Selling telecoms services, and services in general, is actually completely different from 
selling physical products. Sometimes the job of companies selling finished, physical 
products is easier from this point of view than a company which is trying to sell services 
[ORO 5]. 
 
Legacy versus new [1;11%]. It was also argued that the type of implementation 
mattered as there were wide differences between different types of integration efforts. 
 
Again, it is a big difference between implementing a global set of standards on something 
existing or something which is completely new for the market. Because whenever you go 
for something completely new for the market, you can achieve it easier because you do not 
have any so called regression risks [ORO 5]. 
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5.5.4 Learning and implications for next stage 
 
The findings from the Orange Romania case were in many ways surprising. Chance had 
presented this case that had a close to ideal fit from a theoretical sampling perspective. I 
had expected that there would be substantial differences compared with the Orange 
Denmark case given the much stronger position of the Romanian subsidiary. And yet, 
despite all the differences, the tensions experienced by the Romanian managers were 
very similar with the exception of the cultural factors.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, it is interesting to note that political behaviour appear to 
have been especially prevalent in the two Orange cases. This raises the question 
concerning what was unique about these two cases. A particular feature of integration in 
the two Orange cases, compared with the other three cases, was that integration meant 
strategic change away from previous autonomy. It would appear that integration efforts 
were characterised by significant teething-problems as Orange made the transition from 
autonomy towards integration. There were also examples of discrepancies between the 
level of ambition and available resources. In addition, the managerial discretion of 
subsidiary managers was also reduced as a result of integration. This took place at the 
same time as there were significant market discontinuities in both the Danish and the 
Romanian markets. In the Danish case, deregulation of the telecoms market had led to a 
number of new entrants in the form of virtual network operators. In the Romanian case, 
Vodafone had acquired the largest competitor, Connex, and started re-branding efforts. 
If anything, managers in the subsidiaries felt the need to respond even more vigorously 
to local market conditions. It would thus appear that substantial strategic change might 
trigger micro-politics at the subsidiary level. 
 
We also note that the scope of integration was very ambitious in the Orange cases while 
it was more limited in the other three case studies. Integration affected several elements 
of the customer experience as well as internal business functions. From the case studies 
it would seem that tighter integration might generate political behaviour. 
 
Apart from commonalities, there were also differences between the cases.  In this 
regard, there seem to have been more political behaviour in the Danish case. An 
examination of the case contexts suggests four potential reasons. First, there were 
substantial differences in terms of competitive intensity as detailed in Appendix 14.2. 
The Danish market had one of the highest levels of competitive intensity in Europe, 
with five network operators and 14 virtual operators, competing in a small country with 
5.4 million people. The Romanian case was distinctly different with a population of 
around 22 million and four mobile operators out of which two were marginal with less 
than one percent market share each. The Romanian market was thus a de facto duopoly. 
The intense local competition in Denmark appears to have pushed Danish subsidiary 
managers in the direction of local responsiveness and away from integration initiatives. 
Second, Orange Romania had almost 10 times the customer base of Orange Denmark as 
also shown in Appendix 14.2. The overall size of the budget was thus significantly 
larger in the Romanian case meaning that integration efforts required a much smaller 
proportion of total resources in the subsidiary. Every dollar spent thus carried a greater 
weight in the Danish context. Third, the Danish business was underperforming 
financially while the Romanian business was exceeding its financial targets. The Danish 
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business thus had a much lower bargaining power versus headquarters. This made it 
more difficult for the Danish managers to challenge the opinions of headquarters while 
managers in Romania could afford more open confrontations. Fourth, Denmark was 
viewed as culturally and economically closer to the core markets of Orange in Western 
Europe compared to Romania. As Denmark was closer to the corporate centre it would 
appear to have been more difficult to argue the case for exemptions compared to 
Romania that was located in the periphery. Given this, and the fact that Romania was an 
emerging rather than developed market, it would appear that head office managers were 
more willing to make concessions in the Romanian case. 
 
The Romanian respondents also provided important comments regarding the challenges 
of strategic change as part of integration. The case thus provided a sensitising lens 
which was later applied to the Danish data following the logic of constant comparison. 
This process identified similar quotes made by the Orange Denmark respondents that 
had previously been overlooked. From this it became clear that both of the Orange cases 
were characterised by integration as significant strategic change. Both operators had 
previously followed multidomestic strategies.  
 
For additional case studies, it thus became interesting to identify integrated operating 
models that were not going through substantial change. In addition, it would be 
worthwhile to investigate another multinational other than Orange. With this in mind, I 
scanned my network of contacts from the telecoms industry to think about suitable case 
studies. I considered several possible candidates that were rejected due to predominantly 
multidomestic strategies, including subsidiaries of Millicom, TeliaSonera and 
TeleDenmark (TDC). This led me to focus on the Nordic subsidiaries of Hutchison in 
Sweden and Denmark. I had several former colleagues who worked there including my 
previous manager who had become the CEO at 3 in Denmark. This looked promising 
from the perspective of negotiating access.  In addition, Hutchison was „born global‟ 
rather than a previously multidomestic operator that was in transition towards greater 
integration. Given the opportunity to conduct research in both the Danish and the 
Swedish subsidiaries of 3, and the fact that I had moved to Singapore, led to me to book 
consecutive visits for field work.  
 
I made some minor modifications to the interview guide used for the Orange Romania 
case. I merged the sections talking about value chain integration and marketing mix 
standardisation as respondents‟ comments were similar for the two areas. I also added a 
number of questions relating to corporate parenting following additional literature 
review. Some questions were also included regarding which factors influenced how 
subsidiary managers responded to local-global tensions. This included direct questions 
about what made them 1) comply, 2) challenge or negotiate, 3) manipulate or 4) ignore 
requests from headquarters. These categories had been developed as I was analysing 
and trying to make sense of the data from the two Orange case studies. During that 
process it was clear that I had primarily asked about questions that helped me to 
understand „causes‟ of tensions and „consequences‟ in terms of impact. This 
modification was made to allow me to further explore subsidiary managers „responses‟ 
to tensions. 
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In light of the above, the approach taken to theoretical sampling can best be labelled 
what Pettigrew (1990) has called „planned opportunism‟, given the combination of 
analysis of case differences and leveraging industry contacts to secure site access. 
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6 3 DENMARK CASE 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the first-order findings from the third case study conducted of 3 
Denmark. 
 
6.2 Case context 
 
Company context 
 
3 is the brand name used by Hong Kong based conglomerate Hutchison Whampoa 
Limited (HWL) for its third generation (3G) mobile networks in Australia, Austria, 
Denmark, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Sweden and the UK. Hutchison originally 
launched Orange in 1994 but subsequently sold Orange to Mannesmann in October 
1999. After Vodafone acquired Mannesman in February 2000, the European 
Commission mandated the sale of Orange as a condition for approving the Mannesmann 
acquisition. Subsequent to this, France Telecom acquired Orange in August 2000.  
 
Hutchison used the experience gained from Orange together with the proceeds of almost 
GBP 20 billion from the sale of the operator to become a first mover in third generation 
mobile communications. For the Nordic region, Hutchison entered into a joint venture 
with the Wallenberg controlled investment company Investor to bid for 3G licenses. 
The joint venture called Hi3G is 60% owned by Hutchison and 40% owned by Investor. 
Hi3G was awarded a 3G license in Sweden in December 2000 and launched Swedish 
operations in May 2003. Hi3G also won a license in Denmark in September 2001 and 
launched Danish operations in October 2003. Hi3G was further awarded a 3G license in 
Norway in September 2003 but had not yet launched operations at the time of 
conducting the case studies in Denmark and Sweden. 
 
Market context 
 
The Danish market had gone through a period of consolidation but was still one of the 
most competitive markets in Europe when the case study was conducted. The 
consolidation wave had led to Orange being acquired by TeliaSonera, the virtual 
operator Telmore being bought by the incumbent operator TDC and another service 
provider called CBB being acquired by Sonofon. The TeliaSonera owned operator Telia 
achieved critical mass following the Orange acquisition and the two aggressive service 
providers Telmore and CBB became part of the established operators. The mobile 
market stabilised as a result of these changes. Though 3 in Denmark was clearly sub-
scale with less than three percent of the market and below 140,000 customers. Despite 
high average revenues per customer (ARPU), as a result of targeting high value 
customers and synergy benefits from integration with Sweden, the CEO of 3 in 
Denmark estimated that the company needed above 300,000 customers to become 
EBITDA positive.  
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Integration context 
 
The 3 case studies are interesting in that 3 launched with a common brand name across 
its subsidiaries from the start. 3 also took steps to procure networks, IT systems and 
handsets on a group basis from the beginning. Beyond these areas, further integration 
was rarely mandated but took place on a voluntary basis between countries. As a result, 
several European subsidiaries had agreed to second product management resources into 
a team in London to work on content partnerships with major media companies. This 
initiative originated in the subsidiaries and the decision whether to opt-in or out was left 
to the local CEOs. As a result, the level of cross-border integration was in general much 
less compared with Orange. However, the level of integration between 3 in Sweden and 
Denmark was very significant and goes in many ways far beyond the level of 
integration in the Orange case studies. On a Scandinavian basis, 3 is run based on the 
concept of a shared services organisation responsible for network, IT and finance. In a 
benchmarking between 3 in Denmark and 3 in Austria, it was found that the Danish 
business was operating at only 60% of the comparable operating costs of 3 in Austria. 
The 3 case is thus interesting in that the global layer of integration was limited to some 
major areas, notably brand name and purchasing, while there was very tight operational 
integration between Sweden and Denmark.  
 
3 Denmark is a case of ad hoc global integration supported by strong regional 
integration through a Scandinavian shared services organisation. The Danish 3 case is 
also interesting given the need to interact with both the global headquarters in Hong 
Kong and the regional shared services organisation based in Stockholm, Sweden. 
 
6.3 Data collection 
 
Respondents 
 
All respondents were senior managers at 3 Denmark. The six interviews lasted between 
43 and 83 minutes and generated 23,452 words when transcribed. 
 
Table 6-1 
3 Denmark respondents 
Respondent Data collection Interview length 
CEO 
(Danish, Male) 
Face to face 
May 29, 2006 
81 minutes 
(6,051 words) 
Customer Service Director 
(Swedish, Female) 
Face to face 
May 29, 2006 
83 minutes 
(4,257 words) 
Marketing Director 
(Danish, Female) 
Face to face 
May 30, 2006 
69 minutes 
(2,860 words) 
Sales Director 
(Danish, Male) 
Face to face 
May 30, 2006 
43 minutes 
(3,339 words) 
Business Development Director  
(Danish, Male) 
Face to face 
May 30, 2006 
65 minutes 
(3,426 words) 
Manager: Strategy, Process and 
Programme Management  
(Danish, Male) 
Face to face 
May 30, 2006 
45 minutes 
(3,529 words) 
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Interview guide 
 
The interview guide was a slightly modified version of the extended interview guide 
used in the Orange Romania case. This included merging some areas and adding a 
number of questions relating to corporate parenting. This updated interview guide was 
also used for 3 in Sweden and for Vodafone in China. 
 
The interview guide is available in Appendix 14.6. 
 
6.4 Tension findings 
 
This section presents the findings related to local – global managerial tensions as 
experienced by the subsidiary managers at 3 in Denmark. 
 
6.4.1 Frequency of tensions 
 
There was substantially less tension reported in the 3 Denmark case compared with the 
two previous Orange cases. The respondents had differing opinions regarding the 
frequency of tensions ranging from „It is very common‟ [3DK 3], to „I don‟t feel there is 
a conflict‟ [3DK 4]. 
 
6.4.2 Areas affected by tensions 
 
It would appear that tension was the highest in the areas affected directly by the 
Scandinavian shared services organisation. This specifically included technical areas 
such as network and IT. In addition, there had been some tension in finance that appears 
largely resolved following a reorganisation that put Stockholm in charge of finance in 
Denmark. The commercial side had been fairly autonomous but recently more steps had 
been taken in the direction of integrating the commercial side, which had created some 
friction. 
 
6.4.3 Causes of tensions 
 
The same structure, as used in the Orange Denmark and Orange Romania cases, was 
used to categorise managerial tensions. 
 
Categories of managerial tensions 
1. Content of integration initiatives 
2. Decision-making process and interaction with headquarter representatives 
3. Implementation of integration initiatives 
4. Loss of autonomy of subsidiary managers 
5. Cultural differences 
 
However, no passages of text were coded to the last two categories. In this regard it is 
important to note that the two Orange cases involved substantial strategic change that 
likely led to a greater sense of loss of autonomy. 
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Perceptions of the content of integration initiatives 
 
Tensions regarding the perceived misfit of integration initiatives were discussed by a 
majority of subsidiary managers [4;67%].  
 
Underlying market differences [3;50%]. Half of the subsidiary managers reported 
misfit based on underlying market differences. It was a widely held perception that 
Denmark was treated in a somewhat step-motherly fashion by the Nordic headquarters 
located in Stockholm. 
 
Most of the decisions are based on Swedish market conditions. I‟ve never seen a market 
survey regarding a product that would be beneficial for the Danish business in the 
business market. We don‟t use business cases for doing business. It‟s primarily a gut 
feeling in Sweden [3DK 5]. 
 
Legacy set-up [1;17%]. Misfit could also be the result of legacy set-ups that prevented 
integration initiatives from becoming beneficial. This included the installed base of 
handsets in the customer base. 
 
If for whatever reason, this particular service could not be implemented on the major 
handsets, or one of the major handsets, then that would be a problem [3DK 3].  
 
Perceptions of the decision-making process 
 
All managers [6;100%] discussed various aspects of the strategic decision making 
process or the way that headquarter managers had interacted with the Danish subsidiary 
that they were not satisfied with. 
 
Lack of fair treatment [4;67%]. A majority of managers felt that the Danish subsidiary 
was not fairly treated by people in the shared services organisation located in Sweden. 
 
50% of the problem is people‟s attitudes. It depends on where people are sitting but a 
lot of people like to build empires. They want to have responsibility in terms of money 
and people...If they don‟t like me, I won‟t get anything [3DK 5].  
 
Lack of understanding from managers at headquarters [5;83%]. Most respondents 
felt that there was a lack of understanding about the Danish market and the Danish 
operation among people both in Hong Kong and within the shared services organisation. 
 
I think some of the main problems are that they don‟t understand the business, only the 
IT systems. They need to spend time in the countries where they are responsible for 
implementation because if you‟re just in Stockholm you will never succeed. You need 
to understand the local business [3DK 5]. 
 
Integration not ‘sold’ to subsidiary [2;33%]. Some also discussed that integration 
initiatives had not been „sold‟ to mangers in the Danish subsidiary. 
 
It‟s all about selling ideas. Whether you‟re a CEO or own a company or managing a 
department, raising your children, whatever, you have to sell your ideas and get buy-in. 
At 3 there is a total lack of respect of employees‟ work and intelligence and 
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responsibility…So you have to sell the idea to motivate people to get on board and love 
the idea and work hard on it [3DK 6].  
 
HQ micro management [3;50%]. Half of the respondents also noted that there was a 
tendency towards micro management of the Danish business. This included handsets 
being managed by the CEO of Hutchison as well as a variety of operational decisions 
being micro managed by the Nordic CEO. 
 
They did more or less kill this business with good intentions before I came in. They 
were all over the place doing micro-management at all levels which for me was a 
requirement that there would be no one from Sweden calling anyone in this organisation 
without going through me. Asking, suggesting or simply interfering destroys value. It 
was the case here at least. The Nordic CEO was all over the place. He would call 
managers, shop keepers all over the place. But he did stop a week after I joined and he 
hasn‟t done it since [3DK 3]. 
 
Lack of governance [3;50]. Many managers felt that there was a lack of governance 
structure in the Nordic organisation. This meant that there was no transparency 
regarding how decisions were made and people closer to the seat of power in Stockholm 
were able to exercise more influence. 
 
Some of the weak areas in Scandinavia right now are due to the governance structure. 
Most decisions are taken locally and that means that the Nordic CEO can be sitting in a 
Scandinavian meeting that takes place in Stockholm. Our Danish CEO is not there and 
does not get information that can have an impact on the Danish business. That‟s the 
main problem. People take local decisions without analysing the impact on the other 
Scandinavian areas [3DK 5]. 
 
Perceived inequity [5;83%]. There was a widespread perception of inequity throughout 
the Danish organisation. This included a feeling of not being represented in the 
important Scandinavian decision making forums. 
 
The most important thing is that employees in Denmark don‟t feel that they are 
represented in the Nordic organisation. There is a Nordic organisation that is 
exclusively staffed with a lot of Swedes [3DK 1]. 
 
A number of managers located in Sweden, had Scandinavian or Nordic titles, but it was 
perceived that these people did not allocate sufficient time to the Danish organisation. 
 
On paper most of these activities are Scandinavian but the governance structure and the 
mindset of the managers has nothing to do with the Nordic responsibility. If you look 
for the governance structure we had in place one year ago, we had seven Nordic 
managers in Sweden and one representative in Denmark representing all areas in 
Denmark. Our CEO took that discussion and pushed for a new governance structure in 
Scandinavia. Our main problem is that Nordic managers that have Nordic responsibility 
have only spent time in Sweden. Most of the decisions are taken at the Swedish 
management meetings. We are a small box connected to Sweden. They don‟t see 
Denmark as a company at the same level as Sweden in terms of decision power and 
influence [3DK 5].  
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A senior manager felt that Swedish problems were addressed much faster than Danish 
issues due to the fact that the shared services organisation was co-located with the 
Swedish business. 
 
The shared services organisation with local markets is ideal on a piece of paper. It looks 
good in a business plan and in board presentations. In reality, it‟s very difficult to run… 
The risk is that you feel less responsible locally if the shared service centres do not 
perform. If we have sites that are down in Jutland, and I had the CTO sitting in the 
premises, he would know what I wanted him to do. Maybe it‟s a Swedish thing but 
people seem to cover the till with quilts and you get hidden in a mattress for a long time 
and they come back and talk processes with you and escalation processes and so forth. 
So therein lies the danger; the shared services centre has to be more paranoid of 
customer needs than is presently the case [3DK 3]. 
 
This resulted in a perception that all Danish requirements were constantly prioritised 
with reference to the Swedish situation. 
 
But we are a bit crippled by the fact that everything we want is prioritised against other 
things in Sweden. If we don‟t specify in detail what we need, we don‟t get it. Take the 
understanding of the invoice for example, which generates a lot of calls to customer 
service. Once it was identified as an issue for both countries it was fixed for Sweden but 
not for Denmark because the people who have the Nordic responsibility didn‟t take it 
[3DK 4]. 
 
The same concerns as were voiced in relation to the Nordic head office in Stockholm, 
were also expressed in relation to board meetings involving Hutchison staff from Hong 
Kong and Investor representatives. 
 
I think they chose to forget the Danish experience, because when they talk at the board 
meetings, they refer to the Swedes and don‟t seem to realise that Denmark is a separate 
entity [3DK 2]. 
 
Perceptions of implementation 
 
Most managers [5;83%] also discussed weaknesses in terms of implementation of 
integration initiatives. 
 
Goal and Resource conflicts [2;33%]. One reason related to managers in the shared 
services organisation not being measured on what they delivered to Denmark. 
 
This happens because Swedish managers are not measured on Danish results. If 
someone sits in Sweden as a Nordic marketing manager but don‟t have any kind of 
bonus targets on the Nordic level, he won‟t care about the Danish business. The 
Swedish management team has no bonus requirement for the Danish operation. The 
governance structure in terms of KPIs and bonus targets is local [3DK 5].  
 
Increased bureaucracy [1;17%]. Integration could also lead to bureaucracy in terms of 
additional analysis and information without any obvious value to the Danish 
organisation. 
 
Tensions are often created at the highest level when something needs approval or when 
there are changes in the Danish set-up. Especially when there is a difference compared 
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with how things are done in Sweden. They ask for a lot of analysis. They ask for a lot of 
information but they never make any decisions. And there is no feedback provided to 
the Danish organisation informing us why we should do something in a certain way 
[3DK 1]. 
 
Lack of clear direction [3;50%]. Half of the respondents noted that there was lack of 
clarity in terms of the overall direction. There had been frequent changes in certain 
areas that led to a lack of stability. 
 
You need freedom to run your business. If you make a strategy and operating plan and 
define KPIs and have a budget that reflects your planning you should have the freedom 
to run your business. Denmark has no relationship between these areas. We made a 
distribution strategy last year and that has been changed 3 times; first by the Nordic 
CEO, then by headquarters in Hong Kong and that means that our budget was 
completely changed [3DK 5]. 
 
Unclear roles and responsibilities [2;33%]. In addition, some of the interviewed 
managers felt that the roles and responsibilities were very unclear.  
 
You have to be extremely clear about who is responsible for what in the organisation. 
That is not happening in 3. There is a lot of confusion about who does what and those 
structures get totally fucked up when you have a Nordic CEO who just runs over the 
whole organisation all the time. The managers will of course lose motivation because he 
takes responsibility away from them. That is very dangerous for a company [3DK 6].  
 
Perceptions of the loss of autonomy 
 
Not identified in this case study. 
 
Perceptions of the cultural interaction style 
 
Not identified in this case study. 
 
6.4.4 Consequences of tensions 
 
A number of consequences of tensions were also discussed. 
 
Positive consequences 
 
Not identified in this case study. 
 
Negative consequences 
 
Business impact 
 
Losing control of local business [1;17%]. The lack of attention paid to the Danish 
business meant that one manager felt that the Danish organisation had lost control of its 
own destiny as critical functions were delivered as part of the shared services 
organisation. 
 
The business impact is that some of the key areas are not prioritised [3DK 5].  
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Loss of sales [1;17%]. The strong involvement from Hutchison‟s CEO in terms of 
selecting the handsets had also led to poor reputation for the Danish subsidiary in the 
beginning. 
 
Depending on the problem, there was a big push to buy a lot of LG handsets from the 
beginning and they were flawed. It created a massive bad experience in the market and 
a big hit to this company‟s reputation. The only thing to do was to say to Hutchison‟s 
CEO that we can‟t buy LG for anything but a spice handset. I have to bet on Nokia and 
Sony Ericsson and Samsung because I cannot use a brand that was such a fuck-up. And 
he agreed [3DK 3]. 
 
People impact 
 
Many managers [4;67%] also commented on negative people impact as a result of 
integration efforts. 
 
Demotivation [2;33%]. This included a sense of demotivation. 
 
The impact is the loss of motivation. People have left because they are fed up because 
someone in Sweden says, „we don‟t need your help‟ or „we don‟t have time for you‟. 
The business impact is there, from a customer‟s point of view, on the invoice layout, 
has had a bad experience. Even the management team couldn‟t read the invoice. So the 
customer lost motivation. Lastly, it can affect how people in the organisation view the 
management team. Why can‟t we fix it? You can make an organisation rot from the 
inside. But fixing some of these actions and problems builds trust [3DK 4] 
 
Frustration [3;50%]. As well as frustration. 
 
It is frustrating.  You feel frustrated as a result of market related demands not being met. 
Denmark is not represented in the Nordic organisation. It is a result of lack of insight 
from people in Sweden. As an example, there is a department in the shared services 
organisation called business intelligence. No one in Denmark knows what they are 
doing but they decide which reports should be delivered and when they will be 
delivered [3DK 1]. 
 
6.4.5 Managing tensions 
 
This section presents the findings regarding how the respondents discussed management 
of tensions. 
 
Gamesmanship 
 
Compared with the two Orange cases, only a single respondent discussed various forms 
of gamesmanship. 
 
Asking for forgiveness [1;17%]. This included asking for forgiveness rather than 
permission. 
 
I just do it. I basically ask for forgiveness rather than for permission. Sometimes I do 
things without asking permission but I also respect the total envelope. If I spend another 
6 million on building shop-in-malls, I take it from somewhere else. If they say bring 
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down cost of sales, I‟m the one to know how to do it. And I will act on it. But it seems 
to be the culture here. The only big problem I had was when I paid out bonus to 
everyone and informed Stockholm of what I was doing. The Nordic CEO didn‟t like it 
and wouldn‟t speak to me for months [3DK 3].  
 
Become politician [1;17%]. And the need to act as a politician to balance different 
demands. 
 
It is a very informal organisation that influences things so you have to be somewhat of a 
politician to make your local subsidiary survive and get the attention that it needs. I 
think we‟ve managed that partly through lobbies but also through good performance 
and board presentations [3DK 3]. 
 
Interacting with Group 
 
A majority of respondents [4;67%] discussed how to interact with headquarters. 
 
Argue the local case [3;50%]. Half of the respondents noted that it was important to 
develop the necessary skills to argue the case of the local subsidiary to headquarters. 
 
I try to find all the facts to support my argument and argue with them [3DK 2]. 
 
Build personal networks [1;17%]. One manager noted that it was important to build 
relationships with counterparts in the shared services organisation rather than simply 
escalate all issues to the Nordic CEO. 
 
The way I‟ve worked with Swedes is that instead of pushing and escalating everything 
to the Nordic CEO, I‟ve started a dialogue with the people who have the responsibility 
[3DK 5].  
 
Escalation [2;33%]. On the other hand, a senior manager argued that escalation to 
Hong Kong was sometimes required when there were disagreements between him and 
the Nordic CEO. 
 
If the Nordic CEO and I, disagree wildly over something, we get the CEO of Hutchison 
involved. But they are Chinese and they do not move rigorously. They also say that they 
want your heart and soul and they want to see that if you burn and believe in the case 
and will do anything for the business, they will trust you because of that. I‟ve said 
things to the CEO of Hutchison that were really important and he allowed it because I 
felt so strongly for it [3DK 3].  
 
Fight back for prioritisation [1;17%]. A senior manager argued that it is sometimes 
necessary to fight for the local subsidiary rather than accepting the views of 
headquarters. 
 
This is Denmark and it is as hard-core as it gets. We are a real business and we may be 
small but we have 25 other competitors and 2 runners-up for 3G. It doesn‟t matter if 
we‟re only 380 employees and 130,000 customers. This is as hard as it gets… I don‟t 
accept IT [in the shared services organisation] saying „No‟; I just want to know when 
they can do it. You have to argue from a position of authority. At some point you stop 
arguing and just tell them to deliver [3DK 4].  
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Get people together face to face [1;17%]. This included meeting people face to face 
rather than just speaking on the phone or exchanging e-mails. 
 
When people got together as we did with this invoice project, you could see the body 
language when the meeting started, it was like the Berlin Wall between the Danish side 
of the table and the Swedish side of the table. But two hours later, people were leaning 
over the table and talking and discussing [3DK 4]. 
 
Structure local subsidiary 
 
Half of the respondents discussed the need to get your own subsidiary in shape to be 
able to interact more effectively with headquarters. 
 
Appoint good local people [1;17%]. This included appointing experienced people to 
key positions in the subsidiary. 
 
What we‟ve done wrong is that the wrong people with no knowledge of telecom had 
people who did know under them and things were delegated without authority [3DK 4]. 
 
Streamline interfaces [3;50%]. And streamlining interfaces across the business so that 
it was clear who had the authority to interact with headquarters.  
 
Before the current Danish CEO there was much more interference in everything from 
day-to-day nitty-gritty to bigger things. Now there‟s an approval system that makes sense 
[3DK 4]. 
 
6.5 Integration findings 
 
Following from presenting the findings relating to tension, we continue with the 
respondents‟ suggestions regarding how to make integration decisions and implement 
integration initiatives. 
 
6.5.1 How to make integration decisions 
 
Analysis 
 
Most respondents [5;83%] talked about the need for analysis to support integration 
decisions. 
 
Analyse and benchmark local operations [3;50%]. Half of the respondents discussed 
the need to gain in-depth knowledge about the performance of the different subsidiaries 
before making any decisions. 
 
You need to have some kind of well-defined KPIs on a Scandinavian level so we can 
start to implement best practice within the region. You need to define and measure the 
way you‟re running the business and then start the improvement flow between 
companies. Learning sessions between companies [3DK 5]. 
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Analyse customer needs [3;50%]. It was also considered important to understand 
similarities and differences in customer needs to determine the appropriate level of 
integration. 
 
The only reason we exist in Denmark is because we‟re running a mobile solution on a 
marginal cost structure on Sweden. We cut 40% of our costs compared to if we were a 
full-blown operator. Therefore the mindset of the managers is where can we 
differentiate from Sweden. When does it make sense to build something locally? If we 
look for the balance between saving money through sharing and time to market 
activities, I would recommend that we do it on a Scandinavian level because of a 
cultural background and there‟s also understanding of the local needs that needs to be in 
place. If we start to centralise for example, IT, finance, ERP solutions with Australia, 
we would lose a lot of awareness [3DK 5]. 
 
Analyse market similarities [2;33%]. The same logic was advocated for general market 
similarities. 
 
You have to analyse what the drivers are for global integration and local 
responsiveness. If we look at the drivers for global integration, cost is the most 
important reason. It is thus key to identify meaningful shared services centres across all 
of Europe. Why have just a Nordic finance department? Couldn‟t we just as well have a 
European finance department? If we look at local responsiveness, a key driver relates to 
differences in regulation. And Denmark has the toughest regulation in all of Europe. So 
in this area, it might make more sense to have regional clusters rather than integration 
across all of Europe. You might have to give businesses in tightly regulated markets 
more independence [3DK 1]. 
 
Avoid ‘not invented here’ syndrome [2;33%]. Two of the respondents talked about the 
need to prevent excessive localisation following from a „not invented here attitude‟. 
 
If it was my own company I would definitely go much more into control. I would say 
that today we take out the network and the IT and then we do it on sales, marketing 
costs, services etc. We do 95% of things ourselves and 5 percent of things we have to 
do. I would turn that around to 80% is given; this is what you have to do, these are the 
key metrics. Don‟t reinvent the wheel because we have got 5,000 staff sitting in the UK, 
we have tons of KPIs to look at and why don‟t we use this guy? [3DK 2]. 
 
Make proper initial assessment [3;50%]. Half of the respondents felt that it was 
important to make proper initial assessments and that this was a weak area in the current 
set-up. 
 
Especially when we talk about development. We have a problem with the process of 
identifying new products. Because head office forgets that there are local markets called 
Denmark and Sweden. We need a Nordic project organisation that is better at collecting 
business requirements and sharing experience across the two markets [3DK 1].  
 
Setting the strategy 
 
Most of the interviewed managers [5;83%] also discussed suggestions for how to set the 
integration strategy. 
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Cluster similar countries [3;50%]. This included clustering similar countries to 
maximise synergies between the operations. 
 
I believe it is important to cluster similar countries. By doing that you get larger benefits 
with a European or global organisation [3DK 1]. 
 
Adapt customer facing functions [3;50%]. Half of the respondents also suggested that 
it was important to adapt customer facing functions while technical delivery and support 
functions could be more integrated. 
 
For me it‟s relatively simple and it‟s a journey. Everything that touches the market and 
the customer should be local. Thereby maximising all the dollars or euros you can 
spend on creating your brand position in the local market. The customer experience is 
completely local. Then network, IT systems, platforms and so forth, very easily run 
centrally and that‟s also the 3 Scandinavia business book. We think in terms of shared 
services and there‟s sales, marketing and customer service operations in Denmark and 
Sweden [3DK 3]. 
 
Define overall brand position and focus on common segments [1;17%]. One manager 
argued that it was a prerequisite for far reaching integration that the businesses shared 
more or less the same strategy. This served to align the business requirements. 
 
A key success factor for a market oriented organisation is that you can set and 
implement the same strategy. In the Nordic region we have decided that our strategy is 
„more for the same‟. It is important that the businesses have the same market strategy 
[3DK 1] 
 
Focus on what matters most [1;17%]. A senior manager felt it important that centrally 
coordinated initiatives had major strategic importance and brought benefits that could 
be leveraged across most of the countries. From his viewpoint, headquarters thus 
needed to stay out of niche areas. 
 
Deals that they make must be of major strategic global importance, like the Microsoft 
alliance. Those kinds of very massive globally established brands that we can leverage 
from, they should stick with, but anything below that they should probably not touch. 
Britney Spears would not be popular in some markets, but very popular in others. So it 
gets subjective and emotional and it stops. That‟s too low so I think potentially to do a 
deal with CNN for content services directly on mobile would be something we would 
be looking for. Below that it starts to get into the local problem area [3DK 3]. 
 
Implement principles rather than exact content [1;17%]. Rather than rigorously 
seeking to implement exactly the same content or policies, one manager argued for 
alignment around key principles. He provided the example of being a company that 
offered bundles versus un-bundled tariff plans rather than rolling out exactly the same 
price plans in each country. 
 
Would it be wise to offer one tariff worldwide? Probably not because there are different 
markets and legislation to approach so it would be good to instead set up some KPIs 
that you want to have. I want to have certain marketing or whatever and then you set up 
some so you ensure that you end up with it. We believe in bundles so we will go a long 
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way to try bundles in the market. If group is proven wrong you can take another 
direction. Otherwise you go with it [3DK 2]. 
 
Standardise IT systems [1;17%]. Even the tightly integrated Swedish and Danish 
operations, based on a central shared services organisation, had problems comparing 
operational data. It was thus argued that IT systems and definitions required 
standardisation in order to compare apples with apples. 
 
The main problem is that our data quality is very poor. 80% of the workload in 
Denmark is looking into the data quality. Our main problem is data quality and 
understanding in our business. We get the info from the same place but the definition 
and the way we reflect customer interaction is not the same. If you don‟t have the same 
processes and you don‟t make the same registrations on the same systems you‟ll end up 
with the wrong figures. [3DK 5]. 
 
Work towards a clear vision [1;17%]. Clarity and consistency of direction were also 
considered important attributes of the integration strategy. 
 
First, have a clear strategy and operational plan and a time line against it and 
communicate it. Keep communication going every month. This is what we said we 
would do, this is what we did and this is where we are [3DK 2].  
 
People 
 
Build local market knowledge at headquarters [1;17%].  One manager discussed the 
need to build up more market and operational knowledge at headquarters in order to 
effectively operate integrated models. 
 
If you want to run a company on an integrated level, as a shareholder or head office you 
have to be prepared to gain a lot of knowledge about the separate markets... You either 
leave the countries to run things themselves and put a strong management team in each 
country and let them get to it and deliver solid KPIs which aren‟t negotiable. Or you 
need to build up an interest and knowledge to understand the mechanisms in each 
market... 3 decided to do some integration but they have started to put up boundaries for 
how we run things without really knowing much about the markets. Maybe integration 
means headquarters needs to take a responsibility for the local market?…If they have no 
knowledge of the local market and just base their decisions on views then they can 
actually destroy value. They own the business and if they choose not to listen, It‟s just 
tough luck and there‟s not much else you can do [3DK 4]. 
 
Interaction 
 
Consult and sell integration to subsidiary managers [2;33%]. To achieve buy-in, it 
was felt that headquarters need to do a fair amount of selling of integration to subsidiary 
managers. 
 
You could say that basically you have to sell ideas and that‟s a manager‟s finest role. 
Never come and try to be clever about other countries without knowing what 
competitive situation they are in and what troubles they are struggling with. I feel that 
they do that here [3DK 6].  
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6.5.2 How to implement integration 
 
Manage structure 
 
All respondents [6;100%] discussed the need to manage structural elements to succeed 
with the implementation of integration initiatives. 
 
Align business processes [1;17%]. One respondent provided an insightful comment 
that business processes drive a lot of the requirements for technical systems and for 
people. Aligning business processes thus make it much easier to integrate operations. 
 
During the last 1½ years, I‟ve been working very hard to share more on the 
Scandinavian level but people need to understand that your core product functionality 
and your main processes need to be aligned. Otherwise you can‟t share anything. One of 
my current projects right now is to share the way we‟re doing sales and distribution in 
Scandinavia and we will end up sharing more than 90% of the processes in sales and 
distribution. We‟ll share a logistic model, the same IT systems in the way we‟re doing 
sales and distribution. We‟ll also share the way we count our cost of customer 
acquisition. I see an evolution where we‟ll see tighter integration…The normal 
arguments are that we need to have a local presence and local solutions because of legal 
constraints. The way that I‟d do it is to look behind the management arguments and 
look into the way we are running our business, analyse the processes to see if we could 
share the way we‟re doing things. Most of the time we have built a model that doesn‟t 
make sense [3DK 5].  
 
Blueprint global operating model [3;50%]. Half of the interviewed managers talked 
about the need to blueprint an operating model if you want to integrate across borders. 
 
I can see that the way they have made it within 3 is the right way. The only thing that 
they have missed is that they have missed building an operating model from a global 
point of view. We don‟t need logistic functions everywhere. This area has been missed 
a bit. We need an overall process map. They have missed that because they sent some 
UK guys with lack of operational skills into the local businesses and they failed. Many 
things were well thought through and there are innovative shared systems but somehow 
there seems to be an absence in terms of strategy. The reason for that is that people have 
been allowed to build up local operations. One year ago we had a finance director that 
built up a true copy of the Swedish one, but it didn‟t make any sense to have it [3DK 5]. 
 
Establish governance structure [4;67%]. The majority of respondents discussed the 
need to establish a good governance structure that could balance local and global 
demands. This was viewed as especially important for smaller countries like Denmark 
that relied on critical functions located in other countries. 
 
I can give you an example of how informal the organisation is. If you have a good 
argument for changing something like the invoice layout, to save money and improve 
the customer experience, you can only get that approved if you know the right people. 
The problem with an informal organisation is that you will not be successful unless you 
know the right people [3DK 1]. 
 
Establish knowledge sharing structure [5;83%]. Most of the interviewed managers 
discussed the importance of establishing good infrastructure for knowledge sharing 
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between operations. 3 was seen as suffering from too much independence between the 
different countries. 
 
We took one of the guys from our advertising agency and looked at the various 
advertising campaigns but it‟s so high level because everyone is protecting their own 
things. No one wants any help and they don‟t want to share what they‟re doing. It‟s on a 
very informal level and it‟s very much up to each country to do what they want in terms 
of working together. I‟m not like that, I took a copy paste from Australia and we 
increased our sales [3DK 6]. 
 
Manage people 
 
A couple of people [2;33%] talked about the need to manage the people dimension to 
succeed with implementation of integration. 
 
Build a global mindset [1;17%]. This included building a global mindset rather than 
having parochial country-by-country attitudes. 
 
I believe that in order to create something truly integrated the people in charge of 
Nordic functions have to have a Nordic outlook [i.e. mindset] [3DK 4]. 
 
Provide hands-on leadership [1;17%]. One manager talked about the need to provide 
hands-on leadership and get everyone on board to deliver the integrated strategy. 
 
It‟s basically saying, come up with the facts behind the figures and explain why we do 
what we do, where we‟re heading, share your strategy. You need to get everyone on 
board [3DK 2]. 
 
Share ways of working [1;17%]. The same manager also discussed the importance of 
getting people to share ways of working rather than reinventing the wheel in each 
market. 
 
I would absolutely make it more integrated. They are not getting bang for the buck with 
the current setup. They need to align the companies much more… In UK it‟s a postpaid 
market how do they do it, different offering with higher minute price, can we copy it? 
One of the things UK succeeded with was a massive distribution platform in the 
beginning and then narrowed it down as they went along. It‟s probably the same for 
Sweden and Denmark but don‟t let the local sales director take two years to find that 
out. It costs a shitload of money. Instead of saying, this is what we want to begin with. 
We need to have access to like 40% of the market in order to take 10% of the gross 
adds. Just do the math and then amend it and then you still need to have some good 
ambassadors communicating why. So you get people mentally involved and to buy it. 
There are so many projects in the board meeting, when I hear the marketing activities 
for Sweden I think this is where we‟ll be going in 2 months time but I see that the 
Marketing Director hasn‟t spoken with Sweden, and thus we will have to copy the cost 
[3DK 2]. 
 
Get strong people to drive integration [1;17%]. One manager commented on the need 
for strong management in the local subsidiary. 
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To be honest, we work so independently so I don‟t think people see that. We have to be 
careful that you don‟t get the „get out of jail‟ excuse every time. That comes back to 
management. What do you do with the resources that you have. The marketing director 
says, I can‟t do anything with a 70 million market budget. OK. Siemens has 3 million 
per year. She has 70, she should love it and work with it. You need to keep things in 
perspective. With a clear local CEO clearly communicating and dedicated to the central 
guy you get buy in and you get the culture. You need strong management [3DK 2]. 
 
Manage objectives and resources 
 
Measure performance at the local level [1;17%]. Integrating companies into larger 
business units, such as 3 in the Nordic region, can lead to a diffusion of responsibility. 
Given this, 3 had taken the decision to carefully measure performance at the local 
country level. 
 
I feel that customer experience integration has gone back to being more local because of 
operational reasons and financial reasons. Instead of having one consolidated P&L, they 
wanted to have 2 to make sure that the companies delivered because it‟s easier to 
measure. It gets consolidated at the end anyway because Scandinavia is measured as 
one business unit. [3DK 4]. 
 
Manage interaction 
 
A majority of managers [4;67%] also discussed the need to carefully manage the 
interaction with headquarters. 
 
Build trust [1;17%]. This included establishing trust between head office and the 
subsidiary. 
 
One thing that has to do with people is whether you feel that the head office is worthy 
of your loyalty. If you have a high degree of trust and loyalty you are more likely to 
comply or to openly challenge or negotiate. If you have a low level of trust and loyalty 
you are more likely to ignore or dodge it. What we have in 3 is that there‟s no fear in 
the organisation…With the fear factor, you get compliance for really bad ideas and you 
don‟t challenge so if the shareholder is wrong, he would still get something that doesn‟t 
work because people don‟t challenge it... Having subsidiary managers dodging or 
ignoring is not a good thing nor is the fear factor. It‟s better to have a compliant and 
challenging attitude. The fear culture is easy to create; you just scream and shout at 
people whereas the trust culture is very hard to create. As a leader you have to go in 
with a lot of your personality. You have to trust and handover and make mistakes about 
people and put yourself on the line and prove yourself. It‟s different personalities. Most 
people cannot do the fear thing, they would feel sickened. The trust factor is harder but 
it lasts longer and goes farther. The problem with a trust culture that we have here is 
that you have to combine a strong focus on performance and delivery with „I trust you‟. 
Leaders have to set an example for the other employees to follow [3DK 4].  
 
Ensure HQ follow-up [1;17%]. The strategy manager discussed the need to properly 
follow-up integration initiatives across the shared services organisation. 
 
Our organisation is still in start-up mood. A lot of things get started but then we forget 
to follow-up. As a result, there is no follow-up of initiatives in the Scandinavian 
organisation [3 DK 1]. 
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Establish strong communication [1;17%]. One manager touched upon the need to 
establish good communications channels between headquarters and the countries. This 
included seconding headquarters people to the countries to achieve integration. 
 
You have to have very strong ambassadors represented in each country to tell the CEO 
why we‟re doing this and I think the communication is where the break is [3 DK 2]. 
 
Establish and use subsidiary feedback loop [1;17%]. A manager noted that it was 
important to ensure a working feedback loop between the subsidiary and headquarters. 
 
I think that our board and our HQ are really positive and they listen. They tend to make 
very good decisions and it‟s clear that they think about what works best [3DK 6]. 
 
Manage delivery 
 
A majority of managers also discussed the need to carefully manage delivery. 
 
Ensure consistency [2;33%]. Consistency was seen as essential to ensure delivery. One 
manager proposed that consistency was in fact more important than brilliance as lack of 
consistency leads to confusion. 
 
I think it‟s a very tough question because you can make things work as long as you‟re 
consistent. It doesn‟t have to be the most brilliant way of doing it. It‟s when you start 
changing things that you can break it up... So I should be able to go in and get 
something similar, but if you don‟t, you create confusion [3DK 4 ].  
 
A senior manager compared the management of subsidiaries to raising a family, in an 
illustrative quote. 
 
A bad parent is the opposite. Inconsistent that doesn‟t know what it wants, sometimes 
it‟s things the kids love and then he yells at the kids for non-performance, but the kid is 
confused and does not know what he‟s supposed to do. Sometimes I can get away with 
this and sometimes I can‟t. That creates frustration [3DK 3].  
 
Involve key stakeholders [1;17%]. One manager talked about the need to involve key 
stakeholders across the involved organisations. This was seen as not always happening 
due to lack of governance and the start-up mode of the organisation. 
 
If we are implementing larger initiatives, it needs to be structured as a joint Nordic 
project. I start by identifying who the key stakeholders are across the businesses and 
then I involve them. It is important to ensure that decisions are made based on the right 
supporting information and then to communicate why certain decisions have been made 
[3DK 1].  
 
Ensure strong delivery management [1;17%]. A senior manager talked about the need 
for basic management including making plans and following up on performance. 
 
Make a clear plan for the network: when will they open sites, when will they be on air, 
reporting by month. Customer Service: how many calls do they take per agent, shops, 
how many gross additions do they take per store. Planning and measuring [3DK 2]. 
Other 
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Freedom within guidelines [4;66%]]. A majority of interviewed managers discussed 
the importance of developing a corporate culture that provided freedom within 
guidelines. This meant establishing a framework for subsidiary managers to work 
within. A senior manager used the family metaphor to describe this. 
 
A good parent is consistent. A good parent would say these are the rules, this is what 
I‟ll give you and this is what you have to do for me. You need clear rules. You need 
governance and clear objectives of what you are supposed to achieve. You need to tell 
people what you expect and ask them to deliver consistently. It‟s done lovingly and 
with all the necessary support. The father does not go to school with the kid. The father 
expects the kid to go to school and do what he‟s supposed to do [3DK 3].  
 
6.5.3 Context factors affecting integration 
 
There was less discussion of contextual factors in the 3 Denmark case compared with 
the other cases. 
 
Subsidiary market position [1;17%]. A senior manager talked about how the 
subsidiary‟s market position and the level of competitive intensity affected the need to 
be responsive to local market conditions. 
 
In order to survive in this very competitive market and with a brand and virgin 
technology you need to really understand the market and act on that market‟s premises. 
Standardised solutions worked out in a country far away will not cut it. It needs to feel, 
live and breathe the market to make it fly. So you have to adapt and make things 
bespoke for the market. That‟s the big difference. It‟s what they didn‟t understand when 
they rolled out the business plan [3DK 3]. 
 
6.5.4 Learning and implications for next stage 
 
The case of 3 in Denmark was valuable in that it provided insights into a very different 
form of integration. While the two Orange cases were characterised by systematic and 
programme managed integration efforts, 3 represented a much more entrepreneurial and 
ad-hoc integration logic. Though, with the added layer of complexity coming from tight 
operational integration in the Nordic region as a result of the shared services 
organisation. 
 
3 Denmark was also the first case were change was not a key feature of integration. 
Correspondingly there were no discussions about loss of autonomy. 3 Denmark was 
thus coded with the first three tension driving categories of 1) misfit, 2) unfair process, 
and 3) weak implementation.  
 
There was generally a high level of satisfaction with Hutchison as an owner and the 
integration efforts that had taken place in terms of brand and procurement. There were 
some jokes about the CEO of Hutchison micro managing the selection of handsets but 
overall the respondents seemed to enjoy the high degree of autonomy. Compared with 
the two Orange cases, it was only a single respondent who discussed various forms of 
gamesmanship as a means to manage local-global tensions. There was however 
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substantial frustration with the Nordic shared services organisation that was located in 
Sweden. This stemmed from a widespread perception that Denmark was given a lower 
priority. This was later confirmed by sources in Sweden. The Danish 3 case is thus 
interesting given that both Hong Kong and Stockholm take on the role of headquarters; 
albeit for different functions. This illustrates that the borders between „headquarters‟ 
and „subsidiaries‟ might be rather fuzzy in some cases.  
 
Compared with the two Orange cases that were analysed sequentially, I travelled 
immediately from 3 in Denmark to 3 in Stockholm. Given this, data for 3 in Sweden 
was collected before the Danish 3 case had been analysed.  
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7 3 SWEDEN CASE 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the first-order findings from the fourth case study conducted at 3 
Sweden. 
 
7.2 Case context 
 
Company context 
 
The company context for 3 in Sweden is the same as for 3 in Denmark given that both 
operations were owned 60% by Hutchison Whampoa Limited and 40% by the Swedish 
investment company Investor. 
 
Market context 
 
At the point in time of conducting the case study, the Swedish mobile market was in 
between the Danish and Romania cases in competitive intensity. It could thus be 
characterised as moderately competitive. As in Denmark, the launch of 3 had not been 
easy given the immaturity of the 3G technology leading to all sorts of problems with the 
network. However, 3 Sweden was clearly on its way up and had passed 400,000 
customers when the interviews were conducted.  
 
Integration context 
 
The integration context is also the same as for the Danish 3 operator. It is however 
important to note that the shared services organisation was located at the Swedish 
headquarters and a number of people in Sweden wore double hats in terms of having 
both a Swedish and a Scandinavian responsibility. This led to the Stockholm office 
becoming both a Swedish and a regional headquarters. 
 
7.3 Data collection 
 
Respondents 
 
Five of the six respondents were senior managers at 3 Sweden. The sixth respondent 
had recently moved from the HR Director position to a new position with another 
company within the Investor Group. As mentioned, Investor owned 40% of 3 in 
Scandinavia.  Interviews lasted between 28 and 62 minutes and generated 23,946 words 
when transcribed. 
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Table 7-1 
3 Sweden respondents 
Respondent Data collection Interview length 
Finance Director 
(French, Male) 
Face to face 
May 31, 2006 
62 minutes 
(3,555 words) 
Marketing Director 
(Swedish, Male) 
Face to face 
May 31, 2006 
49 minutes 
(4,656 words) 
Chief Technology Officer 
(Swedish, Male) 
Face to face 
May 31, 2006 
48 minutes 
(3,922 words) 
Customer Service Director 
(Swedish, Female) 
Face to face 
June 1, 2006 
58 minutes 
(4,791 words) 
HR Director (former) 
(Swedish, Male) 
Face to face 
June 1, 2006 
28 minutes 
(2,399 words) 
HR Director (new) 
(Swedish, Female) 
Face to face 
June 2, 2006 
49 minutes 
(4,623 words) 
 
Interview guide 
 
The interview guide was the same as for the 3 Denmark case. 
 
It is provided in Appendix 14.6. 
 
7.4 Tension findings 
 
Similar to the previous cases, this section presents the findings in relation to managerial 
tensions due to local – global demands as discussed by the interviewed subsidiary 
managers. 
 
7.4.1 Frequency of tensions 
 
The respondents felt that there was a low level of tension between the Swedish 
operation and headquarters in Hong Kong given the high degree of independence of the 
Scandinavian operations.  
 
There was some disagreement regarding the level of tension in Scandinavia between the 
Swedish and Danish operations. The majority of respondents argued for tension with 
comments like „It is very common‟ [3SE 3], „It is more common than common that 
there is tension‟ [3SE 6] and „There are a lot of tensions between the local priority and 
Scandinavian priorities‟ [3SE 1]. On the other hand, one manager commented that „I 
don‟t feel that there is a lot of tension between Sweden and Denmark. And I don‟t feel 
any tension at all between Sweden and Hong Kong‟. In this context, it is worth 
mentioning that this manager had only joined the company within the last six months 
and might thus have less insight into the historic relationship between the two 
companies compared with the other respondents who had been with 3 for longer. 
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7.4.2 Areas affected by tensions 
 
There were also differing opinions regarding which areas were affected by tension. One 
manager mentioned that „It is working well everywhere‟, while another stated that „All 
areas are affected‟. A third manager commented that there was a lot of tension in 
marketing while sales was not affected. 
 
7.4.3 Causes of tensions 
 
The same structure as used in the three previous cases was used to categorise 
managerial tensions. 
 
Categories of managerial tensions 
1. Content of integration initiatives 
2. Decision-making process and interaction with headquarter representatives 
3. Implementation of integration initiatives 
4. Loss of autonomy of subsidiary managers 
5. Cultural differences 
 
However, no passages of text were coded to the „loss of autonomy‟ category. This is 
likely the result of integration not involving strategic change in the case of 3. Managers 
in the Swedish operation did however experience substantial cultural differences 
between themselves and their colleagues in Denmark as the findings illustrate. 
 
Perceptions of the content of integration initiatives 
 
Underlying market differences [3;50%]. Half of the respondents talked about 
underlying differences between countries in the Nordic region which made it difficult to 
simply standardise market offers and customer experience. 
 
Our Hong Kong owners seem to think that this is a small territory with the same culture 
and where customers react to the same stimuli. But we have very different regulation 
regarding contractual binding period for subscriptions. And we also have very different 
tone of voice when we communicate with customers. We have differences that you will 
only appreciate if you are from the Nordic region and sometimes we cannot even work 
out the differences ourselves. We have radio and TV programmes that become a success 
in one of the countries and totally fail in other Nordic countries. This represents some 
form of cultural difference [3SE 2]. 
 
Perceptions of the decision-making process 
 
Most of the interviewed managers [5;83%] discussed the decision making process and 
interaction across borders. 
 
Lack of fair treatment [2;33%]. Some respondents discussed the need for fairness in 
the interaction with managers from headquarters. This included being provided with the 
rationale for why certain things should be done in a specific way. 
 
 150 
Situations that are negative, when I become frustrated and get anxious, is when 
standardisation is not supported by a clear argumentation for why we need to do 
something. I think this is the most important point. But then I see this from a Swedish 
perspective. For me as a Swede, it is very important to understand why we do 
something. If I understand that I can pretty much accept anything for I know that the 
owners have the power to decide. I am not naïve enough to think that this is some form 
of democracy. But I need to understand and not just be told to do something [3SE 6]. 
 
Lack of  understanding from managers at headquarters [3;50%]. There were also 
comments that there was a lack of understanding about Nordic differences from 
headquarters managers with specific focus on the Hong Kong Chinese from Hutchison. 
 
I think that our owners, and especially our Chinese owners, believe that Denmark is a 
smaller region of Sweden. Our entire Swedish management team is present at the board 
meeting and then there is just a single Dane representing Denmark [3SE 6]. 
 
Integration not ‘sold’ to subsidiary [2;33%]. There were also instances when 
integration initiatives had not been communicated and sold to members of the 
organisation. 
 
I think the most important factor is participation. The degree to which you involve 
people in the process and bring them along. It is more difficult to succeed with 
integration when someone from above has simply decided that you should do 
something in a certain way… It is not only cultural differences that are overlooked. It is 
also the fact that I want to be involved in matters that concern my work. I want to 
understand the arguments for why we should do something. And I want to absorb the 
arguments so that I can make them my own and then explain to others. I think this is 
overlooked quite often. People think it is sufficient to just send out a PowerPoint 
presentation [3SE 6]. 
 
HQ micro management [2;33%]. Micro management was viewed in a negative light 
and seen by one respondent as something which could lead to the organisation 
becoming overly passive. 
 
A big motivator is for people to feel that they are doing something great. It is the same 
in all aspects of life including in relationships with one‟s parents, one‟s partner or one‟s 
manager. If you are not allowed to do things yourself, and show that you are able, 
people become pacified. And I think that pacifying people is as dangerous as when you 
get into a situation when you start to reward and punish every action. In the end you 
will not get anything done unless there is a direct reward or sanction from above [3SE 
2].  
 
Perceived inequity [3;50%]. Half of the Swedish respondents acknowledged that the 
Danes may not have been treated in a fair way. Though market realities were put 
forward as the rationale by one senior manager. 
 
Sweden comes first and Denmark follows. This is a pity because we should treat each 
country the same. The barrier to that is that you have to move fast in both markets but 
firstly in the Swedish market because it‟s easier than the Danish. There‟s less 
competition. We are in a better position than the Danes. So I would say that from Hong 
Kong and Investor perspectives we will succeed if we make Sweden a success. We will 
not succeed if we make Denmark a success and Sweden fails. Sweden has to make it 
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first. Denmark is icing on the cake. I can agree with that to some extent. Sweden is a 
bigger market. [3SE 1]. 
 
Everyone in Sweden, with the exception of the CTO, works 99.9% with Sweden and 
couldn‟t care less about Denmark [3SE 5]. 
 
Perceptions of implementation 
 
A majority of managers [4;67%] talked about challenges regarding the implementation 
of integration initiatives. 
 
Goal and Resource conflicts [1;17%]. This included an internal struggle between 
Sweden and Denmark for resources from the shared services organisation. 
 
Another reason is the tight financial situation we are experiencing. Everyone is fighting 
for resources in the central services organisation [3SE 6]. 
 
Lack of clear direction [2;33%]. Some respondents discussed the lack of clear direction 
and the swings between centralisation and decentralisation. 
 
It has been centralisation, decentralisation, centralisation and the decentralisation again. 
But that is what our world is like. It is not just here. It is a world of „day strategies‟. 
That is what this company is like. Coming in from the outside I have reflected on this. I 
thought our Hong Kong owners would have some more influence and tell us how we 
should do things much more than they have [3SE 2]. 
 
One manager noted that the pressure to quickly launch local businesses with limited 
resources had pushed people in the direction of taking care of their own operating 
companies and abandoning the initial grand schemes for integration. 
 
We started with a lot of cooperation. But it didn‟t work out. So it was abandoned in 
favour of individual country-by-country solutions. But now we have started to 
cooperate much more again… In the beginning the companies were in too different 
phases of their development. In some countries the business market was important and 
in other countries it was the consumer market…It was difficult to coordinate. And the 
organisations were very slimmed so there was no time to send people to committee 
meetings when they needed to launch quickly. It was hard enough just to concentrate on 
launching your own business [3SE 4]. 
 
Weak delivery of integration initiatives [1;17%]. A senior manager noted that 
Denmark had been poorly treated during the implementation of integrated Scandinavian 
solutions. As a result, insufficient adaptation had been made to cater for local business 
requirements. 
 
The thing that has happened is that when that process started two and a half years ago, it 
was to be the left arm of Sweden. But when people looked at what should be done in 
Denmark, they just implemented what worked in Sweden. They didn‟t really look at the 
local requirements and the adaptation that is needed for standard routine and systems to 
work locally as well. When I go to Denmark I see the legacy and it‟s a problem. Danes 
look at Swedes as a pain in the butt. They don‟t think or look ahead so you have the 
opposite effect; instead of standardising and have a common form, the Danish people 
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try to do everything on their own…We‟re working in the right direction but it takes 
time to change the mentality [3SE 1]. 
 
Perceptions of the loss of autonomy 
 
n/a 
 
Perceptions of the cultural interaction style 
 
Cultural interaction style [5;83%]. A majority of interviewed managers discussed 
substantial cultural differences between Swedes and Danes. This included different 
attitudes towards sticking to agreements, as commented by two respondents. 
 
The mistake is when you underestimate the differences in mentality between Swedes 
and Danes. They are very different. Incredibly different in fact. I have experienced that 
on two occasions. You think you have reached an agreement about something but then 
you cannot recognise the outcome [3SE 3]. 
 
There is a lack of trust due to firstly, the culture. For Swedes, Danes are still the Arabs 
of the north. Even though we agree that things are going to be done a certain way, 
Danes always go their own way and do what they want [3 SE 1]. 
 
7.4.4 Consequences of tensions 
 
There was some discussion about both positive and negative consequences of local – 
global tensions. 
 
Positive consequences 
 
Knowledge sharing [1;17%]. One manager discussed the value in knowledge sharing. 
 
On the business side, I think it‟s good to have an open dialogue on how we should work 
together. This is what makes it a business success. We need to aim at getting the best 
output [3SE 1] 
 
Improvements [2;33%]. There can also be business improvements as a result of internal 
competition and being challenged to do things in a different way. 
 
Some things are positive since all of us working in this type of company are driven by 
competition. It is quite fun when things are going bad for the customer service director 
in Denmark and I am sure she thinks the same about me…You need to have something 
to compete about. But it can be dangerous as well. It can become too much negative 
energy rather than positive energy. It is difficult to tell what level is optimal. When does 
it become a hostile environment? When do you stop sharing knowledge? [3SE 6]. 
 
 153 
Negative consequences 
 
People impact 
 
Demotivation [2;33%]]. A couple of respondents discussed the risk of demotivation if 
headquarters took an insensitive approach to the implementation of integration. 
 
At the end of the day, if things don‟t work and haven‟t been thought through it will have 
direct impact on your customers in terms of worse customer satisfaction, churn and loss 
of revenue. You fail at making your own space in the market. You will also have a 
demotivated local team that doesn‟t believe in headquarters and what they want to 
implement [3SE 1]. 
 
7.4.5 Managing tensions 
 
This section presents the findings relating to the management of tensions. Compared 
with the other cases, no respondent discussed various forms of gamesmanship. 
 
Interacting with Group 
 
Get people together face to face [1;17%]. One respondent talked about the need to get 
people together face to face rather than risk deteriorating relations by escalating issues 
to more senior managers. 
 
I talk with people. I need to get to understand why we are not acting in a constructive 
manner. I have never felt that escalation to superior managers have produced anything 
worthwhile. It is just adding oil to the fire and makes things worse. This hasn‟t 
happened with the new customer services director in Denmark but it did happen before. 
Then I flew down there or they came to see me here [3SE 6].  
 
7.5 Integration findings 
 
There was substantial discussion regarding how integration decisions should be made 
and how integration should be implemented. 
 
7.5.1 How to make integration decisions 
 
Analysis 
 
A majority of interviewed managers [4;67%] discussed the requirements for analysis to 
arrive at sound integration decisions. 
 
Analyse and benchmark local operations [1;17%]. This included the use of 
benchmarking to trigger opportunities to learn from other operations. 
 
We also look at numbers and key performance indicators. I think we are pretty good at 
doing that. We report KPIs every month and they are then distributed to the different 
countries. This includes the ARPU level for voice and data and the penetration level. 
We get that kind of benchmarking every month and I think it is useful. It triggers 
questions like „why is Australia performing so well?‟ We found out that they are good 
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at selling modules with news and content. We then met with 7-8 people from Australia 
and understood sales better in terms of how you package the services and determine 
price and commission levels [3SE 4]. 
 
Analyse customer needs [2;33%]. In-depth analysis of customer needs was seen as an 
area where 3 could improve going forward. 
 
We need more market research to better understand our competitive advantage and how 
we should develop in a specific country. You need a solid foundation to understand how 
the market works and what it is that triggers customers [3SE 6]. 
 
Analyse market similarities [1;17%]. One manager talked about opportunities to 
identify similarities across borders that could be used as the underlying basis to develop 
joint initiatives. 
 
We don‟t do that much research. We should look at that centrally to determine if people 
need the same type of services. Youth segments are often quite similar between markets 
so we should do more market research together [3SE 4]. 
 
Avoid ‘not invented here’ syndrome [2;33%]. A couple of respondents discussed the 
need to safeguard against local tendencies to reject things not invented in the local 
subsidiary. 
 
All companies and all countries always believe they are very unique. I think people get 
stuck in too much „in the box thinking‟. I think you could cooperate across all areas if 
you take country specific differences like legal and regulatory differences into 
consideration. But the question is if people really want to do that? In my own 
experience, people prefer to rely on themselves and determine their own destiny. It is 
things like: „we know Sweden‟, „we now this‟, „we know that‟ and „I know sales‟. It is a 
bit like that. I think that is human nature [3SE 2]. 
 
Make proper initial assessment [1;17%]. In-depth assessments, including business 
cases, were advocated by one senior manager who considered this a weak area at 3. 
 
I have never been part of a management team in a company where there are so few 
business cases. It is very surprising to me. Sometimes it amuses me and sometimes it 
makes me worried. But I am surprised that a loss-making start-up company is making 
decisions purely on gut feeling or based on the opinion of just one man. I don‟t think it 
would be astonishing if you at least saw one business case every six months or so [3SE 
2]. 
 
Setting the strategy 
 
Half of the respondents [3;50%] discussed how strategic decisions should be made in 
relation to integration. 
 
Be clear on integration benefits [1;17%]. One manager advocated that integration had 
to be done for the right reasons and that there was a clear business rationale behind 
decisions. 
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I think it is important that decisions to standardise or integrate are made for the right 
reasons. And I think it is important to also see that the thing being discussed is up and 
running and working in other countries. When you have something that is working, you 
should quickly try and deploy it across the other countries so that you beat the 
competition [3SE 4].  
 
Adapt customer facing functions [2;33%]. A couple of the respondents concluded that 
it was important to adapt the customer experience while back office and support 
functions could be integrated to a greater extent. 
 
You need to get loyal customers to make money over time. And activities that build 
relationships with customers are very different across countries and depend on culture. 
So you need a lot of autonomy when it comes to such areas. However, when it comes to 
supporting areas like network, IT, and even our CRM system, we don‟t need that much 
autonomy. We could standardise a lot of things like that. But we must preserve 
independence when it comes to how we interact with customers. I don‟t think we should 
standardise that [3SE 6]. 
 
Find the right balance [1;17%]. A senior manager expressed how difficult it is to find 
the right balance when it comes to integration. He specifically talked about the need to 
not damage small operators by imposing solutions developed for operators with 
substantially larger customer bases. 
 
It is not easy. I worked for Europolitan before. It was the company that Vodafone 
acquired. Before them, AirTouch bought Europolitan and owned 50%. Vodafone owned 
the other 20% and 30% was floating on the stock exchange. Back then, AirTouch was 
responsible for governance. They owned Mannesman and they owned a lot of operators. 
They operated with the philosophy of demonstrating and sharing experiences across 
countries. In many ways, it was quite similar to what we have today. It is important to 
not force a routine or system onto a small company like Vodafone did with Europolitan. 
Implementing mega systems or complex routines will kill the small company that lacks 
volume in terms of customer base and headcount. You have to operate the business 
based on the local conditions [3SE 3].  
 
Let offer differences determine level of integration [1;17%]. The same manager 
commented that the differences in offer structure between countries decided most of the 
business requirements for processes and systems.  
 
If we had exactly the same offers to customers across different countries, I think we 
could have used the same systems and just changed the languages. But that is not the 
case…Offers in Sweden and Denmark are very different. It is the local competitive 
situation that determines what type of offers you require [3SE 3]. 
 
People 
 
Build local market knowledge at headquarters [2;33%]. A few respondents discussed 
the need to develop in-depth local market understanding among managers at 
headquarters. This would allow managers at headquarters to see when there were real 
market differences, that needed to be catered for, and when subsidiary managers were 
over-stating the needs for localisation. 
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You need two-way communication. It is very important that you pick up unique things. 
There are good things at the local level and there are good things at the global level. It is 
important that head office understands the local conditions. Because if you let the 
subsidiary decide everything becomes local. You must be able to see through that and 
identify when you have genuine similarities and differences versus when it is just 
bullshit [3SE 3]. 
 
Interaction 
 
Be clear that integration will happen [1;17%]. A senior manager talked about the need 
to be very clear that integration was the end result and that what was up for discussion 
was the „how‟ of integration rather than whether integration should happen or not. 
 
I would force them into the same room until we are done. Then we can move on. I left it 
too much up to them and it took too much time [3SE 1]. 
 
Consult and sell integration to subsidiary managers [3;50%]. Half of the respondents 
discussed the importance of consultation and selling from managers at headquarters. 
 
I would try to get buy-in from people by involving them in the process instead of just 
saying, this is how it‟s going to work [3SE 1]. 
 
7.5.2 How to implement integration 
 
The managers at 3 in Sweden provided insights regarding the implementation of 
integration initiatives. 
 
Manage structure 
 
Most managers [5;83%] discussed the need to manage structural elements. 
 
Align business processes [1;17%]. This included aligning business processes to 
facilitate integration. 
 
If our vision is to have the same system behind it would be good to have the same 
administrative processes [3SE 1]. 
 
Blueprint global operating model [1;17%]. A senior manager noted that there was no 
overall operating model for how 3 should function. The company was instead held 
together by the CEO of Hutchison. 
 
The CEO of Hutchison is the glue that ties together all of Europe. And it takes a lot of 
effort for him to manage to achieve that. There is no structural capital within 3…So the 
CEO plays a critical role [3SE 5]. 
 
De-layer headquarters [1;17%]. An advantage of the hands-on management style of 
Hutchison was that there are no unnecessary layers between the CEO of Hutchison and 
operating company CEOs. 
 
Hutchison doesn‟t have any large office somewhere in Europe that is responsible for 
coordinating Sweden, Denmark, England, Austria and Italy. There is no overhead. 
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Instead, the top management team of Hutchison, together with local partners, manage 
the businesses in an extremely hands-on way. The CEO of Hutchison will talk with all 
the local CEOs on a weekly basis [3SE 5]. 
 
Establish knowledge sharing structure [3;50%]. A drawback of the informal 
organisation was however an absence of a formalised knowledge sharing structure. This 
meant a low level of cooperation between 3 in Scandinavia and other 3 operators. 
 
It is a big distance to the other 3 companies apart from Denmark. We don‟t have any 
contact with them. We should be able to better utilise each others experiences to save 
time and resources. I think we should work more closely together [3SE 6].  
 
Opinions ranged from those who wanted just a minimum of structure to facilitate 
knowledge sharing… 
 
I believe in best practice sharing. I think you can get quite far with that. Perhaps, we 
would need some more structure when it comes to areas like advertising to have a more 
formalised exchange. There are clear opportunities to borrow ideas from each other. At 
present it is all based on you actually knowing your colleagues within the company. We 
should perhaps structure knowledge sharing or experience transfer more around all 
elements of service launches [3SE 4]. 
 
…to those who advocated more sophisticated web solutions. 
 
I believe in having an electronic hub where you can find TV commercials, advertising 
and sales campaigns. Something that allows you to pick‟n mix and adapt to your own 
needs [3SE 2]. 
 
Manage people 
 
All of the interviewed managers [6;100%] discussed the importance to manage the 
people dimension to ensure success of integration. 
 
Ensure cultural integration [1;17%]. This included the need to build a common 
corporate culture in the Nordic region to make employees in different countries feel that 
they belong to the same organisation. 
 
HR is not integrated. It is completely local. If we ever want to be one company 
promoting the brand in the same way, a big part of HR needs to be focused on having a 
common Scandinavian function especially around the values and culture development. 
You will always have a local part of HR which is the operative part but the big strategy 
part of HR should be standardised [3SE 1]. 
 
Build a global mindset [2;33%]. A common mindset was thus seen as a requisite. 
 
They need to go to Denmark and see what really works and what doesn‟t work. What 
we are missing is Scandinavianity. They need to get out and talk to people, look at the 
routines and systems [3SE 1].  
 
Get new people without legacy [1;17%]. A senior manager discussed the difficulty in 
making people change the way they do business. He thus favoured replacing the 
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management teams of businesses in case you needed to substantially change the level of 
integration within the company. 
 
Before looking at that you should change the management in the local entities. You 
always have a legacy that think it‟s the best. Definitely get fresh blood to re-work and 
take the best of both businesses. Then, you should look at the external side but look on 
the internal side of things because that‟s where the money is in terms of cost savings. 
Have an open forum and agree on it with new people who have no history. Then send 
out the message internally. External integration requires educating the market. 
Internally, if the will is there from the management, it just works [3SE 1].  
 
Replace blockers [2;33%]. Changes might thus necessitate the replacement of people 
who are blockers. 
 
If I‟m the new leader and find resistance in the company, I would first explain what‟s 
needed and then those that are still negative, should be replaced. It‟s a strong barrier 
[3SE 1]. 
 
Provide hands-on leadership [6;100%]. All managers talked about the value of hands-
on leadership from headquarters. Hutchison‟s top management had gained a lot of 
respect from acting as heavily involved owners rather than distant bureaucrats. 
 
3 hasn‟t got any head office in the traditional sense. They do of course have a head 
office in Hong Kong but it is not like they have 500 people sitting there. Instead, there 
are a few people who travel around to visit the different companies all the time. And 
they have their ears to the local markets. Their presence is really felt in the operating 
companies. It is very dangerous if you have a top management team at headquarters that 
is distant from the operating companies and instead try to run the business through 
management reports. At 3, the business is run in real time [3SE 5]. 
 
Share ways of working [2;33%]. A couple of respondents talked about the need to 
share ways of working rather than getting stuck in parochial mindsets and re-inventing 
the wheel in different operations. 
 
It‟s a combination of both. You need adaptation. Take customer finance. The dunning 
process and collection process cannot be the same as there are different laws in Sweden 
and Denmark. But the basic structure of the process should be the same. But it‟s not 
because of the legacy or the local requirements but because people wanted to do things 
their own way. What is missing today is humility on both sides. Let‟s learn from each 
other and take the best from both companies [3SE 1].  
 
Get strong people to drive integration [2;33%]. Integration requires direction in 
addition to consultation and selling to ensure action in the end. 
 
If everyone should be involved in every decision, it can take forever to make decisions 
and nothing ever gets delivered…It is important to get people to rally behind the 
leader… The Danish CEO is authoritarian in many ways. He is firm and he can show 
the way. But he manages to get his people to stand behind him. I think he could present 
whatever news and still maintain the support of his people. That‟s the kind of leadership 
you need [3SE 6].  
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Treat people well [1;17%]. A senior manager discussed the importance of treating 
people well in the organisation and respecting them. 
 
The level of underlying respect is important. How do I treat the organisation that I am 
responsible for? How do I treat my subordinates? What do I make them feel when I 
present my dictates? How well have I supported my arguments? [3SE 6] 
 
Manage interaction 
 
A majority of respondents [4;67%] talked about the importance of how you interact 
across borders. 
 
Build trust [1;17%]. This included the importance of placing a high degree of trust in 
the local management teams. 
 
I believe in placing a lot of trust in the management teams of the operating companies 
rather than having people at headquarters making decisions. The key factor for success 
is the local CEO and management team. They should be empowered and trusted to run 
the business. And the board should of course constantly challenge the local 
management team [3SE 5]. 
 
Don’t suffocate entrepreneurship [1;17%]. Releasing entrepreneurship was also seen 
as critical to get the most out of people and the best solutions. 
  
This is a company that didn‟t exist six years ago. There is no high profile entrepreneur 
who has created the company. It was founded by two investment companies. I think you 
would have killed creativity if the owners had issued specific dictates regarding how the 
business should be run. People have instead been allowed to find their own ways and 
test what has worked and what has not [3SE 5]. 
 
Encourage people interaction rather than bureaucracy [1;17%]. The same manager 
talked about encouraging people interaction rather than bureaucratic rule through 
policies and procedures. 
 
It is not manuals, processes and procedures that should govern how you work. It is 
important that people are interacting and talking to each other [3SE 5]. 
 
Establish strong communication [3;50%]. Half of the respondents felt that strong 
communication was essential to drive integration. 
 
The thing that I always come back to is the psychology behind it. Putting the right set of 
mind in the stakeholders. Then the thing is done through people and leadership and 
communication is the key [3SE 1]. 
 
Establish and use subsidiary feedback loop [2;33%]. A couple of the interviewed 
mangers discussed the need to establish a working feedback loop from subsidiaries to 
headquarters. 
 
I think it is value adding when headquarters listens to my opinion and considers the 
local situation even when I know that we need to align. It could be the case when we 
need to implement the same system across Scandinavia. It is important that the process 
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is done in such a manner that you feel like a participant and that you have the 
opportunity to influence [3SE 6]. 
 
Other 
 
Prevent unnecessary drift [2;33%]. Some respondents felt that the drive for local 
autonomy had resulted in unnecessary localisation and thus a drift away from common 
solutions. This was sometimes done while hiding behind different regulatory conditions. 
 
We and the Danes always put the blame on the different regulations. But in reality the 
two countries have been driven by a desire for autonomy. As a result we have become 
more different than we should be. But it has been done in the name of regulatory 
differences with statements like „We have different regulation‟ or „We are different‟. 
However, it is beyond doubt that we could have had more synergies and worked closer 
together [3SE 6]. 
 
Freedom within guidelines [5;83%]. Most respondents discussed the need to provide 
freedom to operating company managers within an established framework. This 
provided flexibility for subsidiary managers. 
 
I strongly believe that top management in this case should set the direction but stay 
away from the operational details. These should be left to the operational guys locally to 
fix [3SE 1]. 
 
And it provided freedom while at the same time ensuring that headquarters was present. 
 
It is important to be clear about roles and responsibilities. You need to offer support 
when times are tough and praise when times are good. It is important to always be 
present but never to micro manage [3SE 5]. 
 
Such a model allowed managers the joy of feeling ownership for their businesses while 
respecting overall guidelines. 
 
It is very important to provide freedom within responsibility…You need to create a 
mental framework. This is the frame. This is what we should achieve. This is the 
business model. This is where we are heading. And these are the boundaries you cannot 
overstep. Within these boundaries, you will be given the freedom to grow up and 
develop…Within the boundaries, you will be allowed to make mistakes [3SE 2]. 
 
Achieve integration through independence [2;33%]. In contrast to the other four case 
studies, managers in Sweden talked about the need for operating companies to feel 
independent before they could cooperate on equal terms.  
 
I think it is important that every organisation feels independent. It is then very easy to 
cooperate and be generous. If you don‟t feel independent and cooperation is based on 
someone else telling you how things should be it is very hard to open up…I think 
cooperation between Sweden and Denmark would improve if both companies felt 
independent [3SE 6]. 
 
From this perspective, the degree of cooperation and integration between Sweden and 
Denmark might actually increase if Denmark was granted more independence. 
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There is cooperation between Sweden and Denmark but it is not really genuine 
cooperation…It is a bit of an injustice done to the Danes but it does work. I believe that 
in the next phase, when we get out of the start-up mode, I think it will be more natural 
for us to cooperate [3SE 2]. 
 
7.5.3 Context factors affecting integration 
 
A number of context factors were also discussed. 
 
Subsidiary strength and size [1;17%]. One respondent noted that strong financial 
performance provided flexibility and freedom. 
 
If you have a very profitable company, that gives you freedom of action. It is much 
easier to tell headquarters that some initiative is useless if you are profitable.  It is also 
easier in such situations to accept something without arguing. It is thus easier to interact 
with headquarters if you have strong performance. So I think you are quite unlikely to 
ignore or manipulate headquarters if you have strong financial results [3SE 2]. 
 
Subsidiary market position [1;17%]. The market position of the subsidiary and the 
competitive intensity were also seen as influential factors. Quick changes in the local 
markets might require swift responses. This makes it difficult to rigidly stick to global 
integration plans if local resources are needed to respond to a local challenge. 
 
The other barrier I see especially in this industry, is that we work from an underdog 
position. We have to work very quickly all the time. To apply this change management 
to the entity you have to give the entity the chance to focus on the change management 
and implement it. But the issue now is that we don‟t have time to implement something 
new all the time while you‟re trying to integrate and follow a blueprint set up by 
headquarters. You need time to implement the change [3SE 1]. 
 
Clearly valuable projects [1;17%]. Those projects that provide clear and undisputable 
value were singled out as special cases when subsidiary managers might accept to 
simply be told to implement the projects. 
 
In my experience, nothing will block a really great idea that is logical and seems to lead 
to good results. There may be cultural differences. In Sweden, I think it is important to 
have discussed things in detail. But I don‟t think it is about consensus. I think the talk 
about Swedes and consensus is nonsense. It is not consensus that people are after. They 
want to be able to influence the process. When you see something brilliant you are 
prepared to just accept it and even to be force fed. But the situation is different when 
you feel that something will not work or that you will waste resources. You need to be 
able to discuss such things thoroughly and not just experience that decisions are handed 
down from above [3SE 2]. 
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7.6 Learning and implications for next stage 
 
The Swedish 3 case was different than originally envisaged given the fact that 
Stockholm was also the headquarters for the Nordic shared services organisation. Thus, 
while 3 in Sweden was technically a subsidiary of Hong Kong, on par with Denmark, 
the Swedish organisation also had some of the characteristics of a headquarters.   
 
The findings matched the three first tension categories: 1) misfit, 2) unfair process, and 
3) weak execution. There was no discussion regarding change and the loss of autonomy 
like with the Danish 3 case. However, there were a number of interesting comments 
made by the respondents at 3 in Sweden about substantial cultural differences that had 
generated tension between Sweden and the Danish organisation. This led to the creation 
of another core category for tension. Following comparison with the other cases, 
relevant findings were also identified for Orange in Denmark. These were however 
more difficult to disentangle from „loss of autonomy‟ given that change was a strong 
feature in the Orange Denmark case. 
 
If we compare the two Orange cases, with the two 3 cases, we find a distinct difference 
in the attitudes of managers towards integration. While a large number of managers at 
Orange were sceptical regarding the benefits of integration, most respondents at 3 were 
instead positive towards integration. A number of managers at 3 felt that, if anything, 
more integration rather than less was the way to move forward. The greater disbelief in 
the benefits of integration appears to have triggered more political behaviour in the 
Orange cases. 
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8 VODAFONE CHINA CASE 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the first-order findings from the fifth case study conducted at 
Vodafone China. This case was added based on an opportunistic logic rather than the 
theoretical sampling logic applied to the previous cases. I was invited to the annual 
meeting of the Academy of International Business to present papers and the 2006 
meeting took place in Beijing, China. Given this, I contacted the Chief Representative 
of Vodafone in China, whom I know from before, to investigate whether it would be 
possible to conduct a case study in conjunction with the conference. Vodafone is the 
largest international mobile communications company in the world and China Mobile is 
the world‟s largest operator. I knew from discussions with people within Vodafone that 
China Mobile was viewed by many as part of the Vodafone Group despite the fact that 
the relationship was technically closer to a strategic alliance. I was interested in 
researching how these two giants worked together across a number of cooperation areas. 
I felt that this might add some value to the research programme even though it was not a 
standard headquarters-subsidiary relationship. 
 
8.2 Case context 
 
Company context 
 
China Mobile is the world‟s largest mobile operator with over 270 million customers at 
the time of conducting this case study. China Mobile was incorporated in September 
1997 and listed on the stock exchanges in Hong Kong and New York in October 1997.  
The company is organised into 31 subsidiaries covering all provinces in China. China 
Mobile is considered a state-owned enterprise given that the majority of shares (76%) 
are owned by the Chinese government and Vodafone only owns 3.27% of the operator.  
 
Vodafone initially acquired 2.18% of the business for USD 2.5 billion in November 
2000. This was followed by the signing of a strategic alliance agreement in February 
2001 with the objective of cooperating across several areas including products and 
services, technology, operations and management. Vodafone subsequently increased its 
equity stake to 3.27% in May 2001 by investing an additional USD 750 million. Despite 
its small share, Vodafone is the second largest single shareholder in China Mobile after 
the Chinese government. 
 
Following the investment in China Mobile and the signing of the strategic alliance 
agreement, Vodafone established a fully owned representative office in Beijing in 
November 2001. The office has grown in size but consisted of only nine people when 
conducting the case study. This case study is focused on Vodafone‟s China office rather 
than directly on China Mobile as the latter cannot be considered a subsidiary of 
Vodafone, given the size of the minority holding. 
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Market context 
 
China is the world‟s largest market for mobile communications with over 400 million 
customers. The Chinese mobile market has the lowest competitive intensity of all case 
studies. China Mobile has a 65% market share (GSM technology) and China Unicom, 
another state-owned enterprise, a 35% market share (CDMA technology). 
 
The low competitive intensity is a function of both rapid market growth and the fact that 
only two mobile operators serve the world‟s most populous country with 1.3 billion 
people. 
 
Integration context 
 
Given Vodafone‟s low ownership level, and the fact that China Mobile is not branded 
Vodafone, integration efforts are limited to specific initiatives and are thus closer to a 
strategic alliance than a subsidiary. To date, most integration initiatives relate to value 
chain/activity integration and there have almost not been any examples of 
marketing/customer experience standardisation, with the exception of roaming services. 
However, given the competence and global scale of the Vodafone Group and the 
massive local scale of China Mobile, there are nine cooperation work streams between 
Vodafone and China Mobile. These work streams cover technical, commercial, cost 
savings and standard settings areas. It is the responsibility of Vodafone‟s Beijing office 
to coordinate these nine work streams. 
 
As a majority state-owned company, China Mobile is managed in a top-down way. 
Given this, there is a Chairman‟s forum where the CEO of Vodafone and China Mobile 
meets twice per year to discuss cooperation opportunities and agree on high priority 
areas. There is then a more operational steering committee which meets four times per 
year to establish the roadmap, monitor progress, make operational decisions and resolve 
issues. 
 
8.3 Data collection 
 
Respondents 
 
The respondents were programme and project managers at Vodafone‟s China Office. 
They were responsible for managing projects across the nine cooperation work streams. 
The initial interviews were 73 and 41 minutes and generated 10,849 words when 
transcribed. In addition, I had a brief discussion with Vodafone‟s Chief Representative 
in China which was not transcribed. Following distribution of a draft version of the 
dissertation, I had a follow-up phone interview with the programme manager for 47 
minutes, generating 3,355 words when transcribed. The interviews are labelled in the 
format [Programme] and [Project] for the two managers. 
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Table 8-1 
Vodafone China respondents 
Respondent Data collection Interview length 
Programme Manager 
(Chinese, Female) 
Face to face 
June 22, 2006 
 
Phone follow-up 
January 11, 2007 
73 minutes 
(7,436 words) 
 
47 minutes 
(3,355 words) 
Project Manager 
(Chinese, Female) 
Face to face 
June 22, 2006 
41 minutes 
(3,413 words) 
 
Interview guide 
 
The interview guide was the same as for the 3 Denmark case. However given that I was 
less familiar with Vodafone in China compared with the other four case studies, I 
allowed the discussions to start with more background information. 
 
The interview guide is provided in Appendix 14.6. 
 
8.4 Tension findings 
 
The same structure, as used in the previous four cases, was used to categorise 
managerial tensions. 
 
Categories of managerial tensions 
1. Content of integration initiatives 
2. Decision-making process and interaction with headquarter representatives 
3. Implementation of integration initiatives 
4. Loss of autonomy of subsidiary managers 
5. Cultural differences 
 
However, similar to the two 3 case studies no passages of text were coded to the „loss of 
autonomy‟ category. 
 
8.4.1 Frequency of tensions and areas affected by tension 
 
These questions were not relevant given the structure of the nine work streams. 
 
8.4.2 Causes of tensions 
 
Perceptions of the content of integration initiatives 
 
One respondent provided several examples of how China Mobile staff had perceived 
misfit in relation to integration initiatives proposed by Vodafone. These examples 
covered different products and services, as well as branding, and were coded to the 
following nodes: underlying market differences, negative or marginal local benefits, and 
different strategy and positioning. Following a review of an earlier version of this 
dissertation, staff at Vodafone in China judged that the actual quotes were too sensitive 
to be included in the final version of the dissertation as the material revealed business 
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sensitive material covered by a non-disclosure clause in the strategic alliance agreement 
between Vodafone and China Mobile. Based on this request, the quotes have been 
removed from the dissertation but the findings are retained in the quantitative overview 
provided in Table 14-2. 
 
Perceptions of the decision-making process 
 
Both respondents discussed different aspects of decision-making and interaction 
between Vodafone and China Mobile. 
 
Lack of  understanding from managers at headquarters [2;100%]. There was a 
feeling that the level of understanding from Vodafone‟s managers outside of China was 
rather limited. 
 
I cannot say that the level of understanding is very deep. Everyone understands that 
China is very big. The subscriber base is huge. That is the common understanding. 
There is no confusion about that. But in terms of how to make it work here, I don‟t 
think the understanding is very deep. And China is still, in terms of the global footprint, 
I don‟t think that China is top priority. Europe is the central focus. China is not the 
central focus [Project]. 
 
On occasions, managers from Vodafone had simply treated China Mobile like any other 
operating company that could be told by headquarters what to do. The staff at 
Vodafone‟s Beijing office took efforts to educate their Vodafone colleagues about the 
Chinese market, about China Mobile and Chinese culture. 
 
They think that China is a very remote country and Vodafone is simply the best in the 
world. Then we show them this paper which tells them that the Chinese economy is 
now the fourth in the world, China‟s telecoms market is now the biggest in the world 
and still growing fast. And how big China Mobile is. The customer base is bigger than 
ours and the EBITDA margin is better than ours. And after they read this, they 
understand why we want them to treat China Mobile as a partner rather than just 
another operating company. And we also do a culture orientation course for the senior 
management and we summarise this for everyone in the working groups to tell them 
how to work with Chinese people. This includes the Chinese concept of  „losing face‟. 
Chinese do not want to have direct conflicts in front of their managers in a meeting. 
And the Chinese concept of „no surprise‟. They want to know in advance what you will 
raise during formal meetings or conference calls. This type of basic business culture 
orientation helps to educate our European colleagues [Programme].  
 
Lack of trust [1;50%]. Trust was viewed as important to establish a good working 
relationship between Vodafone‟s headquarters and the Beijing office. 
 
We do constructive push back if they don‟t listen. If they don‟t listen and they are 
dictating „this is what you need to do, just do it‟. That is very bad. And also if they do 
not trust us. We need to win trust from many parties but first of all our head office 
needs to trust us [Programme]. 
 
Perceived inequity [2;100%]. Both respondents discussed the need to establish an 
equitable relationship between Vodafone and China Mobile.  
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We are certainly seeking benefits for Vodafone. That is clear. But if we are only 
seeking benefits for Vodafone and only thinking from the Vodafone perspective. The 
mindset cannot be that Vodafone wants this and then we go and tell China Mobile that 
[Programme]. 
 
While it was not possible to have exactly equal benefits for each project, it was 
important that the overall relationship remained equitable over time. 
 
For all commercial projects, for example, I cannot say that the benefits are balanced. It 
is just unlikely that you can have equal balance. Sometimes the other party gains more 
than the other and sometimes vice versa [Project]. 
 
Perceptions of implementation 
 
Both managers also talked about the implementation of joint initiatives. 
 
Goal and Resource conflicts [1;50%]. Different levels of objectives were sometimes 
not reconciled. This meant that some strategic projects conflicted with shorter term 
budgets and performance targets. 
 
Re-prioritisation. It happens for several reasons. One is the disconnect between the 
senior management versus the working level. I mentioned some projects that were 
identified during the chairman‟s forum, the highest senior management meeting. When 
they are thinking about something, they think strategically 3-5 years ahead. But when it 
comes down to the working level they are saying that my KPIs for the next 24 months 
have nothing to do with this. Why should I spend a significant amount of time on this 
topic [Programme]. 
 
Increased bureaucracy [1;50%]. The different cooperation work streams also led to a 
lot of paperwork and the need to coordinate with people in different parts of the world 
and in different time zones. 
 
You get a lot of paper work to do. A lot of reporting. Numerous reports: daily, weekly, 
by-weekly, monthly. Only to write those reports takes 25% of my time but do not 
generate any value [Programme]. 
 
Weak delivery of integration initiatives [1;50%]. Tension could also be created when 
the parties had agreed to an initiative but delivery did not happen as planned.  
 
We have a typical case. We proposed to set up a project, an intellectual property project. 
The work plan was developed and both parties meet for the workshop. The shake hands 
and everything is courteous. But later on, China Mobile did not even set up the work 
team for half a year. But the work plan has been approved [Project]. 
 
Perceptions of the cultural interaction style 
 
Both respondents talked about cultural challenges. The parties seem to operate in very 
different ways that cause misunderstanding and irritation on both sides. 
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Cultural interaction style [2;100%]. There were numerous examples provided of how 
it was difficult to work together due to cultural differences. This included the Chinese 
perceiving the Europeans as too direct and straightforward. 
 
The Europeans, especially the Spanish or the Dutch, they are very direct. When they 
write e-mails, they talk about the issue directly. In China we start with „how is the 
weather today‟ or something similar. However some Europeans go straight to the point 
and they do not use some terms that the British might use like „would it be possible 
to…‟, a little bit indirect. They will just say „I need you to do this‟ [Programme].  
 
On the other hand, many European Vodafone representatives found it hard to 
understand when the Chinese meant „yes‟ or „no‟. 
 
Unless there is a very big benefit they will very often not follow even if they say „yes‟. 
It is because of Chinese culture. They will not say „no‟ directly…When they say „yes‟, I 
don‟t think the Vodafone people understand the meaning of this kind of 
„yes‟…Sometimes they do not say „no‟ but you can see from their behaviour that it is a 
„no‟ [Project]. 
 
There were also very different working styles and reluctance from China Mobile to 
commit to specific deliverables and timeframes. 
 
The different working styles may also cause tension. But China Mobile is a very big 
company. The different parts of China Mobile are very different. The R&D and 
technology sides are more Westernised. They know about Gantt charts. They know 
about Vodafone‟s way of working in terms of setting a plan with milestones and 
reviewing progress. And they understand KPIs. It is easier to get R&D to follow the 
Vodafone management style. But on the other side, they do not want to commit. For 
many projects, it is the first time for them to work with us, so they do not have 
experience of how long time it will take. They do not want to make any commitments 
so that they may lose face later on. Like saying it will take 6 months and then it takes 8 
months. They don‟t like us in the steering committee meeting to review the milestone 
progress. They don‟t like this way and they feel it is like a test. They feel that they are 
being tested at the meetings every quarter. They are more into „claim victory‟ type of 
meetings where they say what they have achieved. But there may originally have been 
10 targets to meet and they have only delivered 5. Then it is not successful. But they 
prefer to just tell the audience about the 5 that they have achieved. This is causing 
tension as well. The Europeans are more time sensitive. They want to move on the 
agenda all the time. Even when we have agreed an agenda at the beginning of the 
meeting, the Chinese may come back after 30 minutes and want to discuss other topics 
that are more important. Then the Vodafone people may say that we have already 
agreed the agenda and concluded the earlier topics [Programme]. 
 
8.4.3 Managing tensions 
 
There was some discussion regarding the management of tension. There were however 
no comments in relation to the use of gamesmanship. 
 
Interacting with Group 
 
Both respondents talked about how to interact with headquarters. 
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Argue the local case [1;50%]. This included the need to become good at arguing the 
local case to managers at headquarters. 
 
We also need to push back Vodafone and tell them what we see as realistic and 
constructive to do in China. This might not be realised by our colleagues in the UK. Our 
colleagues in the UK may not realise what we can do so we must remind them. But if 
they are raising requests that are not realistic, then we need to also constructively push 
back and tell them that this is not what you should do in China [Programme]. 
 
Educate headquarters [2;100%]. Given the large differences between the UK and 
China, the Beijing office managers had taken it upon themselves to actively seek to 
educate both parties to bridge the gaps. 
 
We are not only telling our European colleagues how they should deal with the Chinese. 
We also tell China Mobile how they should work with Europeans [Programme]. 
 
Structure local subsidiary 
 
Streamline interfaces [1;50%]. One of the project managers discussed the need to 
establish good interfaces across the business.   
 
This was a mess for some time but later on we came up with a process. We identified 
key account managers for China in for example Vodafone Group technology. All 
problems that we think we need to escalate to Group technology management, we go to 
that person who reports directly to the CTO [Programme]. 
 
Get your priorities straight 
 
Decide who you work for [1;50%]. The need to be clear on who you work for was also 
discussed. 
 
So we remember that we are Vodafone employees and seek benefits for Vodafone. But 
we are not blindly following what the Group people want to do in China. We gather 
knowledge and then tell them what we think that Vodafone and China Mobile can do 
together in China [Programme]. 
 
8.5 Integration findings 
 
There were also a number of comments raised regarding the making of integration 
decisions and the implementation of integration initiatives. 
 
8.5.1 How to make integration decisions 
 
Analysis 
 
Make proper initial assessment [1;50%]. One manager talked about the need to make 
proper assessments of the strategic goals of the parties. 
 
First we need to understand. Then to be understood. We need to really understand the 
strategic goals of the different parties. What does Vodafone achieve from China. Will 
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Vodafone only see China as a low cost base? Or does Vodafone see China for 
opportunities? We need to first understand and contract with Vodafone what they 
expect from China. We are paid by Vodafone. And from China Mobile we also need to 
understand their international strategy. What are their concerns? What are their 
priorities? To understand each side is very important [Programme]. 
 
Setting the strategy 
 
Focus on what matters most [1;50%]. The need to prioritise all potential integration 
areas was also discussed. Eventually both sides agreed to a short list of projects for 
execution. 
 
We organise brainstorm sessions. It is a long list. After we collect their priorities. Their 
individual priorities from both sides. Then we come up with a long list. We may 
identify 20 interesting areas for the next 12-18 months. Then from the long list, we 
identify the objectives, scope, financial benefits for each project which comes down to a 
short list of about 10 proposed projects for example. Then we go to Group marketing 
and Group technology to check with them for an indication of how much resources we 
may need to work on the projects. Then we get their sign-off and commitment and 
responsible persons for the projects. We then come back to China Mobile with a 
proposal from Vodafone on the short list [Programme]. 
 
Work towards a clear vision [1;50%]. It was also argued that it is important to know 
what the overall strategic direction is; both globally and for China. 
 
A very important job is on the strategy because we can come up with our own strategy 
based on our understanding but we don‟t know the business in the other countries. They 
[headquarters] have the special view of the whole footprint of Vodafone, so that they 
can come up with the strategy. Then when they come up with the global strategy 
framework we are in a better position to customise the China strategy [Programme]. 
 
People 
 
Build local market knowledge at headquarters [1;50%]. The need for in-depth local 
market understanding at headquarters was also discussed. 
 
Vodafone is quite big and China is very remote. A lot of people do not quite understand 
what China is because China is so far and remote. They do not understand China and 
they do not understand China Mobile. Especially how big China Mobile is, how 
significant, how impactful it is in China. It is not easy for either party to give in easily. 
One party will say „this is what I want‟. Each party is so used to it because they are so 
strong powers [Project]. 
 
Interaction 
 
Consult and sell integration to subsidiary managers [1;50%]. Similar to other cases, 
the importance of consultation and selling of integration initiatives was discussed. 
 
They need to listen. They need to listen to the local viewpoint. Seek to understand first. 
And second, they sit in a very good position where they have information from 
everywhere. So they should have the responsibility to consolidate, integrate and 
synergise best practice sharing in various parts in the footprint. And they need to have 
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the wisdom to identify when something working in one country will not work in China. 
They need to have the wisdom to identify what will work in another country. And then 
they need to organise the help to each island, the China island, to help them to 
communicate so that they can work better as a whole. The whole should be bigger than 
the sum of the parts. This is what we want the head office to do [Programme]. 
 
8.5.2 How to implement integration 
 
Manage structure 
 
De-layer headquarters [1;50%]. One of the project managers mentioned that Vodafone 
China had previously reported to a person in a lower level in the hierarchy at 
headquarters. This led to delays in decision-making and low visibility for the Beijing 
office. There was also only a limited amount of authority delegated to the managers in 
the Beijing office. However, following a recent restructuring, the head of the Beijing 
office instead reported to one of the top people at headquarters. 
 
Now we have changed the structure. This means decentralisation. They want to give 
more flexibility and more power to the local side…This is a positive change for us. It 
started earlier this year [Programme]. 
 
Establish governance structure [1;50%]. The same respondent also discussed the 
importance of a well functioning governance structure with clear channels for decision 
making, communication and escalation. 
 
From my perspective, it is a good move to make the governance structure work better. 
Because one of the typical concerns for the head office, versus a remote representative 
office, is what are these guys doing every day. …We need to come up with a 
communication scheme which the management feels confident with so that they know 
the status and make sure that we have enough opportunity to escalate [Programme]. 
 
Manage people 
 
Both of the interviewed managers talked about the importance of managing people in an 
effective way to ensure the success of integration. 
 
Acknowledge integration efforts [1;50%]. Managers in the Beijing office took specific 
steps to recognise contributions to joint projects between China Mobile and Vodafone. 
This was done to raise the profile of participants given that these projects sometimes fell 
outside of standard job descriptions. 
 
That is why we come to China Mobile and raise this indirectly by providing 
recognition. All the people that have contributed their time and efforts in our projects 
will be recognised by senior management. In the senior management meeting, they will 
have a session about the Vodafone joint projects. And when we have their CEO or their 
CTO meeting we will mention this so that they get visibility inside their organisation. 
They get a chance to interface and meet and talk with their senior management 
[Programme]. 
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Move people around [1;50%]. There was also an exchange programme designed to 
share experience between China Mobile and Vodafone. This helped people build 
networks and to gain a better understanding of the other party. 
 
We also have a people exchange programme with China Mobile. The idea is Vodafone 
sending one person in R&D and China Mobile sending one person. And we exchange 
people in different parts of the organisation for about 12 months so that they understand 
each other‟s processes and can support joint projects [Programme].  
 
Secure top management commitment [1;50%]. As a state owned enterprise (SOE), 
China Mobile operated in a very centralised manner. It was thus a key requirement to 
secure top management commitment for any initiatives on the joint roadmap. 
 
They also need to understand China Mobile‟s way of decision making. It is top-down. 
You need to get the buy-in of the senior management at China Mobile. That is very 
important. They need to push it down to make it work…China Mobile is very, very 
centralised. China has 31 provinces and China Mobile has 31 subsidiaries. When the 
Group says „do it‟, pretty much all 31 provinces will do it [Project]. 
 
Treat people well [1;50%]. One manager noted that China Mobile was a great host for 
all visitors from Vodafone. Visitors thus felt a bit like royalty when pampered by their 
Chinese hosts. This helped to build up good-will and to make Vodafone employees 
want to return to support further projects in China. 
 
China Mobile takes perfect care of our guests. When China Mobile says it is a working 
lunch, it is a banquet with 10 courses. Chinese people are very hospitable. When they 
come here to meet with vendors, they are also very nicely treated [Programme]. 
 
Manage objectives and resources 
 
There was some discussion on the need to prioritise projects and ensure local resources. 
 
Establish dedicated working groups [1;50%]. As discussed in the tensions section, 
there had been occasions when China Mobile had not established working groups for 
agreed joint projects. One manager talked about the need to ensure that resources were 
actually allocated to joint projects.  
 
Establish local prioritisation forum [1;50%]. To manage joint projects, the parties had 
established a governance structure that included an overall prioritisation forum that 
pulled together all requirements for joint projects. This was done as part of a steering 
committee which met once per quarter. 
 
On the governance structure, we made the investment in China Mobile and then we 
signed the strategic alliance agreement. In that, the Chairman‟s forum is defined. Our 
CEO and the CEO of China Mobile meet two times per year. They set the overall 
strategy. Then below that, is what we call the steering committee. This committee meets 
four times per year. That committee approves plans for projects or any other decisions. 
It is more about implementation...During the Chairman‟s forum they identify these 
interesting strategic areas and then the steering committee take the responsibility to 
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further follow-up and confirm whether we should start on initiatives. Or if we should 
form working groups to work on it [Programme].  
 
Manage interaction 
 
Effective interaction was also advocated by the respondents. 
 
Build trust [1;50%]. One respondent talked about the need to build trust with managers 
at headquarters. Vodafone‟s Beijing Office is far from headquarters and a lot of 
interaction happens through reports. 
 
[Headquarters] is not confident with the information we provide. If we send too much 
they say, we don‟t have time to read. If we send too little they say that we are hiding 
something. So we need to clarify expectations and build their confidence in terms of 
what we do in China [Programme]. 
 
Encourage people interaction rather than bureaucracy [1;50%]. Getting people 
together, face to face, was seen as the fastest way to achieve progress. Circulating draft 
versions and trying to resolve issues over conference calls was, in comparison, a time 
consuming process. 
 
It is much, much more efficient to work face to face. We need to have 10 conference 
calls to clarify 5 pages of specifications. It takes only 2 hours face to face [Programme].  
 
Establish strong communication [1;50%]. Two-way communications was also seen as 
vital. 
 
The communication channel needs to be there. Either top-down or bottom-up but the 
mutual communication needs to be there [Project]. 
 
Manage delivery 
 
Involve key stakeholders [1;50%]. Given the top down structure of China Mobile, one 
manager discussed the need to ensure that the key stakeholders, with proper authority, 
were involved throughout the process.  
 
Other 
 
Freedom within guidelines [1;50%]. The need for headquarters to provide freedom for 
the subsidiaries to develop within clear guidelines was also discussed. 
 
The head office is like a parent. As a parent, you should have control. You cannot really 
spoil the kids and let them do whatever they want. You should have the control overall 
in an overall sense. But as a good parent you need to understand the kids very well and 
develop a very good plan for the development of these kids. And kids also varies. You 
cannot really use one single method to treat all kids. It will not work out because each 
kid has its own strengths and weaknesses [Project].  
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8.5.3 Context factors affecting integration 
 
The respondents discussed a number of contextual factors that impacted on integration. 
 
Legacy versus new [1;50%]. It was seen as easier to implement new projects that were 
not affected by the legacy of either party. 
 
Both parties can get along pretty well and to comply with it under the condition that it is 
something which is new for both parties. So that both parties can do it together and 
benefit together. It is a new start for both parties [Project]. 
 
Clearly valuable projects [1;50%]. Projects that were perceived as clearly valuable by 
China Mobile were also more likely to be successfully implemented. 
 
Another case is that the heads of the two big giants, they see a certain project as 
valuable. Then they say „yes, let‟s do it‟. China Mobile is top down. When the big guy 
says „yes‟, then people follow [Project].  
 
Projects championed by junior people [1;50%]. China Mobile was also seen as less 
likely to comply with projects that had been initiated by more junior people in 
Vodafone.  
 
Typical example for this is that in the start of the project, the originator of the project is 
not from the top. Either he is from Vodafone, at Director level or someone below that 
who has proposed something. And if it is not something which is high on China 
Mobile‟s agenda, then maybe in the very beginning they may say „yes‟ but later on it 
will not really work out [Project]. 
 
8.6 Feedback from Vodafone China  
 
The draft version of this dissertation was distributed to all respondents in December 
2006 in order to share the research findings and allow respondents to comment. One of 
the interviewed managers at Vodafone China, labelled [Programme] felt that the 
situation had changed significantly since conducting the interviews. Based on this 
feedback, I scheduled a phone interview for 11 January 2007 in order to receive updated 
information, which is reported below. 
 
The key change within Vodafone was the appointment of a new CEO for the EMAPA 
region covering Central Europe, Middle East, Asia Pacific and Affiliates shortly after 
the initial interviews had been conducted. The new CEO had made efforts to get to 
know China and had spent one week in China travelling to Beijing, Shanghai and 
Harbin in order to get acquainted with Chinese culture, economy, politics and 
consumers. Managers in the Beijing office had previously not experienced this level of 
attention from senior headquarters staff as noted by the respondent. 
 
We have been here for five years and this is the first time that an executive committee 
member from Vodafone spends a whole week in China...We see this as a firm 
commitment to China [Programme].  
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The regional CEO met with a number of business leaders in China, including both 
Chinese and expatriates, and with government officials. One message that had come 
across was the importance of developing a strong and empowered local team in China 
that had the ability to bridge the gap between headquarters and the local Chinese 
market. 
 
The most interesting concept he learnt during the trip is a word called „cultural 
bilingualism‟. It is very difficult for a foreigner to really get into the centre of a social 
circle which is built up by Chinese. Therefore, it is not really about mixing the two 
cultures. You cannot mix the two cultures. They are so distinct. Therefore, the foreigners 
making business in China need to develop the ability to switch modes. When you talk to 
Chinese people you need to switch to the Chinese mode. When you talk to headquarters, 
you need to switch to another mode. Therefore, as a foreign company, you need to 
develop a very strong local team. And you delegate to this team when you meet with the 
senior management so that the local team have authority from you. I think [the CEO] did 
believe all of this. After this trip, the interest in China, the attention and support to China 
was significantly raised [Programme]. 
 
The new CEO had also taken steps to ensure integration of the China office into the 
Vodafone Group. Previously, the Beijing office had been more of an isolated appendix 
rather than fully integrated. 
 
I recall something interesting when [the new CEO] came to our office. We asked „what is 
your expectation of the China team?‟ It is a typical question we ask every visiting 
executive. The typical answer is that we like you to ‟blah, blah, blah‟. [The new CEO] 
was very different. He said, the question should be modified because the China team is 
not fighting alone. I would say „What are Vodafone‟s objectives in China apart from what 
I expect you to do in China?‟ So the Group CEO, and all the Group resources, he lined up 
a team, and then himself and the regional CEO reporting to him. This whole team works 
as „One Vodafone‟ to leverage China for the benefit of the whole Vodafone. For the first 
time we felt that we are very closely linked with the Group. He also proposed some very 
small details about communication between Vodafone China and the Group. Like day to 
day, we now have online news. Due to IT reasons, we used to receive the American or 
the Japanese news (before we sold Japan), rather than the UK news. And there was online 
training that we didn‟t participate in. And there are internal Vodafone magazines that we 
didn‟t receive. He took note of all of this and then told one of his direct reports who 
works on business improvement and integration. He has tasked that team to incorporate 
China into the global platform. This is the first time that we feel that we are part of the 
EMAPA team. We used to think of ourselves as just the Vodafone China team. The 
identity, the feeling of the identity, is now that we are part of the EMAPA team. Which I 
think is beneficial for both. Both for headquarters people and for the China team 
[Programme]. 
 
Following the new CEO‟s initial trip to China, he had organised a „China Day‟ at 
headquarters in order to raise awareness about China at headquarters and among other 
countries in the EMAPA region. 
 
In the EMAPA region, as we cover many, many countries, and the people who work in 
the Group may not have been, or very few people apart from [the CEO] have travelled to 
all these countries. They do not understand each other. We probably speak 17 languages 
and have very different cultures. He suggested the need to help build mutual 
understanding. And also to introduce the concept of China and the latest development of 
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the Chinese market to Group people. Therefore we had the China Day, a whole day 
workshop about China. We had speakers from Vodafone China on the overall Chinese 
history and economy, on the Chinese market, about Chinese culture. About our partner 
China Mobile. About our vision in China. What our objectives are. We also invited our 
business partners who are working with us to explore opportunities in China. For 
example, we are trying to find low cost suppliers in China. That event was a good 
success. Many people had follow-up questions. It aroused their interest in China 
[Programme]. 
 
The initial one week trip and the China Day had been followed by a significant increase 
in interaction between staff at the Beijing office and the Vodafone Group. 
 
[The Beijing Office manager] gets to travel more for the headquarters management 
meetings. It is a symbol that we are more strategically linked with headquarters. All the 
working level people, including the technology and the head of commercial, the project 
managers, and myself we also travel more or much more than before. Vodafone is 
making efforts to design a clear China strategy which should be available within the next 
two months. Vodafone‟s global strategy is evolving. Therefore we need to also clearly 
define the up to date strategy and strategic goals in China. The whole project team has 
more interaction including both face to face interaction and day to day contacts with their 
Group counterparts. Also, [the regional CEO‟s] team members are also flying more 
frequently to China. When we talk with each other, it is not like we are talking to 
someone we never met. Someone we don‟t really know. We know what the person looks 
like. We know the person, not only their voice. It helps with the efficiency and the 
effectiveness of work [Programme]. 
 
The interviewed manager concluded that these changes had provided a lot more clarity 
regarding the overall direction, which had improved motivation. 
 
Now I understand my job much better than before. This is primarily because we have 
now stated a clear global strategy and we are in the course of defining very clear strategic 
objectives for Vodafone. I know the big picture of where we are going. And it helps 
because I can see how I can contribute towards achieving these goals. That is very 
motivating [Programme]. 
 
In comparison to before, the higher level of attention and commitment from the regional 
CEO had increased the belief in that the strategy and objectives for China really meant 
something. Previously, such statements appear to have been more empty words, and that 
it was difficult to take them seriously which had led to an element of hesitation. 
 
We developed the Vodafone China vision, mission and values a long time ago. We know 
the most important things we should do in China. But without the strong attention and 
commitment from headquarters, I don‟t think I had the current level of confidence that 
this was really what the Group people wanted. So when I made efforts to deliver results 
according to the three or four mission statements or goals, I was not that confident that 
this was absolutely the right thing for me to do. But now I see the alignment from the top 
management in the company down to the working level in Vodafone China. Everyone is 
fully aligned. Everybody is on the same page for what should be done in China. It fits 
with the global strategy, it fits with the China strategy. And it fits with my objectives. 
This alignment or transparency provides a huge confidence I believe [Programme]. 
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In sum, the follow-up interview provided further insights into what headquarters can do 
to energise and motivate subsidiary managers. First, it appears essential to make 
subsidiary managers feel that they are part of the group rather than being an appendix 
far out in the periphery. Second, it suggests the importance of attention and genuine 
commitment from headquarters. Third, it seems vital to ensure clarity and alignment 
regarding strategy and objectives. 
 
8.7 Learning  
 
The Chinese case illustrated that many of the same categories that were identified in the 
previous four case studies were also relevant in this case. This suggests that many of the 
findings might apply across a variety of cross-company forms of cooperation and 
integration beyond formal headquarters-subsidiary ties.  
 
Tensions were identified in the four areas of: 1) misfit, 2) unfair process, 3) weak 
execution and 5) cultural misunderstandings. There was no discussion of the fourth area 
of loss of autonomy. This is also logical given that change was not a core component of 
integration. 
 
The case of Vodafone in China was very different in that integration initiatives were 
much more limited in scope and were clearly identified and jointly agreed between 
Vodafone and China Mobile. From the cases, it was more difficult to identify the extent 
to which conflicts between the parties were the result of political behaviour or primarily 
challenges due to very different corporate and national cultures of the actors.  
 
The follow-up interview suggests that the relationship between headquarters and 
subsidiaries can change in a relatively short period of time. In this particular case, 
changes seem to have led to positive improvements. Presumably, changes could also 
quickly generate negative effects. This echoes Weick‟s (1979) suggestion that 
organisations keep falling apart and thus require „chronic rebuilding‟ and that processes 
need to be continually reaccomplished (1979:44). In addition, the follow-up interview 
highlighted the limitation of a „snap shot‟ approach to conducting research in that any 
account is coloured by the circumstances when collecting the data. A processual study 
might have yielded additional insights in this regard. The opportunity to interact with a 
respondent and discuss the draft dissertation was also a very rewarding experience. This 
suggests the potential benefits of a collaborative action research approach such as 
cooperative inquiry (Eden & Huxham, 2002; Reason, 2001; Reason, 2006; Reason & 
McArdle, 2004; Reason & Torbert, 2001). 
 
As nothing fundamentally new emerged in the Chinese case, from a content perspective, 
this provides some indication that theoretical saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1998) has been reached.  However, theoretical saturation is a concept 
that better fits with a positivist research strategy based on an objectivist ontology. From 
the perspective of a constructivist stance, it cannot be ruled out that another researcher 
might have reached a different conclusion. 
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9 SECOND-ORDER ANALYSIS 
 
In this chapter, I seek to theorise on the basis of the first-order findings from the 
individual case studies. The tone of voice will thus change from the respondents‟ 
accounts, which were used for the abductive descriptions, to my own voice as I seek to 
construct theory based on the retroductive approach. Beyond being consistent with the 
chosen research strategy, this method of presentation also has the benefit of separating 
the descriptive first-order findings from my second-order theorising. I hope that this will 
serve to address some of the issues surrounding lack of transparency of qualitative 
research by allowing the reader to independently review the first-order descriptions in 
separation from the second-order theorising.  
 
The objective is to develop a grounded theory that provides insights into the causes of 
tensions at the subsidiary level and how subsidiary managers responded to such 
tensions. 
 
9.1 Managerial tensions at the subsidiary level 
 
The first task is to search for the generative mechanisms that produced tension in the 
case studies and seek to outline the contingent factors that activated the mechanisms. 
The objective is to explain the causes of managerial tensions across the five case 
studies. In line with the constructivist stance adopted in this research programme, the 
emerging theory is viewed in terms of a stimulus-organism-response (S-O-R) model. 
This is in contrast to earlier attempts at understanding human nature according to a 
simpler stimulus-response (S-R) model in which human behaviour was portrayed as 
fairly mechanistic and passive (Ilgen & Klein, 1989). Managerial agency thus takes 
centre stage in the grounded theory developed below rather than environmental 
determinism. Subsidiary managers‟ interpretation and sensemaking are thus considered 
vital to understand their responses as the contextual contingency differences, listed in 
Appendix 14.2, only appear to explain some differences between primarily the two 
Orange cases.  
 
The first-order findings identified five mechanisms generating managerial tensions at 
the subsidiary level: 
 
1. Misfit of initiatives 
2. Unfair process 
3. Weak execution 
4. Loss of autonomy  
5. Cultural misunderstanding 
 
This chapter will discuss each mechanism in turn and seek to identify the contingent 
factors that activated the tensions. Consistent with the retroductive research strategy, the 
emerging theory will be discussed in terms of tendencies rather than absolutes (Blaikie, 
2000). The identified mechanisms are assumed to be located in the „real‟ domain. This 
implies that they might be transferable to other situations provided that the context is 
similar and the mechanisms are triggered by the contingent factors. The findings might 
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thus be transferable provided that there is a degree of similarity between the sending 
context and the receiving context (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  
 
9.1.1 Perceived misfit of initiatives 
 
The first mechanism capable of generating tension is defined as when subsidiary 
managers perceive a misfit between what is mandated by headquarters and the local 
business requirements. This dimension is thus primarily concerned with the content of 
integration decisions. 
 
Evidence 
 
Perceived misfit of integration efforts were reported by managers in all of the five case 
studies as shown in Table 14-2. There were most discussions by managers in the two 
Orange case studies, probably due to the magnitude of integration driven by 
headquarters at the same time as the competitive climate was intensified in Denmark 
and in Romania. 
 
Contingent factors triggering mechanism 
 
This mechanism is more likely to be triggered the greater the perceived difference 
between countries considered for implementation of integration initiatives. This 
includes differences between markets and subsidiaries as well as the relative importance 
of integration initiatives in a local context.  
 
Underlying market differences. These factors include the level of market maturity 
(introduction, growth, maturity), the degree of competitive intensity, customer 
behaviour, legal and regulatory frameworks, the degree of sophistication in sales and 
marketing infrastructure and cultural differences. There were examples of these factors 
provided in all five case studies. 
 
Subsidiary differences. There may be significant differences in terms of the market 
position of the subsidiaries (challenger, incumbent), the brand positioning and target 
segments. Priorities are also likely to change depending on the lifecycle of the company 
(start-up, growth, maturity). In addition, different legacy set-ups may contribute to a 
perception of misfit. Examples of this were provided both during the start-up phase of 3 
as well as for the two Orange cases.  
 
Different strategic focus. The degree to which integration initiatives address major 
concerns of the business or can generate significant revenue growth and/or cost savings. 
This was especially discussed in the Orange Romania case given that most integration 
initiatives originated from a Western European context. 
 
9.1.2 Perceived unfair process 
 
The second mechanism capable of generating tension is defined as subsidiary managers‟ 
perception of the fairness of the integration process. This includes the way decisions are 
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made and how head office managers interact with subsidiary managers. This dimension 
thus relates to the process of integration and the behaviour of head office managers. 
 
Evidence 
 
Perceptions regarding the lack of fairness in the integration process were discussed by 
managers in all of the five case studies. This is illustrated in Table 14-2. It is surprising 
to note that a large number of subsidiary managers felt that they were not fairly treated 
by their counterparts at headquarters. Subsidiary managers also universally reported that 
managers at headquarters lacked sufficient understanding of the local market conditions. 
 
Contingent factors triggering tension 
 
This mechanism is likely to be triggered when subsidiary managers feel that head office 
managers do not treat them well or when they are ignorant of the local situation. 
 
Unfair treatment. This includes lack of consultation with subsidiary managers, failure 
to listen to feedback, micro management and lack of trust in subsidiary managers. It 
also includes a culture of fear that would make subsidiary managers hesitant to openly 
voice concerns. It can also be the result of perceived inequity. Examples of such 
behaviours were reported across all the case studies. In addition it includes darker 
elements such as ethnic cleansing in favour of specific nationalities as discussed in the 
Orange Romania case.  
 
Integration not ‘sold’. The process can also be viewed as unfair if subsidiary managers 
do not feel that integration has been explained and „sold‟ to them but rather simply 
mandated from headquarters. This was discussed in all case studies with the exception 
of Vodafone in China. The integration set-up was quite different in the China case given 
that the integration roadmap was jointly agreed rather than mandated by headquarters. 
This probably explains why managers at Vodafone China did not discuss this topic. 
 
Lack of HQ understanding. This includes a head office staffed with managers without 
sufficient operational experience. It also relates to head office managers who have not 
invested time and effort to gain a deep understanding of the subsidiaries‟ local 
conditions. It is noteworthy that this was discussed across all five case studies. 
 
9.1.3 Perceived weak execution 
 
The third mechanism capable of generating tension is defined as subsidiary managers‟ 
perception of the implementation of integration. This dimension is thus concerned with 
the execution of integration.  
 
Evidence 
 
Examples of weak execution of integration initiatives were reported by managers in all 
of the five case studies as shown in Table 14-2. Goal and resource conflicts regarding 
local versus global priorities appear to have been especially common. 
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Contingent factors triggering tension 
 
Goal and resource conflicts. This occurs when integration initiatives are started without 
resources being agreed. Local and global projects then compete for the same resources 
in the local subsidiary. Typically examples occur when global projects are introduced 
after the local budgets have been agreed. There were slight differences between the 
cases. In the two Orange cases, this type of tension occurred as integration initiatives 
were seen as consuming large amounts of local resources that could have been put to 
better use. In the Orange cases plus Vodafone in China there were also examples of 
conflicting short-term and long-term objectives. In contrast, tensions in the two 3 cases 
were created due to a fight for resources from the Nordic shared services organisation. 
 
Lack of clear direction. This can occur when different parts of headquarters put forward 
inconsistent instructions towards subsidiaries. Examples include focusing on short term 
financial performance by cutting budgets at the same time as other head office 
departments mandate integration initiatives that require additional resources. Also, if 
delivery roadmaps keep changing frequently, little actual delivery takes place. There 
was general discussion across the cases that the overall objective and long-term 
direction of integration was not sufficiently clear to subsidiary managers. 
 
Inexperienced people at headquarters. The Orange cases illustrated how subsidiary 
managers felt that managers at headquarters lacked sufficient operational experience. 
This is likely the result of previously non-operational managers at headquarters being 
transferred into operational roles with the responsibility for group-wide implementation 
projects. 
 
Unclear roles and responsibilities. This results in either too many people trying to do 
the same thing or things fallings between stools as no one is responsible for a particular 
activity. This was reported in Orange Denmark and in 3 Denmark. These two 
subsidiaries had the lowest bargaining power versus headquarters of the five cases. This 
finding might thus be the result of subsidiary managers feeling that managers at 
headquarters did not take their concerns seriously. 
 
Weak delivery. A lack of planning means that integration initiatives are started without 
proper preparation and thus clarity regarding who should deliver what and when using 
which resources. As illustrated in the Orange cases, a poor prior track record of 
headquarters delivery can also make subsidiary managers hesitant to fully support new 
integration initiatives. 
 
9.1.4 Perceived loss of autonomy 
 
The fourth mechanism capable of generating tension is defined as subsidiary managers‟ 
perception of the loss of autonomy as a result of integration efforts. It is thus different 
compared with the previous three mechanisms as it relates to subsidiary managers, and 
their loss of power and control. 
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Evidence 
 
The loss of control was only discussed in the two Orange case studies as shown in Table 
14-2. These were also the only two cases where integration meant large scale strategic 
change. It would thus appear that there needs to be change from autonomy towards 
integration for this mechanism to become activated. 
 
Contingent factors triggering tension 
 
Change from independence to integration. This form of tension was only noted in the 
two Orange cases which indicates that strategic change away from independence 
towards integration is required for this tension to occur. 
 
Reluctance to change. The two Orange cases provided several examples of how 
subsidiary managers resisted the changes being imposed by headquarters. In a 
multidomestic configuration, subsidiary managers typically have full managerial 
discretion as long as the budget is delivered. Integration then reduces the level of 
autonomy of subsidiary managers as their decision making authority is reduced. The 
CEO of Orange Romania noted that in the extreme case, his only role would eventually 
be to cut ribbons and perform other ceremonial tasks. 
 
9.1.5 Perceived cultural misunderstanding 
 
The fifth mechanism capable of generating tension is defined as subsidiary managers‟ 
perceptions of cultural misunderstanding leading to a tense working relationship. This 
dimension is thus concerned with the cultural differences experienced during 
integration. It relates specifically to misunderstandings resulting from differences in 
working style such as attitudes towards time and processes, and the importance placed 
on sticking to agreements. 
 
Evidence 
 
This type of tension was only reported in the following three cases: Orange Denmark, 3 
Sweden and Vodafone China as shown in Table 14-2. The case of China is relatively 
straightforward as there were substantial differences in terms of both national and 
corporate culture between Vodafone and China Mobile. The other cases appear more 
difficult to explain. However, further analysis reveals the reason. The respondents in 
Orange Denmark and 3 Sweden all referred to a tendency for Danish managers to strive 
for a very high degree of autonomy. The three respondents discussing this in Orange 
Denmark were all non-Danes describing their Danish colleagues. The five respondents 
in 3 Sweden all talked about their Danish colleagues. While it is perhaps not surprising 
that culture can pose challenges between the UK and China, it is more interesting to 
note the amount of tension generated in the interaction of Danes and non-Danes 
including with the Swedes. 
 
Attitude towards time, process and agreements. The discussion with managers at 3 in 
Sweden (relating to Denmark) and the managers at Vodafone in China revealed 
 183 
differences in the degree to which time, processes and agreements were considered 
binding obligations between parties. 
 
9.2 Managerial responses at the subsidiary level 
 
This section identifies the different responses that subsidiary managers used to manage 
or cope with tension and the contingent factors that appear to influence such responses. 
While the previous section closely followed the coding in the data, this section is based 
on imposing categories onto the cases. I argue that responses fall in two different 
categories. In the first category we find responses in which subsidiary managers follow 
headquarters instructions or have an open dialogue with head office managers. This 
includes complying with, negotiating or challenging integration decisions. In the other 
category, we have cases where subsidiary managers manipulate or ignore head office 
instructions. This section seeks to understand what factors lead to compliance or an 
open dialogue with headquarters versus managers manipulating or ignoring what 
headquarters desires. 
 
9.2.1 Comply 
 
Definition 
 
Complying means that subsidiary managers substantially follow the integration 
decisions made by headquarters. 
 
Evidence 
 
The five cases provided different illustrations of what factors influenced subsidiary 
managers‟ compliance with headquarters mandated integration initiatives. 
 
Contingent factors 
 
It would appear that the following factors contribute towards triggering this mechanism. 
 
Valuable and possible. When subsidiary managers see integration initiatives as valuable 
and possible in the local context, the natural response appears to be compliance. This 
was reported by managers as the most obvious cases of successful integration efforts. 
One respondent in 3 Sweden noted that subsidiary managers were prepared to accept 
being force-fed by initiatives only as long as the benefits were obvious. 
 
Resource dependence. If subsidiary managers are heavily dependent on head office for 
resources or for approval of expenditure plans, this can force compliance. Orange 
Denmark was a special case where the poor performance of the business made 
managers more willing to comply with integration initiatives even if they would have 
preferred to fight back. 
 
Fear of repercussions. Managers may also comply out of fear of repercussions. 
Subsidiary managers referred specifically to the risk of going against top corporate 
priorities championed by the Group CEO. This was mentioned especially for the two 
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Orange cases were subsidiary managers had been threatened that non-compliance would 
have adverse impacts on their careers. 
 
Not worth the fight. Certain initiatives may not live up to the criteria of „valuable‟ and 
„possible‟ but the negative impact may be too small to risk a fight with head office. 
Compliance may then be the result as managers wish to save goodwill for when they 
need it more. 
 
Part of blueprint. Some features appear to be considered fundamental to the 
multinational‟s identity and business model. This will typically include institutionalised 
aspects such as brand names and logos that are essential to create coherence across 
subsidiaries. However, this typically only applies to ingrained features of the 
multinational rather than to new initiatives or changes to existing features. There were 
thus no examples reported in the cases of subsidiary managers seeking to challenge the 
brand name or corporate values. This factor was identified using Sherlock Holmes‟ style 
„the dog that did not bark‟ logic rather than being derived directly from respondents‟ 
quotes. 
 
Presence of expatriates. Three respondents in the Orange Denmark case argued that the 
expatriate CEO was more inclined to comply with headquarters and less likely to pick a 
fight. This was seen as a result of expatriates being both socialised to headquarters 
norms and as being dependent on headquarters for their future career progression within 
the company. 
 
It is important to note regarding the above that both resource dependence and fear of 
repercussions can suppress healthy discussions about integration efforts and lead to 
passive rather than genuine compliance. And performance may suffer as a result. 
 
9.2.2 Negotiate or Challenge 
 
Definition 
 
Negotiation means that subsidiary managers negotiate with headquarters to change 
some aspects of the proposed integration initiative. This includes scope, timeframes, 
resources and targets. The objective is to take part in the integration initiative but in a 
different way than originally envisaged by headquarters.  
 
Challenging means that subsidiary managers openly question integration efforts put 
forward by headquarters with the objective of either opting out or fundamentally 
changing the nature of the integration initiative. 
 
Both of the above are thus potentially constructive responses as they open up a dialogue 
with headquarters. 
 
Evidence 
 
There were frequent discussions by respondents across several cases regarding the need 
to argue the local case against headquarters.  
 185 
Contingent factors 
 
Negotiating with or challenging head office appears more likely to happen when some 
of the following conditions are met. 
 
Low value. Initiatives that have a relatively low value in the local context may not 
justify immediate prioritisation or full implementation as per the original scope. 
Respondents in the two Orange cases, 3 Denmark and Vodafone China provided 
examples of products and services with business cases that appeared negative in the 
local market. 
 
Inappropriate. Integration, as envisaged by headquarters, might be inappropriate in the 
local contexts due to factors such as legal and regulatory framework or cultural factors. 
Respondents in both Orange Denmark and 3 Denmark talked specifically about 
legislation that prevented long contractual binding periods. 
 
Lack of resources. Shortage of financial or people resources in the local subsidiary may 
make it difficult or impossible to follow Group requirements. The case of Orange 
Denmark is illustrative in that the mandated integration initiatives were considerably 
larger than the total CAPEX budget for the subsidiary. 
 
Legacy set-up. There may be specific legacy conditions that make implementation, as 
requested, difficult or uneconomical. Legacy set-ups affected implementation in both 
Orange Denmark and Orange Romania. 
 
It would appear that one or more of the above factors need to be combined with the 
following to result in negotiation or challenge from subsidiary managers: 
 
Tolerant culture. Negotiation as well as challenge are more likely when the 
organisational culture is open and allows for an honest dialogue between subsidiary and 
headquarters.  
 
High subsidiary bargaining power. This is the case when subsidiary managers high 
bargaining power versus head office makes the latter more likely to listen and consider 
subsidiary managers opinions. This was a clear difference between Orange Denmark 
and Orange Romania. Orange Denmark had a very low bargaining power versus 
headquarters and subsidiary managers reported in detail the need to resort to political 
gamesmanship behaviours to cope with the local – global tensions. In contrast, Orange 
Romania had a much higher bargaining power versus headquarters. There appears to 
have been less common to apply gamesmanship tactics in the Romanian case. The CEO 
in Romania had previously been the CEO in Denmark and reported that his bargaining 
power was substantially greater in Romania compared to what it had been in Denmark. 
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9.2.3 Manipulate 
 
Definition 
 
Manipulation means that subsidiary managers use gamesmanship to avoid following the 
instructions of headquarters but without challenging or negotiating openly. 
 
Evidence 
 
As discussed above, there was primarily a discussion of political gamesmanship 
behaviour in the two Orange cases.  
 
Contingent factors 
 
The situation is similar to when subsidiary managers negotiate with or challenge 
headquarters with the significant exception that subsidiary managers do not feel that 
they can openly engage head office in a dialogue or they have previously been over 
ruled but do not wish to comply. Manipulation is thus more likely to happen when 
managers fear repercussions from head office and feel that they cannot engage in an 
honest dialogue. Alternatively when managers feel the need to hide something from 
head office managers, such as a lack of compliance. 
 
Intolerant culture. When there is a culture of fear, managers might not dare to openly 
negotiate or challenge headquarters. Threats by the corporate CEO of the Orange Group 
had triggered manipulative actions by managers in Orange Denmark and Orange 
Romania. 
 
Low subsidiary bargaining power. If subsidiary managers have low bargaining power 
versus head office, they may have a more difficult time to argue their case for 
exemptions or modifications to proposed integration initiatives. This is the opposite of 
the above discussion about high bargaining power. 
 
Something to hide. Managers might also have something to hide that may be revealed if 
they engage in an open dialogue with head office. Examples of this included budget 
discussions when subsidiary managers created buffer zones to use for future 
contingencies. This was discussed in the 3 Sweden and Orange Romania cases. 
 
Perceived injustice. There were some indications of an „eye for an eye‟ logic according 
to which perceived injustice appear to have legitimised manipulative behaviour for 
subsidiary managers. This tendency was most prevalent in the Orange Denmark case 
where there was substantial tension and a majority of managers felt unfairly treated. 
 
9.2.4 Ignore 
 
Definition 
 
Ignoring means that subsidiary managers carry on with their local business without 
taking note of integration initiatives. 
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Evidence 
 
This was discussed by managers in Orange Denmark and Vodafone China. 
 
Contingent factors 
 
Insignificant initiatives. This included integration initiatives that were viewed as 
insignificant. These initiatives would typically not be „programmed‟ into the overall 
delivery machinery and appear in Group wide status tracking. 
 
Initiatives or rules appear irrelevant. If initiatives imposed by head office clearly 
appear irrelevant for the local context, they may simply be ignored. 
 
Championed by junior people. Initiatives that are driven by junior staff at Group 
without direct backing from more senior people. This was discussed in the Vodafone 
China case and in the Orange Denmark case, 
 
9.2.5 Re-connecting with literature 
 
Figure 9-1 below presents a summary of the grounded theory developed above 
regarding causes and consequences of tensions at the subsidiary level based on the five 
researched cases.  
 
Figure 9-1 
Summary of causes and consequences of tensions 
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Following from this is an attempt to re-connect with extant literature with the objective 
of integrating the empirically grounded findings with the existing knowledge base. 
 
The model above is presented as a theory of sensemaking at the subsidiary level. 
Building on Figure 2-4 in the literature review, I argue that subsidiary managers‟ 
experience of dissonance/tension between local and global requirements might result in 
attempts to reinforce their local schema. Alternatively, subsidiary managers might 
attempt to re-frame the schema held by managers at headquarters or seek to undermine 
headquarters integration actions. 
 
Figure 9-2 
Managing dissonance/tension 
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external change) and strategic change (i.e. internal change). The result, over time, is that 
environmental changes and incremental strategic changes in the company move apart 
(Johnson, 1988). However, the strategic drift in the researched cases was different in 
that headquarters managers were responding to a different enacted environment than the 
one that subsidiary managers experienced in the local contexts in which they were 
embedded. Subsidiary managers may thus perceive corporate strategic drift when their 
experience suggests that the corporate strategy is unclear, unrealistic or inappropriate in 
a local operating context. In terms of subsidiary management, there are ample 
opportunities for disagreement on „environmental‟ requirements and required strategic 
responses. From the perspective of subsidiary managers, strategic initiatives originating 
at headquarters might thus be perceived as drifting away from the job that needs to be 
done in the local operating context. 
 
Perceived lack of procedural justice 
 
A number of the findings related to subsidiary managers‟ perceptions of the strategy 
process and how they felt they had been treated by managers at headquarters. These 
findings are closely related to the construct known as procedural justice (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1991; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993b; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993a; Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1993c; Kim & Mauborgne, 1995; Taggart, 1999). Procedural justice is 
defined by Kim and Mauborgne as „the extent to which the dynamic of the 
multinational‟s strategy-making process for its subsidiary units are judged to be fair by 
subsidiary top management‟ (1993a:422). A high level of perceived procedural justice 
has been shown to lead to significantly greater compliance by subsidiary units even in 
the situation when subsidiary managers disapprove of the decisions taken by the 
corporate centre. The construct is thus essential as it will inevitably be difficult to please 
all subsidiary units in a transnational company, and yet integration and compliance is 
required to make a global integration strategy work. 
 
As mentioned in the literature review, Kim and Mauborgne (1993c) have outlined  five 
central pillars to procedural justice in the context of multinational management. First, 
the existence of two-way communication between the corporate centre and the 
subsidiary in strategic decision making. Second, the ability for subsidiary managers to 
legitimately challenge the strategic views of the corporate centre. Third, that the 
corporate centre is knowledgeable about the local situation of subsidiaries. Fourth, that 
subsidiary managers are given an account of the final strategic decisions by the 
corporate centre together with an explanation of the rationale behind the final decision. 
And fifth, that the corporate centre is consistent in decision making across subsidiaries. 
The findings from this research illustrated lack of procedural justice on all five pillars 
listed above and showed how lack of procedural justice can result in significant tensions 
at the subsidiary level. 
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Perceived weak strategy execution 
 
A number of the findings related to perceived poor execution of the integrated strategy. 
Even an appropriately formulated strategy will not ensure success if execution is done 
poorly. Bossidy, et al. (2002) argue that „[e]xecution is the unaddressed issue in the 
business world today. Its absence is the single biggest obstacle to success and the cause 
of most of the disappointments that are mistakenly attributed to other causes‟ (2002:5, 
italics in original). The empirical evidence suggests that subsidiary managers perceived 
strategy execution as weak across multiple areas and that this can result in substantial 
tension at the subsidiary level.  
 
Perceived loss of personal control 
 
Personal control (Greenberger & Strasser, 1986) is a construct that provides significant 
insight into the loss of managerial autonomy perceived by the subsidiary managers in 
the two Orange cases during the transition period from a multidomestic to an integrated 
strategy configuration. Greenberger and Strasser (1986) define personal control as „the 
individual‟s beliefs, at a given point in time, in his or her ability to effect a change, in a 
desired direction, on the environment. Individuals in organizations are viewed as 
desirous of increasing their personal control„ (1986:164). In their review of related 
literature, Greenberger and Strasser found that decreases in personal control resulted in 
a range of different negative consequences for both individuals and organisations. Some 
of these factors are of particular relevance to this research such as: increased stress, 
decreased performance, increased sabotage and depression. Greenberger and Strasser 
(1986) further state that „individuals will attempt to satisfy their needs for control in 
spite of  (and frequently because of) the barriers and constraints the organization places 
on the attainment of personal control‟ (1986:174). The empirical findings from the two 
Orange cases illustrate how subsidiary managers might experience a loss of personal 
control following from a change to an integrated strategy. This happened at the same 
time as there was discontinuity in the competitive landscape and managers perceived 
competitive intensity as increasing and the need to respond vigorously in the local 
market contexts. This research thus shows how a loss of personal control can lead to 
substantial tensions among subsidiary managers. 
 
Perceived cultural differences 
 
There were discussions of cultural differences and misunderstandings in three of the 
case studies: Orange Denmark, 3 Sweden (in relation to Denmark) and Vodafone China. 
The potential for cultural challenges is not surprising given the seminal studies by Hall 
(1960) and Hofstede (1980; 1981; 1985). While cultural misunderstanding between 
China Mobile and European based Vodafone staff could be expected, given both high 
psychic distance (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) and different corporate cultures requiring 
double-layered acculturation (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996), it was interesting to 
note the level of friction between Danes and their Northern European colleagues from 
Sweden and the UK. Denmark is located in the same small power distance/weak 
uncertainty avoidance, as Sweden and the UK, in Hofstede‟s (1985) research which 
might suggest that cultural friction would be less common. This indicates that culture 
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can play a significant role even between countries located in the similar quadrant on 
Hofstede‟s (1985) cultural country maps.  
 
The empirical findings further indicate differences in attitudes towards time and 
agreements that are consistent with the dimensions of culture identified by Hall (1960). 
 
Logics of action and organisational coupling 
 
Consistent with the chosen research strategy, different contexts are considered to have a 
significant impact on how social actors make sense of their world and how they act. 
Given this, it is interesting to note that very little research has addressed differences in 
strategy making between headquarters and subsidiaries. In a rare study addressing this 
gap, Regnér (2003) found that „[s]trategy making in the periphery was inductive, 
including externally oriented and exploratory strategy activities like trial and error, 
informal noticing, experiments and the use of heuristics. In contrast, strategy making in 
the centre was more deductive involving an industry and exploitation focus, and 
activities like planning, analysis, formal intelligence and the use of standard routines‟ 
(2003:57, italics in original). From this, it would appear that strategy making follows 
different logics of action (Friedland & Alford, 1991) depending on the context of actors. 
Logics of action can be defined as „systems of scripts, norms, and schemas among 
which people shift‟ (DiMaggio, 1994:39). Snook has argued (2000) that organisational 
actors shift between two fundamental logics of action: task-based and rules-based. 
When following a task-based logic of action, actors are guided by the need to complete 
a task at hand. This contrasts with the rules-based logic of letting policies and 
procedures guide action. If we synthesise these arguments in relation to multinational 
companies, it would appear that the deductive nature of strategy making at headquarters 
(the centre) is closer to a rules-based logic while the inductive strategy making in 
subsidiaries (the periphery) gravitate towards a task-based logic. This argument is 
further strengthened by reference to the integration-responsiveness discussion. In order 
to achieve integration, it makes perfect sense for headquarters to follow a deductive 
process based on analysis across multiple markets and subsidiaries. A reductionist rules-
based strategy logic has the advantage of allowing managers at headquarters to make 
sense out of a complex combination of markets and subsidiaries. In contrast, the 
inductive strategy logic that Regnér (2003) found in the periphery, makes perfect sense 
from a subsidiary perspective given the presence of a range of idiosyncratic pressures 
for local market responsiveness. As subsidiaries are operational units, a task-based logic 
is practical given the need to respond to a particular operating environment.  
 
Following from the above discussion, we gain further insight into the differences of 
strategy logic if we introduce the concept of loose coupling (Weick, 1976). Weick 
(1979) has argued that „[l]oose coupling occurs either when two separate systems have 
few variables in common or when common variables are weak compared to the other 
variables that influence the system. Two systems that are joined by few common 
variables or weak common variables are said to be loosely coupled. What loose 
coupling means practically is that if one of the variables is disturbed, the disturbance 
will tend to be limited rather than to ramify‟ (1979:111). Loose coupling is interesting 
in a multinational context given that subsidiaries can be viewed as loosely coupled from 
headquarters most of the time. This especially characterises multidomestic strategy 
 192 
configurations. In contrast, integration requires tighter coupling between the 
organisational units in the multinational. Responsiveness on the other hand, is 
dependent on loose coupling to allow subsidiary managers the operational freedom to 
respond to local conditions. 
 
If we try to synthesise the discussion above, we find that these different constructs 
combine together to shed further light on strategy making at headquarters and in 
subsidiaries. The deductive strategy making at headquarters is thus well suited for a 
„rules-based‟ logic of action and requires tight coupling to drive consistency and 
integration across the multinational. In contrast, we find that the inductive strategy logic 
in subsidiaries is correspondingly well suited to a „task-based‟ logic of action and 
requires loose coupling to allow subsidiary managers to be responsive to differences in 
local market conditions. These features are summarised in Table 9-1 below. 
 
Table 9-1 
Difference between headquarters and subsidiaries 
 Headquarters Subsidiaries 
Strategy making Deductive Inductive 
Logics of action Rules-based Task-based 
Priority given to Integration / Standardisation Responsiveness / Adaptation 
Desired coupling Tight Loose 
 
Practical action and practical drift 
 
I argue that Snook‟s (2000) constructs of practical action and practical drift can be used 
to shed further light on the non-compliant managerial behaviours revealed in the case 
studies. The concept of practical action is required to understand how practical drift 
occurs. Snook (2000) has defined practical action as „behavior that is locally efficient, 
acquired through practice, anchored in the logic of the task, and legitimized through 
unremarkable repetition‟ (2000:182). Snook has described how local procedures, over 
time, can become legitimate: „Anchored in the logic of the task, locally efficient 
procedures acquired through practice gain legitimacy through unremarkable repetition. 
If such emergent actions survive long enough without interfering with global interests, 
and if local procedures are successfully repeated without consequence, they stand a 
good chance of becoming accepted practice‟ (Snook, 2000:184). Thus, local practice 
can become legitimised and thus institutionalised over time provided that emergent 
local actions are allowed to continue over extended periods of time and that the 
consequences are not grave enough for someone to put an end to them. Practical action 
follows a task-based logic of doing „whatever it takes‟ to get the job done in a local 
operating environment. Snook (2000) argues that members in an organisation alternate 
back and forth between a rule-based and a task-based logic of action according to the 
context. However when „a disconnect between the real world constraints of everyday 
practice and those imposed by artificial, external dictated logic of action creates an 
inherently unstable situation. Instability generates pressures for change‟ (Snook, 
2000:192). Snook continues: „When the rules don‟t match, pragmatic individuals adjust 
their behavior accordingly; they act in ways that better align with their perceptions of 
current demands. In short, they break the rules‟ (2000:193). Snook (2000) has labelled 
this phenomenon practical drift which is defined as „the slow, steady uncoupling of 
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local practice from written procedure‟ (2000:194). In this context, subsidiary managers 
may break „global‟ rules imposed by headquarters when they perceive that „local‟ 
circumstances demand it.  
 
A key driver behind practical drift is the constant and often ever increasing 
requirements for efficiency in local operations. Meyer and Rowan (1977) have argued 
that „conflicts between categorical rules and efficiency arise because institutional rules 
are couched at high levels of generalization (Durkheim, 1933) whereas technical 
activities vary with specific, unstandardized, and possibly unique conditions. Because 
standardized ceremonial categories must confront technical variations and anomalies, 
the generalized rules of the institutional environment are often inappropriate to specific 
situations‟ (1977:355). Over time, there is thus typically a growing discrepancy between 
the optimal functioning of the organisation and the demands for efficiency. 
Alternatively, the sheer magnitude of rules, policies or guidelines is simply too difficult 
to follow when in the field. When small incremental deviations meet no resistance, they 
are reinforced and eventually institutionalised (Snook, 2000). 
 
As most organisational subsystems are loosely coupled, there is typically limited danger 
in practical drift. However, most rules exist for a reason and „[t]he organizational 
challenge arises precisely because, as each uneventful day passes in a loosely coupled 
world, it becomes increasingly difficult to demonstrate the integrative benefits of global 
standardization over the practical benefits of local adaptation. Hence, the behavioral 
balance tips in the direction of local adaptation at the expense of global 
synchronization‟ (Snook, 2000:196) 
 
The impact of this is a growing discrepancy between local practical action and global 
written rules (Snook, 2000:196). The result is described by Snook (2000): „[t]he net 
effect of this practical drift is a general loosening of globally defined rationality. Gone 
is the tightly logical and synchronized rationale that governed system design and rule 
production at birth. In its place are multiple incrementally emergent sets of procedures, 
each born out of unique subunit logics grounded in the separate day-to-day pragmatics 
of loosely coupled worlds‟ (2000:197). The danger is of course what happens when the 
loosely coupled everyday reality is replaced by instances of tight coupling between the 
unit making the rules, typically the headquarters, and the field unit responsible for 
action, typically the subsidiary. When units become more tightly coupled, there is a 
much higher probability that the rules, that have been broken, were needed to avoid 
some negative consequence. I argue that this is not an exclusive characteristic of high 
profile disasters in highly reliable organisations, such as the one researched by Snook 
(2000), but also something that can be unveiled under much less dramatic 
circumstances. A mundane example would be when a telecoms operator has mandated 
requirements for the design of billing systems. There are typically very good local 
reasons for deviating from such changes, especially if there are costly changes to legacy 
systems and no immediate benefits of following the rules from headquarters. Another 
example would be when a series of locally-efficient incremental modifications alters the 
original specifications. In a loosely-coupled world, these changes do typically not have 
an immediate impact. However, problems will arise when the multinational has sold a 
similar tariff plan to a multinational customer and discovers that it cannot be 
implemented across subsidiaries as the uniform standard no longer exists at the 
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subsidiary level. We then have an instance of sudden tight coupling where practical drift 
has significant consequences at the corporate level. 
 
The performance impact of practical drift is difficult to untangle ex-ante as practical 
drift may have both positive and negative consequences depending on the context in 
which it occurs. It is also possible that practical drift may have a positive local effect 
while a negative impact for the multinational as a whole. Unfortunately it is often not 
possible to distinguish the effect until ex post, and sometimes not even then due to 
causal ambiguity. An interesting situation could occur if there is a substantial difference 
in interpretation between managers at headquarters and in the subsidiaries. Subsidiary 
managers may feel that headquarter managers are misinterpreting the market place and 
that their deliberate strategy, manifested through centrally mandated initiatives and 
policies, in fact represent strategic drift (Johnson, 1988) making the company less 
responsive to the local operating environment the subsidiary is facing. When subsidiary 
managers then adapt or resist policies or initiatives originating from the corporate centre 
to fit their local operating environment, headquarters may see that as practical drift in a 
pathological sense.  
 
Given the inherent complexity of managing global integration in large multinationals, 
question marks can be raised regarding the extent to which tensions can ever be 
managed away in a rational manner. De-coupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) as a result of 
practical actions at the subsidiary level may thus constitute vital survival skills for 
subsidiary managers in multinationals when confronted with irreconcilable demands for 
global integration and local responsiveness. In the language of Brunsson (1985; 1989), 
subsidiary management may thus on occasions use „hypocrisy‟ and de-couple talk, 
decisions and action to manage competing demands and keep the subsidiary 
functioning. 
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10 MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
This chapter outlines the managerial implications of the dissertation.  
 
10.1 Managing integration at headquarters 
 
Figure 10-1 below summarises the implications for managers at headquarters based on 
the findings of this research. The details of the model are discussed in the following 
sections. This section thus seeks to develop actionable knowledge (Argyris, 1996), for 
use by management practitioners, in the form of design propositions (Romme, 2003) 
and solutions concepts (van Aken, 2005). The recommendations presented below 
should not be viewed as an exact science but rather as a design exemplar which „means 
that practitioners do not have to design a solution for their problem from scratch, as 
would be the case for a totally novel situation, but that the design assignment consists of 
choosing the right solution concept and then designing a specific variant of the solution 
concept to suit the specific situation‟ (van Aken, 2005:23). These recommendations 
may thus help practitioners to craft strategies (Mintzberg, 1987) of relevance to their 
own integration challenges. 
 
Figure 10-1 
Managing integration at headquarters 
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10.1.1 Integration decision making 
 
This section presents the findings regarding decision-making in relation to integration. 
 
Appoint and involve the right people 
 
Respondents in the two Orange cases discussed the need to ensure that operational 
people were involved in the decision-making process. The purpose of this was to inject 
an element of realism into the planning of integration initiatives by taking local 
implementation requirements into consideration. This can be achieved both by 
appointing ex-operational people to headquarters and by involving subsidiary managers 
during the decision-making process. 
 
The interviewed managers in the two 3 cases and in Vodafone China talked about the 
need for headquarter managers to build up in-depth local market knowledge. Close 
engagement with subsidiaries and study of the local operating environments prevent 
headquarters managers from becoming isolated in corporate ivory towers. 
 
Prepare analysis 
 
There was widespread discussion across the cases about the need to anchor integration 
decisions in thorough analysis rather than to just rush ahead with integration. This 
included in-depth analysis and benchmarking of the local operations. A number of 
respondents also discussed the need to study local market conditions to determine 
similarities and differences between countries. The guiding logic is that substantial 
business and market differences make it more difficult to integrate. A number of 
variables were mentioned including similarities in customer needs, market development 
stage, company development stage and media channels. Such analysis was seen as 
making it easier to deflect parochial criticism that every market is too unique to be 
integrated. 
 
Develop strategy 
 
Respondents discussed the need to be clear about the purpose and benefits of 
integration. This included having a clear vision for the company and how integration 
would contribute towards realising the envisaged future. Some respondents noted that it 
was important to see that integration was driven by business rationale rather than power 
ambitions of managers at headquarters. Following from this, it was argued that 
consistent objectives needed to be established that aligned long-term ambitions with 
short-term budgets and resources. This included realistic expectations of overall 
subsidiary performance and the contribution of integration initiatives in a local context. 
Funding considerations thus have to be addressed at an early stage to avoid a too large 
discrepancy between ambition and means. 
 
Integration was seen as easier to achieve if companies had a similar market position and 
targeted the same market segments. Given this a number of the interviewed managers 
talked about the potential to cluster similar countries together to achieve integration 
rather than simply apply a „one size fits all‟ strategy across the board. 
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The need to focus on what really mattered was also discussed given some negative 
experiences with ever expanding integration efforts as well as focus on what was 
perceived as niche areas of limited value. In addition, respondents in the two Orange 
cases discussed the potential to develop a modular approach based on a minimum core, 
consistent across all countries, and then further modules that were applied to 
subsidiaries with more similar circumstances. This would thus allow for a differentiated 
approach. 
 
One respondent in the 3 Denmark case also touched upon a pragmatic approach based 
on applying shared principles rather than standardising the exact content across markets. 
Thus while the output might not be exactly the same it could still be based on following 
the same underlying principles or processes. 
 
It was further considered important to develop a flexible strategy that provided „freedom 
within guidelines‟ rather than to impose a rigid strategy from above. This was seen as 
safe-guarding the need for alignment within the multinational without tying subsidiary 
managers‟ hands behind their backs or stifling entrepreneurship or creativity. 
 
10.1.2 Integration execution 
 
The five case studies also generated insights into the execution of integration decisions. 
 
Manage resources 
 
Managers in the two Orange cases talked about the need to align corporate ambitions 
and resources at the subsidiary level due to the many conflicts experienced between 
long-term integration goals and short-term budgetary constraints. It was proposed that 
the budget and target setting process for subsidiaries needed to be integrated with 
strategy making and integration at corporate headquarters to prevent similar disconnects 
from occurring.  The need for dedicated working groups was also stressed to ensure that 
people were allocated to drive initiatives forward. 
 
The establishment of various prioritisation forums was discussed to ensure that 
resources could be allocated to local and global priorities and that resource conflicts 
between the two could be resolved. 
 
Managers in the Orange case studies talked about the benefits of implementing 
integration efforts in stages rather than in one giant project. This allowed for gradual 
learning and modifications along the implementation path. It was also seen as providing 
proof that integration worked which generated a positive atmosphere. Managers in the 
two Orange subsidiaries and in 3 Sweden also discussed the importance of avoiding 
pendulum swings between local and global as that created a „stop-and-go‟ feeling in the 
subsidiary and made resource planning difficult. 
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Manage structure 
 
Given the risk of competing demands for resources from local and global projects, the 
need for a clear and working governance structure was discussed. This appears to have 
been a problem especially in 3 Denmark where many subsidiary managers felt that 
Denmark was being ignored by the shared services organisation. The topic was also 
discussed at Vodafone in China given the complexity to manage joint projects across 
Vodafone and China Mobile. 
 
The benefits of aligning business processes was discussed given that processes drive the 
design of systems and has organisational impacts. Thus, if processes could be aligned, 
there was greater potential to achieve cross-border integration. 
 
Integration also requires coordination between different organisational entities in the 
multinational. Respondents thus argued that there needs to be some efforts to align the 
organisation structures between subsidiaries or to at least determine interfaces. 
 
One respondent in the Orange Denmark case argued that ownership control of 
subsidiaries made it much easier to realise integration plans. In the case of Orange 
Denmark, minority shareholders had previously blocked cross-border integration 
efforts. 
 
Managers in the two 3 cases discussed the need to blueprint an overall operating model 
for the multinational so that it was clear what organisational units were responsible for 
what and how processes worked between headquarters and subsidiaries. 
 
There were also some discussions in the Orange Sweden and Vodafone China cases 
about the benefits of de-layering headquarters to limit bureaucracy and provide swift 
decision-making. 
 
Managers in the two 3 cases talked about the need to improve knowledge sharing 
structures to facilitate cross-border learning. There appears to have been an almost 
complete lack of structural support for integration within 3 given the ad hoc approach 
taken to integration. 
 
Manage people 
 
The people dimension was considered very important across the cases. In those cases 
were integration meant strategic change, it was proposed that new profiles needed to be 
compiled as business requirements might change substantially. The need to appoint 
strong managers, with credibility in the organisation as well as drive, was proposed to 
ensure that integration would move forward. The need to replace blockers was also 
discussed in the 3 Sweden case. Given that integration might mean significant strategic 
change, it was considered essential to be aware of and manage situations where roles 
would be substantially re-defined as a result of integration. This was seen as especially 
important in cases where subsidiary managers‟ autonomy was curtailed. 
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The need to ensure top management commitment was also discussed. It appears to have 
been especially important in high power distance cultures such as Romania and China 
judging from the case findings.  
 
A consistent theme across all case studies was the request for managers at headquarters 
to adopt a consultative approach and to „sell integration‟ to subsidiary managers. 
However, managers in the two Orange cases and in 3 Sweden also stated that it was 
important to make it clear that integration „will happen‟ and what was being discussed 
was the details around implementation rather than the overall strategic direction. Such 
efforts of sensegiving (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) might be especially important when 
integration means substantial change. 
 
The need for constant communication was stressed across all five case studies. 
Managers at Vodafone China and 3 Sweden advocated getting people together face to 
face rather than relying on more impersonal means of communications such as e-mails. 
This helped to defuse tense situations where the firing off of e-mails could aggravate the 
situation. 
 
It was also seen as important to treat people well in other parts of the organisation. 
Judging from the tensions created by perceptions of unfair process, it would appear that 
this trivial sounding point needs emphasising. As an example, managers at Vodafone in 
China made special efforts to acknowledge integration efforts made by parties 
contributing to joint projects. The need to build and maintain trust was also discussed 
across the two 3 case studies and in Vodafone China. This included an open corporate 
culture were mistakes were accepted provided that learning was generated. In addition, 
respondents in the two Orange cases discussed the need to treat all nationalities in an 
equal manner given a widespread perception that France Telecom had favoured French 
nationals. This was even described by one respondent as „ethnic cleansing‟. 
 
Integration was seen as easier to achieve if there was a global mindset and at least some 
level of cultural integration within the multinational. It was also considered important to 
encourage knowledge sharing between different organisational units. Both cultural 
integration and knowledge sharing was seen as facilitated by transferring people around 
as well as meeting on business trips. Some respondents talked about the need to create a 
subsidiary „pull‟ for integration in order to let the companies grow together rather than 
integration only being perceived as a „push‟ from headquarters. 
 
Manage delivery 
 
Strong delivery management was emphasised in the two Orange cases and 3 Denmark. 
This included involving key stakeholders and a consistent approach throughout the 
process. 
 
There was some discussion in the Orange Romania case about the need to not skip 
phases in the implementation and rush ahead without having done a proper job. There 
was also a discussion about the need to stick to the minimum core of what had been 
decided in the strategy rather than getting carried away in a ‟mission creep‟ fashion 
towards ever expanding integration. 
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The need for headquarters to follow-up on integration initiatives was stressed in the 3 
Denmark case where a start-up mood appear to have led to more things being initiated 
than followed through. Respondents in 3 Sweden and Orange Romania also talked 
about the importance of establishing and using feedback loops from subsidiaries into the 
corporate centre to modify integration initiatives and approaches when required. 
 
10.2 Managing integration in the multinational subsidiary 
 
This section presents the findings regarding how subsidiary managers balanced 
competing demand from global integration efforts and local requirements. The research 
identified four areas: 1) management of subsidiary priorities, 2) management of 
subsidiary structure, 3) management of interaction with headquarters, and 4) self-
management. 
 
 
Figure 10-2 
Managing integration in the subsidiary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.2.1 Manage subsidiary priorities 
 
The research identified the risk of multiple voices and conflicting objectives during the 
integration process. This was especially the situation for the two Orange case studies. 
Given this, it helps to decide an overall stance towards integration to know if the 
guiding star should be to maximise local performance or to follow any and all 
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As a baseline against which to discuss and prioritise Group initiatives, it would appear 
essential to have a credible strategy and plan in the local subsidiary. This also helps to 
identify areas where Group support could be helpful. 
 
10.2.2 Manage subsidiary structure 
 
The management of a number of structural components emerged from the five case 
studies. Some managers at Orange Denmark discussed the importance of creating an 
overall consolidated roadmap in the local subsidiary. Integration will mean that 
origination of initiatives will take place both within the subsidiary and at various units 
at headquarters. Given this, it is helpful to build up a consolidated roadmap of all 
initiatives with their contribution to the business and resource implications. A total 
overview provides a picture against which to make trade-offs and ultimately manage 
delivery. 
 
Cross-border integration typically means that the subsidiary will have a multitude of 
interfaces across different levels and in different functional areas at headquarter level 
and possibly with employees in other subsidiaries. Streamlining interfaces is essential to 
ensure control over who can commit the subsidiary to what level of participation. It also 
ensures that consistent information flows from the subsidiary to Group. This was 
discussed by managers at Orange Denmark, 3 Denmark and Vodafone China. 
 
Given that initiatives from both Group and the local subsidiary may compete for the 
same local resources, there needs to be a local prioritisation forum with an escalation 
channel to Group. The consolidated roadmap discussed above, is a useful tool for forum 
participants. 
 
As with streamlined interfaces, it is important the management team acts in unison 
versus Group to appear professional. 
 
10.2.3 Managing interaction with headquarters 
 
Managers across all case studies, apart from 3 Sweden, discussed the importance of 
becoming competent at arguing the local case to managers at headquarters. To argue 
with data that is perceived as objective, such as market research findings of high quality 
research, appears to give more credibility compared to arguing that something simply 
does not work in a local context without providing justification. 
 
There were discussions about the need to establish personal relationships with people at 
headquarters. This provides early insight into what happens at headquarters in addition 
to ensuring that the subsidiary‟s voice will be heard if required. 
 
All case studies showed that subsidiary managers felt that managers at headquarters had 
insufficient understanding of local market conditions. There is thus a need to 
continuously educate headquarters about the local situation. 
 
Signalling that you are on board builds up credibility and a good reputation for future 
situations when the subsidiary may need exemptions or modifications. 
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It was viewed as vital to be able to read the political landscape and use that input to help 
prioritise which of the Group initiatives and targets were most important when faced 
with conflicting demands. 
 
In cases where local resources fell far short of group ambitions, managers in the Orange 
Denmark case appear to have had some success in terms of requesting additional 
resources from headquarters to finance implementation of group initiatives. 
 
There was also some discussion regarding the need to develop an ability to compromise 
to arrive at outcomes that could be accepted by managers at both headquarters and in 
subsidiaries. 
 
Even small subsidiaries appear to be able to exercise significant leverage by being 
active participants in various Group forums that establish the rules of the game. In such 
forums, strong participants appear to be able to wield greater power than the size of 
their operation. 
 
From the case findings, it would also appear that gamesmanship might become 
inevitable in certain situations. Subsidiary managers might thus need to master 
manipulation for use in such circumstances when an open discussion is not possible. 
This includes a variety of different manipulation tactics such as asking for forgiveness 
rather than permission, creating confusion, complying on paper, delaying 
implementation, building subsidiary alliances and making deliverables contingent on 
Group. 
 
10.2.4 Self-Management 
 
A number of respondents noted that it could be very stressful to be torn between local 
and global priorities. The complexity of matrix-style reporting relationships, either 
implicit or explicit, in many cases meant that it was difficult to determine who was 
ultimately responsible for a particular issue. The ability to manage stress thus appears to 
be an important competence to not succumb to competing pressures. The respondents 
discussed different ways of achieving this. One approach was to consider the overall 
value creation potential in the local subsidiary as the ultimate goal. Other, less outcome 
oriented approaches, included simply limiting the hours worked or serving the person 
who shouted the loudest. 
 
Given the risk of conflicting objectives, and thus the potential of not being able to 
please everyone, some respondents commented that it helps to clarify who you work 
for. One respondent noted that the ultimate authority is the person in the organisation 
who can decide your destiny. 
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11 CONTRIBUTION AND LIMITATIONS 
 
This research programme was initiated due to a previous focus on integration from a 
macro perspective and thus a lack in our micro level understanding of how subsidiary 
managers balance pressures for integration and responsiveness. The research 
specifically focused on how subsidiary managers interpret and respond to cross-border 
integration efforts originating from the corporate headquarters when also confronted 
with substantial pressures for local responsiveness. The empirical material was collected 
by going inside five multinational subsidiaries in four countries to interview 35 
managers in order to better understand cross-border integration from their perspectives. 
Based on this research, we now know a lot more about what happens inside 
multinational subsidiaries and this knowledge can be used to guide management action. 
The core thesis resulting from this research is that subsidiary managers‟ perceptions and 
responses are central to the outcome of corporate integration efforts. Given this, 
managers at headquarters have critical roles to play as sensegivers and change deployers 
in order to influence the sensemaking and actions of subsidiary managers. 
 
This chapter begins by outlining the contribution to knowledge according to the 
framework developed by Boyer (1990) consisting of scholarship of discovery, 
scholarship of integration, scholarship of application and scholarship of teaching. 
 
The research could be labelled as „normal science‟ in Kuhn‟s (1962) terminology given 
that the existing paradigm relating to MNC strategy and headquarter-subsidiary 
relations has been extended rather than fundamentally reinvented. 
 
Following from the overview of the contribution of the dissertation, the chapter 
continues with a discussion of the limitations of the research and presents efforts made 
to disseminate the findings from the research programme. 
 
11.1 Scholarship of discovery 
 
Boyer‟s (1990) category of scholarship of discovery corresponds to what is commonly 
implied by the term academic research.  
 
This section will outline the contribution of the dissertation to the different literatures 
reviewed in Chapter 2 to illustrate how this research has moved the MNC strategy and 
management field forward. Figure 11-1 below summarises the key contributions of the 
dissertation by level of analysis in a format similar to Figure 2-3.  
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Figure 11-1 
Contribution by level of analysis 
 
Industry
Company
Headquarters/
Parent
Subsidiary/
Business Unit
Managers
Contributions to the MNC strategy and management literature
Further empirical support for the  importance of procedural justice in MNC context
Deep understanding of local-global tensions and managerial responses
Understanding of how MNC subsidiary managers cope with institutional duality
Empirical evidence of micro politics
Relevance of corporate parenting literature confirmed in MNC context
Practical drift and strategic drift imported into MNC literature
Built on autonomous strategic behaviour and subsidiary initiative through focus
on managerial non-compliance rather than entrepreneurship
Similarities with post-merger integration literature confirmed
Un-bundling of integration and contribution to strategy-structure debate
 
 
 
This dissertation has made the most significant contribution in the lower half of the 
figure in relation to a micro level perspective of integration. As noted in the literature 
review, we had a knowledge gap at this level of analysis as micro level cross-border 
integration issues have previously only been partly covered by the literatures on 
procedural justice in a headquarter-subsidiary context and the emerging field of MNC 
micro-politics. This research has specifically added an understanding of the causes of 
local-global tensions in multinational subsidiaries and managerial responses (as was 
illustrated in Figure 9-1). This model has identified five drivers that can trigger tensions 
in a subsidiary context. These drivers were 1) perceived misfit / strategic drift, 2) 
perceived lack of procedural justice, 3) perceived weak strategy execution, 4) perceived 
loss of personal control and 5) perceived cultural misunderstanding, based on a 
sensemaking perspective. This research has also outlined some contingent factors that 
influence what actions managers take to manage or cope with competing demands 
between local responsiveness and global integration. The managerial responses include 
a discussion regarding whether subsidiary managers are likely to comply, challenge or 
negotiate, manipulate or ignore integration efforts originating at the corporate 
headquarters. This includes rich examples of both overt and covert political behaviours 
in MNC subsidiaries. The research also uncovered some contingent factors that appear 
to influence these managerial responses at the subsidiary level.  
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This research thus provides further insights into how subsidiary managers cope with the 
challenges posed by operating in a context of institutional duality (Kostova & Roth, 
2002) as a result of simultaneously being embedded in both local and group 
environments. In extant literature we note that while the existence of institutional 
duality has been recognised, there have only been a limited number of studies which 
address managerial responses. One exception is the argument by Kostova and Roth 
(2002) regarding „ceremonial adoption‟ of headquarters‟ practices in MNC subsidiaries. 
This could be viewed as an example of MNC micro-politics (Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 
2006). Ceremonial adoption can be perceived as a coping mechanism when subsidiary 
managers are faced with conflicts between global categorical rules and the need to 
deliver local efficiencies (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). According to Kostova and Roth 
(2002) „when confronted with internal organizational pressure from their parent 
company to adopt a practice, foreign subsidiaries act as active agents and may adopt the 
practice to varying degrees‟ (2002:217) and „units from different institutional contexts 
may have different interpretations of the practice, leading in turn, to different responses. 
Those in more favourable environments will be better equipped to understand the 
practice and to adopt it in their units because they will view it as consistent with the 
local context‟ (2002:218). As suggested by Kostova and Roth (2002) „ceremonial 
adoption is likely to result from high uncertainty about a practice or a belief that it is not 
valuable combined with strong pressure to adopt the practice coming from the 
legitimating environment‟ (2002:220).  Ceremonial adoption can thus be viewed as an 
example of Brunsson‟s (1985; 1989), argument that managers de-couple talk, decisions 
and actions to manage competing demands. As evidenced by the high degree of political 
behaviour in the two researched Orange subsidiaries, the findings of this dissertation 
also lend further support to Eisenhardt and Bourgeois‟ (1988) conclusion that 
organisational politics is linked to centralised, rather than decentralised, decision 
making. This dissertation has provided further empirical support for the existence of 
ceremonial adoption in MNC subsidiaries. However, the dissertation has added a richer 
overview of managerial responses to institutional duality than those described by 
Kostova and Roth (2002). There are thus clear parallels to the five strategic responses to 
institutional pressures outlined by Oliver (1991): acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, 
defiance and manipulation. However, while Oliver‟s paper is conceptual in nature, this 
dissertation presents empirical evidence regarding managerial responses and contingent 
factors. The result is a more rounded view of subsidiary managers‟ actions and 
behaviours grounded in micro level empirical data.  
 
The dissertation also offers further support for the importance of procedural justice 
(Kim & Mauborgne, 1991; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993a; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993c) in a 
headquarter-subsidiary context. The absence of procedural justice appears to be more 
likely to lead to non-compliant managerial behavours at the subsidiary level. Following 
from this, we might thus expect a higher level of micro political behaviours, such as 
ceremonial adoption, if subsidiary managers do not feel that the integration has been 
fair. It is noteworthy that managers in all five subsidiaries expressed concerns regarding 
the fairness of the integration process and how they had been treated by managers at 
headquarters. 
 
Moving further up in Figure 11-1, the research found that cross-border integration can 
lead to similar tensions and frustrations at the subsidiary level, as discussed in the post-
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merger integration literature regarding managers in the acquired firm. This suggests that 
integration relating to both post-merger integration and cross-border integration share 
common features. Regarding the literature on strategic change, the dissertation has 
illustrated the frustrations experienced by the managers in the two Orange subsidiaries 
as they perceived a reduction in their level of personal control (Greenberger & Strasser, 
1986). The findings of this research thus provide further support for the relevance of 
personal control for changes to multinational strategy configurations. Personal control 
has previously been used in a headquarter-subsidiary context by Partington (1998). The 
research also provides additional support for Huy‟s (2002) argument that middle 
managers play vital roles in terms of maintaining continuity during times of significant 
strategic transition. 
 
At the middle level of analysis, we find the discussions regarding autonomous strategic 
behaviour (Burgelman, 1983b; Burgelman, 1983a), in the mainstream strategic 
management field, and of subsidiary initiative (Birkinshaw et al., 1998; Birkinshaw & 
Fry, 1998) in the international business field. This dissertation has clearly shown that 
subsidiary managers are active agents that are capable of having significant influence on 
corporate integration efforts. Figure 9-1, illustrates some of the factors that can 
contribute towards an outcome of either subsidiary alignment or subsidiary drift. This 
dissertation thus provides arguments, going beyond extant literature that link subsidiary 
managers‟ actions and agency with alignment or drift at the level of the MNC 
subsidiary unit. Whilst building on autonomous strategic behaviour and subsidiary 
initiative, this dissertation has added a richer understanding of both compliant and non-
compliant managerial behaviours. As we have seen, subsidiary managers‟ perceptions 
and actions are thus likely to have significant impact on the successful execution of 
corporate integration efforts. 
 
This research has also shown that the findings of the „corporate parenting‟ literature is 
highly relevant in an MNC context. This is especially the case regarding the potential 
for headquarters to destroy value in subsidiaries (Goold & Campbell, 2002; Goold et al., 
1998).  This finding does not come as a surprise but it is important to note that the 
corporate parenting discussion largely exists outside the literature on headquarters-
subsidiary relations in the international business field. This research has thus confirmed 
the relevance of this stream of research to an MNC context. 
 
In the middle of Figure 11-1 we find the theoretical arguments regarding practical drift 
and strategic drift. The research has indicated that Snook‟s (2000) theory of practical 
action and practical drift has a wider relevance than just disasters in high reliability 
organisations. This suggests that there is potential for these constructs to be used in a 
variety of different contexts beyond Snook‟s original application. The dissertation has 
also extended Johnson‟s (1988) construct of strategic drift by showing that subsidiary 
managers can perceive headquarters proactive integration decisions as strategic drift and 
they may then take mitigating actions. This might be the result of subsidiary managers 
responding according to their local schema. This suggests that strategic drift may be 
perceived differently depending on the location of the social actors and the context in 
which they are embedded. Given this, it would appear that managers at headquarters 
have critical roles to play as sensegivers (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991), especially when 
integration efforts mean significant change at the subsidiary level.  
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In addition, the research makes a theoretical contribution to our understanding of 
different strategy modes at headquarters and in subsidiaries. This is achieved by relating 
strategy making modes (Regnér, 2003), logics of action (Snook, 2000) and loose 
coupling (Weick, 1976) with the integration-responsiveness discussion (Prahalad & 
Doz, 1987; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). This contribution brings together theoretical 
constructs from different fields to provide a deeper understanding of differences in 
perspectives and behaviour of managers at headquarters and in subsidiaries. 
 
At the highest level of analysis (macro/meso), this dissertation makes a contribution to 
the literature on MNC strategy and structure by un-bundling cross-border integration. 
This was illustrated in Figure 2-1 in the literature review chapter by separating 
integration scope from integration type. Integration scope includes 1) internal: value 
chain activities, and 2) external: customer experience / marketing mix. Integration type 
includes 1) alignment consisting of integration as ongoing strategic coordination, and 2) 
change meaning integration as „one-off strategic change‟. As already discussed, this 
provides some insights into the debate regarding whether „structure follows strategy‟ or 
„strategy follows structure‟ (Burgelman, 1983b; Chandler, 1962). Managerial decisions 
to standardise marketing mix elements can result in the need for structural adjustments 
in order to integrate the value chain as a result of marketing mix standardisation. This 
would correspond to „structure follows strategy‟. However, decisions concerning value 
chain integration may necessitate a standardisation of the customer experience beyond 
what may have been contemplated initially. Such effects would instead correspond to 
„strategy follows structure‟. This interrelationship between decisions to standardise the 
customer experience and decisions to integrate value chain activities does not appear to 
have been explored sufficiently in extant literature. This un-bundling of integration 
allows the field of international business to contribute theoretical arguments back to 
mainstream strategic management. This is relevant as the field of international business 
might have become too much of an importer rather than an exporter of theoretical ideas 
in relation to core disciplines within the field of management studies. 
 
Knowledge about practice 
 
This dissertation also offers knowledge about management practice. It provides a rich 
account of what subsidiary managers actually do to reconcile competing demands for 
integration and responsiveness. There are thus parallels to Mintzberg‟s (1973; 1975) 
work in terms of trying to understand what actually happens inside the complex 
managerial world. The dissertation thus makes a contribution to the emerging 
perspective of strategy-as-practice (Chia, 2004; Jarzabkowski, 2004; Jarzabkowski, 
2005; Johnson et al., 2003; Whittington, 1996; Whittington, 2004). In this regard, it is 
worthwhile to notice that strategy-as-practice scholars are typically not letting 
multinational contexts take centre-stage for their studies with the noteworthy exception 
of Regnér (2003). This dissertation has thus contributed towards expanding the 
contextual arena for strategy-as-practice research. 
 
In addition, the dissertation provides insights into change and transformation in the 
mobile communications industry. In addition to the empirical research, this is illustrated 
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in the overview of the mobile communications industry and from archival research of 
mobile operators‟ annual reports. 
 
 
11.2 Scholarship of integration 
 
The dissertation has made a contribution towards integrating disparate fields within 
management studies. First, the literature review provided a broad overview of how 
different forms of „integration‟ and „coordination‟ have been used in extant research. 
This illustrated parallels across diverse literatures including MNC strategy, marketing 
standardisation, corporate parenting, post-merger integration, international joint 
ventures and strategic alliances, and strategic change. The outcome of this is a richer 
understanding of integration than what could have been achieved from within a single 
literature. This includes insights into integration rationales, challenges and capabilities. 
Second, following from the grounded analysis of the empirical findings, an attempt was 
made to re-connect with literature and develop a theory of the causes and consequences 
of tensions at the subsidiary level including contingent factors. The resulting model 
integrates literature from such diverse fields as strategic management (strategic drift), 
MNC strategy (procedural justice), practitioner oriented implementation literature 
(execution), organisational behaviour (personal control), cross-cultural studies (cultural 
differences) and organisation theory (logics of action, practical drift). The end product 
thus draws upon several bodies of knowledge rather than respecting the neat borders of 
theoretical disciplines. While this avenue is certainly open to potential criticism, 
Lawrence (1992) has advocated such problem-oriented research over conventional 
theory-oriented research. Finally, Table 3-1 in the methodology chapter provides an 
overview of different philosophical perspectives and illustrates points of agreement and 
disagreement between different research traditions. This synthesis of different research 
approaches could be useful beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
 
 
11.3 Scholarship of application 
 
Beyond addressing areas of interest to the academic community, this dissertation also 
yields insights of value to the practitioner community. First, the research has resulted in 
prescriptive models of integration for use by managers at both headquarters and in 
subsidiaries. These prescriptions are grounded in micro level data in contrast to much of 
the existing prescriptions relating to cross-border integration. These models will 
hopefully be able to convey at least some valuable insights to a practitioner audience but 
the prescriptions have to be applied with caution based on an understanding of the 
sending and receiving contexts (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Second, the prescriptive 
research findings have been applied in a consulting project with an international mobile 
operator who wishes to establish integrated operations on a regional basis. This 
provided confidence that the models and findings of this research programme are 
accessible to a wider audience of managers. This is viewed as important in light of 
Chia‟s (2004) critique that much strategy research speaks „in a language foreign to its 
application‟ (2004:33). In addition, Lawrence (1992) has commented that he considers 
the primary quality test of research to be whether or not it is used in practice. 
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Methodological approaches 
 
The dissertation has illustrated how the retroductive research strategy can be used from 
a constructivist realist perspective (Blaikie, 1993; Blaikie, 2000) to research strategic 
management at the subsidiary level. The realist focus on underlying structures or 
generative mechanisms and contingent factors has not made much impact in the fields 
of international business and strategic management.  The dissertation has also linked the 
constructivist realist perspective with grounded theory and illustrated how the two 
approaches can be combined. This research makes a minor methodological contribution 
by providing „proof-of-concept‟ for other researchers interesting in exploring the realist 
approach.  
 
11.4 Scholarship of teaching 
 
There have been some, but to date limited, opportunities to teach the findings from this 
research programme. This includes guest lecturing to students in the following three 
institutions: 
 
 Chinese University of Hong Kong (Executive MBA programme) 
 Cranfield School of Management (Full-time MBA programme) 
 Oman College of Banking & Financial Studies (Exec. Education programme) 
 
I hope that I will be able to continue to teach the next cohorts of managers about the 
challenges of cross-border integration. 
 
11.5 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
 
A key limitation of this dissertation is that all respondents were subsidiary managers. 
This was in line with the research design but needs to be acknowledged nevertheless 
given that it takes two to tango; integration requires action of managers at both 
headquarters and in subsidiaries. While the dissertation makes a contribution to 
knowledge by focusing explicitly on the subsidiary management perspective, the 
flipside of the coin is a „biased‟ account based exclusively on information from 
subsidiary respondents. An alternative research design could have interviewed managers 
both in subsidiaries and at headquarters level to identify similarities and differences in 
their schemas and explored possible perception gaps. 
 
Another limitation of this research relates to the reliance on respondents‟ retrospective 
accounts of integration and headquarters-subsidiary relations. My original intention had 
been to „catch reality in flight‟ (Pettigrew, 1990) and study cross-border integration as it 
unfolded in the case of Orange in Denmark. This avenue was closed when the business 
was sold to TeliaSonera in October 2004. Whilst I found a way to re-orient the research, 
I still believe that there would have been advantages with such a process-oriented study 
compared to the reliance here on respondents‟ retrospective, and therefore possibly 
biased, accounts. A future study could track specific integration initiatives over time, 
ideally from both headquarters and subsidiary perspectives. Alternatively, an action 
research approach could be utilised in order to co-create knowledge together with the 
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respondents (Eden & Huxham, 2002; Reason, 2001; Reason, 2006; Reason & McArdle, 
2004; Reason & Torbert, 2001). 
 
The dimensions used for theoretical sampling in this study did not focus specifically on 
successful and unsuccessful integration efforts. Further research could select „polar‟ 
cases of successful and unsuccessful integration attempts to try to understand the causes 
of success and failure. Such an approach might come closer to an Eisenhardt (1989b) or 
Yin (2003) positivist approach to case studies. 
 
The research was limited to the mobile communications industry. This industry could be 
classified as „high-velocity‟ (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988), as well as transnational 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989) or multifocal (Prahalad & Doz, 1987), which might have 
exacerbated the level of local-global tensions and thus affected the findings. Further 
studies could focus on how subsidiary managers respond to pressures for integration 
and responsiveness in a variety of different contexts. 
 
Drawing on Thorngate‟s (1976) and Weick‟s (1979) categories of accuracy, simplicity 
and generality used to categorise theoretical forms, Langley (1999) argues that 
grounded theory approaches are high in accuracy but correspondingly lower in 
simplicity and generality. Grounded theories thus stay relatively close to the original 
data which makes it harder to move from the particular to the general. Given that 
grounded theory has been used in this research programme, Langley‟s (1999) 
observation provides a high level overview of the strengths and shortcomings of the 
chosen approach. Alternative methodological approaches might yield additional 
insights. 
 
Generalisation of findings has always been a sensitive issue for all case based research. 
Hence, this issue needs to be addressed also regarding the findings generated from this 
research. In this regard, it is important to note that empirical generalisation in a 
conventional sense was not the aim of the research. The important question is thus not 
statistical generalisation but rather if the findings generated from this study could have 
relevance in contexts beyond the scope of the five researched subsidiaries. As the 
research is based on realist inquiry, I would argue that this might be the case. The 
essence of the realist approach is the focus on uncovering generative mechanisms and 
contingent factors to seek to explain events occurring in the actual or empirical domain. 
As a result, this research has identified a number of generative mechanisms that are 
assumed to be located in the „real domain‟. These „generative mechanisms endure, even 
when they are not acting, and they act in their normal way, even when the consequents 
of the law-like statements they establish are not realized due to countervailing forces or 
the operation of other intervening mechanisms‟ (Tsoukas, 1989:552). This means that 
generative mechanisms are „real‟ in the sense that they are capable of producing events 
in the actual and empirical domains but such events need not happen if they are not 
activated by contingent factors or countervailing factors or mechanisms intervene. For 
the realist researcher, uncovering such relationships is the essence of science.  
 
However, given that the inquiry has been based on an unconventional philosophical 
perspective, the dissertation also includes thick descriptions of the research settings to 
allow the reader to judge whether the results could be applicable to other similar 
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contexts (Balogun & Johnson, 2004). This will hopefully provide an element of comfort 
for readers not used to the logic of realism. In Yin‟s (2003) terminology, this means that 
the research will hopefully allow for an amount of analytic generalisation rather than 
statistical generalisation.  However, it is also important to remember Van Maanen‟s 
(1988) cautionary words that „[m]eanings are not permanently embedded by an author 
in the text at the moment of creation. They are woven from the symbolic capacity of a 
piece of writing and the social context of its reception‟ (1988:25). From this viewpoint, 
a limitation of the research is that the author can only control the sending context and 
not the receiving context (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
 
It could be argued that the trustworthiness of the inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) was 
increased as I was an „insider‟ in two of the researched subsidiaries and knew those 
respondents from my work. In addition, I had access to additional documentation in the 
two Orange subsidiaries in relation to both strategy and delivery roadmaps at group as 
well as local levels. However, there are possible sources of response bias that may have 
had an impact on the research. This is especially important to discuss in relation to the 
two Orange case studies. First, I was employed by the parent company of both 
subsidiaries and I knew all the respondents. As identified, I was thus an „insider‟ 
(Evered & Louis, 1981) which could have had both a positive and a negative effect on 
the answers provided. As an insider, I could get close to the data but it also meant that 
my ability to be naïve was limited (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). Second, a number of the 
respondents in the Danish case had already left or were in the process of leaving the 
company. Managers who had left the business may have had negative attitudes towards 
integration efforts that were stopped due to the sale of the business. This may, on the 
other hand, have resulted in more honest views of the integration efforts. Overall, I 
believe it was positive to combine inquiry from the inside with inquiry from the outside. 
The first two case studies, conducted from the inside, helped to sensitise me to the 
research topic and to contextual factors. This was very valuable for the following three 
case studies, conducted from the outside, given that I had a much more limited exposure 
to those research settings. 
 
11.6 Dissemination of research findings 
 
The findings from this research programme have been disseminated through several 
conference papers and one journal articleas detailed in Table 11-1 below.  
 
Table 11-1 
Conference papers and journal articles  
Conferences Paper Co-authors 
Academy of 
International 
Business 
(AIB) 2006, 
Beijing 
Un-bundling strategic integration in the 
multinational corporation 
 
Causes and consequences of practical drift in the 
multinational subsidiary 
Cliff Bowman 
 
 
Cliff Bowman and 
Véronique Ambrosini 
Academy of 
Management 
(AoM) 2006, 
Atlanta 
Marketing mix standardization in multinational 
corporations: A review of the evidence 
 
Challenges to cross-border integration: An 
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The paper together with Jon Billsberry is not directly related to the dissertation but 
inspiration for writing the paper came after having found that a significant proportion of 
interviewed subsidiary managers had experienced tensions relating to lack of procedural 
justice and fair treatment. 
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12 PERSONAL REFLECTIONS 
 
The long nature of a PhD journey offers ample time for reflection. In my case, reflection 
has been an integral part of my efforts given that I have worked in several multinational 
corporations at both headquarters and in subsidiaries. In particular, I worked for two of 
the five case companies while collecting the data. My research journey has thus been an 
opportunity to stand back from a busy managerial career to try and make sense of my 
own experience as well as to interpret the viewpoints of my respondents. With the 
benefit of hindsight, I should have been even more reflexive and used my deep 
involvement with the two Orange case studies for ethnographic work in the form of 
both extensive field notes and an auto-ethnography. I believe it was my prior 
indoctrination with positivist thinking that led me to ignore such opportunities for data 
collection. In fact, I have found it much harder than I had expected to break loose from 
the conceptual shackles of positivism. Terminology referring to prediction, 
generalisation, validity and reliability has infused academia and it is sometimes hard not 
to use such positivist language as the yardstick against which to measure other forms of 
scholarly endeavours. For me, this research programme has thus been a reflexive 
journey into a world I had previously only known as a manager. In addition, it has been 
an attempt to break free from the rather one-dimensional „scientific‟ world in which 
positivism represents the only valid form of knowledge generation. The opportunity to 
learn about the philosophy of science, including different ontological and 
epistemological assumptions, has thus been a valuable part of the doctorate and led me 
to appreciate intellectual pluralism. 
 
Besides the above, the part I value the most relates to a sense of being part of a 
community and contributing to a collective undertaking that transcends national and 
organisational borders. This is very different from working in a company where 
information is often jealously guarded within the firm rather than shared openly through 
conferences and publications. While working on this doctoral dissertation, I have in 
chronological order lived in Sweden, Denmark, Oman, Romania and Singapore. And 
yet, I have been „plugged‟ into the same community of scholars along the journey, read 
the same publications and submitted papers to the same conferences. The research 
community has also provided ample opportunities to engage in stimulating and 
rewarding discussions with faculty, fellow doctoral students and MBAs. 
 
Another inevitable part of a doctorate is that you take on a more humble attitude 
towards scholarly efforts. In the beginning of doctoral studies I remember how I, 
together with fellow doctoral students, frequently labelled most research published in 
top journals as being of low value. While I still believe that much of management 
research suffers from a clear lack of relevance, I have come to appreciate the beauty of 
academic writing as a result of learning how difficult it is to conduct and summarise 
research. In this regard, I am pleased that I have been able to present research findings 
from this dissertation to both a scholarly audience at leading conferences as well as to 
practitioner audiences at full-time and executive MBA programmes. 
 
Writing a dissertation was also challenging given the different shape and form 
compared to shorter, much more focused, academic papers destined for conferences and 
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journals. It took some time getting used to but afterwards I can conclude that it is a 
privilege to not be restricted to just 7,000-10,000 words; this is especially the case when 
presenting qualitative research. 
 
At the end of the dissertation, I must confess that I only ever know what my research 
was about after I had done it despite the pretence of rationality conveyed through the 
structure of the dissertation. As such, it thus echoes Weick‟s (1979) dictum of „how can 
I know what I think until I see what I say?‟ (1979:133) and Bateson‟s (1978) „an 
explorer can never know what he is exploring until after it has been explored‟ 
(1978:22). 
 
As final thoughts, it is my wish that the findings from this dissertation will ultimately 
help at least some practicing managers with the challenges of cross-border integration. 
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14 APPENDIX 
 
14.1 Comparison of different integration models 
 
 Centrally 
structured global 
integration 
Ad hoc global 
integration with 
regional 
operations 
Specific 
cooperation 
programmes 
Cases  Orange 
Denmark 
 Orange 
Romania 
 3 Sweden 
 3 Denmark 
 Vodafone 
China 
Global strategic 
control 
Tight covering 
many areas 
Loose apart from 
brand and 
purchasing 
Limited to specific 
cooperation areas 
only 
Global financial 
control 
Tight Tight N/A given small 
stake in China 
Mobile 
HQ ownership 
control 
Fully controlled 
(almost 100% 
ownership) 
Majority control 
(60% owned) 
Minority stake 
(3.27% owned) 
Size of central 
functions 
Very large Very small Very large 
Integrated core 
operations 
Limited Very high from 
shared services 
N/A 
Primary 
coordination 
mechanisms 
 Structural 
through central 
roadmaps and 
programme 
management 
 Expatriates 
 Personal 
through 
Hutchison CEO 
and informal 
links 
 No expatriates 
 Structural 
through 
Vodafone 
China team 
 Expatriates 
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14.2 Comparison of individual case studies 
 
 Orange 
Denmark 
Orange 
Romania 
3 
Denmark 
3  
Sweden 
Vodafone 
China
5
 
Country 
population
1
 
5.5 million 22.3 
million 
5.5 million 9.0 million 1.3 billion 
GDP/capita PPP 
adjusted
1
 
Developed 
USD 
34,600 
Developing 
USD 
8,200 
Developed 
USD 
34,600 
Developed 
USD 
29,800 
Developing 
USD 
6,800 
Corruption 
index
2
 
4 85 4 6 78 
Mobile market 
development 
Mature Rapid 
growth 
Mature Mature Early 
growth 
Owner origin French French Hong 
Kong 
Hong 
Kong 
UK 
Owner control 100% Above 95% 60% (40% 
Investor) 
60% (40% 
Investor) 
3.27% 
Power distance 
(country/owner)
3
 
Low (18) 
vs.  
High (68) 
High (90) 
vs. 
High (68) 
Low (18) 
vs.  
High (68) 
Low (31) 
vs.  
High (68) 
High (80) 
vs.  
Low (35) 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
(country/owner)
3
 
Low (23) 
vs.  
High (86) 
High (90) 
vs. 
High (86) 
Low (23) 
vs.  
Low (29) 
Low (29) 
vs.  
Low (29) 
Low (30) 
vs.  
Low (35) 
Individualism 
(country/owner)
3
 
High (74) 
vs.  
High (71) 
Low (30) 
vs. 
High (71) 
High (74) 
vs.  
Low (25) 
High (71) 
vs. 
Low (25) 
Low (20) 
vs. 
High (89) 
Masculinity 
(country/owner)
3
 
Low (16) 
vs.  
Mid (43) 
Mid (42) 
vs. 
Mid (43) 
Low (16) 
vs.  
High (57) 
Low (5) 
vs. 
High (57) 
High (66) 
vs. 
High (66) 
Market position Challenger Leader Challenger Challenger Leader 
Market share 14% 51% 2.5% 5% 65% 
Competitive 
intensity
4
 
High 
(HH Index 
= 2,200) 
Low 
(HH Index 
= 4,700) 
High 
(HH Index 
= 2,700) 
Medium 
(HH Index 
= 3,600) 
Low 
(HH Index 
= 5,450) 
Customer base Small 
750,000 
Medium 
Almost 7 
million 
Small 
137,000 
Small 
400,000 
Very large 
>270 
million 
Bargaining 
power vs 
headquarters 
Low High Low Medium High 
Notes: 1) CIA World Factbook, 2) www.transparency.org for 2005 report on corruption perception where 
the least corrupt country is ranked as number 1, 3) www.geert-hofstede.com, 4) calculated based on 
company data and regulator statistics, 5) data refers to China Mobile rather than Vodafone‟s office 
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14.3 Coding tables 
 
Table 14-1 
Integration Rationale 
 
 
 Orange 
Denmark 
Orange 
Romania 
3  
Denmark 
3  
Sweden 
Vodafone 
China 
Overall 
Cost reduction n/a 9 
(100%) 
6 
(100%) 
3 
(50%) 
1 
(50%) 
19 
(54%) 
Secure HQ control n/a 2 
(22%) 
0 0 1 
(50%) 
3 
(9%) 
Sharing best 
practices 
n/a 6 
(67%) 
1 
(17%) 
2 
(33%) 
1 
(50%) 
10 
(29%) 
Gain market 
advantage 
n/a 7 
(78%) 
0 1 
(17%) 
1 
(50%) 
9 
(26%) 
Leverage combined 
scale 
n/a 0 0 0 1 
(50%) 
1 
(3%) 
Strategic-defensive n/a 0 0 0 1 
(50%) 
1 
(3%) 
Table 14-2 
Causes of Tensions 
 Orange 
Denmark 
Orange 
Romania 
3  
Denmark 
3  
Sweden 
Vodafone 
China 
Overall 
Content: Perceived misfit  10 
(83%) 
8 
(89%) 
4 
(67%) 
3 
(50%) 
1 
(50%) 
26 
(74%) 
Underlying market differences 5 
(42%) 
8 
(89%) 
3 
(50%) 
3 
(50%) 
1 
(50%) 
20 
(57%) 
Negative or marginal benefits 4 
(33%) 
4 
(44%) 
0 0 1 
(50%) 
9 
(26%) 
Different strategy or positioning 3 
(25%) 
1 
(11%) 
0 0 1 
(50%) 
5 
(14%) 
Legacy set-up 4 
(33%) 
1 
(11%) 
1 
(17%) 
0 0 6 
(17%) 
Misfit of integration partner 0 2 
(22%) 
0 0 0 2 
(6%) 
       
Process: Perceived lack of fair 
process 
12 
(100%) 
8 
(89%) 
6 
(100%) 
5 
(83%) 
2 
(100%) 
33 
(94%) 
Lack of fair treatment 10 
(83%) 
5 
(56%) 
4 
(67%) 
2 
(33%) 
0 21 
(60%) 
Lack of HQ understanding 7 
(58%) 
4 
(44%) 
5 
(83%) 
3 
(50%) 
2 
(100%) 
21 
(60%) 
Integration not „sold‟ to subsidiary 5 
(42%) 
5 
(56%) 
2 
(33%) 
2 
(33%) 
0 14 
(40%) 
Lack of trust 2 
(17%) 
4 
(44%) 
0 0 1 
(50%) 
7 
(20%) 
HQ micro management 0 2 
(22%) 
3 
(50%) 
2 
(33%) 
1 
(50%) 
8 
(23%) 
Lack of governance 0 0 3 
(50%) 
0 0 3 
(9%) 
Perceived inequity 0 0 5 
(83%) 
3 
(50%) 
2 
(100%) 
10 
(29%) 
 Orange 
Denmark 
Orange 
Romania 
3  
Denmark 
3  
Sweden 
Vodafone 
China 
Overall 
Execution: Perceived weak 
execution 
12 
(100%) 
8 
(89%) 
5 
(83%) 
4 
(67%) 
2 
(100%) 
31 
(89%) 
Goal and resource conflicts 11 
(92%) 
8 
(89%) 
2 
(33%) 
1 
(17%) 
1 
(50%) 
23 
(66%) 
Increased bureaucracy 1 
(8%) 
3 
(33%) 
1 
(17%) 
0 
 
1 
(50%) 
6 
(17%) 
Lack of clear direction 10 
(83%) 
4 
(44%) 
3 
(50%) 
2 
(33%) 
0 19 
(54%) 
Inexperienced people at 
headquarters 
3 
(25%) 
3 
(33%) 
0 0 0 6 
(17%) 
Unclear roles and responsibilities 3 
(25%) 
0 2 
(33%) 
0 0 5 
(14%) 
Weak delivery of integration 
initiatives 
4 
(33%) 
5 
(55%) 
3 
(50%) 
1 
(17%) 
1 
(50%) 
14 
(40%) 
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 Orange 
Denmark 
Orange 
Romania 
3  
Denmark 
3  
Sweden 
Vodafone 
China 
Overall 
Autonomy: Perceived loss of local 
autonomy 
6 
(50%) 
6 
(67%) 
0 0 0 12 
(34%) 
Loss of local autonomy 6 
(50%) 
1 
(11%) 
0 0 0 7 
(20%) 
Reluctance to change 4 
(33%) 
5 
(56%) 
0 0 0 9 
(26%) 
       
Culture: Perceived cultural 
differences 
Orange 
Denmark 
Orange 
Romania 
3  
Denmark 
3  
Sweden 
Vodafone 
China 
Overall 
Cultural interaction style 3 
(25%) 
0 0 5 
(83%) 
2 
(100%) 
10 
(29%) 
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Table 14-3 
Consequences of tensions 
 Orange 
Denmark 
Orange 
Romania 
3  
Denmark 
3  
Sweden 
Vodafone 
China 
Overall 
Positive consequences 2 
(17%) 
5 
(56%) 
0 2 
(33%) 
0 9 
(26%) 
Getting new perspectives 1 
(8%) 
4 
(44%) 
0 0 0 5 
(14%) 
Knowledge sharing 1 
(8%) 
0 0 1 
(17%) 
0 2 
(6%) 
Improvements 0 3 
(33%) 
0 2 
(33%) 
0 5 
(14%) 
       
Negative consequences: Business 5 
(42%) 
8 
(89%) 
2 
(33%) 
0 0 15 
(43%) 
Crashed implementation 0 1 
(11%) 
0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
Losing control of local business 0 1 
(11%) 
1 
(17%) 
0 0 2 
(6%) 
Following a sub-optimal strategy 1 
(8%) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
Wasting resources 3 
(25%) 
3 
(33%) 
0 0 0 6 
(17%) 
Losing time to market 1 
(8%) 
3 
(33%) 
0 0 0 4 
(11%) 
Loss of sales 0 3 
(33%) 
1 
(17%) 
0 0 4 
(11%) 
Neglecting customers 0 4 
(44%) 
0 0 0 4 
(11%) 
       
Negative consequences: People 4 
(33%) 
4 
(44%) 
4 
(67%) 
2 
(33%) 
0 14 
(40%) 
Demotivation 1 
(8%) 
3 
(33%) 
2 
(33%) 
2 
(33%) 
0 8 
(23%) 
Frustration 4 
(33%) 
1 
(11%) 
3 
(50%) 
0 0 8 
(23%) 
Generating scepticism 1 
(8%) 
2 
(22%) 
0 0 0 3 
(9%) 
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Table 14-4 
Managing tensions: Gamesmanship 
 
 Orange 
Denmark 
Orange 
Romania 
3  
Denmark 
3  
Sweden 
Vodafone 
China 
Overall 
Gamesmanship 10 
(83%) 
7 
(78%) 
1 
(17%) 
0 0 18 
(51%) 
Ask for forgiveness 2 
(17%) 
0 1 
(17%) 
0 0 3 
(9%) 
Become politician 0 0 1 
(17%) 
0 0 1 
(3%) 
Break guidelines 1 
(8%) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
Build subsidiary alliances 2 
(17%) 
1 
(11%) 
0 0 0 3 
(9%) 
Comply on paper 2 
(17%) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(6%) 
Create confusion 1 
(8%) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
Delay implementation 4 
(33%) 
2 
(22%) 
0 0 0 6 
(17%) 
Economise the truth 0 1 
(11%) 
0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
Make deliverables contingent on HQ 1 
(8%) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
Overembrace some initiatives 2 
(17%) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(6%) 
Passive compliance 1 
(8%) 
2 
(22%) 
0 0 0 3 
(9%) 
Prioritise local demands 5 
(42%) 
4 
(44%) 
0 0 0 9 
(26%) 
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Table 14-5 
Managing tensions: Group/HQ interaction 
 
Table 14-6 
Managing tensions: Structure local organisation 
 Orange 
Denmark 
Orange 
Romania 
3  
Denmark 
3  
Sweden 
Vodafone 
China 
Overall 
Group/HQ interaction 12 
(100%) 
8 
(89%) 
4 
(67%) 
1 
(17%) 
2 
(100%) 
27 
(77%) 
Argue local case 2 
(17%) 
5 
(56%) 
3 
(50%) 
0 1 
(50%) 
11 
(31%) 
Be honest and straight with Group 2 
(17%) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(6%) 
Build personal networks 7 
(58%) 
1 
(11%) 
1 
(17%) 
0 0 9 
(26%) 
Compromise 1 
(8%) 
2 
(22%) 
0 0 0 3 
(9%) 
Educate HQ 0 0 0 0 2 
(100%) 
2 
(6%) 
Escalation 1 
(8%) 
2 
(22%) 
2 
(33%) 
0 0 5 
(14%) 
Fight back for prioritisation 1 
(8%) 
1 
(11%) 
1 
(17%) 
0 0 3 
(9%) 
Get people together face to face 0 0 1 
(17%) 
1 
(17%) 
0 2 
(6%) 
Get the right targets up front 1 
(8%) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
Influence the rules of the game 1 
(8%) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
Request additional resources 5 
(42%) 
0 0 0 0 5 
(14%) 
Signal compliance 4 
(33%) 
0 0 0 0 4 
(11%) 
Understand the political landscape 3 
(25%) 
0 0 0 0 3 
(9%) 
 Orange 
Denmark 
Orange 
Romania 
3  
Denmark 
3  
Sweden 
Vodafone 
China 
Overall 
Structure local organisation 7 
(58%) 
1 
(11%) 
3 
(50%) 
0 1 
(50%) 
12 
(34%) 
Create consolidated roadmap 5 
(42%) 
0 0 0 0 5 
(14%) 
Ensure united management team 2 
(17%) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(6%) 
Appoint good local people 0 0 1 
(17%) 
0 0 1 
(3%) 
Reprioritise 2 
(17%) 
1 
(11%) 
0 0 0 3 
(9%) 
Streamline interfaces 2 
(17%) 
0 3 
(50%) 
0 1 
(50%) 
6 
(17%) 
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Table 14-7 
Managing tensions: Get your priorities straight 
 
 
Table 14-8 
Managing tensions: Personal approach 
 
 Orange 
Denmark 
Orange 
Romania 
3  
Denmark 
3  
Sweden 
Vodafone 
China 
Overall 
Get your priorities straight 4 
(33%) 
2 
(22%) 
0 0 1 
(50%) 
7 
(20%) 
Decide on what matters most 3 
(25%) 
2 
(22%) 
0 0 0 5 
(14%) 
Decide who you work for 1 
(8%) 
0 0 0 1 
(50%) 
2 
(6%) 
 Orange 
Denmark 
Orange 
Romania 
3  
Denmark 
3  
Sweden 
Vodafone 
China 
Overall 
Personal approach 0 2 
(22%) 
0 0 0 2 
(6%) 
Serve the one who shouts the loudest 0 1 
(11%) 
0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
„Switch off‟ 0 2 
(22%) 
0 0 0 2 
(6%) 
Table 14-9 
How integration decisions should be made 
 Orange 
Denmark 
Orange 
Romania 
3  
Denmark 
3  
Sweden 
Vodafone 
China 
Overall 
Analysis 0 8 
(89%) 
5 
(83%) 
4 
(67%) 
1 
(50%) 
18 
(51%) 
Analyse and benchmark local 
operations 
0 7 
(78%) 
3 
(50%) 
1 
(17%) 
0 11 
(31%) 
Analyse customer needs 0 4 
(44%) 
3 
(50%) 
2 
(33%) 
0 9 
(26%) 
Analyse market development stage 0 4 
(44%) 
0 0 0 4 
(11%) 
Analyse market similarities 0 1 
(11%) 
2 
(33%) 
1 
(17%) 
0 4 
(11%) 
Avoid „not invented here‟ syndrome 0 0 2 
(33%) 
2 
(33%) 
0 4 
(11%) 
Make proper initial assessment 0 2 
(22%) 
3 
(50%) 
1 
(17%) 
1 
(50%) 
7 
(20%) 
       
Strategy 6 
(50%) 
9 
(100%) 
5 
(83%) 
3 
(50%) 
1 
(50%) 
24 
(69%) 
Agree funding up front 2 
(17%) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(6%) 
Align objectives 0 1 
(11%) 
0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
Be clear on integration benefits 0 4 
(44%) 
0 1 
(17%) 
0 5 
(14%) 
Cluster similar countries 0 2 
(22%) 
3 
(50%) 
0 0 5 
(14%) 
Adapt customer facing functions 1 
(8%) 
2 
(22%) 
3 
(50%) 
2 
(33%) 
0 8 
(23%) 
Define overall brand position 0 1 
(11%) 
1 
(17%) 
0 0 2 
(6%) 
Define minimum core 0 1 
(11%) 
0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
Find the right balance 2 
(17%) 
1 
(11%) 
0 1 
(17%) 
0 4 
(11%) 
Focus on common segments 0 1 
(11%) 
1 
(17%) 
0 0 2 
(6%) 
Focus on what matters most 1 
(8%) 
1 
(11%) 
1 
(17%) 
0 0 3 
(9%) 
Implement a modular approach 2 
(17%) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(6%) 
Let offer differences determine level 
of integration 
0 0 0 1 
(17%) 
0 1 
(3%) 
Implement principles rather than 
exact content 
0 0 1 
(17%) 
0 0 1 
(3%) 
Standardise IT systems 0 1 
(11%) 
1 
(17%) 
0 0 2 
(6%) 
Work towards a clear vision 1 
(8%) 
3 
(33%) 
1 
(17%) 
0 0 6 
(17%) 
  Orange 
Denmark 
Orange 
Romania 
3  
Denmark 
3  
Sweden 
Vodafone 
China 
Overall 
People 1 
(8%) 
3 
(33%) 
1 
(17%) 
2 
(33%) 
0 7 
(20%) 
Build local market knowledge at HQ   1 
(17%) 
2 
(33%) 
0 3 
(9%) 
Ensure operational people are 
involved in the integration process 
0 1 
(11%) 
0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
Get the right people 1 
(8%) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
       
Interaction 4 
(33%) 
6 
(67%) 
2 
(33%) 
3 
(50%) 
1 
(50%) 
16 
(46%) 
Be clear integration will happen 3 
(25%) 
2 
(22%) 
0 1 
(17%) 
0 6 
(17%) 
Consult and sell integration to 
subsidiary managers 
1 
(8%) 
6 
(67%) 
2 
(33%) 
3 
(50%) 
1 
(50%) 
13 
(37%) 
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Table 14-10 
How integration decisions should be implemented 
 
 Orange 
Denmark 
Orange 
Romania 
3  
Denmark 
3  
Sweden 
Vodafone 
China 
Overall 
Manage structure 3 
(25%) 
0 6 
(100%) 
5 
(83%) 
1 
(50%) 
15 
(43%) 
Align business processes 0 0 1 
(17%) 
1 
(17%) 
0 2 
(6%) 
Align subsidiary org. structures 2 
(17%) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(6%) 
Ensure control of subsidiaries 1 
(8%) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
Blueprint global operating model 0 0 3 
(50%) 
1 
(17%) 
0 4 
(11%) 
De-layer HQ 0 0 0 1 
(17%) 
1 
(50%) 
2 
(6%) 
Establish governance structure 0 0 4 
(67%) 
0 1 
(50%) 
5 
(14%) 
Establish knowledge sharing 
structure 
0 0 5 
(83%) 
3 
(50%) 
0 8 
(23%) 
 Orange 
Denmark 
Orange 
Romania 
3  
Denmark 
3  
Sweden 
Vodafone 
China 
Overall 
Manage people 3 
(25%) 
5 
(56%) 
2 
(33%) 
6 
(100%) 
2 
(100%) 
18 
(51%) 
Acknowledge integration efforts 0 0 0 0 1 
(50%) 
1 
(3%) 
Ensure cultural integration 0 0 0 1 
(17%) 
0 1 
(3%) 
Engage people 0 1 
(11%) 
0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
Get new people without legacy 0 0 0 1 
(17%) 
0 1 
(3%) 
Build a global mindset 1 
(8%) 
0 1 
(17%) 
2 
(33%) 
0 4 
(11%) 
Provide hands-on leadership 0 0 1 
(17%) 
6 
(100%) 
0 7 
(20%) 
Move people around 0 1 
(11%) 
0 0 1 
(50%) 
2 
(6%) 
Replace blockers 0 0 0 2 
(33%) 
0 2 
(6%) 
Review people profile required 2 
(17%) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(6%) 
Share ways of working 0 2 
(22%) 
1 
(17%) 
2 
(33%) 
0 5 
(14%) 
Get strong people to drive 
integration 
1 
(8%) 
0 1 
(17%) 
2 
(33%) 
0 4 
(11%) 
Secure top management 
commitment 
0 3 
(33%) 
0 0 1 
(50%) 
4 
(11%) 
Treat people well 0 0 0 1 
(17%) 
1 
(50%) 
2 
(6%) 
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 Orange 
Denmark 
Orange 
Romania 
3  
Denmark 
3  
Sweden 
Vodafone 
China 
Overall 
Manage objectives and resources 2 
(17%) 
3 
(33%) 
1 
(17%) 
0 0 6 
(17%) 
Avoid too many swings 0 1 
(11%) 
0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
Establish dedicated working groups 0 1 
(11%) 
0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
Ensure local prioritisation forum 0 1 
(11%) 
0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
Ensure local resources 1 
(8%) 
1 
(11%) 
0 0 0 2 
(6%) 
Implement in staged approach 1 
(8%) 
1 
(11%) 
0 0 0 2 
(6%) 
Measure performance at local level 0 0 1 
(17%) 
0 0 1 
(3%) 
 Orange 
Denmark 
Orange 
Romania 
3  
Denmark 
3  
Sweden 
Vodafone 
China 
Overall 
Manage interaction 0 6 
(67%) 
4 
(67%) 
4 
(67%) 
2 
(100%) 
16 
(46%) 
Accept mistakes in order to learn 0 2 
(22%) 
0 0 0 2 
(6%) 
Build trust 0 0 1 
(17%) 
1 
(17%) 
1 
(50%) 
3 
(9%) 
Don‟t suffocate entrepreneurship 0 0 0 1 
(17%) 
0 1 
(3%) 
Ensure HQ follow-up 0 0 1 
(17%) 
0 0 1 
(3%) 
Encourage people interaction rather 
than bureaucracy 
0 0 0 1 
(17%) 
0 1 
(3%) 
Establish strong communication 0 5 
(56%) 
1 
(17%) 
3 
(50%) 
1 
(50%) 
10 
(29%) 
Establish and use subsidiary 
feedback loop 
0 2 
(22%) 
1 
(17%) 
2 
(33%) 
0 5 
(14%) 
Use subtle control mechanisms 0 1 
(11%) 
0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
 Orange 
Denmark 
Orange 
Romania 
3  
Denmark 
3  
Sweden 
Vodafone 
China 
Overall 
Manage delivery 1 
(8%) 
7 
(78%) 
4 
(66%) 
0 1 
(50%) 
13 
(37%) 
Don‟t skip phases in process 0 1 
(11%) 
0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
Be consistent 0 0 2 
(33%) 
0 0 2 
(6%) 
Involve key stakeholders 0 0 1 
(17%) 
0 1 
(50%) 
2 
(6%) 
Stick to the minimum core 0 1 
(11%) 
0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
Ensure strong delivery management 1 
(8%) 
5 
(56%) 
1 
(17%) 
0 0 7 
(20%) 
  
Table 14-11 
Contextual variables affecting integration 
 
 
 Orange 
Denmark 
Orange 
Romania 
3  
Denmark 
3  
Sweden 
Vodafone 
China 
Overall 
Other       
Prevent unnecessary drift 0 0 0 2 
(33%) 
0 2 
(6%) 
Provide freedom within guidelines 0 1 
(11%) 
4 
(66%) 
5 
(83%) 
1 
(50%) 
11 
(31%) 
Achieve integration through 
independence 
0 0 0 2 
(33%) 
0 2 
(6%) 
 Orange 
Denmark 
Orange 
Romania 
3  
Denmark 
3  
Sweden 
Vodafone 
China 
Overall 
Service industry 1 
(8%) 
1 
(11%) 
0 0 0 2 
(6%) 
Legacy versus new  1 
(8%) 
1 
(11%) 
0 0 1 
(50%) 
3 
(9%) 
Subsidiary strength and size 2 
(17%) 
0 0 1 
(17%) 
0 3 
(9%) 
Having an expatriate as CEO 3 
(25%) 
0 0 0 0 3 
(9%) 
Transition period 3 
(25%) 
0 0 0 0 3 
(9%) 
Different culture 1 
(8%) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(2%) 
Long term future of the business 1 
(8%) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(3%) 
Subsidiary market position 2 
(17%) 
0 1 
(17%) 
1 
(17%) 
0 4 
(11%) 
Clearly valuable projects 0 0 0 1 
(17%) 
1 
(50%) 
2 
(6%) 
Projects championed by junior 
people 
1 
(8%) 
0 0 0 1 
(50%) 
2 
(6%) 
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14.4 Interview guide: Orange Denmark 
 
Opening questions: 
1. How common was it to experience competing demands between [Telco] Group 
global/regional integration initiatives and requirements for local market 
responsiveness? 
2. How did you feel about dealing with competing demands? 
3. What impact, if any, did competing demands have on how you managed your work? 
 
Specific questions if tension was established: 
4. In what areas of the business were the competing pressures the highest? 
5. If there was tension, what were the reasons behind the tension? 
6. Did you discuss the tension explicitly in the management team? In what way? 
7. What strategies/tactics did you use to manage/cope with tensions? [key question to 
spend considerable time on during the interview] 
8. What worked well/not so well? Why? 
9. Would you have done anything differently with hindsight? Why? 
10. What learning can you derive from your experience? 
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14.5 Interview guide: Orange Romania 
 
PART I – Marketing Mix Standardisation 
 
Marketing mix is defined to include elements of the customer experience such as brand 
name, product, offer structure, packaging, advertising, promotion, sales and distribution, 
customer service, warranties, web site and price. 
 
Standardisation is defined as standardising elements of the marketing mix, to at least 
some extent, across multiple markets. The opposite of standardisation would be total 
autonomy where the local subsidiaries would have complete freedom in relation to how 
to manage the elements of the marketing mix.  
 
WHAT to standardise? 
1. What elements of the marketing mix are standardised in your company? To what 
extent? 
2. What elements of the marketing mix do you think might be suitable versus not 
suitable for standardisation? – Why? 
 
WHY standardise? 
3. Why do you standardise elements of the marketing mix across subsidiaries in 
multiple markets and what outcomes are you seeking to achieve? 
 
WHEN to standardise? 
4. When does it make sense versus not sense to seek to standardise the marketing mix? 
What are the indicators? 
 
HOW to standardise? 
5. How does your company decide on what marketing mix elements to standardise? 
6. What information or tools assist in making good standardisation decisions? 
7. How should the strategic decision process be organised between headquarters and 
subsidiaries to ensure appropriate standardisation decisions? 
8. What are the key success factors versus „deal breakers‟ to ensure effective 
implementation of standardisation? 
9. What management processes or practices facilitate implementation of 
standardisation? 
10. If attempts to standardise aren‟t working properly, what are the problems that this 
causes? 
 
Other 
 
Anything else of importance we have not discussed in relation to standardisation?
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PART II – Value Chain Integration 
 
Integration of value chain activities 
 
The value chain is used to categorise a company‟s generic value adding activities. The 
first category consists of „primary activities‟ such as: inbound logistics, production, 
outbound logistics, sales and marketing and maintenance. The second category consists 
of „support activities‟ including administration, human resource management, R&D and 
procurement. 
 
Integration is defined as physical integration or strategic coordination of activities in 
the value chain across subsidiaries in multiple markets. The opposite of integration 
would be completely stand alone subsidiaries in every market with independent as well 
as complete stand alone value chains to serve the local market.  
 
WHAT to integrate? 
11. What activities in the value chain are integrated in your company? To what extent? 
12. What activities in the value chain do you think might be suitable versus not suitable 
for integration? – Why? 
 
WHY integrate? 
13. Why do you integrate activities in the value chain across subsidiaries in multiple 
markets and what outcomes are you seeking to achieve? 
 
WHEN to integrate? 
14. When does it make sense versus not sense to seek to integrate value chain activities? 
What are the indicators? 
 
HOW to integrate? 
15. How does your company decide on what value chain activities to integrate? 
16. What information or tools assist in making good integration decisions? 
17. How should the strategic decision process be organised between headquarters and 
subsidiaries to ensure appropriate decisions regarding value chain integration? 
18. What are the key success factors versus „deal breakers‟ to ensure effective 
implementation of value chain integration? 
19. What management processes or practices facilitate implementation of value chain 
integration? 
20. If attempts to integrate aren‟t working properly, what are the problems that this 
causes? 
 
Other 
 
21. Anything else of importance we have not discussed in relation to integration? 
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PART III – Relationship between Standardisation and Value Chain Integration 
 
Relationship between standardisation and value chain integration 
22. How would you describe the relationship between decisions to standardise 
marketing mix elements and decisions to integrate value chain activities? How do 
the decisions influence each other? 
23. Do you typically consider both aspects together in decision making or treat them as 
separate areas? 
What decisions are typically made first? 
 
PART IV – Balancing Local Responsiveness and Global Integration 
 
Responsiveness is defined as decisions taken autonomously by a subsidiary to respond 
primarily to local customer needs or competitive demands (Prahalad & Doz, 1987). 
 
Integration is defined as physical integration or strategic coordination of activities in 
the value chain across subsidiaries in multiple markets. The opposite of integration 
would be completely stand alone subsidiaries in every market with independent as well 
as complete stand alone value chains to serve the local market.  
 
Competing demands are defined as situations when there is a conflict, at least in the 
short run, between pursuing both „local‟  and „global/regional‟ requirements 
simultaneously. 
 
HOW common is tension? 
24. How common is it to experience competing demands between „local‟ and „global‟ 
requirements in your company? 
 
WHERE is tension created? 
25. In what functions in your company is the tension the highest? – Why? 
 
WHY is tension created? 
26. What are the underlying reasons causing tensions? 
27. What could have been done to avoid the creation of tension? 
 
WHAT is the impact of tension? 
28. What is the impact of tensions? 
 
HOW to manage tension? 
29. What strategies/tactics have you used to manage tensions or mitigate the effects of 
tensions?  
a. What worked well/not so well? Why? 
b. Would you have done anything differently with hindsight? Why? 
c. What learning can you derive from your experience? 
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Other 
 
30. Anything else of importance we have not discussed in relation to balancing local 
responsiveness and global integration? 
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14.6 Interview guide: 3 Denmark, 3 Sweden, Vodafone China 
 
PART I – Marketing Mix Standardisation & Value Chain Integration 
 
Marketing mix is defined to include elements of the customer experience such as brand 
name, product, offer structure, packaging, advertising, promotion, sales and distribution, 
customer service, warranties, web site and price. 
 
Standardisation is defined as standardising elements of the marketing mix, to at least 
some extent, across multiple markets. The opposite of standardisation would be total 
autonomy where the local subsidiaries would have complete freedom in relation to how 
to manage the elements of the marketing mix.  
 
The value chain is used to categorise a company‟s generic value adding activities. The 
first category consists of „primary activities‟ such as: inbound logistics, production, 
outbound logistics, sales and marketing and maintenance. The second category consists 
of „support activities‟ including administration, human resource management, R&D and 
procurement. 
 
Integration is defined as physical integration or strategic coordination of activities in 
the value chain across subsidiaries in multiple markets. The opposite of integration 
would be completely stand alone subsidiaries in every market with independent as well 
as complete stand alone value chains to serve the local market.  
 
WHAT to standardise and integrate? (have prompt card ready) 
1. What elements of the marketing mix are standardised in your company today? 
Do you feel that this is the appropriate level of standardisation? 
2. What activities in the value chain are integrated in your company today? 
Do you feel that this is the appropriate level of integration? 
3. Has the level of standardisation and integration been constant since the launch of 
operations or has there been any significant changes? 
 
WHY standardise/integrate? 
4. Why do you standardise marketing mix elements and integrate value chain 
activities? What outcomes are you seeking to achieve? 
 
WHEN to standardise/integrate? 
5. When does it make sense versus not sense to seek to standardise and integrate? 
What are the indicators? 
 
HOW to standardise/integrate? 
6. How does your company decide on what to standardise and integrate? 
7. What information or tools assist in making good standardisation and integration 
decisions by managers at headquarters? 
8. How should the strategic decision process be organised between headquarters and 
subsidiaries to ensure appropriate standardisation and integration decisions? 
9. What are the key success factors versus „deal breakers‟ to ensure effective 
implementation of standardisation and integration? 
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10. If attempts to standardise or integrate aren‟t working properly, what are the 
problems that this causes? 
 
OUTCOME of standardisation/integration 
11. When does headquarters „add value‟ with standardisation and integration? 
12. When does headquarters „destroy value‟ with standardisation and integration? 
13. What characterises headquarters as a „good parent‟ in relation to standardisation and 
integration? 
14. What characterises headquarters as a „bad parent‟ in relation to standardisation and 
integration? 
15. What factors influence how you respond to standardisation and integration 
initiatives? 
i. Comply 
ii. Challenge or negotiate 
iii. Manipulate 
iv. Ignore 
 
Other 
 
16. Anything else of importance we have not discussed in relation to standardisation 
and integration? 
 
PART II – Balancing Local Responsiveness and Global Integration 
 
Responsiveness is defined as decisions taken autonomously by a subsidiary to respond 
primarily to local customer needs or competitive demands (Prahalad & Doz, 1987). 
 
Integration is defined as physical integration or strategic coordination of activities in 
the value chain across subsidiaries in multiple markets. The opposite of integration 
would be completely stand alone subsidiaries in every market with independent as well 
as complete stand alone value chains to serve the local market.  
 
Competing demands are defined as situations when there is a conflict, at least in the 
short run, between pursuing both „local‟ and „global/regional‟ requirements 
simultaneously. 
 
HOW common is tension? 
17. How common is it to experience competing demands between „local‟ and „global‟ 
requirements in your company? 
 
WHERE is tension created? 
18. In what functions in your company is tension the highest? – Why? 
 
WHY is tension created? 
19. What are the underlying reasons causing tensions? 
20. What could have been done to avoid the creation of tension? 
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WHAT is the impact of tension? 
21. What is the impact of tensions? 
b. Business impact 
c. Personal impact 
 
HOW to manage tension? 
22. What strategies/tactics have you used to manage tensions or mitigate the effects of 
tensions?  
d. What worked well/not so well? Why? 
e. Would you have done anything differently with hindsight? Why? 
f. What learning can you derive from your experience? 
 
Other 
 
23. Anything else of importance we have not discussed in relation to balancing local 
responsiveness and global integration? 
 
 
14.7 Original Danish node structure 
 
Original Danish Node Structure 
 
NVivo revision 2.0.161 Licensee: Andreas 
 
Project: Orange Danmark User: Administrator Date: 4/15/2005 - 8:31:27 AM  
NODE LISTING 
 
 Nodes in Set: All Tree Nodes 
 Created: 3/30/2005 - 9:04:35 PM 
 Modified: 4/15/2005 - 8:26:34 AM 
 Number of Nodes: 130 
 
 1 (1) /Management 
 
 2 (1 3) /Management/Subsidiary Management 
 
 3 (1 3 11) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills 
 4 (1 3 11 2) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Get your priorities straight 
 5 (1 3 11 2 2) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Get your priorities straight/Prioritize business performance 
 6 (1 3 11 2 5) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Get your priorities straight/Pick the right fights 
 7 (1 3 11 2 13) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Get your priorities straight/Know who you work for 
 8 (1 3 11 6) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Know the dirty tricks 
 9 (1 3 11 6 1) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Know the dirty tricks/Forgiveness rather than permission 
 10 (1 3 11 6 3) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Know the dirty tricks/Comply on paper 
 11 (1 3 11 6 4) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Know the dirty tricks/Delay implementation 
 12 (1 3 11 6 11) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Know the dirty tricks/Play out group entities against each 
 13 (1 3 11 6 14) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Know the dirty tricks/Overembrace some projects 
 14 (1 3 11 6 15) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Know the dirty tricks/Claim we already have it 
 15 (1 3 11 6 19) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Know the dirty tricks/Make deliveries contingent on group 
 16 (1 3 11 6 20) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Know the dirty tricks/Leverage implementation knowledge 
 17 (1 3 11 7) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Demonstrate loyalty 
 18 (1 3 11 7 18) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Demonstrate loyalty/Show you are a good and loyal soldie 
 19 (1 3 11 8) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Build networks 
 20 (1 3 11 8 6) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Build networks/Networking and dialogue 
 21 (1 3 11 8 8) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Build networks/Subsidiary coalitions 
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 22 (1 3 11 8 17) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Build networks/Interface with Group at the right  2 
 23 (1 3 11 9) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Know the pitfalls 
 24 (1 3 11 9 6) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Know the pitfalls/Discussing too honestly 
 25 (1 3 11 9 9) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Know the pitfalls/Argue bottom line financials 
 26 (1 3 11 23) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Personal skills/Keep business sense 
 
 27 (1 3 13) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Organizational skills 
 28 (1 3 13 3) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Organizational skills/Influence the rules of the game 
 29 (1 3 13 3 9) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Organizational skills/Influence the rules of the game/Influence group governance 
 30 (1 3 13 5) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Organizational skills/Know your financials 
 31 (1 3 13 5 9) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Organizational skills/Know your financials/Importance of initial targets 
 32 (1 3 13 5 16) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Organizational skills/Know your financials/Request funding 
 33 (1 3 13 10) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Organizational skills/Argue with objective research data 
 34 (1 3 13 10 21) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Organizational skills/Argue with objective research data/Request market research and local te 
 35 (1 3 13 11) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Organizational skills/Parallel implementation organization 
 36 (1 3 13 12) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Organizational skills/Change skill sets 
 37 (1 3 13 24) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Organizational skills/Ensure your organization is in order 
 38 (1 3 13 24 2) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Organizational skills/Ensure your organization is in order/Get the right people 
 39 (1 3 13 24 2 1) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Organizational skills/Ensure your organization is in order/Get the right people/Experienced  
staff 
 40 (1 3 13 24 5) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Organizational skills/Ensure your organization is in order/Create consolidated roadmap 
 41 (1 3 13 24 10) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Organizational skills/Ensure your organization is in order/Streamline subsidiary interfaces 
 42 (1 3 13 24 11) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Organizational skills/Ensure your organization is in order/Get total overview fast 
 43 (1 3 13 24 12) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Organizational skills/Ensure your organization is in order/Ensure united management team 
 44 (1 3 13 24 22) /Management/Subsidiary Management/Organizational skills/Ensure your organization is in order/Justify exemptions 
 
 45 (1 4) /Management/Headquarter Management 
 
 46 (1 4 1) /Management/Headquarter Management/Vision and strategy 
 47 (1 4 1 6) /Management/Headquarter Management/Vision and strategy/Communicate strategy 
 
 48 (1 4 6) /Management/Headquarter Management/Organizational skills 
 49 (1 4 6 1) /Management/Headquarter Management/Organizational skills/Get the right people 
 50 (1 4 6 1 2) /Management/Headquarter Management/Organizational skills/Get the right people/Understand expats versus locals 
 51 (1 4 6 2) /Management/Headquarter Management/Organizational skills/Implementation roadmap 
 52 (1 4 6 2 1) /Management/Headquarter Management/Organizational skills/Implementation roadmap/Know what to standardise 
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 53 (1 4 6 2 3) /Management/Headquarter Management/Organizational skills/Implementation roadmap/Differentiate subsidiaries 
 54 (1 4 6 3) /Management/Headquarter Management/Organizational skills/Agree funding 
 55 (1 4 6 4) /Management/Headquarter Management/Organizational skills/Align structure 
 56 (1 4 6 5) /Management/Headquarter Management/Organizational skills/Set operating model 
 57 (1 4 6 7) /Management/Headquarter Management/Organizational skills/Need to own the subsidiaries 
 58 (1 4 6 8) /Management/Headquarter Management/Organizational skills/Develop mindset 
 59 (1 4 6 12) /Management/Headquarter Management/Organizational skills/Beware of pendular swings 
 
 60 (2) /Tensions 
 
 61 (2 1) /Tensions/Frequency 
 62 (2 1 6) /Tensions/Frequency/Frequency of tensions 
 63 (2 1 10) /Tensions/Frequency/Frequency of management discussions 
 
 64 (2 2) /Tensions/Impact 
 65 (2 2 1) /Tensions/Impact/Time and speed 
 66 (2 2 3) /Tensions/Impact/Loss of motivation 
 67 (2 2 4) /Tensions/Impact/Loss of focus 
 68 (2 2 4 8) /Tensions/Impact/Loss of focus/Reprioritisations 
 69 (2 2 5) /Tensions/Impact/Knowledge sharing 
 70 (2 2 6) /Tensions/Impact/Decrease efficiency 
 71 (2 2 6 10) /Tensions/Impact/Decrease efficiency/More admin resources required 
 72 (2 2 7) /Tensions/Impact/Lost local opportunities 
 73 (2 2 9) /Tensions/Impact/Needed to break guidelines 
 
 74 (2 5) /Tensions/Affected business functions 
 
 75 (2 7) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions 
 76 (2 7 1) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Poor organization 
 77 (2 7 1 1) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Poor organization/No overall forum for prioritization 
 78 (2 7 1 3) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Poor organization/Unclear roles and responsibilities 
 79 (2 7 1 5) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Poor organization/Multiple voices issuing direction 
 80 (2 7 1 10) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Poor organization/Unclear rules of the game 
 81 (2 7 1 20) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Poor organization/Lack of processes and governance 
 82 (2 7 1 21) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Poor organization/Going through a transition period 
 83 (2 7 1 24) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Poor organization/Dual reporting roles 
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 84 (2 7 1 26) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Poor organization/Unrealistic implementation plans 
 85 (2 7 1 27) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Poor organization/Lack of subsidiary differentiation 
 86 (2 7 1 32) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Poor organization/Poor information flows 
 87 (2 7 2) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Different conditions 
 88 (2 7 2 3) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Different conditions/Market differences 
 89 (2 7 2 3 9) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Different conditions/Market differences/Legislative differences 
 90 (2 7 2 3 14) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Different conditions/Market differences/Geographic complexity 
 91 (2 7 2 3 18) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Different conditions/Market differences/Cultural differences 
 92 (2 7 2 5) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Different conditions/Subsidiary differences 
 93 (2 7 2 5 1) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Different conditions/Subsidiary differences/Size 
 94 (2 7 2 5 15) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Different conditions/Subsidiary differences/Different heritage - legacy 
 95 (2 7 2 5 28) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Different conditions/Subsidiary differences/Resource availability 
 96 (2 7 4) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Lack of trust 
 97 (2 7 4 1) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Lack of trust/Financial underperformance 
 98 (2 7 4 2) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Lack of trust/Power games 
 99 (2 7 4 3) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Lack of trust/Unclear end game 
 100 (2 7 4 3 19) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Lack of trust/Unclear end game/Not seeing end game 
 101 (2 7 4 3 30) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Lack of trust/Unclear end game/End game not communicated to all 
 102 (2 7 4 8) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Lack of trust/Lack of subsidiary consultation 
 103 (2 7 4 23) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Lack of trust/Group non delivery 
 104 (2 7 10) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Competing goals 
 105 (2 7 10 11) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Competing goals/Different timeframes 
 106 (2 7 10 13) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Competing goals/Target inconsistency 
 107 (2 7 10 29) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Competing goals/Pursuing own agendas 
 108 (2 7 10 33) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Competing goals/Inflexible supplier framework agreem 
 109 (2 7 12) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Inflexible mindsets 
 110 (2 7 12 1) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Inflexible mindsets/Centralist mindset 
 111 (2 7 12 10) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Inflexible mindsets/Parochial attitudes 
 112 (2 7 13) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Redefined management roles 
 113 (2 7 13 17) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Redefined management roles/Management demotion 
 114 (2 7 14) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Lack of experienced people 
 115 (2 7 14 4) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Lack of experienced people/Lack of experience 
 116 (2 7 14 31) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Lack of experienced people/Lack of right people 
 117 (2 7 34) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Disagreement on direction 
 118 (2 7 34 1) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Disagreement on direction/Different prioritization 
 119 (2 7 34 6) /Tensions/Reasons for tensions/Disagreement on direction/CEO pet projects 
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 120 (2 8) /Tensions/Reactions to tensions 
 121 (2 8 2) /Tensions/Reactions to tensions/Personal reactions 
 122 (2 8 2 1) /Tensions/Reactions to tensions/Personal reactions/Not bothered 
 123 (2 8 2 2) /Tensions/Reactions to tensions/Personal reactions/Rational versus emotional 
 124 (2 8 2 6) /Tensions/Reactions to tensions/Personal reactions/Frustration 
 125 (2 8 2 7) /Tensions/Reactions to tensions/Personal reactions/Divided 
 126 (2 8 2 8) /Tensions/Reactions to tensions/Personal reactions/Resignation 
 127 (2 8 9) /Tensions/Reactions to tensions/Gradual acceptance 
 128 (2 8 9 1) /Tensions/Reactions to tensions/Gradual acceptance/Denial 
 129 (2 8 9 2) /Tensions/Reactions to tensions/Gradual acceptance/Passive compliance 
 130 (2 8 9 3) /Tensions/Reactions to tensions/Gradual acceptance/Genuine compliance  
 
 
14.8 Romanian node structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NVivo revision 2.0.161 Licensee: Andreas 
 
Project: Orange Romania User: Administrator Date: 4/1/2006 - 9:43:25 AM  
NODE LISTING 
 
 Nodes in Set: All Tree Nodes 
 Created: 3/29/2006 - 1:02:07 PM 
 Modified: 3/29/2006 - 1:02:07 PM 
 Number of Nodes: 208 
 
 1 (1) /Integration 
 2 (1 1) /Integration/Context Factors 
 3 (1 1 1) /Integration/Context Factors/Products versus services 
 4 (1 1 2) /Integration/Context Factors/Type of implementation 
 5 (1 1 3) /Integration/Context Factors/Legacy versus new 
 
 6 (1 2) /Integration/Affected Business Areas 
 7 (1 2 1) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Mix Elements 
 8 (1 2 1 1) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Mix Elements/Web 
 9 (1 2 1 2) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Mix Elements/Advertising 
 10 (1 2 1 3) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Mix Elements/Pricing 
 11 (1 2 1 4) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Mix Elements/Products and services 
 12 (1 2 1 5) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Mix Elements/Sales and distribution 
 13 (1 2 1 6) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Mix Elements/Customer service 
 14 (1 2 1 7) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Mix Elements/Promotions 
 15 (1 2 1 8) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Mix Elements/Brand 
 16 (1 2 1 9) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Mix Elements/Offer structure 
 17 (1 2 1 10) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Mix Elements/Network 
 18 (1 2 1 11) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Mix Elements/Packaging 
 19 (1 2 2) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Value Chain 
 20 (1 2 2 1) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Value Chain/HR 
 21 (1 2 2 2) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Value Chain/Finance 
 22 (1 2 2 3) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Value Chain/Procurement 
 23 (1 2 2 4) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Value Chain/Sales 
 24 (1 2 2 5) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Value Chain/Marketing 
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 25 (1 2 2 6) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Value Chain/Network and IT 
 26 (1 2 2 7) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Value Chain/Customer service 
 27 (1 2 2 8) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Value Chain/Logistics 
 28 (1 2 2 9) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Value Chain/Administration 
 29 (1 2 3) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Interrelationship 
 30 (1 2 3 1) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Interrelationship/Link between outside and inside 
 31 (1 2 3 2) /Integration/Affected Business Areas/Interrelationship/Treated separately 
 
 32 (1 4) /Integration/Integration Rationale 
 33 (1 4 1) /Integration/Integration Rationale/Cost reduction 
 34 (1 4 2) /Integration/Integration Rationale/HQ control 
 35 (1 4 3) /Integration/Integration Rationale/Share best practice 
 36 (1 4 6) /Integration/Integration Rationale/Employee Motivation 
 37 (1 4 9) /Integration/Integration Rationale/Market positioning advantage 
 38 (1 4 9 4) /Integration/Integration Rationale/Market positioning advantage/Standardised customer experience 
 39 (1 4 9 5) /Integration/Integration Rationale/Market positioning advantage/Promote Western image 
 40 (1 4 9 7) /Integration/Integration Rationale/Market positioning advantage/Selling to corporate customers 
 41 (1 4 9 8) /Integration/Integration Rationale/Market positioning advantage/Sustain global position 
 
 42 (1 5) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions 
 43 (1 5 1) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Interaction 
 44 (1 5 1 2) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Interaction/Consultative approach 
 45 (1 5 1 14) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Interaction/Be clear integration will happen 
 46 (1 5 1 18) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Interaction/Selling approach 
 47 (1 5 1 27) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Interaction/View from business owner perspective 
 48 (1 5 1 28) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Interaction/Create country pull effect 
 49 (1 5 2) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Strategy 
 50 (1 5 2 3) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Strategy/Customer facing functions 
 51 (1 5 2 4) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Strategy/Define minimum core 
 52 (1 5 2 6) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Strategy/Align objectives 
 53 (1 5 2 9) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Strategy/Be clear on integration benefits 
 54 (1 5 2 11) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Strategy/Cluster similar countries 
 55 (1 5 2 13) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Strategy/Work towards a clear vision 
 56 (1 5 2 21) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Strategy/Focus on what matters most 
 57 (1 5 2 23) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Strategy/Define brand position 
 58 (1 5 2 24) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Strategy/Focus on common segments 
 264 
 59 (1 5 2 25) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Strategy/Finding the right balance 
 60 (1 5 3) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/People 
 61 (1 5 3 5) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/People/Ensure operational people in process 
 62 (1 5 3 10) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/People/Move people around 
 63 (1 5 29) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Analysis 
 64 (1 5 29 1) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Analysis/Use of benchmarking 
 65 (1 5 29 2) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Analysis/Test with market research 
 66 (1 5 29 7) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Analysis/Analyse customer needs 
 67 (1 5 29 8) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Analysis/Standardise IT systems 
 68 (1 5 29 12) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Analysis/Analyse market development stage 
 69 (1 5 29 15) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Analysis/Analyse competitors 
 70 (1 5 29 16) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Analysis/Analyse resource requirements early 
 71 (1 5 29 17) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Analysis/Analyse local operations 
 72 (1 5 29 19) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Analysis/Evaluate customer benefit 
 73 (1 5 29 22) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Analysis/Make proper initial assessment 
 74 (1 5 29 26) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Analysis/Analyse market similarities 
 
 75 (1 6) /Integration/Implementing Integration 
 76 (1 6 3) /Integration/Implementing Integration/People 
 77 (1 6 3 2) /Integration/Implementing Integration/People/Share ways of working 
 78 (1 6 3 6) /Integration/Implementing Integration/People/Top management commitment 
 79 (1 6 3 7) /Integration/Implementing Integration/People/Engage people 
 80 (1 6 3 9) /Integration/Implementing Integration/People/Move people around 
 81 (1 6 5) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Interaction 
 82 (1 6 5 3) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Interaction/Use subsidiary feedback loop 
 83 (1 6 5 8) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Interaction/Accept mistakes to learn 
 84 (1 6 5 14) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Interaction/Strong communication 
 85 (1 6 5 19) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Interaction/Use subtle control mechanisms 
 86 (1 6 14) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Objectives and resources 
 87 (1 6 14 4) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Objectives and resources/Ensure local prioritisation 
 88 (1 6 14 10) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Objectives and resources/Ensure local resources 
 89 (1 6 14 11) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Objectives and resources/Consistency of objectives 
 90 (1 6 14 12) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Objectives and resources/Implement in stages 
 91 (1 6 14 16) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Objectives and resources/Avoid too many swings 
 92 (1 6 14 17) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Objectives and resources/Dedicated working group 
 93 (1 6 20) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Delivery management 
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 94 (1 6 20 1) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Delivery management/Stick to the minimum core 
 95 (1 6 20 5) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Delivery management/Strong delivery management 
 96 (1 6 20 15) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Delivery management/Don't skip phases 
 97 (1 6 20 18) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Delivery management/Strong change management 
 
 98 (1 7) /Integration/How Integration Decisions Are Actual 
 99 (1 7 1) /Integration/How Integration Decisions Are Actual/Who is making decisions 
 100 (1 7 2) /Integration/How Integration Decisions Are Actual/How decisions are made 
 
 101 (10) /Tensions 
 102 (10 1) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions 
 103 (10 1 1) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit 
 104 (10 1 1 3) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Negative or marginal local benefits 
 105 (10 1 1 3 4) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Negative or marginal local benefits/Group focused on niche areas 
 106 (10 1 1 3 6) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Negative or marginal local benefits/Marginal benefits 
 107 (10 1 1 3 8) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Negative or marginal local benefits/Negative results 
 108 (10 1 1 5) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Different strategy and positioning 
 109 (10 1 1 5 1) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Different strategy and positioning/Difference in target segments 
 110 (10 1 1 5 2) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Different strategy and positioning/Different sales & distribution 
 111 (10 1 1 9) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Misfit of integration partner 
 112 (10 1 1 12) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Underlying market differences 
 113 (10 1 1 12 3) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Underlying market differences/Fit with local competitive situation 
 114 (10 1 1 12 5) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Underlying market differences/Different HR markets 
 115 (10 1 1 12 7) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Underlying market differences/General market differences 
 116 (10 1 1 12 10) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Underlying market differences/Cultural differences 
 117 (10 1 1 12 11) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Underlying market differences/Changing market conditions 
 
 118 (10 1 2) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice 
 119 (10 1 2 1) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of HQ understanding 
 120 (10 1 2 1 11) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of HQ understanding/Lack of Group operational knowledge 
 121 (10 1 2 1 13) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of HQ understanding/Group micro management 
 122 (10 1 2 1 17) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of HQ understanding/Parochial attitudes at HQ 
 123 (10 1 2 1 18) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of HQ understanding/Oversimplistic HQ management 
 124 (10 1 2 3) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of trust 
 125 (10 1 2 3 14) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of trust/Trust missing 
 126 (10 1 2 3 16) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of trust/Tensions not resolved 
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 127 (10 1 2 4) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of local belief in process 
 128 (10 1 2 4 2) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of local belief in process/Lack of communication and selling 
 129 (10 1 2 4 6) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of local belief in process/Lack of local buy-in 
 130 (10 1 2 19) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of fair treatment 
 131 (10 1 2 19 1) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of fair treatment/Unrealistic Group expectations 
 132 (10 1 2 19 3) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of fair treatment/War lords and ethnic cleansing 
 133 (10 1 2 19 4) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of fair treatment/Revenge from HQ 
 134 (10 1 2 19 5) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of fair treatment/Group inaction 
 135 (10 1 2 19 7) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of fair treatment/HQ taking energy of subsidiary 
 136 (10 1 2 19 8) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of fair treatment/Lack of empowerment 
 137 (10 1 2 19 9) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of fair treatment/Integration that never stops 
 138 (10 1 2 19 10) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of fair treatment/Hiding behind the Group label 
 139 (10 1 2 19 12) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of fair treatment/Lack of Group value add 
 140 (10 1 2 19 15) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of fair treatment/Lack of transparency and fairness 
 
 141 (10 1 3) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution 
 142 (10 1 3 1) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Resource conflicts 
 143 (10 1 3 1 2) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Resource conflicts/Goal or resource conflicts 
 144 (10 1 3 1 6) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Resource conflicts/Increased bureaucracy 
 145 (10 1 3 1 9) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Resource conflicts/Lack of prioritisation 
 146 (10 1 3 1 12) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Resource conflicts/Too tight deadlines 
 147 (10 1 3 2) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Weak preparation 
 148 (10 1 3 2 11) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Weak preparation/Poor initial assessment 
 149 (10 1 3 3) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Lack of clear objectives 
 150 (10 1 3 3 3) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Lack of clear objectives/Multiple voices 
 151 (10 1 3 4) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Weak people 
 152 (10 1 3 7) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Pendular swings 
 153 (10 1 3 13) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Weak delivery 
 154 (10 1 3 13 1) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Weak delivery/Feeling like a guinea pig 
 155 (10 1 3 13 5) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Weak delivery/Weak implementation 
 156 (10 1 3 13 10) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Weak delivery/Weak change management 
 
 157 (10 1 4) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived loss of local power 
 158 (10 1 4 1) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived loss of local power/Loss of local power 
 159 (10 1 4 2) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived loss of local power/Finding the balance 
 160 (10 1 4 3) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived loss of local power/Reluctance to change 
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 161 (10 1 5) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Misunderstanding 
 
 162 (10 2) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions 
 163 (10 2 1) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Positive consequences 
 164 (10 2 1 1) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Positive consequences/Getting new perspective 
 165 (10 2 1 2) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Positive consequences/Improvements 
 166 (10 2 3) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences 
 167 (10 2 3 15) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/Business impact 
 168 (10 2 3 15 1) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/Business impact/Resource impact 
 169 (10 2 3 15 1 3) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/Business impact/Resource impact/Wasting time to cover ones ass 
 170 (10 2 3 15 1 4) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/Business impact/Resource impact/Losing good people to Group 
 171 (10 2 3 15 1 8) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/Business impact/Resource impact/Wasting resources 
 172 (10 2 3 15 5) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/Business impact/Losing control of local business 
 173 (10 2 3 15 6) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/Business impact/Customer impact 
 174 (10 2 3 15 6 1) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/Business impact/Customer impact/Neglecting customers 
 175 (10 2 3 15 6 2) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/Business impact/Customer impact/Loss of sales 
 176 (10 2 3 15 6 10) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/Business impact/Customer impact/Losing time to market 
 177 (10 2 3 15 6 14) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/Business impact/Customer impact/Company perceived as out of  
touch 
 178 (10 2 3 15 11) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/Business impact/Crashed implementation 
 179 (10 2 3 16) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/People impact 
 180 (10 2 3 16 4) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/People impact/Cover your ass 
 181 (10 2 3 16 6) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/People impact/Feeling like a fool 
 182 (10 2 3 16 7) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/People impact/Demotivation 
 183 (10 2 3 16 9) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/People impact/Generating scepticism 
 184 (10 2 3 16 12) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/People impact/Personal stress 
 185 (10 2 3 16 13) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/People impact/Missed targets 
 
 186 (10 3) /Tensions/Managing tensions 
 187 (10 3 1) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Gamesmanship 
 188 (10 3 1 1) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Gamesmanship/Passive compliance 
 189 (10 3 1 5) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Gamesmanship/Prioritise local demands 
 190 (10 3 1 6) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Gamesmanship/Economise the truth 
 191 (10 3 1 11) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Gamesmanship/Delay implementation 
 192 (10 3 1 14) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Gamesmanship/Build subsidiary alliances 
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 193 (10 3 2) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Personal approach 
 194 (10 3 2 7) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Personal approach/Serve the one who shouts the loudest 
 195 (10 3 2 8) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Personal approach/Switch off 
 196 (10 3 3) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Get your priorities straight 
 197 (10 3 3 12) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Get your priorities straight/Decide on what matters most 
 198 (10 3 4) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Structure local organisation 
 199 (10 3 4 13) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Structure local organisation/Reprioritise 
 200 (10 3 5) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Group interaction 
 201 (10 3 5 2) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Group interaction/Argue local case 
 202 (10 3 5 3) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Group interaction/Compromise 
 203 (10 3 5 9) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Group interaction/Fight back for prioritisation 
 204 (10 3 5 10) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Group interaction/Escalate 
 205 (10 3 5 15) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Group interaction/Build personal networks 
 206 (10 8) /Tensions/Frequency of Tensions 
 207 (10 9) /Tensions/Areas of Tensions 
 
 
14.9 Re-coded Danish node structure 
 
NVivo revision 2.0.161 Licensee: Andreas 
 
Project: Orange Denmark New User: Administrator Date: 4/1/2006 - 9:30:31 AM  
NODE LISTING 
 
 Nodes in Set: All Tree Nodes 
 Created: 3/31/2006 - 11:24:19 AM 
 Modified: 3/31/2006 - 11:24:19 AM 
 Number of Nodes: 146 
 
 1 (1) /Integration 
 2 (1 1) /Integration/Context Factors 
 3 (1 1 4) /Integration/Context Factors/Subsidiary strength 
 4 (1 1 5) /Integration/Context Factors/Relative size of subsidiary budget 
 5 (1 1 6) /Integration/Context Factors/Restructuring 
 6 (1 1 7) /Integration/Context Factors/Geographical complexity 
 7 (1 1 8) /Integration/Context Factors/Different legacy 
 8 (1 1 9) /Integration/Context Factors/Expatriate at top 
 9 (1 1 10) /Integration/Context Factors/Transition period 
 10 (1 1 11) /Integration/Context Factors/Different cultures 
 11 (1 1 12) /Integration/Context Factors/Long term future of business 
 12 (1 1 13) /Integration/Context Factors/Subsidiary market position 
 
 13 (1 5) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions 
 14 (1 5 1) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Interaction 
 15 (1 5 1 14) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Interaction/Be clear integration will happen 
 16 (1 5 1 18) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Interaction/Selling approach 
 17 (1 5 2) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Strategy 
 18 (1 5 2 1) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Strategy/Modular approach 
 19 (1 5 2 2) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Strategy/Agree funding up front 
 20 (1 5 2 3) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Strategy/Customer facing functions 
 21 (1 5 2 13) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Strategy/Work towards a clear vision 
 22 (1 5 2 21) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Strategy/Focus on what matters most 
 23 (1 5 2 25) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/Strategy/Find the right balance 
 24 (1 5 3) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/People 
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 25 (1 5 3 1) /Integration/How to Make Integration Decisions/People/Get the right people 
 26 (1 6) /Integration/Implementing Integration 
 27 (1 6 1) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Structure 
 28 (1 6 1 1) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Structure/Align subsidiary structures 
 29 (1 6 1 2) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Structure/Controlled subsidiaries 
 30 (1 6 3) /Integration/Implementing Integration/People 
 31 (1 6 3 1) /Integration/Implementing Integration/People/Strong people 
 32 (1 6 3 3) /Integration/Implementing Integration/People/Global mindset 
 33 (1 6 3 4) /Integration/Implementing Integration/People/Review people profiles required 
 34 (1 6 14) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Objectives and resources 
 35 (1 6 14 10) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Objectives and resources/Ensure local resources 
 36 (1 6 14 12) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Objectives and resources/Implement in stages 
 37 (1 6 20) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Delivery management 
 38 (1 6 20 5) /Integration/Implementing Integration/Delivery management/Strong delivery management 
 
 39 (10) /Tensions 
 40 (10 1) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions 
 41 (10 1 1) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit 
 42 (10 1 1 3) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Negative or marginal local benefits 
 43 (10 1 1 3 4) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Negative or marginal local benefits/Group focused on niche areas 
 44 (10 1 1 3 6) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Negative or marginal local benefits/Marginal benefits 
 45 (10 1 1 3 8) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Negative or marginal local benefits/Negative results 
 46 (10 1 1 5) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Different strategy and positioning 
 47 (10 1 1 5 3) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Different strategy and positioning/Different market position 
 48 (10 1 1 12) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Underlying market differences 
 49 (10 1 1 12 1) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Underlying market differences/Different regulation 
 50 (10 1 1 12 3) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Underlying market differences/Fit with local competitive situation 
 51 (10 1 1 12 7) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Underlying market differences/General market differences 
 52 (10 1 1 12 10) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived misfit/Underlying market differences/Cultural differences 
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53 (10 1 2) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice 
 54 (10 1 2 1) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of HQ understanding 
 55 (10 1 2 1 1) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of HQ understanding/HQ refusing to listen 
 56 (10 1 2 1 11) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of HQ understanding/Lack of Group operational knowledge 
 57 (10 1 2 1 17) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of HQ understanding/Parochial attitudes at HQ 
 58 (10 1 2 1 18) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of HQ understanding/Oversimplistic HQ management 
 59 (10 1 2 3) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of trust 
 60 (10 1 2 3 14) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of trust/Trust missing 
 61 (10 1 2 4) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of local belief in process 
 62 (10 1 2 4 2) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of local belief in process/Lack of communication and selling 
 63 (10 1 2 4 6) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of local belief in process/Lack of local buy-in 
 64 (10 1 2 19) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of fair treatment 
 65 (10 1 2 19 1) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of fair treatment/Unrealistic Group expectations 
 66 (10 1 2 19 3) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of fair treatment/War lords and ethnic cleansing 
 67 (10 1 2 19 15) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived lack of justice/Lack of fair treatment/Lack of transparency and fairness 
 
 68 (10 1 3) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution 
 69 (10 1 3 1) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Resource conflicts 
 70 (10 1 3 1 2) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Resource conflicts/Goal or resource conflicts 
 71 (10 1 3 1 6) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Resource conflicts/Increased bureaucracy 
 72 (10 1 3 1 9) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Resource conflicts/Lack of prioritisation 
 73 (10 1 3 2) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Weak preparation 
 74 (10 1 3 2 11) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Weak preparation/Poor initial assessment 
 75 (10 1 3 3) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Unclear roles and responsibilities 
 76 (10 1 3 4) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Weak people 
 77 (10 1 3 6) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Weak process 
 78 (10 1 3 7) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Pendular swings 
 79 (10 1 3 8) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Lack of clear objectives and rules 
 80 (10 1 3 8 2) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Lack of clear objectives and rules/Unclear rules of the game 
 81 (10 1 3 8 3) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Lack of clear objectives and rules/Multiple voices 
 82 (10 1 3 8 5) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Lack of clear objectives and rules/Unclear strategy and objectives 
 83 (10 1 3 8 7) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Lack of clear objectives and rules/Lack of visibility and overview 
 84 (10 1 3 13) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Weak delivery 
 85 (10 1 3 13 2) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Weak delivery/Group non delivery 
 86 (10 1 3 13 5) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived weak execution/Weak delivery/Weak implementation 
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 87 (10 1 4) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived loss of local power 
 88 (10 1 4 1) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived loss of local power/Loss of local power 
 89 (10 1 4 3) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Perceived loss of local power/Reluctance to change 
 
 90 (10 1 5) /Tensions/Causes of Tensions/Misunderstanding 
 
 91 (10 2) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions 
 92 (10 2 1) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Positive consequences 
 93 (10 2 1 1) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Positive consequences/Getting new perspective 
 94 (10 2 1 3) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Positive consequences/Knowledge sharing 
 95 (10 2 3) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences 
 96 (10 2 3 15) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/Business impact 
 97 (10 2 3 15 1) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/Business impact/Resource impact 
 98 (10 2 3 15 1 8) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/Business impact/Resource impact/Wasting resources 
 99 (10 2 3 15 2) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/Business impact/Suboptimal strategy 
 100 (10 2 3 15 3) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/Business impact/Taking a lot of time 
 101 (10 2 3 15 6) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/Business impact/Customer impact 
 102 (10 2 3 15 6 10) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/Business impact/Customer impact/Losing time to market 
 103 (10 2 3 16) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/People impact 
 104 (10 2 3 16 1) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/People impact/Frustration 
 105 (10 2 3 16 7) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/People impact/Demotivation 
 106 (10 2 3 16 9) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Negative consequences/People impact/Generating scepticism 
 107 (10 2 5) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Other 
 108 (10 2 5 2) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Other/Enacting the transnational 
 109 (10 2 5 4) /Tensions/Consequences of Tensions/Other/Needed to break guidelines 
 
 110 (10 3) /Tensions/Managing tensions 
 111 (10 3 1) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Gamesmanship 
 112 (10 3 1 5) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Gamesmanship/Ask for forgiveness 
 113 (10 3 1 7) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Gamesmanship/Prioritise local demands 
 114 (10 3 1 12) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Gamesmanship/Create confusion 
 115 (10 3 1 16) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Gamesmanship/Passive compliance 
 116 (10 3 1 19) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Gamesmanship/Claim already have it 
 117 (10 3 1 20) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Gamesmanship/Over embrace some initiatives 
 118 (10 3 1 21) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Gamesmanship/Make deliverables contingent on group 
 119 (10 3 1 22) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Gamesmanship/Break guidelines 
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 120 (10 3 1 30) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Gamesmanship/Build subsidiary alliances 
 121 (10 3 1 31) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Gamesmanship/Comply on paper 
 122 (10 3 1 32) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Gamesmanship/Delay implementation 
 123 (10 3 2) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Structure local organisation 
 124 (10 3 2 6) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Structure local organisation/Create consolidated roadmap 
 125 (10 3 2 8) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Structure local organisation/Ensure united management team 
 126 (10 3 2 9) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Structure local organisation/Streamline interfaces 
 127 (10 3 2 10) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Structure local organisation/Internal negotiations 
 128 (10 3 2 23) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Structure local organisation/Reprioritise 
 129 (10 3 3) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Get your priorities straight 
 130 (10 3 3 14) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Get your priorities straight/Decide who you work for 
 131 (10 3 3 24) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Get your priorities straight/Decide on what matters most 
 132 (10 3 5) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Group interaction 
 133 (10 3 5 3) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Group interaction/Signal compliance 
 134 (10 3 5 11) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Group interaction/Understand the political landscape 
 135 (10 3 5 13) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Group interaction/Get the right targets up front 
 136 (10 3 5 15) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Group interaction/Build personal networks 
 137 (10 3 5 18) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Group interaction/Be honest and straight with Group 
 138 (10 3 5 25) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Group interaction/Request additional resources 
 139 (10 3 5 26) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Group interaction/Argue local case 
 140 (10 3 5 27) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Group interaction/Compromise 
 141 (10 3 5 28) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Group interaction/Fight back for prioritisation 
 142 (10 3 5 29) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Group interaction/Escalation 
 143 (10 3 6) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Influence rules of the game 
 144 (10 3 6 1) /Tensions/Managing tensions/Influence rules of the game/Influence rules of the game 
 
 145 (10 8) /Tensions/Frequency of Tensions 
 
 146 (10 9) /Tensions/Areas of Tensions 
 
 
14.10 Combined node structure for all five cases 
 
Node Summary Report 
 
Project:  PhD Combined 
 
Generated:  12/02/2007 15:38 
 
Integration 
Integration\Affected Business Areas 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Interrelationship 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Interrelationship\Link between outside and inside 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Interrelationship\Treated separately 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Mix Elements 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Mix Elements\Advertising 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Mix Elements\Brand 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Mix Elements\Customer service 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Mix Elements\Network 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Mix Elements\Offer structure 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Mix Elements\Packaging 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Mix Elements\Pricing 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Mix Elements\Products and services 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Mix Elements\Promotions 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Mix Elements\Sales and distribution 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Mix Elements\Web 
 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Value Chain 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Value Chain\Administration 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Value Chain\Customer service 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Value Chain\Finance 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Value Chain\HR 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Value Chain\Logistics 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Value Chain\Marketing 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Value Chain\Network and IT 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Value Chain\Procurement 
Integration\Affected Business Areas\Value Chain\Sales 
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Integration\Context Factors 
Integration\Context Factors\Championed by junior people 
Integration\Context Factors\Clearly valuable projects 
Integration\Context Factors\Different cultures 
Integration\Context Factors\Expatriate at top 
Integration\Context Factors\Long term future of business 
Integration\Context Factors\Service Industry 
Integration\Context Factors\Subsidiary market position 
Integration\Context Factors\Subsidiary strength and size 
Integration\Context Factors\Transition period 
 
Integration\How Integration Decisions Are Actually Made 
Integration\How Integration Decisions Are Actually Made\How decisions are made 
Integration\How Integration Decisions Are Actually Made\Who is making decisions 
 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Analysis 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Analysis\Analyse and benchmark local operations 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Analysis\Analyse customer needs 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Analysis\Analyse market development stage 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Analysis\Analyse market similarities 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Analysis\Avoid Not Invented Here localisation 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Analysis\Make proper initial assessment 
 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Interaction 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Interaction\Be clear integration will happen 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Interaction\Consultation and selling 
 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\People 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\People\Build local market knowledge at HQ 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\People\Ensure operational people in process 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\People\Get the right people 
 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Strategy 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Strategy\Agree funding up front 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Strategy\Align objectives 
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Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Strategy\Be clear on integration benefits 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Strategy\Cluster similar countries 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Strategy\Customer facing functions 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Strategy\Define brand position 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Strategy\Define minimum core 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Strategy\Find the right balance 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Strategy\Focus on common segments 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Strategy\Focus on what matters most 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Strategy\Modular approach 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Strategy\Offer differences determine integration 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Strategy\Principles rather than exact content 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Strategy\Standardise IT systems 
Integration\How to Make Integration Decisions\Strategy\Work towards a clear vision 
 
Integration\Implementing Integration 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Delivery management 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Delivery management\Don't skip phases 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Delivery management\Ensure consistency 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Delivery management\Involve key stakeholders 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Delivery management\Stick to the minimum core 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Delivery management\Strong delivery management 
 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Freedom within guidelines 
 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Integration though independence first 
 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Interaction 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Interaction\Accept mistakes to learn 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Interaction\Build trust 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Interaction\Don't suffocate entrepreneurship 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Interaction\HQ follow-up 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Interaction\People interaction rather than bureaucracy 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Interaction\Strong communication 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Interaction\Use subsidiary feedback loop 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Interaction\Use subtle control mechanisms 
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Integration\Implementing Integration\Objectives and resources 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Objectives and resources\Avoid too many swings 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Objectives and resources\Dedicated working group 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Objectives and resources\Ensure local prioritisation 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Objectives and resources\Ensure local resources 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Objectives and resources\Implement in stages 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Objectives and resources\Measure at operational level 
 
Integration\Implementing Integration\People 
Integration\Implementing Integration\People\Acknowledge integration contributions 
Integration\Implementing Integration\People\Cultural integration 
Integration\Implementing Integration\People\Engage people 
Integration\Implementing Integration\People\Get new people without legacy 
Integration\Implementing Integration\People\Global mindset 
Integration\Implementing Integration\People\Hand-on leadership 
Integration\Implementing Integration\People\Move people around 
Integration\Implementing Integration\People\Replace blockers 
Integration\Implementing Integration\People\Review people profiles required 
Integration\Implementing Integration\People\Share ways of working 
Integration\Implementing Integration\People\Strong people 
Integration\Implementing Integration\People\Top management commitment 
Integration\Implementing Integration\People\Treat people well 
 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Prevent unnecessary drift 
 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Structure 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Structure\Align business processes 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Structure\Align subsidiary structures 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Structure\Controlled subsidiaries 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Structure\Create global operating model 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Structure\De-layer HQ 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Structure\Establish governance 
Integration\Implementing Integration\Structure\Knowledge sharing structure 
 
Integration\Integration Rationale 
Integration\Integration Rationale\Cost reduction 
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Integration\Integration Rationale\HQ control 
Integration\Integration Rationale\Leverage combined scale 
Integration\Integration Rationale\Market positioning advantage 
Integration\Integration Rationale\Market positioning advantage\Promote Western image 
Integration\Integration Rationale\Market positioning advantage\Selling to corporate customers 
Integration\Integration Rationale\Market positioning advantage\Standardised customer experience 
Integration\Integration Rationale\Market positioning advantage\Sustain global position 
Integration\Integration Rationale\Share best practice 
Integration\Integration Rationale\Strategic-defensive 
 
Tensions 
Tensions\Areas of Tensions 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions 
 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Cultural differences 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Cultural differences\Cultural interaction style 
 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\HQ micro management 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Lack of fair treatment 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Lack of fair treatment\Disrespectful style 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Lack of fair treatment\Group inaction 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Lack of fair treatment\HQ doesn't care about subsidiary 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Lack of fair treatment\HQ not explaining rationale 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Lack of fair treatment\Integration that never stops 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Lack of fair treatment\Lack of transparency and fairness 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Lack of fair treatment\Unrealistic Group expectations 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Lack of fair treatment\War lords and ethnic cleansing 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Lack of governance 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Lack of HQ understanding 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Lack of HQ understanding\HQ lack of country and market knowledge 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Lack of HQ understanding\HQ refusing to listen 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Lack of HQ understanding\Lack of Group operational knowledge 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Lack of HQ understanding\Oversimplistic HQ management 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Lack of HQ understanding\Parochial attitudes at HQ 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Lack of selling and buy-in 
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Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Lack of trust 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Perceived inequity 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Perceived inequity\Lack of representation 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Perceived inequity\Unfair balance between parties 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived lack of fair process\Perceived inequity\Unfair resource allocation 
 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived loss of local autonomy 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived loss of local autonomy\Loss of local autonomy 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived loss of local autonomy\Reluctance to change 
 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived misfit 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived misfit\Different strategy and positioning 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived misfit\Misfit of integration partner 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived misfit\Negative or marginal local benefits 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived misfit\Underlying market differences\Changing market conditions 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived misfit\Underlying market differences\Cultural differences 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived misfit\Underlying market differences\Different regulation 
Tensions\Causes of Tensions\Perceived misfit\Underlying market differences\Fit with local competitive situation 
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